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THEJUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEFJUDGE
STEPHANIE K SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan in 1940. She was graduated magna
cum laude from Smith College in 1962, and
from Harvard Law School in 1965. After
graduating from law school,Judge Seymour
practiced law in Boston, Massachusetts from
1965 until 1966, in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1967
and in Houston, Texas from 1968 until 1969.
From 1971 to 1979 she practiced with the Tulsa
law firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel
& Anderson. In 1979, she was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa and
the American and Oklahoma County Bar
Associations. Additionally, Judge Seymour
served as a bar examiner from 1973 through
1979; she served on the United StatesJudi-
cial Conference Committee on Defender
Services, 1985-87, and as chair, 1987-90.
JUDGEJOHNJ. PORFILIO
Judge Porfilio was born in Denver, Colo-
rado in 1934. He received his B.A. from the
University of Denver in 1956 and received
his LL.B. from the University of Denver Col-
lege of Law in 1959.Judge Porfilio then prac-
ticed law with the Denver firm of Carbone &
Walsmith until 1962. From 1962 until 1975,
he worked in the Colorado Attorney
General's Office. Specifically,Judge Porfilio
served as Assistant Attorney General from
1962 until 1967, as Deputy Attorney General
from 1967 to 1972, and as Attorney General
for the State of Colorado from 1972 until 1975.
InJanuary, 1975,Judge Porfilio was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Porfilio was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from 1949
to 1951, and Brigham Young University from
1955 to 1956 when he graduated. Judge
Anderson then attended the University of
Utah College of Law where he received his
LL.B. degree in 1960. He was Editor in Chief
of the Utah Law Review, Order of the Coif,
and Phi Kappa Phi. He then served as a trial
attorney in the tax division of the United
States Department ofJustice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined the
law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in Salt
Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he practiced
until he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen states,
and in the United States Supreme Court. He
has served as President and Commissioner
of the Utah State Bar. Additionally, Judge
Anderson has been a member of the Utah
Judicial Counsel and the UtahJudicial Con-
duct Commission, and he has served as
Chairman of the Utah Law andJustice Cen-
ter Committee.Judge Anderson's civic activi-
ties include lectures at the University of Utah
College of Law, member of the Executive
Committee of the Salt Lake Area Chamber
of Commerce, and director of numerous cor-
porations. He is a Master of the Bench,
American Inn of Court Number VII.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia, Kan-
sas. She received her B.A. in American Stud-
ies from the University of Kansas in 1968 and
was a member of Mortar Board and Phi Beta
Kappa.Judge Tacha then attended law school
and received herJ.D. from the University of
Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House Fellow,Judge Tacha was sent on offi-
cial trips to southeast Asia, east and central
Africa, and the European Economic Com-
munity. After her fellowship,Judge Tacha was
an associate with the law firm of Hogan and
Hartson in Washington, D.C. In 1973, she re-
turned to Kansas and entered private prac-
tice in Concordia, Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the fac-
ulty of the University of Kansas Law School
in 1974. In 1979, she became associate Vice
Chancellor of Academic Affairs, and in 1981,
she became the Vice Chancellor for Aca-
demic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in 1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky, Okla-
homa, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.Judge
Baldock attended the New Mexico Military
Institute, where he graduated in 1956. He
received hisJ.D. from the University of Ari-
zona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of Sand-
ers, Bruin & Baldock, PA. In 1983, he be-
came a federal district judge in Albuquerque,
New Mexico and was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1985. In 1988,Judge Baldock re-
ceived an OutstandingJudge Award from the
State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934 in
Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in Upton
and Newcastle, Wyoming.Judge Brorby at-
tended the University of Wyoming and re-
ceived a B.S. in Business. He graduated with
a J.D. with Honor from the University of
Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United States
Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He engaged in
the private practice of law in Gillette, Wyo-
ming from 1961 to 1988.Judge Brorby was
appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in 1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
WyomingJudicial Supervisory Commission.
He has served on numerous Bar committees.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kansas
in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas. He
received his B.A. in economics from North-
western University in 1962 and received his
J.D. from the University of Michigan Law
School in 1965, where he graduated first in
his class. While at the University of Michi-
gan Law School, he was elected to the Order
of Coif, the Barrister Society, and he was
Editor-in- Chief of the Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked forJustice Byron
R. White of the United States Supreme Court
during the 1965-66 term. From 1966 until
1988, he practiced as a trial lawyer with the
Denver law firm of Davis, Graham & Stubbs.
In 1988, Judge Ebel was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit
Judge Ebel's civic activities include teach-
ing Corporations as an adjunct professor at
the University of Denver College of Law,
teaching Professionalism and Ethics at Duke
University School of Law, teaching
the confirmation class at the St.James Pres-
byterian Church and participating in numer-
ous Bar Association activities. He has served
as vice-president of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation and is a fellow of the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers, a senior judge of the
Doyle Inns of Court, and a member of the
Town & Gown Society.
JUDGE PAULJ. KELLY
Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr. was born in
Freeport, New York, in 1940. He received a
B.B.A. in Economics and Finance from the
University of Notre Dame in 1963 and his
J.D. from Fordham University School of Law
in 1967
From 1968 to 1992,Judge Kelly engaged
in a general litigation practice with the New
Mexico law firm of Hinkle, Cox, Eaton,
Coffield & Hensley. Judge Kelly served in
the New Mexico House of Representatives
from 1977 to 1981.
Currently, Judge Kelly is a member of
the Board of Visitors of the Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law and serves as President
of the Northern New Mexico American Inn
of Court.Judge Kelly has been active in vari-
ous Bar activities. He has served on a New
Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, the New
Mexico AppellateJudges' Nominating Com-
mission, as a reviewing officer and Hearing
Committee chair for the Disciplinary Board
of New Mexico Supreme Court, as a mem-
ber of the New Mexico Public Defender
Board, the New Mexico State Personnel
Board and as President of the Chaves County
Bar Association.Judge Kelly was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1992.
JUDGE ROBERT H. HENRY
Judge Henry was born in Shawnee,
Oklahoma on April 3, 1953. He received his
B.A. in Political Science in 1974 and hisJ.D.
in 1977, both from the University of Okla-
homa.
After graduating from law school,Judge
Henry opened a private law practice in
Shawnee and served in the Oklahoma House
of Representatives for five terms. In 1986, at
the age of thirty-three, he was elected Okla-
homa Attorney General, running unopposed
for re-election in 1990. In 1991, he became
Dean of the Oklahoma City University
School of Law, where he taught in the areas
of state and local government law and legis-
lation.
Judge Henry served on numerous com-
mittees of the National Association of Attor-
neys General, including the Supreme Court
Committee, which he chaired, and the State
Constitutional Law Advisory Board. He is an
American Bar Foundation Fellow, a Commis-
sioner for Oklahoma on the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and a member of the American Law
Institute. Judge Henry has also served on
numerous civic and educational boards in-
cluding the Oklahoma Nature Conservancy,
the Board of Visitors of the University of
Oklahoma Press, and the Western History
Collection of the University of Oklahoma. He
has received the Conservationist of the Year
Award from the Oklahoma Wildlife Federa-
tion, the Human Rights Award from the
Oklahoma Human Rights Commission, and
is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.
Judge Henry was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in 1994.
JUDGE CARLOS F LUCERO
Judge Lucero was born in Antonito,
Colorado in 1940. He received his B.A. from
Adams State College and his J.D. from
George Washington University. In 1995, he
was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Lucero clerked forJudge William
E. Doyle of the District Court of Colorado
for the 1964-1965 term. Prior to his clerk-
ship, he was a staff aide for the United States
SenateJudiciary Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure. He entered
private practice in Alamosa, Colorado where
he became a senior partner in the law firm of
Lucero, Lester and Sigmund.
While in private practiceJudge Lucero
served on the Colorado Supreme Court
Board of Law Examiners, the ABA Action
Commission to Reduce Court Cost and De-
lay, the advisory board to the ABAJournal,
the ABA Committee on the Availability of
Legal Services, and the CBA Ethics Commit-
tee. He also served on President Carter's
Presidential Panel on Western State Water
Policy, the Board of Directors of Colorado
Rural Legal Services, the Colorado Histori-
cal Society and the Santa Fe Opera Associa-
tion of New Mexico. In addition, he was




Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brigham
Young University in 1957 with high honors.
Judge McKay then received hisJ.D. from the
University of Chicago in 1960 and was the
law clerk forJusticeJesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court for the 1960-61 term.
From 1961 to 1974, Judge McKay practiced
with the law firm of Lewis and Roca in Phoe-
nix, Arizona; however, he did take a two year
leave to serve as Director of the United States
Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa.Judge McKay
was a law professor at Brigham Young Uni-
versity from 1974 until 1977 In 1977, he was
appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge McKay
currently resides in Provo, Utah.
SENIORJUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. He served as Chief
Judge from 1977 until 1984. In 1984,Judge
Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as director of the
Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of the Le-
gal Committee of the New Mexico
Cattlegrowers' Association, Regent of the
Museum of New Mexico and as a director of
the Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIORJUDGE
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to Okla-
homa City in 1927. During World War I, he
served as a First Lieutenant in the Army. Af-
ter the war,Judge Holloway returned to com-
plete his undergraduate studies at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in
1947.Judge Holloway then attended Harvard
Law School, where he graduated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1968 and became Chief
Judge in 1984. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
SENIORJUDGE
ROBERT H. McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in 1927
where he has lived since. He received his A.B.
and LL.B. degrees from the University of
Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an Honor-
ary Doctor of Law degree from the Univer-
sity.
During World War II,Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney and as
a Colorado District Court Judge. In 1961,
Judge McWilliams was elected to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court where he served until
he was appointed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1970. In
1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIORJUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late Frank
A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's Con-
gressman, Governor and United States Sena-
tor.Judge Barrett attended the University of
Wyoming for two years prior to his service
in the Army during World War II. Following
the war, he attended Saint Catherine's Col-
lege at Oxford University and Catholic Uni-
versity of America and received his LL.B.
from the University of Wyoming Law School
in 1949. In 1973, he received the Distin-
guished Alumni Award from the University
of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for the
towns of Lusk and Manville and attorney for
the Niobrara County Consolidated School
District. From 1967 until 1971,Judge Barrett
served as Attorney General for the State of
Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. In 1987, he assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of theJudi-
cial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court of Review, and




Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huximan and subsequently practiced with the
Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher.Judge Logan became a professor
at the University of Kansas Law School in
1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean of that
school. He served in that capacity until 1968.
Since 1961,Judge Logan has been a visiting
professor at Harvard Law School, the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School, Stanford Uni-
versity School of Law, and the University of
Michigan Law School. He lectures at Duke
University Law School. He was a special com-
missioner for the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas from 1964 until 1967
and was a candidate for the United States
Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored books
and numerous articles on estate planning,
administration and corporate law. In 1977, he
was appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR
This year I am excited to announce the formation of a new committee
designed to assist the Law Review Editorial Board. The Denver University Law
Review Alumni Advisory Board is comprised of alumni members of the Law
Review. We thank the following members of the legal community who volun-





















In addition to traditional Survey topics, this edition of the Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey contains two special features. First, a dialogue on judicial
recusal between members of the Law Review and several Tenth Circuit judges
follows the Survey on Professional Responsibility. It is my hope that this dis-
cussion provides the Tenth Circuit practitioner with a judicial perspective on
recusal.
This Survey Edition also includes a detailed examination of the United
States Supreme Court's controversial affirmative action decision in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.' In Adarand, the Court abruptly departed from the
previous standard by mandating strict scrutiny review of federal affirmative
action programs. In recognition of the fact that this significant case originated
in the Tenth Circuit, a review of Adarand begins this edition.
Kerri M. Pertcheck, Editor
THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL TENTH CIRCUIT SURVEY
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).

RAISE HIGH THE ROOF BEAM:
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA
AND THE
NEW LEVEL OF SCRUTINY FOR FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently.'
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court reviewed a significant Tenth Circuit decision during
the 1994-95 survey period: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.2 Adarand ad-
dressed the issue of affirmative action;3 specifically, the level of scrutiny ap-
propriate for evaluating federal race-based programs. The Supreme Court va-
cated the Tenth Circuit's decision in Adarand and held that all racial classifi-
cations, whether imposed by federal, state, or local government, should be
subject to "strict scrutiny."4 This standard applies even if the program in ques-
tion has a benign purpose' and requires that all government affirmative action
programs' be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.,
The Adarand Court, however, failed to provide firm direction as to what
measures government entities should take in order to serve these interests.
This article traces the development of affirmative action jurisprudence and
attempts to provide guidance for practitioners litigating government affirmative
1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment, and dissenting in part).
2. 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
3. Affirmative action programs are rooted in the assumption that employers hire workers
and contract for jobs within a framework reflecting long-standing patterns of discrimination and
prejudice. To correct the resulting imbalances, employers must consider race or sex by endeavor-
ing to hire and retain workers from groups which have suffered from past discrimination. Affirma-
tive action programs are necessary in public contracting to assure that contracts are awarded to
deserving parties, not merely favored ones. EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES & SAN FRANCISCO
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR URBAN AFFAIRS, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HANDBOOK: HOW TO
START AND DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 1 (Judith Kurtz et al. eds., 1992) [hereinaf-
ter THE HANDBOOK].
4. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
5. See id. In the context of affirmative action, a "benign" purpose refers to a remedial goal,
such as attempting to remedy the effects of past discrimination, or to a non-remedial goal, where
role models are provided for minorities, or to promote diversity. Id.
6. The law surrounding affirmative action distinguishes between programs for private enti-
ties and those implemented by government. The Adarand decision applies only to government
employment. Courts require stricter standards for government employers than for private ones;
however, private entities still need to follow guidelines in enacting an affirmative action plan. For
practical guidance in this realm, see THE HANDBOOK, supra note 3; JAMES WALSH, MASTERING
DIVERSITY: MANAGING FOR SUCCESS UNDER ADA & OTHER ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1995).
7. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
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action claims or advising government employers who wish to institute a per-
missible affirmative action plan in the wake of Adarand.
I. VOLUNTARY GOVERNMENTAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS'
The Supreme Court's struggle with the heated topic of affirmative action9
is apparent in the many plurality and majority opinions on this issue, which
reflect a chronic lack of consensus within the Court. The Adarand decision
represents a drastic change in the Court's treatment of affirmative action
law.'" In Adarand, the Court mandated that all racial classifications, whether
imposed by federal, state, or local government, be analyzed under a strict scru-
tiny standard." The ramifications of the decision are not yet clear. However,
because all race-conscious programs must now serve a compelling governmen-
tal need, Adarand threatens to extinguish all but the most narrowly and care-
fully crafted race-based state and federal affirmative action programs. 2
A. The Pre-Adarand History of Affirmative Action
The Court first treated the issue of affirmative action in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. 3 Bakke involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to a state-run medical school's policy of reserving a certain number of
spaces in the enrolling class for minority applicants.' 4 Allan Bakke, a white
8. Affirmative action law is divided into two sectors: court-ordered and voluntary. This
article deals solely with voluntary plans. It should be noted that affirmative action is distinct from
a quota system, for which it is often mistaken. Quota programs reserve a set number or percentage
of positions for individuals in specific groups. The quota will be met whether or not the applicants
are properly qualified. Individuals who are not a member of a specific group are ineligible to
compete for reserved positions. Affirmative action plans, on the other hand, do not preclude any
individual from competing for a position, but instead seek to increase the number of minority ap-
plicants through recruitment and outreach programs. These programs seek to ensure that all quali-
fied job applicants are aware of employment possibilities. THE HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.
9. The issue of affirmative action compels a strong emotional response in many. For view-
points critical of affirmative action, see Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and
Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Martin
Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-Defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the
Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627 (1985). For those speaking in
favor of affirmative action, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991); Frances L. Ansley, A Civil Rights Agenda for the Year 2000: Con-
fessions of An Identity Politician, 59 TENN. L. REV. 593 (1992); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court
1975 Term, Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976);
John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Ctu. L. REV. 723
(1974).
10. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
11. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
12. Despite Justice O'Connor's contention in Adarand that the Court wished to dispel the
perception of strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact," strict scrutiny is a formidable
obstacle. Id. at 2117. The last time that a majority of the Court upheld a race-based classification
under strict scrutiny was in 1944, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In that
decision, the Court voted 6-3 to uphold an executive order, borne of a fear of sabotage, to tempo-
rarily exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas. Id. at 215-24.
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281. The admissions committee designated 16 places out of 100 for
which only minority applicants could be eligible. Id. at 275-76.
[Vol. 73:3
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male twice rejected by the University of California at Davis Medical School,
alleged that he would have been admitted to the school under the special
standards for minority admissions." Justice Powell, writing for a plurality,
ordered Bakke's admission to the program. 6 He rejected the university's con-
tention that discrimination against a white majority cannot be viewed as such
if it is remedial in nature. 7 He noted that classifications granting benefits on
the basis of race would instill resentment in the individuals "burdened,"' 8 and
stressed the "inherent unfairness" of depriving "innocent persons of equal
rights and opportunities."' 9 The Court, however, also ruled that race could be
a factor in the admissions process." While emphasizing that a diverse student
15. The university had a separate admissions committee largely composed of members of
minority groups. Id. at 274. If, in 1973, an applicant answered "yes" to questions indicating that
he wished to be considered "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged," or, in 1974, that
he wished to be considered as a member of a minority group, the application was sent to a special
admissions committee. Id. at 274-75. At this point, the application was screened to determine the
validity of the claim. Id. If the applicant was eligible for the special admissions program, he was
rated by a similar standard to the general admissions program, except that the grades of the special
applicants were not required to meet the general applicants' 2.5 grade point average cutoff. Id. at
275. The special committee presented its top candidates to the general committee until the number
of minority applicants that the faculty had agreed would be accepted were admitted. Id. at 274-75.
During the two years for which Bakke was denied admission to the medical school, minority
applicants were admitted who had significantly lower grades or Board scores than Bakke. Id. at
277.
16. Id. at 320.
17. Id. at 294. In so holding, Justice Powell first articulated a theme which would run
through later cases and prove pivotal in Adarand: that affirmative action programs, although be-
nign in purpose, have the impact of exacting discrimination against whites and must, therefore, be
subject to the same standards as classifications imposing traditional discrimination.
18. Id. at 295 n.34.
19. Id. Bakke makes apparent the concept of white "entitlement." Many commentators have
perceived this notion and its ramifications regarding affirmative action programs. As one
commentator critically commented, "Any remedy for past discrimination must not be too costly to
whites. So-called 'innocent' whites may not be made to pay the penalty for past injustices." Rich-
ard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1993). For another analysis of the concept of white "entitlement" in
Bakke and other decisions, see D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the
Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 486 (1993) (stating that the constitutional question in Bakke was
merely a ruse to strip minorities and their advocates of both the medical school's affirmative ac-
tion program and the true concept of affirmative action by redefining it to mean reverse discrimi-
nation); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1767 (1993)
(noting the irony of the Court's use of the Equal Protection Clause to protect benefits for whites
with an eye toward their "established expectations," despite the Clause's original purpose: to se-
cure equality for African-Americans and renounce race-based and race-conscious measures as
unconstitutional).
20. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296 n.36. The Court stated that race or ethnic background could be
"deemed a 'plus"' in the applicant's file, just as would any other traditional factors such as "ex-
ceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential" or "a life spent
on a farm." Id. at 316-17. One commentator stated:
Justice Powell here was deeply wrong; the daily experience of being a member of a
stigmatized minority is not equivalent to a summer job or an ability to play the pi-
ano .... Justice Powell reduced race to a plus factor in order to make it "fit in" with
the existing decision-making procedures of the university. Race is brought down to the
level of work experience because that is a level with which the institution is familiar;
race consciousness is only acceptable if it can be envisioned as a normal "factor" akin to
those used in the usual institutional procedures.
Adam Winkler, Sounds of Silence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 923, 942-43 (1995).
1996]
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body was a sufficiently compelling goal for an institution of higher learn-
ing,2 the Court objected to the strict allotment of spaces by race.2 Notably,
the Court also found that remedying the disabling effects of identified prior
discrimination was a fitting justification for an affirmative action program, de-
spite the fact that the university did not present this argument.23
Two years after the Bakke decision, the Court revisited the issue of race-
based classifications in Fullilove v. Klutznick.24 Unlike Bakke, Fullilove in-
volved a federal program; namely, the "Minority Business Enterprise" (MBE)
provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. In Fullilove, an
association of construction contractors and subcontractors instituted an action
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the MBE.25 Writ-
ing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger upheld the provision as an exercise
of Congress's spending power 6 and commerce power.27 The Court held that
"in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more com-
prehensive remedial power than in the Congress."28
The Fullilove Court found that the MBE program was "narrowly tailored"
to accomplish Congress's goal of remedying past discrimination in public
works projects.29 Chief Justice Burger explicitly declined to apply a labeled
standard of review, saying instead that racial classifications must receive a
"most searching examination."3 ° He further noted that while the Court did not
adopt the standards from Bakke, the provision in question would survive re-
view under either test discussed in Bakke.3'
21. The Court in Bakke recognized diversity as a "compelling goal," despite the fact that it
did not uphold the program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12, 314.
22. See id. at 311. The university attempted to distinguish their "special admissions" pro-
gram from a quota system by saying that no true number was set for minority acceptees. Id. at
288. The university asserted that it would not accept an unqualified applicant merely to meet a
quota, nor would it cap the number of minority students by limiting the number admitted under
general admission standards. Id. at 288 n.26. The Court called the distinction "semantic," stating
that whether termed a goal or quota, the program still amounted to a line drawn on the basis of
race or ethnicity. Id. at 289.
23. Id. at 307. The Court emphasized that racial and ethnic classifications must be "precisely
tailored to serve a compelling government interest," the exact definition of strict scrutiny. Id. at
299. Four Justices in Bakke (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackinun), however, argued for a less
stringent standard of review for racial classifications "designed to further remedial purposes." Id.
at 359. These Justices suggested intermediate scrutiny as the proper test for race-conscious reme-
dies. Id. at 362.
24. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). For an analysis of Fullilove, see Sofia Adrogue, When Injustice Is
the Game, What Is Fair Play?, 28 HoUs. L. REv. 363, 369-76 (1991); Drew S. Days, III,
Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987).
25. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448, 455. The act required that, absent an administrative waiver,
states use at least 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects to procure
goods or services from minority owned businesses. Id. at 448.
26. Id. at 473-78.
27. Id. at 475-78.
28. Id. at 483. The Court further observed that Congress possesses "broad powers" to reme-
dy the results of past discrimination. Id. at 478. Congress also need not compile a record or pres-
ent findings; the Court was "well satisfied" that Congress had an "abundant historical basis" from
which to judge the existence of a nationwide problem. Id.
29. Id. at 487-88. The program provided for a waiver and exemption and was limited in ex-
tent and duration. Id.
30. Id. at491.
31. The program would, therefore, have been upheld under strict or intermediate review. Id.
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Several years later, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,32 the
Court examined the types of past discrimination that could justify an affirma-
tive action program.3 The Court struck down a collective bargaining agree-
ment extending layoff protection to minority teachers, while denying the same
benefit to white teachers with more seniority. 4 The plurality reached this
decision by applying a strict scrutiny standard and finding that the school
board's goal of providing role models for minority students was not "narrowly
tailored" and did not meet a "compelling government interest."35
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Wygant, agreed that remedying
"societal" discrimination did not constitute a compelling state interest. 6 She
then noted the detrimental effect of requiring illegal discrimination as a pre-
requisite to an affirmative action program.37 Such a requirement would se-
verely undermine government employers' incentive to voluntarily meet their
civil rights obligations. Finally, Justice O'Connor provided tangible guid-
ance as to what acts of prior discrimination would be sufficient to support the
enactment of an affirmative action program.39 She rejected the school board's
assertion that the difference between the number of minority students in the
school and the number of minority teachers employed by the school could be
evaluated for discriminatory practices.' Instead, she asserted that an "infer-
ence of deliberate discrimination in employment" is permissible only when the
proven availability of minorities in the relevant labor pool "substantially
exceeded those hired."'" Such an inference may provide a compelling basis
at 492. In a concurring opinion, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun repeated their assertion
in Bakke that intermediate scrutiny was the applicable level of review for a remedial program. Id.
at 519. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the set-aside program was unconsti-
tutional. They asserted that the "Constitution is colorblind" and that the "decision is wrong for the
same reason that Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong." Id. at 522-23.
32. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
33. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270. Once again, the Court failed to unite in a majority opinion. As
in Bakke, Justice Powell authored the plurality opinion. Id.
34. Id.
35. In fact, the Court said that the role-model objective, that black students are in a better
position when taught by black teachers, could actually work to legitimize discriminatory employ-
ment practices by encouraging the use of low African-American enrollment figures to justify a
"corresponding" dearth of African-American teachers. The Court further stated that the role-model
theory creates a situation analogous to that rejected in Brown v. Board of Education when "carried
to its logical extreme." Id. at 276.
First, the Court found that remedying societal discrimination did not amount to a compel-
ling government interest. "Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for
imposing a racially 'classified remedy." Id. at 276-78. Instead, Justice Powell insisted that the
particular institution implementing the affirmative action program must show that it committed
discrimination in the past to justify the layoff inequalities. Id. at 274-75. Second, the Court held
that the layoff plan was not narrowly tailored; less restrictive means were available to achieve the
same goal, so the program could not withstand strict scrutiny. Id. at 280 n.6. The Court, however,
carefully distinguished Wygant from cases which involved hirings: "though hiring goals may bur-
den some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs
impose." Id. at 282.




40. Id. at 294.
41. Id.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
for an employer to execute a voluntary affirmative action plan in order to
remedy discernible prior employment discrimination.42
In Richmond v. JA. Croson," the Court finally achieved a majority opin-
ion and determined that strict scrutiny provided the appropriate standard of
review when analyzing state and local government programs." Additionally,
the Court provided further insight into the type of statistical evidence of past
discrimination necessary to meet the "compelling government interest" stan-
dard.45 The city of Richmond, Virginia adopted a Minority Business Utili-
zation Plan requiring prime contractors to subcontract at least 30% of city
construction contracts to "Minority Business Enterprises."' The city argued
that the program was constitutional under the justifications expressed in
Fullilove 7 The Court held, however, that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state
and local governments, without regard to the purpose of the statute.' Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, distinguished Fullilove as a federal pro-
gram, and thus exempt from strict scrutiny.49
Croson represented the first time that a majority of the Court agreed that
a race-based affirmative action measure must be evaluated under strict scruti-
ny. The Court held that while states and localities may take remedial action
upon a finding that their practices led to discrimination, they must also identi-
fy the discrimination with "some specificity" before adopting an affirmative
action program.0 The majority stated that the city failed to establish proof of
discrimination sufficient to constitute a compelling government interest.5 The
Court found that reliance on general past discrimination did not amount to a
compelling interest,52 and rejected the city's statistical argument that while
the city's population was over 50% black, minorities received only .67% of
the city's construction contracts. 3 As in Wygant, however, the Croson Court
was not without advice as to the type of statistical evidence relevant to a suc-
cessful claim of past discrimination. It stated that disparities between minority
participation in a particular industry and the percentage of minorities qualified
in the skills to compete in that industry could be probative of discrimination. 4
42. Id. at 292.
43. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). For an in-depth treatment of Croson, see Jennifer M. Bott, Affirma-
tive Action from Bakke to Croson: The Affirmative Action Quagmire and the D.C. Circuit's Ap-
proach to FCC Minority Preference Policies, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 845 (1990); Dianne E.
Dixon, The Dismantling of Affirmative Action Programs: Evaluating City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 35 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1609 (1990).
44. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-500.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 469.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. at 490-91, 493-94.
49. Id. at 489.
50. Id. at 504.
51. Id. at 505.
52. Id. at 497-98.
53. Id. at 479-80, 499.
54. Id. at 501. The Court intimated that a proper statistical evaluation in this case would be a
comparison of the number of MBEs in Richmond qualified to accept city subcontracting work
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Justice O'Connor was careful to distinguish Fullilove from the similar
"set-aside" program in Croson by drawing heavily on the "unique remedial
powers of Congress."5 She noted that Congress, unlike the states, had a spe-
cific mandate to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 This enforcement
power incorporates the power to "define situations which Congress determines
threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with
those situations."57 Thus, the Court's analysis in Croson turned on the nature
of the governmental body enacting the regulation.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice White, noted that congressionally enacted racial preferences raise discrete
issues," implying that the standard of review for a federal program differed
from that involving a state or local government. One year later, the Court gave
effect to this concept in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.59 Metro Broadcast-
ing involved a challenge to a congressional mandate that the FCC give prefer-
ence to minorities when awarding licenses for radio and television stations.'
In this case, the Court applied an intermediate standard of review and held that
the FCC's minority preference policy did not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment.6 The Court found "overriding signifi-
cance" in the fact that the programs were mandated by Congress." Further-
more, the Court found that benign race-conscious measures required by
with the percentage of city construction funds awarded to minority subcontractors. Id. at 502.
55. Id. at 488.
56. Id. at 490.
57. Id. The dissent in Croson found Richmond's set-aside program indistinguishable from
the program upheld in Fullilove. Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan &
Blackmun, JJ.). They argued for a more lenient standard of review, namely, the intermediate stan-
dard they had proposed in Bakke. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359). The dissent contended that
this intermediate standard was met in Croson by the city's twin objectives of "eradicating the
effects of past discrimination" and of "preventing [its] own spending decisions from reinforcing
and perpetuating the exclusionary effects" of the discrimination. Id. at 536-37. After considering
the evidence provided to the city council and Congress's findings as outlined in Fullilove, the
dissent, using the majority's own language, established the existence of a "'strong,' 'firm,' and
'unquestionably legitimate' basis upon which the city council could determine that the effects of
past racial discrimination warranted a remedial and prophylactic governmental response." Id. at
540.
58. Id. at 490.
59. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). For an in-depth look at Met-
ro Broadcasting, see generally Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: Affirmative Action
at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 583 (1991) (discuss-
ing the difficulty of reconciling previous affirmative action cases); Patricia Williams, Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1990).
60. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 552.
61. Id. at 564-65.
62. Id. at 563. The Court held that minority ownership policies were "substantially related"
to the achievement of a legitimate government interest in broadcasting diversity. Id. at 566. Justice
Brennan, relying on Fullilove, stated that the FCC policy did not constitute a quota and did not
impose an undue burden on nonminorities because the program involved only a limited number of
licenses. Id. at 598-99. Justice O'Connor, in her Metro Broadcasting dissent (and subsequently in
Adarand), contradicted her contention in Croson that congressional programs deserve to be distin-
guished from those administered by states and localities. She argued that, under Croson, strict
scrutiny must be applied to the FCC policy. Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia &
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). She attacked remedial policies, such as the one in question, as endorsing
race-based reasoning and dividing the country into stigmatized groups, encouraging racial hostility
and conflict. Id. at 604.
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Congress were constitutionally permissible even if not "'remedial' in the sense
of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal dis-
crimination." ' This distinction was significant, as the Court ultimately recog-
nized broadcasting diversity as a compelling non-remedial goal. Although the
Court had previously recognized diversity as a compelling goal in Bakke,
Metro Broadcasting was the first, and only, affirmative action case in which
the court upheld a program seeking to promote a non-remedial goal.
B. Summary of the State of Affirmative Action Law Prior to Adarand
Before Adarand, the Court's focus was on the distinction between federal
and state programs. The Court had never before applied strict scrutiny to an
affirmative action program adopted by Congress or failed to uphold such a
program. Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting controlled Congressional actions;
Croson governed state and local programs. Federal programs received interme-
diate review; the Court subjected state and local programs to strict scrutiny.
The Court recognized that remedying the effects of past discrimination consti-
tuted a "compelling government interest," and acknowledged that a non-reme-
dial goal could meet that objective. The Bakke Court explicitly held that a di-
verse student body was a compelling goal for an institution of higher learn-
ing.' In Metro Broadcasting, when it upheld the FCC's goal of promoting
63. Id. at 564-65.
64. The Court has never overruled this concept, and under Bakke, diversity remains a com-
pelling interest in the setting of higher education. This holding, however, is in jeopardy due to
recent opinions emerging from the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. In Podberesky v.
Kirwan, the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland denied a student of Hispanic and
white origin equal protection of the laws by denying him consideration for a scholarship open
only to African-American students. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). The university maintained that the scholarship program was nec-
essary to combat the enduring effects of a long history of past discrimination against African-
American students. Id. at 152. The Fourth Circuit found evidence of present effects of past dis-
crimination at the university insufficient to support the program. Id. at 153-54. In necessitating
present effects, the circuit court is expanding the requirements; the Supreme court requires only a
finding of past discrimination to justify the application of a race-based measure. Id. The require-
ment of present effects had previously been advanced by Justice Scalia in his Croson concurrence.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 520. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, allowing the decision to stand, and
to be the controlling standard in the Fourth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas, invalidated the University of Texas' Law School
admissions program, which provided for special admissions standards for minorities. Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 95-1773, 1996 WL 227009 (U.S. July
1, 1996). The court denied that Bakke controlled the issue, and instead relied on Adarand. Id. at
944. In doing so, the court reviewed the program under a strict scrutiny standard and held that the
need for diversity in a university student body can never be a compelling reason to impose racial
classifications. Id. at 948. The Hopwood court held that race can never be used as a factor in
admissions, not even as the "plus" factor enunciated in Bakke, Id. While the use of race was not
permitted, a university
may properly favor one applicant over another because of his ability to play the cello,
make a downfield tackle, or understand chaos theory. An admissions process may also
consider an applicant's home state or relationship to school alumni .... Schools may
even consider factors such as whether an applicant's parents attended college or the
applicant's economic and social background.
Id. at 946. The university has decided that the ruling applies not only to admissions, but to finan-
cial aid, scholarships, and fellowships. Renae Merle, Morales: On Hopwood, Wait for the Court,
DAILY TEXAN, Apr. 9, 1996, at 1. On July 1, 1996, the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
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broadcasting diversity, the Court recognized diversity as an important govern-
ment interest.65 The Court did not explicitly address, however, whether the
concept of diversity as a constitutionally permissible goal of an affirmative
action plan reaches beyond the context of the broadcasting and university set-
tings.
II. ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. V. PENA66
A. Facts and Procedural History
The Small Business Act (SBA) provides government contractors with
financial incentives to employ "disadvantaged business enterprises" (DBEs) as
subcontractors. According to § 637(d) of the SBA, a DBE is at least 51%
owned and controlled by individuals who are socially and economically disad-
vantaged.67 Members of certain minority racial and ethnic groups, s as well
as women, are presumed socially and economically disadvantaged.'
In accordance with the Act, the Federal Lands Highway Program (FLHP)
effected the Subcontracting Compensation Clause (SCC), which provided
contractors with an incentive payment of up to 1.5% of the original contract
value if they hired DBE subcontractors.7" FLHP awarded Mountain Gravel
Construction Company (Mountain Gravel) a federal highway contract.7
Adarand Constructors, Inc. (Adarand), a white-owned subcontractor, not recog-
nized as a DBE, applied to build the guard rail portion of the project. 2
Mountain Gravel chose a subcontractor who submitted a higher bid but was a
certified DBE, thereby entitling Mountain Gravel to a $10,000 incentive pay-
ment.
73
Adarand sued the government, asserting that the FLHP's policy of offer-
ing financial incentives to contractors who hired DBE subcontractors violated
the Equal Protection Clause.74 The United States District Court for the
tiorari, thereby declining the opportunity to reconsider the Bakke decision, at least for now.
65. Because the Metro Broadcasting Court upheld the legitimacy of the goal of broadcast
diversity under the intermediate standard, it remains unsettled whether this is a "compelling goal"
under strict scrutiny.
66. 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1994). The act defines socially disadvantaged individuals as "those
who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a
member of a group without regard to their individual qualities." Id. § 637 (a)(5). "Economically
disadvantaged individuals are those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in
the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as
compared to others in the same business area who are not socially disadvantaged." Id. § 637
(a)(6)(A).
68. These socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include: "Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities." Id. §
637(d)(3)(c) (1994).
69. This presumption is rebuttable under DBE criteria. See Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1541.
70. Id. at 1540.
71. Id. at 1541.
72. Id. at 1542.
73. Id. at 1541-42.
74. Id. at 1542.
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District of Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of the government,
and Adarand appealed.75
B. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision, hold-
ing the challenged policy constitutional.76 The court relied on Fullilove77 to
support its decision, citing Fullilove for the proposition that Congress properly
acts within its "broad powers under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it imposes an affirmative action program to
remedy nationwide discrimination in the construction industry.""
The court held that, under Fullilove, courts "must apply a lenient standard,
resembling intermediate scrutiny" to federal affirmative action programs. 9 It
was careful to distinguish Croson's application of the "strict scrutiny" standard
for state and local programs."0
The Court of Appeals found significance in the fact that the challenged
program did not require contractors to participate in the program and did not
set precise DBE goals.8 ' Rather, the contractor had the "option, not the obli-
gation" to choose a DBE subcontractor.82 Because the "program induces,
rather than compels" contractors to select DBE subcontractors, the court found
that it did not violate equal protection.83
C. Supreme Court Decision4
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the
Tenth Circuit.85 Although the Court did not dismantle the challenged
75. Id. at 1539, 1542. The district court rejected Adarand's argument that the program must
be subjected to strict scrutiny under the standards set out in Croson, and held that Metro Broad-
casting and Fullilove should control. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240, 244
(D. Colo. 1992). The court found that in Adarand, as in Fullilove, Congress had "abundant his-
torical basis" to support the challenged program. Id. The district court also found the program
sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve Congress's important objectives. Id.
76. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1547.
77. Id. at 1543 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)); see discussion supra
notes 24-31 and corresponding text.
78. Adarand, 16 F.3d at 1543-44.
79. Id. at 1544. The court recognized that Metro Broadcasting also called for intermediate
scrutiny of federal programs. Id. at 1545 n.12.
80. Id. at 1545 ("The lesson that we glean from Fullilove and Croson is that the federal
government, acting under congressional authority, can engage more freely in affirmative action
than states and localities.").
81. Id. at 1547.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
85. Justice O'Connor filed the opinion joined by Justice Kennedy; Justices Scalia and
Thomas filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment; Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined; Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined; Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Breyer joined.
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program, the decision clearly leveled an overwhelming blow to federal affir-
mative action programs. The Court held that all racial classifications, whether
imposed by federal, state, or local government, must be analyzed under a strict
scrutiny standard.86 In doing so, the Court relied heavily on its decision in
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, extending the standard it adopted for states and
localities to the federal government. 7
The Court began the opinion with a review of its decisions leading up to
Adarand. As previously discussed, the Court in Croson8" held that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all raced-based action by state
and local governments. While conceding that Croson did not determine the
level of review required by the Fifth Amendment for federal race-based action,
the Adarand Court held that certain tenets relating to this issue had been pre-
viously decided by the Court in the cases leading up to Croson:89
First, skepticism: "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination," . . .
[s]econd, consistency: "the standard of review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification," 9 1.. , third, congruence:
"[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same
as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.
92
The Court merged these three propositions and concluded that any person, re-
gardless of race, who is exposed to inequality by a government classification
based on race is entitled to have the government substantiate this classification
under strict scrutiny.93
The Court then addressed the previous case inconsistent with the new
standard enunciated in Adarand: Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.94 Faced with a
directly opposing opinion, the Adarand Court decided that Metro
Broadcasting's analysis was flawed.95 Attacking its own opinion, penned
merely five years earlier, the Court found that Metro Broadcasting erroneously
rejected Croson's insistence that strict scrutiny review of government classifi-
cations is necessary.96 Furthermore, the Court faulted Metro Broadcasting for
86. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
87. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Croson.
88. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
89. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
90. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
273 (1986)).
91. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
92. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
93. Id.
94. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding two federal race-based policies against an Equal Pro-
tection challenge by stating that congressionally mandated benign classifications are subject to
intermediate scrutiny), overruled by 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). For a full discussion of Metro Broad-
casting, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
95. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-13.
96. Id. at 2112 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493) ("Absent searching judicial inquiry into
the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifi-
cations are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."). While Justice O'Connor expounds on this
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rejecting the tenet that "congruence" should exist between the criteria relevant
to "federal and state racial classifications.
'97
To the Adarand majority, Metro Broadcasting undermined the principle
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments exist to "protect persons, not
groups."'98 The Adarand Court concluded that strict scrutiny should thus be
required for all group classifications, including race, whether imposed by state,
local, or federal government." The Court then explicitly overruled Metro
Broadcasting to the extent that the case is inconsistent with the Adarand hold-
ing.10
°
The Court in Adarand declared that all "federal racial classifications," like
state and local classifications, "must serve a compelling government interest
and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest."'' Although the Court
refused to concede that Fullilove called for a standard below strict scrutiny, it
eliminated any potential ambiguity by stating that if Fullilove held those clas-
sifications to a less rigid standard, "it no longer controll[ed]."'
The majority maintained that the strict scrutiny standard of review guaran-
tees that courts will consistently give racial classifications careful examina-
tion. ' 3 The Court tempered this, however, by asserting that it wished to
eliminate the perception that "strict scrutiny is strict in theory, fatal in
fact."' The Court concluded by remanding the case to the Tenth Circuit for
further consideration, in light of the fact that Adarand "alters the playing field
in some important respects."'0 5 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit had not ad-
dressed whether the interests served by the subcontracting compensation claus-
es were compelling and whether the program was sufficiently narrowly tai-
lored."°6
2. Concurring Opinions
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He depart-
ed from the majority, however, by arguing that the government never possess-
es a "compelling" interest in classifying individuals on the basis of race in
order to "make up" for a discriminatory past."
Justice Thomas also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He
agreed with the majority's conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to all race-
theory at length in Adarand, she touches on it only briefly in Croson. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
97. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111-13.
98. Id. at 2112.
99. Id. at 2113.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2117.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
105. Id. at 2118.
106. Id.
107. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia contended that a system of racial entitlement,
even with noble purposes, "reinforce[s] and preserve[s] for future mischief the way of thinking
that produced race slavery, race privilege, and race hatred." Id. at 2119.
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based governmental classifications.ta He wrote separately, however, to at-
tack Justice Stevens's and Justice Ginsburg's dissents, which in his view main-
tained "a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal protection."'
Justice Thomas argued that laws intending to oppress a race and those intend-
ing to provide "benefits on the basis of race" are of "moral and constitutional
equivalence.'" 0
3. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens authored a dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Jus-
tice Stevens stated that, "instead of deciding this case in accordance with
controlling precedent, the Court today delivers a disconcerting lecture about
the evils of governmental racial classifications."''. He rejected the majority's
notion that no "meaningful difference" exists between the determination to
place a special burden on a minority and the determination to confer a benefit
upon individual members of a minority." 2 Stevens argued that no "moral or
constitutional equivalence" exists between the concepts of discrimination and
affirmative action." 3 He accused the Court of adopting a policy which
"would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a wel-
come mat;" one which would fail to see the disparity between a policy that
rendered "black citizens ineligible for military service" and one intended to
recruit black servicemen."4
Justice Stevens next attacked the majority's concept of "congruence,"
asserting that it overlooked fundamental differences between the legislative
bodies enacting the programs. ' 5  He argued that Metro Broadcasting,
Fullilove, and Croson all raise crucial differences between federal and state
programs, ' and questioned the Court's silence as to the "sudden and enor-
mous departure from the reasoning in past cases."
' 1 7
108. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id. Affirmative action programs, he averred, "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiori-
ty" and may induce them to believe "that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Id. Finally, he termed
"discrimination based on benign prejudice ... just as noxious as discrimination inspired by mali-
cious prejudice." Id.
111. Id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. He argued that the two reflect competing impulses; one seeks to foster a class struc-
ture, the other equality. Id.
114. Id. at 2121. Justice Stevens seemed to subtly ridicule the majority's contention that
courts will not be able to differentiate between "invidious" and "benign" discrimination: "But the
term 'affirmative action' is common and well-understood. Its presence in everyday parlance shows
that people understand the difference between good intentions and bad." Id. He also admonished
the majority's holding that remedial classifications and discrimination are equivalent and should
not be upheld "in the name of 'equal protection."' Id. at 2122.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2124.
117. Id. at 2125. Justice Stevens further criticized the majority's failure to adhere to stare
decisis in its treatment of Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, saying that the majority ignored the
power of binding precedent. Id. at 2131. He noted that Metro Broadcasting was overruled only as
far as its use of intermediate scrutiny, and, therefore, its holding that diversity may constitute a
sufficient government interest to warrant a nonremedial race-based program remains in force. Id.
at 2127.
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Justice Souter wrote a second dissent, and was joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. Justice Souter argued that stare decisis compels adher-
ence to Fullilove."8 Additionally, he observed that the majority opinion in
Adarand does not suggest a real change in the Court's traditional view of
Congress's § 5 powers as "broad," "unique," and "unlike [those of] any state
or political subdivision."'' 9
Justice Ginsburg authored the third dissent, joined by Justice Breyer. She
argued that since Congress was already handling the subject of affirmative ac-
tion, no compelling reason existed for the Court's intervention on the is-
sue. 20 Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Stevens's contention that Con-
gress deserves great deference from the judiciary. Additionally, she recounted
the long history of discrimination against racial minorities in this country.'2'
4. Analysis
Adarand radically alters the landscape of affirmative action law. Prior to
this decision, the Court had never before applied strict scrutiny to a remedial
race-conscious program adopted by Congress. By requiring strict scrutiny
review for all racial classifications imposed by federal, state, or local govern-
ments, the decision promises to end all but the most "narrowly tailored" feder-
al, state, and local affirmative action programs.
Perhaps the most disturbing facet of the Court's decision is the guise
under which the Court imposed its mandate. The Court asserted that strict
scrutiny is necessary because only under such heightened review does it be-
come clear whether the program in question seeks to advance minorities or op-
press them. In Adarand, the Court constructively terminated a policy designed
to foster equality, while attempting to do so in a favorable light, with fairness
as its guiding principle. As the dissent recognized, however, the majority's
sudden concern for a lower court's inability to differentiate between good and
bad intentions is little more than a transparent pretext with which to put an
end to all race-based measures.
The Court erred in several other respects by vacating the Tenth Circuit's
decision. First, the Court adopted the theory of "congruence," asserting that
equal protection analysis should be identical under either the Fifth or the Four-
teenth Amendment. In doing so, it ignored the fundamental difference between
the federal government and the states; a distinction which previous Courts had
outlined so laboriously.'22
118. Id. at 2132 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2133.
120. Id. at 2134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Ginsburg noted that she would
not interfere with the programs at issue in Adarand, and "would leave their improvement to the
political branches." Id. at 2136.
121. Id. ("Congress surely can condone that a carefully designed affirmative action program
may help realize, finally, the 'equal protection of the laws' the Fourteenth Amendment has prom-
ised since 1868.").
122. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although members of today's majority trumpeted
the importance of that [federal-state dichotomy] distinction in Croson, they now reject it in the
name of 'congruence."'). Justice Stevens makes a valid point: in Croson, as in Adarand, Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist were aligned with Justice O'Connor, who, in authoring Croson,
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In fact, throughout Adarand's majority opinion, Justice O'Connor flatly
contradicts what she previously stated in Croson. In Croson, she relied upon
the distinction between Congress and state governments in holding that state
programs should be subject to a strict scrutiny standard: "What appellant ig-
nores is that Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific
Constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."" 3 Additionally, her Croson opinion relied heavily on Chief Justice
Burger's Fullilove opinion, expounding at length on Congress's competence to
properly employ race-conscious remedial relief.'24 In failing to distinguish
the congressional program at issue in Adarand from the city program in
Croson, Justice O'Connor abandons a principle fundamental to constitutional
jurisprudence: the distinction between state and federal government.
Congressional programs should be treated differently than those adopted
by states and localities. Congress merits appropriate deference from the judi-
ciary as to race-based measures because of its "specifically delegated pow-
ers."' " Congress derives its authority from several sources. First, Congress
possesses "institutional competence as the National Legislature."'26 The Con-
stitution also grants Congress powers through the Spending Clause, 2' the
Commerce Clause,'28 and the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amend-
ments.'29 Furthermore, Congress is a co-equal branch, and the Court is
bound to give Congress's decisions "great weight."'30 These powers justify
judicial deference to measures adopted by Congress that are not granted to
those designated by states or localities.
The Court further erred in asserting that, by overruling Metro Broadcast-
ing, it was not making new law, but merely restoring the law to its former
status. In Fullilove, prior to Metro Broadcasting, the Court spoke on the
had focused on the difference between state and federal programs. Justice Rehnquist did not write
a separate opinion in either case. Justice Scalia, concurring in the Croson judgment, wrote, "A
sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race rests not only upon the
substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and governmental theory."
Croson, 488 U.S. at 522. Kennedy, on the other hand, while concurring in the judgment, stated
that congressional programs should be subject to strict scrutiny:
The process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when it is enacted by a
state becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee when enacted by Congress
poses a difficult proposition for me; but as it is not before us, any reconsideration of that
issue must await some further case.
Id. at 518.
123. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490.
124. Id. at 487-88.
125. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.
126. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 474.
128. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides Congress with authority to
"regulate any activity that has a 'real and substantial relation to the national interest.' Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964).
129. These Amendments "worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional
and state power over matters of race .... 'They were intended to be what they really are, limita-
tions of the powers of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress."' Croson, 488 U.S.
at 490 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
130. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472.
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question of the applicable standard of review for a federal affirmative action
program and specifically chose not to apply strict scrutiny.
Although the Fullilove Court chose not to impose a label on the standard
employed, it upheld a program on a standard plainly less severe than strict
scrutiny;13 1 in fact, Justice Burger took great pains to avoid the term.132 By
denying that Adarand represents a vast departure from existing law, the Court
indulges in a flimsy rationalization for a result-driven opinion.
III. PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF ADARAND
A. Introduction
Adarand promises to have far-reaching repercussions. While the Clinton
administration publicly lauded affirnative action in the weeks following
Adarand, 3 the administration simultaneously called for an immediate review
of all federal agencies to ensure compliance with the Adarand standard.'34
Deval Patrick, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, has indicated
that some federal affirmative action plans "will have to end and others will
have to be reformed" due to Adarand's stricter standards.,35
It is unclear whether Adarand threatens all federal race-based programs.
Although the strict scrutiny standard will make it significantly more difficult
for race-conscious programs to survive, Justice O'Connor left open a window
of hope in Adarand. She explicitly acknowledged the need for race-conscious
programs by stating that "[tihe unhappy persistence of both the practice and
131. The Metro Broadcasting Court confirmed this: "A majority of the Court in Fullilove did
not apply strict scrutiny to the race-based classification at issue." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at
564.
132. In fact, Justice O'Connor herself explicitly recognized this fact in Croson: "The principal
opinion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice Burger, did not employ 'strict scrutiny' or any other
traditional standard of equal protection review." Croson, 488 U.S. at 487. Justice Burger merely
found that racial preferences must receive a "most searching examination." He did not name strict
scrutiny; in fact, he rejected it, saying, "This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly,
the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as University of California Regents v. Bakke."
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
133. "[T]he federal Government will continue to support lawful consideration of race, ethnici-
ty, and gender under programs that are flexible, realistic, subject to reevaluation, and fair." Presi-
dent Clinton's Memorandum on Affirmative Action, July 19, 1995, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
147, at D42 (Aug. 1, 1995).
134. Id. For a comprehensive list of all congressional race-based programs, see Congressional
Research Service's Compilation and Overview of Federal Laws and Regulations Establishing
Affirmative Action Goals, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at D25 (Feb. 23, 1995).
135. Affirmative Action: Some Programs Will Fail the Adarand Test, Patrick Tells House
Oversight Panel, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at D3, 1 (July 21, 1995). The Department of
Justice has been hard at work to adjust federal affirmative action programs in compliance with
Adarand. Less than a year after Adarand, the Department of Justice has already published propos-
als to reform affirmative action in federal procurement which conform to the standards outlined in
Adarand. See Justice Department Proposed Reform to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D22 (May 23, 1996). The Justice Department has also com-
piled an impressive list of studies and statistics on racial discrimination of minority-owned busi-
nesses which provide evidence that federal programs are justified under the compelling interest
test. See Justice Department Appendix on the Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Feder-
al Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D23 (May 23, 1996).
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lingering effects of racial discrimination" in this country will sometimes justify
a narrowly tailored race-based remedy.
3 6
The question remains, however, as to what exactly constitutes a "compel-
ling" governmental interest and what internal checks a program must possess
to be viewed as "narrowly tailored." Although the Adarand Court did not
provide explicit guidance, direction is available from precedent. Croson is
perhaps the best resource, as the Adarand Court relied heavily upon its rea-
soning. Additionally, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant provides
practical advice for public employers. 37
B. The "Compelling Interest" Requirement
In order for a government affirmative action program to meet the compel-
ling interest standard, the government employer must demonstrate that the plan
addresses ongoing discrimination, or that effects of past discrimination are
shown by particularized findings.'38 Statistical evidence, therefore, may be
the only acceptable verification of discrimination.'39
Clearly, generalized societal discrimination is not a sufficient justification
for an affirmative action plan."4 For example, a government employer can-
not justify an affinative action plan on the foundation that discrimination is a
pervasive problem in the United States. Evidence of nationwide discrimination
in a particular industry is similarly insufficient to justify a state or local pro-
gram; the discrimination must be linked to the local industry. 4' In the case
of a federal program, however, evidence of nationwide discrimination may still
be sufficient.
An industry is not required to hire minorities in proportion to the repre-
sentation of the minority in the general population. 42 Instead, the statistics
must reflect the number of minorities in the relevant population with the skills
required to perform the job.'43 The analysis, therefore, hinges on the dispari-
ty between the number of qualified minorities in the relevant population and
the number employed by the specific government entity.'" In certain em-
ployment contexts, such as those involving entry level positions or positions
requiring little training, disparities between the number of minorities in a
136. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117.
137. See discussion supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
138. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
139. Id. at 501-03 (calling for statistical evidence to support discrimination in the work force).
140. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
141. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. If the program in question is enacted by a state or local gov-
ernment, the statistical evidence must be specific to the local industry. The Croson Court chastised
the city for relying on congressional findings of nationwide discrimination in the industry rather
than statistics reflecting the local industry. Id.
142. In Croson, evidence that while the city's population was over 50% minority, minority
businesses received only 0.67% of the city's prime contracts, was not adequate in the Court's eyes
to demonstrate discrimination. Id. at 501.
143. Id.
144. d. at 501-02.
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particular field and those in the general population may be probative of a
pattern of discrimination. 5
The requirement of a disparity between the number of qualified minorities
in the relevant pool and the number of minorities hired is somewhat flawed by
failing to account for one of the critical effects of discrimination. Discrimi-
nation is a pervasive problem to the extent that it virtually precludes participa-
tion of minorities in certain industries. Discrimination, therefore, can clearly
still exist even if the number of qualified minority participants in an industry
was proportional to the number hired. Croson left unanswered the question of
whether a government may provide evidence that the number of minorities
participating in a particular field would have been greater had it not been for
historical patterns of discrimination. The trend in lower courts has been to
allow reliance upon such evidence."
The issue remains open as to whether affirmative action may be used for
non-remedial objectives. The program at issue in Adarand was determined to
be remedial, in that it sought to redress the effects of past discrimination, and
thus did not lead the Court to address this issue. Justice Stevens, however, in
his Adarand dissent, maintained that the concept of promoting diversity is
consistent with the majority's opinion in Adarand.47 While the majority
overruled Metro Broadcasting on other grounds, the holding that diversity
constituted a significant government interest remains intact."4u Additionally,
the Court in Bakke identified a diverse student body as a compelling interest
for a university. 49 It is unclear, however, whether the concept of diversity as
a compelling interest extends beyond the unique environment of a university.
Because Metro Broadcasting was decided under the intermediate scrutiny
standard, broadcast diversity was found to satisfy only an important govern-
ment interest. 5 ' The compelling government interest in diversity outside of
the university or broadcasting contexts remains unclear.
C. The "Narrowly Tailored" Requirement
In order to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, the affirmative action pro-
gram must also be "narrowly tailored." The Court has not set forth specific
standards to advise employers how to narrowly tailor their affirmative action
programs. The following factors, derived from several Supreme Court opin-
ions, offer some assistance in assessing whether a program is "narrowly tai-
lored."
One important aspect of a narrowly tailored program involves whether the
government considered race-neutral means before adopting the affirmative
action program.' Other determinants include the flexibility and duration of
145. Id.
146. Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, Justice Department Memorandum on Su-
preme Court's Adarand Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. BNA) No. 125, at D33, 14 (June 29, 1995).
147. Id.
148. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
150. See discussion supra note 59-65 and accompanying text.
151. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. Examples of race-neutral measures suggested by the Court
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the plan,'52 regular assessment and reevaluation procedures,'53 the scope of
the program, 54 and the availability of waiver provisions.'55 Additionally,
the reasonableness of a numerical goal in light of the number of qualified
minorities in the industry is pivotal in determining whether a program meets
the narrow tailoring requirement. 5 6 Finally, courts will consider the effect of
the program on third parties."'
CONCLUSION
The Adarand decision is disturbing on a number of levels. Perhaps most
distressing is the Court's dismissal of the good will and race-consciousness
inherent in enacting an affirmative action program. The assertion that strict
scrutiny is necessary to determine the injurious or beneficial nature of an
affirmative action program undercuts the competency of Congress, as well as
that of every court in the land.
Affirmative action was just one of a calculated list of political statements
issued this term by the conservative Court. Like Adarand, the two other cases
involving race and decided by the Court this term severely limited the
government's ability to provide measures to promote racial equality.' By
ignoring precedent and requiring strict scrutiny for congressionally mandated
include "[slimplification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding requirements, and training
and financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races." Id. at 509-10; see also United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 ("In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appro-
priate, we look to several factors, including the efficacy of alternative remedies."); Wygant, 476
U.S. at 280 n.6 (stating that governments must consider "lawful alternative[s] and less restrictive
means" and citing the theory that the racial classification should "fit" more closely than other
available measures).
152. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 170; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513 (stating that the "tempo-
rary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate") (Powell, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 374
(noting that the medical school's strict allotment of 16% of the spaces in the class for minority
applicants was too rigid).
153. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513.
154. The Wygant Court found that random inclusion of certain minority groups "further illus-
trates the undifferentiated nature of the plan." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284, n.13. In Croson, the Court
criticized the "gross overinclusiveness" of Richmond's racial categories. The district court took
judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of minority individuals in Richmond were African-
American. Despite this, the plan included Spanish-speaking, Asian-American, Indian, Eskimo, and
Aleut individuals. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
155. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (enumerating the availability of waiver provisions among
a list of factors contributing to the narrow tailoring requirement); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 488 (not-
ing the significance of Congress's allowance for administrative waiver and exemption, given a
showing that the level of minority participation cannot be reached while still maintaining the goals
of the program).
156. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.
157. Id. The Court has historically frowned on programs which it felt placed heavy burdens
on nonminorities. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (holding that none of the interests offered by the
university could justify a plan which completely prevented nonminorities from competing for a
specific number of positions); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282 (holding that layoff provision imposed too
great an injury to nonminorities).
158. Jeffery Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 1995, at 19. Miller v.
Johnson called into question the Voting Rights Act by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from employing race as the "predominant purpose" in apportioning voting districts.
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). Missouri v. Jenkins constrained the federal courts'
power to remedy the effects of school desegregation. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
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programs, the Court is expanding its own role and limiting that of Congress,
its supposed "co-equal" branch.
As the Court felled the axe on affirmative action programs, it hid behind
the ruse of a color-blind Constitution. As Justice Scalia trumpeted in his
Adarand concurrence, "In the eyes of the government, we are all one race
here. It is American."'59 The original intent behind this doctrine carried far
more wisdom than the shallow dogma that remains today. Justice Harlan, the
sole dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson, felt strongly that the statute which denied
African-Americans access to the same train cars that carried whites was de-
grading and unconstitutional."6 He wrote:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. 6'
The color-blind Constitution, once a concept embodying fairness and equality,
has become yet another vehicle for oppression by a majority voice.
Lia A. Fazzone
159. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896).
161. Id. at 559.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law shields individuals from abuses of power at the hands
of administrative agencies.' The Federal Administrative Procedures Act
(APA)2 provides a set of standards for reviewing different types of agency
action.' A court's ability to protect individuals against agency abuses of pow-
er relates directly to the scope of review permitted by the APA, which varies
depending on the type of agency action at issue.' The APA's standard of re-
view for formal agency action is the "substantial evidence" standard.5 Courts
review informal agency action under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.'
Due to an agency's specialized knowledge, however, courts grant considerable
deference to agency decisions under these standards.'
Part I of this Survey discusses two cases in which the Tenth Circuit ap-
plied the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards of re-
view. In Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp.,' the Tenth Circuit followed
the District of Columbia Circuit Court's reasoning regarding the convergence
of the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards of review.9
The Tenth Circuit concluded that when determining factual support, both stan-
dards require "substantial evidence" to uphold an agency's decision.' In
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," the
Tenth Circuit deferred a question of law involving an agency's contract
1. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.1 (3d ed. 1991). Administrative law
provides the legal principles by which agencies exercise their power. Id. Congress exercises con-
trol over agencies by establishing standards and procedures in an agency's enabling statute and by
policing day-to-day agency action through oversight committees. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UN-
DERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9-9[B] (2d ed. 1992).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
4. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 624 ("If the scope of review is too broad, agencies
are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts"; conversely, if
the scope is too restrictive, review becomes meaningless since "it prevents full inquiry into the
question of legality.").
5. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (stating that cases subject to §§ 556-557, which govern hearings
and initial decisions, or "otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing" are subject to
that standard).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (providing that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action
which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
7. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 624-25 (explaining that deference to administrative
expertise and calendar pressure have narrowed the scope of review by courts); see Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (finding that
agencies have been delegated authority to make policy choices and judges, "who have no constitu-
ency," must afford deference to an agency's decisions).
8. 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
9. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Board of Governors, Inc., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
10. Id.
1. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
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interpretation, using the arbitrary and capricious standard.'2 In granting defer-
ence to the agency's decision, the Tenth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's
conclusion that the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.13 implicitly modified earlier cases that
withheld deference on questions involving contract interpretations. 4
Part II of this Survey examines the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the
social security regulations governing the adjudication of benefit disputes. In
O'Dell v. Shalala,5 the Tenth Circuit interpreted the "final decision," which
courts review under the social security regulations, as including any new evi-
dence that a complainant presents to the Appeals Council. 6 The court's deci-
sion clarified what constitutes the record of review, and resolved two conflict-
ing lower court holdings.'7
I. REVIEWING AGENCY DECISIONS
A. Informal Agency Action and the Convergence of the Substantial Evidence
and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review:
Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp.'
1. Background
The Federal Administrative Procedures Act 9 (APA) establishes standards
for judicial review of federal agency action." The APA standards are de-
signed to provide a check on agency authority while simultaneously ensuring
that each agency is able to perform its task within the authority granted to
it.11
Courts review formal agency action under the substantial evidence stan-
dard.22 The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
12. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1485. The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC's) action under the substantial evidence standard pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1994) which applies to the Commission's factual decisions. Northwest Pipeline,
61 F.3d at 1485.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1486.
15. 44 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1994).
16. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859.
17. Id. (noting that the two opinions were "diametrically opposed").
18. 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). The judicial review provisions of the APA apply "except to the
extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(a)(2). The APA contains six provisions establishing the
scope of review including: (1) substantial evidence, (2) arbitrary and capricious, (3) "contrary to a
constitutional right," (4) "in excess of statutory jurisdiction," (5) "failing to observe procedures re-
quired by law," and (6) "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial
de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. § 706(A)-(F).
21. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 9.2.12, at 583 (1986)
(explaining that the standards of review reflect the scope of authority granted to an agency). See
generally Phillip F. Smith, Jr., Administrative Law Survey of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
71 DENY. U. L. REV. 801, 815-16 (1994) (discussing the effect of the different standards of re-
view).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, 706(2)(E); ARTHuR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsIMow, STATE
AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.4, at 625 (1989). Formal agency action consists of hear-
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion."23 When reviewing an agency's decision, a court examines the "record
as a whole" to determine if substantial evidence supports the agency's deci-
sion.24 The APA mandates the application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard when reviewing informal agency action.' In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,26 the Court stated that under the arbitrary and
capricious standard,27 a court must determine whether an agency has articu-
lated a rational basis for its action.2" Under this "narrow" standard,29 the
court may not substitute its own rationale, but must review an agency's action
on the grounds articulated by the agency itself.30 In doing so, the court must
focus on the informal administrative record.3' The arbitrary and capricious
standard further requires an agency to explain how it proceeded from its find-
ings to its subsequent action.32 However, authorities on administrative law
have typically characterized the substantial evidence standard as more de-
manding than the arbitrary and capricious standard, although the Supreme
Court has never explicitly resolved this supposed difference.33 Since both the
arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards require sufficient
factual support in the record,34 courts have referred to the tests as converging,
and to any articulated distinction between them as "largely semantic."35
ings subject to the APA "trial-type" provisions of §§ 556-557 of the APA. Fox, supra note 1, §
50 (defining a "trial-type" proceeding as an "adversarial process, intended to be similar to, but not
identical with, a civil bench trial in federal court"); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (finding that review under the substantial evidence standard is
authorized under the APA's rule-making provisions or "when the agency action is based on a
public adjudicatory hearing").
23. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act required the same
standard of proof as the APA, and finding that the substantial evidence standard required the court
to consider evidence that "fairly detracts from [the record's] weight").
24. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488 (acknowledging that a "reviewing court is not barred
from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence support-
ing that decision is substantial").
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)-(2)(A). See generally Fox, supra note 1, §§ 58-60 (discussing the lack
of a "trial-type" hearing and informal nature of the informal agency action).
26. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
27. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
28. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416). Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard requires the
court to consider "whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
29. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
30. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 50.
31. Smith, supra note 21, at 815-16 (discussing review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard).
32. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 50; 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.4, at 202-03 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the "reasoned
decision-making" in which the agency must engage).
33. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.4, at 202. Since both the substantial evidence
and arbitrary and capricious standards are extremely deferential, "courts have experienced difficul-
ty applying the distinction the Court continues to draw" regarding the characterization of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard as the more lenient. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33
(discussing the arbitrary and capricious standard).
34. BoNnFILD & ASiMOW, supra note 22, § 9.4, at 625 (noting that courts determine factual
support under both standards based on a "reasonableness review" standard).
35. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.5, at 202-03 (citing cases referring to the tenden-
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2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
a. Facts
In Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 6 a certified class of farmers
challenged the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service's (ASCS)
decision to reduce wheat crop deficiency payments.37 Due to flooding, these
farmers had been unable to plant their winter wheat during the fall.3" Con-
cerned with the effect of late planting on deficiency payments, the farmers
held a meeting with state officials.39 The farmers left the meeting with the
impression that program wheat could be planted after the designated planting
season without reductions in deficiency payments, provided it was planted in a
"workmanlike" manner.' After having planted their crops, the farmers re-
ceived notice that the ASCS had reduced deficiency payments for late planted
wheat.4
ASCS's initial decision was based on the determination that program
regulations allowed reductions in deficiency payments for late planting.4'
With the exception of this late planting finding, the ASCS failed to state the
rules it applied or the factors it considered in making the initial decision to
reduce deficiency benefits.43 The state ASCS committee, and subsequently
the Deputy Administrator of State and County Operations, affirmed the initial
ASCS decision in informal hearings." The district court agreed with the ad-
ministrative committees and affirmed the ASCS's decision under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. 5
cy of the standards to converge); see Fox, supra note 1, § 76[C] (explaining then-Judge Scalia's
view that there is no difference between the two tests in terms of factual support); see also
BONFIELD & AsIMOW, supra note 22, § 9.4, at 625 ("The prevailing view is that judicial re-
view ... under a substantial evidence standard is no different than under an arbitrary and capri-
cious standard."). Prior Tenth Circuit case law recognized that "[t]he 'substantial evidence' test
has been equated with the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review." Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 904 F.2d 1456, 1459 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 936 (1991).
36. 42 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).
37. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1564-65. ASCS reduced the payments for winter wheat as fol-
lows: 20% in January, 35% in February, and 100% in March. Id. at 1570. Spring wheat planted in
March was reduced 30% and spring wheat planted after March was reduced 100%. Id. at 1570-71.
38. Id. at 1569.
39. Id. Class members participated in the 1987 Price Support and Adjustment Program for
wheat which guarantees each farmer "the target price for their crop, if the ultimate market price
falls below that price, farmers are entitled to'deficiency payments' to make up the difference." Id.
at 1567. The statutes implementing the Price Support and Adjustment Program are: The Agricul-
ture Act of 1949 §§ 101-356, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1471 (1994) (creating deficiency payments); 7
U.S.C. §§ 1308 to 1308-5 (1994) (limiting deficiency payments); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1445 to 1445-3
(1994) (implementing deficiency payments).
40. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1569.
41. Id. at 1564.
42. Id. at 1564, 1570.
43. Id. at 1565.
44. Id. at 1571.




The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in choosing to apply
the arbitrary and capricious standard.' In reversing the lower court, the Tenth
Circuit noted that the district court had supplied its own rationale for the
agency's decision rather than reviewing the record to determine if the agency
"articulated a reasoned basis for its conclusions" as the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard requires.' To determine the proper application of the arbi-
trary and capricious standard, the Tenth Circuit adopted then-Judge Scalia's
convergence analysis.' Under this theory, "informal agency action will be set
aside as arbitrary if it is unsupported by 'substantial evidence."' 49 The factual
support required to withstand the arbitrary and capricious analysis does not
substantially differ from the factual support required to satisfy the substantial
evidence standard. 0 A decision, therefore, unsupported by substantial evi-
dence "in the APA sense" would be arbitrary." Recognizing that courts have
characterized the substantial evidence standard as more demanding, the Tenth
Circuit stated that adopting the convergence theory did not entail substituting
the arbitrary and capricious standard with the "arguably more stringent" sub-
stantial evidence standard. 2
3. Analysis
In the context of analyzing factual support, a dual application of both the
arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence standards"' results in "con-
vergence theory," the ultimate test of reasonableness. 4 The Tenth Circuit, in
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,5 equat-
ed its practice of deferring to agencies on questions of law with a reasonable-
ness test that agencies use to interpret statutes. 6 Because the convergence
theory entails both the arbitrary and capricious and the substantial evidence
standards, the Tenth Circuit may have implicitly equated all three stan-
dards-convergence, reasonableness, and the practice of deference-while
applying them to a question of law." Since Judge Scalia's theory was based
46. Id. at 1580.
47. Id.; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(explaining that the reviewing court may only uphold an agency's decision on its own rationale).
For a discussion of the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, see supra notes 26-35
and accompanying text.
48. Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575 (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Board of Governors, Inc., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84); see Fox, supra note 1, §76[C] (ex-
plaining Judge Scalia's view that substantial evidence is a specific application of the arbitrary and
capricious standard and does not require more factual support).
51. O/enhouse, 42 F.3d at 1575 (quoting Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684).
52. Id. at 1575-76.
53. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
54. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84 (citing ScHwARTz, supra note 1, § 10.8);
BONFIELD & ASIMOW, supra note 22, § 9.4, at 625.
55. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
56. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1486 (citing Long Island Lighting Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 20 F.3d 494, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
57. Id. at 1487 (holding that the agency decision was "a rationally based, reasonable con-
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on the standards' operation when determining questions of factual support, the
extension of the convergence theory to at least some questions of law may
turn "substantial evidence" into a threshold requirement to support both factual
and legal determinations."
Although courts have traditionally described the arbitrary and capricious
standard as "more lenient" than the substantial evidence standard, it may only
be "less stringent" in regard to the distinction between what evidence a court
may or may not rely on when reviewing an agency's decision." When re-
viewing an agency's informal decision under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, a court may consider all of the information that was before the agency
when it made its decision.' A review of formal agency action, on the other
hand, limits the court to the closed record.6 Consequently, the arbitrary and
capricious standard appears to be more lenient only in regard to the nature of
the record that a court may review to determine whether an agency's decision
was rational. Both standards, however, apparently require the same quantum of
evidence to support an agency's decision. Regardless of where the court finds
factual support during its review of an informal decision, "substantial evi-
dence" appears to be the minimum amount of evidence required to uphold an
agency's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard.62
4. Other Circuits
The Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have adopted the convergence
theory, and, therefore, appear to view the distinction between the arbitrary and
capricious and substantial evidence standards as "largely semantic" regarding
review of the factual bases of agency decisions.63 The Second Circuit views
struction, and is, therefore, entitled to ... deference"). See generally discussion infra part I.B
(discussing Northwest Pipeline and judicial review of questions of law). Note, however, that com-
ments made prior to Northwest Pipeline question the propriety of equating questions of law with
questions of fact. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.8.
58. See Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84 (discussing the convergence of the arbitrary
and capricious standard and the substantial evidence standard).
59. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.4 ("While the Court consistently characterizes
the arbitrary and capricious test as less demanding than the substantial evidence test, the Court has
never explained the difference between the two."); see American Paper Inst. v. American Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983) (describing arbitrary and capricious as the more
lenient standard). The arbitrary and capricious standard does serve a purpose independent of re-
view for factual support. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 11.4, at 203. The standard
ensures that the agency engaged in "reasoned decision making" and included an explanation of
how it reached its decision. Id. In a sense, this element is implied in the substantial evidence stan-
dard because the formal record will contain the basis for the agency's decision.
60. E.g., Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684.
61. See id. This limit did not originate with the arbitrary and capricious standard, but rather
in 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994), which requires that "the agency ... give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule making." Id.
62. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 950 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing other Seventh Circuit
cases which found the distinction to be semantic); Amusement and Music Operators Ass'n v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 676 F.2d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir.) (holding that the distinction is largely
semantic and that the criteria tend to converge), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Associated
Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that the "con-
troversy is semantic in some degree"); see also Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the
Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal
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the significance of the substantial evidence standard as "limiting the agency to
the confines of the public record." Under informal action, however, the
D.C. Circuit applies the arbitrary and capricious standard to the evidence be-
fore an agency.' Under both standards, the quanta of support needed to up-
hold an agency decision are identical.'
Judge Scalia, however, acknowledged in Data Processing that there are
cases in which the standards do not converge. 67 An agency's action may be
arbitrary if it is an "abrupt and unexplained departure from agency precedent,"
even though it may be supported by substantial evidence." The arbitrary and
capricious standard thus operates as a "catchall, picking up administrative
misconduct" by enabling courts to strike down agency decisions as arbitrary
where the substantial evidence test is not applicable.69
B. Deference to Agencies on Questions of Law:
Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission'
1. Background
The standard of review for agency decisions has been traditionally depen-
dent upon whether the issue was one of fact or law.7' As experts in a regu-
lated area, agencies were traditionally responsible for determining facts.72
Reviewing courts, therefore, accorded substantial deference to an agency's
factual decisions.73 Conversely, courts traditionally reviewed questions of law
de novo based upon courts' expertise in applying and interpreting the law.74
In 1984, the Court altered the traditional distinction between law and fact
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.75 In
Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541, 553 (1986) (listing cases that apply the convergence
theory).
64. Associated Indus., 487 F.2d at 349-50.
65. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 684-85; McGrath, supra note 63, at 555.
66. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683-84 ("[lIt is impossible to conceive of a 'nonarbitrary'
factual judgment supported only by evidence that is not substantial in the APA sense.").
67. Id. at 684-85; McGrath, supra note 63, at 555.
68. Data Processing, 745 F.2d at 683.
69. Id.
70. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
71. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.5, at 632; Phillip G. Oldham, Regulatory Consent De-
crees: An Argument for Deference to Agency Interpretations, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 396 (1995)
("Traditional common law notions guided the early period in administrative law, dividing the
authority of courts and agencies along the lines of law and fact-similar to the roles played by
judge (law) and jury (fact).").
72. Oldham, supra note 71, at 396.
73. ScHwARTZ, supra note 1, § 10.6.
74. Id. (describing the "law-fact distinction"). De novo review is defined as reviewing the
matter "as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been previously rendered."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990); see also Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960) (noting that an agency's contract interpretation is subject to
de novo review); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("[l]f the action is based upon a
determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an or-
der may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.").
75. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Oldham, supra note 71, at 395 (explaining how Chevron "ex-
ploded the idea that courts are best situated to interpret statutes"); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes,
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Chevron, the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the EPA's inter-
pretation of the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act.76 The Court
determined that the EPA's interpretation reflected a pure policy decision in an
area where Congress had delegated authority to the EPA."' The Court's deci-
sion produced a two-part test for judicial review of an agency's statutory con-
struction."
First, courts must determine if "Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue."79 Both courts and agencies must defer to clear Con-
gressional intent." Once Congress has resolved any policy disputes, any re-
maining issue becomes one of law." By deferring to the agency's statutory
interpretation, as required by Chevron, the Court "gives force to the principle
of legislative supremacy" by requiring policy decisions to be made by the
elected branches of government.8 2
Second, policy issues arise when congressional intent is unclear or ambig-
uous. 3 As a result, the reviewing court must apply step two of the Chevron
test which determines "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute," and thus implements the underlying policy. 4
Since the Court decided Chevron in 1984, the case's impact has been
enormous, as courts have applied its test in over 1,000 cases. 5 The wide-
spread application of the Chevron analysis, however, has produced an
73 TEx. L. REV. 83, 87 (1994) ("Prior to Chevron... the primary and ultimate authority for
interpreting statutes resided in the judiciary.").
76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41. The statute at issue in Chevron required "permits for the
construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources." 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5)
(1994). Congress did not explicitly define "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act or its legisla-
tive history, but did provide that the administrator was to take into account both economic and
environmental interests. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1)(A). The EPA defined "stationary source" to in-
clude all sources within the same industrial grouping, forming the bubble concept. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 840.
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-66.
78. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.2 (discussing the Chevron "two-step").
79. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The Court found the legislative history, though unclear on the
precise issue, supportive of the EPA's broad discretion to implement the amendments to the Clean
Air Act. Id. at 862.
80. Id. at 842-43.
81. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3.
82. Id. § 3.3, at 116. Chevron allows Congress to check the executive branch by insuring
that Congress's intent is carried out and it encourages Congress to resolve policy disputes at the
legislative stage. Id.; see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (reasoning that Chevron's separation
of powers rationale allows policy decisions to be determined by political branches rather than the
unelected judiciary branch). But see Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency
Interpretations of Statutes? A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275 (arguing that Chevron's deference requirement is a self-
imposed limit based on justiciability grounds rather than being constitutionally or statutorily re-
quired).
83. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3; see Pauly v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680, 696 (1991) (noting that the "resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a ques-
tion of policy than of law"); Oldham, supra note 71, at 393 (explaining that "Chevron's explicit
recognition that statutory interpretation involves significant policy choices has changed the legal
landscape").
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
85. 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.2, at 110 (stating that "Chevron is one of the
most important decisions in the history of administrative law").
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expansion beyond the "policy" and "law" distinction that the Court initially
made in Chevron.s6 One form that this expansion takes is the interpretation
of contracts by agencies.
2. Tenth Circuit Opinion
a. Facts
In Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,7
the Tenth Circuit reviewed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERC) interpretation of a natural gas tariff.8 The tariff applied to
Northwest's "unbundled" customers.89 In response to FERC's order, North-
west filed its tariff in 1985, initiating "open access" transportation under the
Natural Gas Policy Act?0 Section 14.8 of the Act "required each shipper to
pay ... a fuel reimbursement percentage ["FRP"] rate to compensate North-
west for the shipper's pro rata share of the system fuel."' Northwest calcu-
lated its unbundled customers' FRP "by dividing the total amount of system
fuel by the unbundled customers' total annual transportation volumes."92
Northwest Natural Gas Company, one of Northwest's unbundled customers,
challenged the rate by claiming that Northwest had been incorrect in calculat-
ing the FRP based only on unbundled customers' transportation volume in-
stead of the "total annual volume" that the tariff required.93 Northwest's cal-
culation resulted in a higher FRP rate for unbundled customers.94 In interpret-
ing section 14.8 of Northwest's tariff, the commission determined that "total
annual volume" included both unbundled and bundled customers.95 The com-
mission therefore ordered Northwest to issue refunds to affected unbundled
customers. 96
86. See Oldham, supra note 71, at 399-412 (discussing Chevron's expansion to interpretation
of contracts and regulations, and arguing for expansion to agency consent decrees).
87. 61 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1995).
88. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1481-85.
89. Id. at 1482. Bundled customers are charged a single rate for both transportation and
storage costs. Id. Unbundled customers "are charged separately for each component of the ser-
vice." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. System fuel is the amount of fuel lost through leaks plus the amount used to run the
pipeline. Id. Section 14.8 of Northwest's tariff states, "Fuel use requirements shall be determined
using a factor calculated by dividing the total annual fuel and lost and unaccounted-for gas for
Transporter's total transmission system, by the total annual volumes, including gas used for fuel
and lost and unaccounted-for gas." Id. (quoting Northwest Pipeline Corp., 65 F.E.R.C. 61,046,
61,428 n.2 (1993)).
92. Id. at 1483.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1484. The commission concluded that "total annual volume" included both bun-
dled and unbundled customers based on the same canons of contract interpretation that a court
would employ. Id. at 1486.
96. Id. at 1484.
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b. Decision
In reviewing FERC's interpretation of the tariff, the Tenth Circuit adopted
the D.C. Circuit's rationale and concluded that Chevron entitles FERC's inter-
pretation of contractual language to judicial deference.97 The Tenth Circuit
determined that Chevron's emphasis on deference to agency expertise "implic-
itly modified earlier cases that adhered to the traditional rule of withholding
deference on questions of contract interpretation." '98 Because FERC has "vast
experience in the interpretation" of tariffs, the principles underlying Chevron
"clearly dictate[d]" deference to FERC's interpretation." The court concluded
that FERC applied the ordinary meaning of the word "total," which allowed it
to be read consistently throughout the section."° The Tenth Circuit held that
under the adopted D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Chevron, FERC's interpreta-
tion was reasonable and entitled to deference even if it was different than the
interpretation the court itself would have reached.'
3. Analysis
Although the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Williams Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," it remains unclear to
what extent the court will extend deferential treatment outside the area of
tariffs governed by FERC. The Chevron Court reasoned that policy decisions
should be made at the agency level since agencies are closer to the directly
elected executive and legislative branches.0 3 This separation of powers dis-
tinction between policy decisions and questions of law may severely limit the
courts' role as a check on the elected branches of government. Under the
Chevron distinction, a court can only refuse to give deference to an agency's
decision when that agency has disregarded the express intent of Congress. This
interpretation of Chevron may limit a court's ability to exercise effective re-
view, or to engage in "judicial policymaking,"' to situations where the
court perceives a clear attempt to undermine congressional intent, deems it
necessary to exercise a check on the executive and legislative branches, and
feels justified in applying a heightened level of review.
97. Id. at 1486 (citing Williams Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 3
F.3d 1544, 1549 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
98. Id. (quoting Williams Natural Gas, 3 F.3d at 1549 and National Fuel Gas Supply Corp.
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869
(1987)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1487. Northwest's interpretation requires the word "total" to take on two different
meanings. Id. For statutory language of the applicable tariff provision, see supra note 91.
101. Northwest Pipeline, 61 F.3d at 1487.
102. 3 F.3d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
104. 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 32, § 3.3, at 113 (stating that the courts "engage in





The D.C. Circuit has concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron diminished the lower courts' ability to exercise de novo review on
questions of law involving contract interpretations.0 5 According to the D.C.
Circuit, Chevron implicitly modifies cases that have withheld deference on
contract interpretation questions'" In National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission," the D.C. Circuit stated that the
agency's greater expertise with the agreement supports deferential review;
however, Chevron alone was sufficient to compel granting deference.0 8
Even when granting deference to an agency's interpretation of a contract,
the reviewing court still must determine if the agency's interpretation is sup-
ported both factually and legally."l An agency's decision must be the result
of reasoned decision-making as ascertained from the record."0 The D.C. Cir-
cuit described three situations in which deference would be inappropriate.'"
First, where an agency's interpretation has vacillated, "granting deference
might give the agency license to act arbitrarily by making inconsistent deci-
sions without justification."" 2 Second, "if the agency itself were an interest-
ed party," deference may be inappropriate." 3 Third, the court would not re-
quire deference where Congress intended courts to independently review agen-
cy decisions." 4
105. National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 811 F.2d 1563,
1570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987). Chevron held that unless Congress directly
addresses the precise issue, a court may not "impose its own construction on the statute," but must
determine if "the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843.
106. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1570. The D.C. Circuit cited Texas Gas Transmission Corp.
v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960), which upheld an agency's de novo review of a
contract, as being modified by Chevron. Id.
107. 811 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987).
108. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1570; see also Williams Natural Gas, 3 F.3d at 1549-50
(quoting National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1570) (finding that even where a settlement agreement was
purely private, FERC approval is only a further factor for granting deference since "Chevron prin-
ciples alone compel this conclusion").
109. Tarpon Transmission Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 860 F.2d 439, 442
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Vermont Dep't of Public Serv. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
817 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); see Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 745 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that "a court need [not] accept an agency
interpretation that black means white"), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
110. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 26 F.3d 1129,
1135 (D.C. Ci. 1994) (denying the Commission's interpretation); Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 20 F.3d 494, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that the
Commission's interpretation was unreasonable); Tarpon Transmission, 860 F.2d at 442 (conclud-
ing that an agency's analysis was inadequate for meaningful review). But see Natural Gas
Clearinghouse v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 965 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(stating that the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking and upholding the agency's decision
by granting it "substantial deference").
111. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1571.
112. Id. National Fuel only suggested a vacillation exception, it did not adopt one. Williams
Natural Gas, 3 F.3d at 1550.
113. National Fuel, 811 F.2d at 1571.
114. Id.
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In contrast to these opinions, the Fifth Circuit, in Mid Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,"5 held that courts are not re-
quired to defer to agency interpretations when reviewing a settlement con-
tract.1 6 The court stated that contract construction is a question of law which
courts can review "freely.""' 7 The court noted that when the agency's special
understanding of the subject matter enhances its interpretation, there "may be
room to defer to the views of the agency," but such interpretations are not
conclusive."' In Mid Louisiana Gas, however, the Commission relied solely
on the language of the agreement, so there was no agency interpretation to
which the Fifth Circuit could afford deference." 9
II. DEFINING THE RECORD FOR REVIEW IN SOCIAL SECURITY CASES:
O'DELL V. SHALALA 20
A. Background
A determination of social security benefits consists of four stages prior to
judicial review. 2' An initial determination of a claimant's eligibility for ben-
efits and a request for reconsideration constitute the first two stages.'22 If a
claimant seeks reconsideration, the third stage consists of a de novo review of
the initial agency decision at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(AU).'23 The ALJ conducts an informal review and bases her decision on
the evidence presented at the hearing.'24 An ALJ's decision is binding unless
a claimant proceeds to the fourth stage by requesting review at the Appeals
Council (AC)." The AC determines, upon review, whether or not the ALJ
115. 780 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1986).
116. Mid Louisiana Gas, 780 F.2d at 1243; see also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 724 F.2d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that questions of law do
not require technical expertise and are freely reviewable by the court).
117. Mid Louisiana Gas, 780 F.2d at 1243.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 44 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1994).
121. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (1995). See generally John J. Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency
in Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social Security's Medical-Vocational
Guidelines-Two Birds with One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REv. 329, 334-
35 (1983) (discussing the social security claims process); Wayne A. Kalkwarf, The Jurisdictional
Dilemma in Reopening Social Security Decisions, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 545 (1989-90) (discuss-
ing the review and reopening procedures for social security); F. William Hessmer IV, Notes and
Comments, Own Motion Review of Disability Benefit Awards by the Social Security Administra-
tion Appeals Council: The Improper Use of an Important Procedure, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 141, 143
(1988) (discussing the social security adjudication process and levels of agency consideration for
disability claims).
122. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(l)-(a)(2).
123. Id. § (a)(3); Kalkwarf, supra note 121, at 548.
124. Kalkwarf, supra note 121, at 548; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1995) (describing the
AU hearing process which allows claimant to "appear in person, submit new evidence, examine
the evidence used in making the determination or decision under review, and present and question
witnesses").
125. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (1995); 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(4); see also Larry M. Gropman,
Fifteenth Annual Survey of Sixth Circuit Law, Social Security, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 871, 873
(stating that the Appeals Council's purpose is to provide final agency review, ensuring that ALJ
decisions are consistent with overall agency policy).
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based her decision on substantial evidence, abused her discretion, or erred on a
question of law.'2 6 The AC also reviews decisions involving "broad policy or
procedural issue[s]" affecting the public interest.'27
On review, the AC can consider any new evidence that is both material
and relates to the period during which the AU made her decision. 2 ' The
AC, however, relies heavily on the ALJ record when reviewing the AL's
decision.'2 9 Once the AC reviews a case, considers the new evidence, and
renders a decision, that decision is final and the next opportunity for review
occurs at the federal district court level. 3 If the AC denies review by deter-
mining that the new evidence is not material, the ALJ's decision becomes final
and the complainant may then seek judicial review outside of the agency."'
Review in federal district court is available only for "final decisions.' 2
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides the statutory basis for judicial review.'33 A
claimant must, therefore, exhaust all possible administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial review.'34
Courts review social security decisions under the substantial evidence
standard. 5 The reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence
supports the record, but it "may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute
its judgment for that of the agency."'36 The court may also remand the case,
126. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)-(a)(3) (1995).
127. Id. § (a)(4).
128. Id. § (b). Section 404.970(b) states:
If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council shall consider the addi-
tional evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the date of the adminis-
trative law judge hearing decision. The Appeals Council shall evaluate the entire record
including the new and material evidence .... It will then review the case if it finds that
the administrative law judge's action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of
the evidence currently of record.
Id. (emphasis added). The new and material evidence must relate to this time period since the
evidentiary record is closed after the AU decision. Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The
Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security
Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 250 (1990).
129. Hessmer, supra note 121, at 146.
130. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1995); 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(5). A claim must be filed in federal
court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
131. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955(b).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988 & Supp. 1993); Hessmer, supra note 121, at 146 (explaining
that the Appeals Council decision, or the AU's decision if the Appeals Council denies review,
constitutes the final stage of the social security adjudication process). Jurisdiction is granted re-
gardless of the amount in controversy. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
133. Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, When Is Claim Sufficiently Presented to Secretary of Health
and Human Services to Permit Judicial Review Under § 405(g) of Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)), 99 A.L.R. FED. 198, § 2[al, at 203 (1990).
134. Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, Provision of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) Making the Secretary of
Health and Human Services' Findings of Fact Conclusive If Supported by Substantial Evidence As
Applying to Administrative Law Judge or Social Security Council, 90 A.L.R. FED. 280, § 2[b], at
289 (1988) (stating that failure to exhaust administrative remedies will lead to dismissal since
section 405(g) only applies to "final decisions").
135. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See generally 2 HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SO-
CIAL SECuRnTY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES, §§ 672, 723, 728 (4th ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993) (dis-
cussing substantial evidence in social security cases).
136. Skutt, supra note 133, § 2[b], at 289. See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 135, §§
19961
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for good cause, to the Commissioner for consideration of new evidence. 3 7
Because § 405(g) requires a court to review the "final decision," and neither §
405(g) nor the regulations define the record of the "final decision" that the
district court must review, the opinions of the circuit courts differ on what
constitutes the proper record of review.'38
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in O'Dell, two district courts within
the Tenth Circuit were in conflict with regard to what record to review.'39 In
Jones v. Sullivan,'" the court held that when the AC denies review, the new
evidence submitted to the AC for consideration becomes part of the record for
review.' 4' The O'Dell district court reached a contrary result, holding that
new evidence submitted to the AC was not part of the record on review. 42
The Tenth Circuit took the opportunity to resolve the conflict when O'Dell
came before it on appeal.'43
B. Tenth Circuit Opinion
1. Facts
In O'Dell v. Shalala,'" O'Dell applied for disability benefits alleging an
inability to work. 45 The ALJ determined that O'Dell did not suffer from a
disabling knee condition during the insured period and denied benefits." On
appeal to the AC, O'Dell submitted two new pieces of evidence concerning
her condition."' The AC determined that O'Dell's "new evidence did not
provide a basis for changing the ALJ's decision and declined review.'
'
4
672, 723, 728 (describing the application of substantial evidence during social security review).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g). Section 40 5(g) states:
The court may ... for good cause shown ... remand the case to the Secretary .... and
it may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only
upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good
cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior pro-
ceeding....
Id. Remand may be allowed where there is a combination of an unrepresented claimant, failure of
the ALJ to fully explore facts and leads, and brevity of the oral hearing. 2 McCoRMICK, supra
note 135, § 754, at 331.
138. Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (11th Cir.
1994). For a discussion of circuit court decisions defining the record of review, see infra notes
161-71 and accompanying text.
139. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 857-58 (noting that the district court for the Western District of Okla-
homa refused to consider new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council); Jones v. Sullivan, 804
F. Supp. 1398, 1404 (D. Kan. 1992) (allowing new evidence to be considered).
140. 804 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Kan. 1992).
141. Jones, 804 F. Supp. at 1404 (adopting the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Nelson v.
Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992)).
142. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 857-58.
143. Id.
144. 44 F.3d 855 (10th Cir. 1994).
145. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 857.
146. Id.
147. Id. O'Dell submitted a report showing degenerative osteoarthritic changes in her knee
and a physician's letter stating that O'Dell had difficulty standing and walking due to her knee
condition. Id.
148. Id. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (listing the types of cases that the Appeals Coun-




The Tenth Circuit held that the record on review includes new evidence
presented to the AC where the AC declines further review of an AU deci-
sion. 49 After discussing other circuit courts' treatments of the issue, the
Tenth Circuit based its decision to consider new evidence on several fac-
tors. 50 First, relying on 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), the court determined that
the Secretary's regulation "gives a claimant a last opportunity to demonstrate
disability before the decision becomes final."'' Second, the court noted that
the section requires the AC to "evaluate the entire record including the new
and material evidence submitted."''5 2 Last, also under § 404.970(b), the AC
must review the ALJ's decision if the "decision is contrary to the weight of
evidence 'currently of record."""5 In O'Dell, the court determined that the
regulation appeared to incorporate the new evidence into the final record.
5 4
The court therefore concluded that, although the AC declined further review
and upheld the ALl's decision, thus completing the final adjudication within
the agency, the Secretary's final decision included the new evidence consid-
ered by the AC.'55
C. Analysis
Upon review, a court must determine whether the record supports the
AL's decision and whether the AC's decision that the evidence was not "new
and material" was correct, thereby justifying the AC's denial of further re-
view. "'56 To make this determination, a court must review both the AU's re-
cord and the new evidence that the AC relied upon in reaching its conclusion.
Despite the fact that considering "new evidence" on appeal is seemingly
inconsistent with the notion of appellate review,'57 such consideration en-
sures compliance with regulations governing the adjudication process.'58 On-
ly by examining the new evidence presented to the AC may a court determine
whether the AC's decision denying review was correct.'59 The regulations
149. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859.
150. Id. at 858-59. The Tenth Circuit noted that the Seventh and Sixth Circuits review the
AU's decision without considering new evidence while the Fourth, Eight, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits include the new evidence in the final decision under review. Id. For a discussion of other
circuit decisions, see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
151. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (authorizing the Appeals Council to
consider new evidence without a showing of good cause).
152. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)) (emphasis added). For the text
of 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), see supra note 128.
153. O'Dell, 44 F.3d at 859 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id. Upon considering the new evidence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision that the Secretary's decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
at 860.
156. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (discussing the effect of the decision); 20 C.F.R. §
404.970 (describing types of cases the Appeals Council will review). By considering the "new"
evidence, which in a sense is no longer "new" once the Appeals Council has considered it, courts
ensure agency compliance with the regulations. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 ("If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals
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establish that once a court determines that the AC was correct in denying re-
view, the ALI's decision becomes final; as a result, a court must examine the
merits of the AL's decision in order to assess whether that decision was
justified." As a result of the division of the process into two distinct seg-
ments, the court is not required to reweigh evidence, only to examine each
record to ensure compliance with the regulations.
D. Other Circuits
Several circuits have held that the record on review must include new
evidence submitted to the AC, even where the AC has denied review.'6 ' The
Ninth Circuit argues that since the AC evaluates the new evidence in deter-
mining whether to review the ALl's decision, courts must consider the new
evidence to determine if the ALJ's decision remains supported by substantial
evidence.' 6 The Eleventh Circuit maintains that each appeal within the ad-
ministrative process contributes to the final record.'63 When the AC denies
review, therefore, the new evidence that it considered becomes part of this re-
cord.'"
In contrast, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that new evidence
presented when the AC denies review may not automatically be considered by
the reviewing court.'65 The Seventh Circuit summarized its position in Eads
v. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services," in an at-
tempt to persuade other circuits who are debating the issue to consider its
view.'67 The Seventh Circuit explained that when the AC denies review, this
limits the reviewing federal court to a determination of the correctness of the
Council shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the
date of the administrative law judge hearing decision.") (emphasis added).
160. 20 C.F.R. § 404.955(b) (providing that an ALl's decision is binding unless the Appeals
Council denies review and a claimant seeks judicial review).
161. See, e.g., Keeton v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1067 (1lth
Cir. 1994) (stating that new evidence first submitted to the Appeals Council is part of the record
on review); Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994) (considering new evidence but
noting that weighing evidence is a "peculiar task for a reviewing court"); Ramirez v. Shalala, 8
F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that when the Appeals Council examines new evidence
while reviewing the ALU's decision, the evidence is included in the record); Nelson v. Sullivan,
966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that newly submitted evidence not included in the ALl
record became part of the record when it was submitted to the Appeals Council); Wilkins v. De-
partment of Heath and Human Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cit. 1991) (holding that the Appeals
Council properly incorporated new evidence into the record, which in turn must be considered
when reviewing the Secretary's final decision).
162. Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1452.
163. Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1067.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that claimant must
demonstrate good cause justifying remand for consideration of new evidence); Micus v. Bowen,
979 F.2d 602, 606 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that courts do not consider new evidence presented
to the Appeals Council when reviewing the Secretary's final decision because the AU did not
have access to it); Wyatt v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that a court can remand for consideration of new evidence only on a showing that
the new evidence is material).
166. 983 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1993).
167. Eads, 983 F.2d at 818.
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ALJ's decision."6 To determine whether the AL's decision was correct, a
court may look only to evidence presented to the AL, not evidence submitted
to the AC.
69
The Seventh Circuit, in turn, justified its position by emphasizing that
considering new evidence requires a court to "sift and weigh evidence," rather
than review "evidentiary determinations," thereby altering the court's appellate
function. 7 ' Since weighing evidence is "inconsistent with the fundamental
tenets of appellate review," the Seventh Circuit argued that courts must re-
mand pursuant to § 405(g) in order to properly establish an arena for the con-
sideration of new evidence. 7'
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's continued trend of deference to agency decisions calls
into question the ability of administrative law to protect individuals against
abuses of an agency's power. Recent decisions have illustrated this trend by
expanding deference to agency interpretations of contracts, and by converging
the substantial evidence and the arbitrary and capricious standards. By con-
tinuing to interpret the standards of review as limiting the court's ability to
question agency decisions, the Tenth Circuit has denied adequate protection to
individuals.' The Tenth Circuit did give more credence to the protections of
administrative law in the realm of social security by reviewing all of the evi-
dence presented in the administrative agency review procedures. Since agen-
cies have the authority to promulgate, enforce, and adjudicate rules, the level
of scrutiny that courts exercise should reflect the agency's authority, thus
ensuring a sufficient check on the administrative branch.
Paul Enockson
168. Id. at 817.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 817-18.
171. Id. The minority circuits argue that the proper procedure should be to remand pursuant to
§ 405(g), under which the claimant must prove that her evidence is "new and material." Cotton, 2
F.3d at 696. However, the regulations do not require a showing of good cause, as required by §
405(g), for consideration of new evidence. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (lacking a good cause
requirement) with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (stating that a showing of good cause for evidence submit-
ted during the administrative process would undermine the Secretary's regulations specifically
allowing evidence to be submitted without such a showing).
172. See SCHWARTz, supra note 1, § 10.1, at 624 (arguing that judicial review becomes





During the survey period between September 1994 and September 1995,
the Tenth Circuit decided four arbitration cases. Two of these cases have fairly
narrow consequences because they concern arbitration only in the securities
industry. In Metz v. Merrill Lynch,' the court held that Title VII claims must
be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in an agreement be-
tween a broker and the National Securities Dealers Association.2 In Kelley v.
Michaels,3 the court extended the authority of arbitrators by allowing them to
award punitive damages under a contract containing conflicting choice of law
and arbitration clauses on punitive awards.4
The two cases involving arbitration outside the securities industry have
broader implications. In Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries,5 the court
refined the scope of arbitration agreements by holding that "arising in connec-
tion with" language mandates arbitration of disputes sufficiently connected to a
contract containing an arbitration agreement.6 In ARW Exploration Corp. v.
Aguirre,7 the court held that an arbitrator may not use the alter ego principle'
to compel nonparties to arbitrate because only the court, not the arbitrator,
may compel a party to arbitrate. 9
This Survey first presents background information on each of these recent
cases. It then discusses the decisions and analyzes their ramifications. The
Survey examines the holdings of these cases in light of similar decisions by
other circuits and offers some explanation of the rationale behind the deci-
sions.
I. ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
Arbitration, used in the securities industry for over a century, 0 has be-
come an important part of the trade, with approximately 6,600 cases submitted
to arbitration per year." Arbitration resolves disputes between securities
1. 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1487-88.
3. 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995).
4. Kelley, 59 F. 3d at 1055.
5. 51 F.3d 1511 (l0th Cir. 1995).
6. Molson, 51 F.3d at 1515.
7. 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
9. ARW Exploration Corp., 45 F.3d at 1460-61.
10. Amy Hutner, U.S. General Accounting Office Report Re Employment Discrimination:
How Registered Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes, in SEcURrIES ARBITRATION
1994, at 453 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 852, 1994).
11. Martin L. Budd, Securities Industry Arbitration-Recent Issues, C977 ALI-ABA 205,
207 (1995).
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firms, between firms and customers, and between firms and their employ-
ees. 2 While the American Arbitration Association handles eight to ten per-
cent of the cases, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) man-
ages the majority of cases.'3
A. Employee Statutory Rights in the Securities Industry
1. Background
In some instances, the increasingly broad scope of arbitration 4 intersects
with a large assortment of federal statutory rights for employees. 5 For exam-
ple, under Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination and encourag-
es equal employment opportunities, 6 an employee may pursue remedies in
several forums. 7 These include state and local agencies and the federal
courts. 8 Title VII and arbitration intersect because the right to a jury trial
granted by Title VII does not render a claim inappropriate for arbitration.'
The statutory right to a judicial forum clashes with contractual rights stem-
ming from contractual language that mandates an arbitral forum.
The securities industry routinely utilizes arbitration clauses. For example,
when a brokerage house employs a securities broker as a registered representa-
tive,2" industry regulatory organizations require the broker to sign a "Uniform
Application for Securities and Commodities Industry Representative and/or
Agent Form."'" The form, a private agreement between the employee and the
regulatory organization, contains a clause requiring arbitration of disputes
between the employee broker and the employer brokerage firm.2 2 An
12. Hutner, supra note 10, at 451.
13. Budd, supra note 11, at 207.
14. In the mid-to-late 1980s, a series of Supreme Court cases significantly expanded the
scope of arbitrable disputes, including claims based on statutory rights. Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that a statutory claim must be
arbitrated under a predispute arbitration agreement unless the agreement was the result of fraud or
the arbitration would undermine the statutory right); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (stating that an agreement to arbitrate future statutory claims must
be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary,
which may be inferred if the statute's underlying purpose conflicts with arbitration); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (explaining that an interna-
tional agreement containing a broad arbitration clause subjects antitrust claims to arbitration).
15. IAN R. MACNEIL Er AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 16.5.1.1 (1994). Other statutori-
ly-created employee rights include those granted by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); the Employee Retirement Income Security Program Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988); and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§
201-219 (1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
17. Id. § 200oe-5(f)(3).
18. Id.
19. Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
638 (1994).
20. Registered representatives are firm employees who deal with customers' buy-sell orders.
Hutner, supra note 10, at 451.
21. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 13.3.3.
22. Id. Though brokerage firms require that brokers with the firm register with one of the
regulatory organizations such as NASD, the registration applications do not fall under the Federal
Arbitration Act § I employment exception because the applications are not employment contracts.
id. at § 16.5.3.1; see also Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991)
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employee may nevertheless seek to avoid arbitration of statutory claims based
on a public policy argument,23 citing the inadequacy of arbitration to address
statutory rights.24
A landmark arbitration case, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2
opened the door to mandated arbitration of statutory claims and severely cur-
tailed the public policy argument.26 In Gilmer, pursuant to an arbitration
clause contained in a broker's representative application, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Ace7 (ADEA) was subject to mandatory arbitration." The Fifth Circuit ex-
tended the reach of Gilmer by holding that a broker's Title VII claim must be
arbitrated. 9 A broad reading of Gilmer permits arbitration of any statutory
claim when an employment contract contains an arbitration agreement."
When determining whether to mandate arbitration of statutory claims,
courts tend to apply Gilmer mechanically and compel arbitration.3 Although
(explaining that an arbitration agreement contained in a securities registration agreement does not
fall under the FAA § I contract of employment exception).
23. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 13.3.4.
24. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-57 (1974) (holding that Title VII
claims are not suitable for arbitration). As an informal procedure, arbitration is inappropriate to
deal with statutory rights due to inadequate fact finding, procedural inadequacies, and the like-
lihood of a decision based on the parties' agreement rather than the statute or application of in-
dustry standards rather than law. Id. But see Patrick 0. Gudridge, Title VII Arbitration, 16 BERKE-
LEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 209, 210 n.4 (1995) ("At minimum, it might be thought, the
Gardner-Denver line is no longer relevant outside the collective bargaining context."). See gener-
ally MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 11.6 (stating that the public policy defense is most often
available in a collective bargaining context).
25. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
28. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27. The Court rejected the employee's broad policy argument that
compulsory arbitration does not comport with the underlying purpose of the ADEA. Id. at 26-27.
The decision also rested in part on the Federal Arbitration Act's policy favoring arbitration. Id. at
25 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(explaining that the FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration")). Another important aspect of
Gilmer lies in the Court's discussion of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
The Court stated that Alexander involved arbitration in a collective bargaining context and was not
decided under the FAA. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22. By distinguishing Alexander in this manner, the
Court created two lines of cases regarding the appropriateness of arbitrating statutory claims. For a
discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions on collective bargaining arbitration, see Kerri M. Pertcheck,
Arbitration Survey, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 571 (1995). See generally Stephen W. Skrainka, The
Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements
for Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA Claims, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 985 (1993) (discussing the
role of arbitration in the collective bargaining context).
29. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
"[b]ecause both the ADEA and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes, and both are enforced by
the EEOC ... we have little trouble concluding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compul-
sory arbitration"). This case is especially relevant because of its importance to the court's decision
in Metz, discussed infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
30. Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspec-
tive on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS
LJ. 1187, 1189 (1993). Scholars, however, express wariness regarding arbitration of all statutory
claims because arbitration may resolve controversies based on nonlegal social values rather than
the law. Additionally, judicial forums are more suited to choose between conflicting public values
inherent in statutory claims. Id.
31. Id. at 1202; see Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir.
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some circuits have foreclosed the arbitration of Title VII claims based on ar-
bitration agreements in a securities registration,32 the majority of circuits re-
quire it.
33
2. Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
3 4
a. Facts
Kelli Lyn Metz, an employee of Merrill Lynch, registered as a broker
with NASD.3" An arbitration clause in the registration application required
Metz to arbitrate all disputes or claims with Merrill Lynch.36 Upon termina-
tion, Metz filed a district court complaint alleging Title VII violations. 7
Merrill Lynch responded with a motion to compel arbitration and stay court
proceedings.38 The district court held that the Title VII claims were not sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration.39 Merrill Lynch's motion to reconsider was
denied, and the company requested dismissal of a subsequent interlocutory
1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
32. Farrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cit. 1993) (concluding that the lan-
guage of the arbitration agreement does not require the arbitration of disputes between NASD
members and a registered representative of the member); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883
F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that based on the text of Title VII and congressional intent,
an employee cannot be required to arbitrate prior to a judicial hearing); Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining that Title VII promotes public
interest and arbitration may hamper this effort).
33. Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (stating the
plaintiff did not waive the right to a judicial forum since the dispute may be pursued in arbitration
and if those proceedings are legally deficient, the plaintiff may move for judicial review); Mago v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that in a private agree-
ment containing an arbitration clause, plaintiff did not meet the burden of showing congressional
intent to preclude Title VII arbitration because the purpose of Title VII is similar to that of the
ADEA); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that
an arbitration agreement contained in a securities registration agreement does not fall under the
FAA § 1 contract of employment exception and must therefore stand); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII claims, like ADEA
claims, are subject to arbitration under the FAA).
34. 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
35. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1485-86. Brokerage firms normally require brokers to register with a
regulatory organization. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
36. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1486. By registering with NASD, Metz agreed to abide by all NASD
rules. Metz v. Merrill Lynch, No. CIV-89-1548-P, 1990 WL 68532, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 1990). The
NASD Manual, 3744, states:
It may be deemed conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade and a
violation of Article III, Section 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice for a member or a person
associated with a member to fail to submit a dispute for arbitration under the Code of
Arbitration Procedure as required by that Code ....
Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488 n.6.
37. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1485-86. Already on probation for poor performance, Metz informed
management of her pregnancy. Id. Her immediate supervisor told Metz that women returning from
maternity leave often did not adequately perform their duties or failed to return at all. Id. Typi-
cally, the brokers decided how to distribute their accounts during a leave. Id. In this case, howev-
er, Metz's supervisor told her that he would make that decision. Id. Within two weeks, Metz and
her supervisor argued about one of Metz's accounts. Id. Metz was fired shortly thereafter. Id. The





appeal, citing multiple circuit court decisions holding that Title VII claims do
not have to be arbitratedi'
After the bench trial resulted in a $53,747 judgment for Metz on the Title
VII claim, Merrill Lynch filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sought to
compel arbitration of the Title VII claim. 4' The company based the motion to
vacate on a change in the law that occurred after the dismissal of the interloc-
utory appeal. 4' The district court denied the motion to vacate, denied a subse-
quent motion for reconsideration, and Merrill Lynch filed an appeal in the
Tenth Circuit.43
b. Decision
Relying on the Supreme Court's enforcement of the arbitration clause in
Gilmer, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Metz must arbitrate her Title VII
claim. 4 As an alternative to her main contention that Title VII claims do not
have to be arbitrated, Metz argued that FAA section 1 precluded arbitration
even if the Title VII claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. 4 FAA
section 1, however, does not apply to arbitration clauses contained in a regis-
tration application'8 and Metz's duty to arbitrate arose from her broker regis-
tration with NASD, not the employment contract with Merrill Lynch.47 As a




42. Id. In Alford v. Dean Witrer Reynolds, Inc., decided after Merrill Lynch sought dismissal
of the appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII claims may be subject to compulsory arbitration.
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
43. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1486.
44. Id. at 1487. The court based much of its reasoning on the similar purposes of the ADEA
and Title VII. "Congress closely modeled the ADEA upon Title VII and [the two] statutes are
similar both in their aims and in their substantive prohibitions." Id. (quoting Cooper v. Asplundh
Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553-54 (10th Cir. 1988)).
45. Id. at 1488. FAA § I provides in part that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1994).
46. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488. The Metz court relied on Gilmer.
[I]t would be inappropriate to address the scope of... [FAA] § I exclusion because the
arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a contract of employment ....
The record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's em-
ployment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the
arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's security registration application, which is a
contract with the securities exchange, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing
the issue uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause of § I of FAA is inap-
plicable to arbitration clauses contained in such registration application.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
47. Id.
48. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488. Although generally holding that Merrill Lynch has the right to
compel Metz to arbitrate her Title VII claims, the court further found that in this specific instance,
Merrill Lynch waived that right by failing to renew its final demand for arbitration in a timely
manner. Id. at 1490.
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3. Analysis
Regardless of the advantages of arbitration,"9 employees fear that manda-
tory arbitration of statutory claims forces 'them to relinquish their statutory
rights.50 By allowing mandatory arbitration of statutory rights, courts permit
employers to condition employment on the relinquishment of these rights.
Thus, through mandatory arbitration policies, business entities may escape the
requirements of regulatory legislation."
Attorney awareness of the potential consequences of entering into such
agreements reduces the risk that an employee will inadvertently waive statuto-
ry rights. Unequal bargaining power, however, makes it difficult to address
this risk regardless of the attorney's awareness. Employees have little chance
of influencing boilerplate language, such as the language contained in the
NASD arbitration clause. Unfortunately, the realities of the job market indicate
that employees will continue to sacrifice their right to a judicial forum in order
to obtain or retain employment.
4. Other Circuits 2
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits recently addressed mandatory arbitration of
Title VII claims based on arbitration agreements contained in securities regis-
tration applications. 3 Both of these cases were decided by circuit courts that
previously upheld mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims.5 4 The cases fur-
ther develop and refine the law surrounding mandatory arbitration of employ-
ment issues.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors55
differs from Metz in that the employee joined the brokerage firm before the
NASD arbitration rules included employment disputes. 6 But because the
49. "Speed, lower costs, informality, the ability to gain a more suitable neutral
decisionmaker, and privacy are the advantages usually cited in support of arbitration. Many of
arbitration's alleged advantages result from the autonomy parties gain when they decide to arbi-
trate rather than go to court." LEONARD L. RisKIN & JAMEs E. WESTBROOK, DisPuTE RESOLU-
TION AND LAWYERS 297 (1987).
50. Patrick D. Smith, Comment, Arbitration--The Court Opens the Door to Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 17 J. CORP. L. 865, 865 (1992);
see, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
51. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.5.4.1. For a general discussion of considerations in
employer-drafted mandatory arbitration policies, see Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet S. Uppal,
Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the
Workplace for the Twenty-First Century, C902 ALI-ABA 875 (1994).
52. The "Other Circuits" sections of this Survey discusses only federal circuit court cases
decided within the survey period of September 1994 to September 1995.
53. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995); Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
54. The court in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), found
that Title VII claims, based on their similarity to ADEA claims, are subject to arbitration under
the FAA. Id. at 230. The court in Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992), found that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of showing that Congress intended to pre-
clude Title VII arbitration because the purpose of Title VII corresponds to that of the ADEA. Id.
at 935.
55. 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995).
56. Williams, 56 F.3d at 659. The opinion also addressed a second contention that the em-
ployee did not knowingly and voluntarily surrender his right to a judicial forum, based on the
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employee signed a second registration after the amendment of the NASD
securities registration, the court held that he had agreed to arbitrate employ-
ment claims." By requiring the employee to arbitrate his Title VII claim, the
Fifth Circuit Court extended the reach of mandatory arbitration for Title VII
claims to the securities industry.
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, restricted compulsory arbitration of Title
VII claims in the securities industry in Prudential Insurance Company of
America v. Lai.5" The Lai court held that brokerage firm employees cannot be
subject to mandatory arbitration of Title VII claims without a "knowing"
waiver of statutory remedies." The decision relied on two factors.' First,
the court held that Congress intended that the waiver of statutory rights result
only from a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes.6 In Lai,
the registration application did not specifically describe the controversies cov-
ered under the arbitration clause.62 As a result, the employees did not know-
ingly surrender statutory remedies and could not be forced to arbitrate Title
VII claims.63
Second, the court recognized that the public policies underlying Title VII
deserve at least as much recognition as the FAA's arbitration policy.' The
court noted that arbitral forums, especially in sexual harassment cases, may
not be appropriate.65
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (1994). The Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA) requires a written waiver of statutory rights. The court determined that
the OWBPA did not apply here because it primarily involves waiver of claims and rights under
the statute rather than waiver of judicial forums. Williams, 56 F.3d at 660.
57. Williams, 56 F.3d at 658.
58. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
59. Prudential Ins. Co., 42 F.3d at 1304-05.
60. Id. In making this decision, the court relied heavily on Alexander, although it is normally
applied in a collective bargaining context. See supra note 28.
61. Prudential Ins. Co., 42 F.3d at 1304. According to a House of Representatives' report,
Congress intended to "encourage[] the use of alternative means of dispute resolution ... where
appropriate" and that alternative dispute resolution should "supplement, not supplant" the remedies
provided by Title VII. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635). In fact, Senator Dole specifically stated that arbitration should be
endorsed only "where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods." Id. at
1305 (quoting 137 CONG. REc. S15,472, S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Dole)).
62. Id. at 1302. The registration agreement stated, "I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy that may arise between me or my firm ... that is required to be arbitrated under the
rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations with which I register." Id. The NASD Manual,
in turn, requires that "[any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission under Part I of
this Code between or among members and/or associated persons... arising in connection with
the business of such member(s) or in connection with the activities of such associated person(s),
shall be arbitrated under this Code .... Id. (quoting NASD Manual, Code of Arbitration Proce-
dure, 3708).
63. Id. at 1305. In addition, the employees did not receive a copy of the NASD Manual. Id.
at 1303. However, even if they had, the court found the language would not give them notice that
they must arbitrate Title VII claims. Id. at 1305.
64. Id.
65. Id. "[Iln an area as personal and emotionally charged as sexual harassment and discrimi-
nation, the procedural right to a hearing before a jury of one's peers, rather than a [NASD arbitra-
tion] panel ... may be especially important." Id. at 1305 n.4.
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B. Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration
1. Background
As arbitrators' authority to decide substantive disputes continues to ex-
pand, their power to award punitive damages becomes increasingly important,
especially in the securities industry.' At one time the securities industry actu-
ally encouraged the use of arbitration, in part to avoid large jury awards.67
Brokers now complain, however, about arbitrators' power to make punitive
awards and the narrow grounds available to appeal such awards.'
Agreements routinely used in the securities industry often designate,
through choice of law clauses, the use of New York state law. Unlike most
states, New York does not allow arbitrators to grant punitive awards.' In the
same agreement, parties may agree to use certain arbitration rules, such as
those of the American Arbitration Association or NASD, which impliedly do
permit such awards." As a result, the arbitration clause may be inherently
contradictory.7 To further complicate an already complex situation, the FAA
does not directly address the propriety of arbitral punitive damage awards.72
Until recently, to determine if a particular arbitrator had the power to
award punitive damages, a court had to resolve the conflict between federal
law and divergent state laws by determining whether the FAA preempts state
law prohibiting punitive awards by arbitrators." Lacking guidance from the
Supreme Court, the Second and Seventh Circuits applied state law74 while
other circuits applied federal law." The Supreme Court resolved the circuit
courts' inconsistency by redefining the analysis of arbitrator-awarded punitive
damages in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.76
The Mastrobuono Court precluded use of the New York rule by finding
that if parties agree to arbitrate punitive damages, the FAA dictates
66. BERTHOLD H. HOENIGER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK app. 7 at 7-2 (1990).
67. J. Stratton Shartel, The Time Is Right for Limits on Punitive Damages in Securities Arbi-
tration Cases, INSIDE LITIG., Nov. 1994, at 2, 2.
68. Id.
69. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that the arbitrator
has no power to award punitive damages because it would violate public policy). The Second and
Seventh Circuits applied the "New York Rule" and vacated the arbitral awards of punitive damag-
es. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991); Fahnestock & Co. v.
Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991); Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th
Cir. 1984). Not coincidentally, the jurisdiction of these two circuits includes New York City and
Chicago, major hubs for the securities industry.
70. Kenneth R. Davis, A Proposed Framework for Reviewing Punitive Damages Awards of
Commercial Arbitrators, 58 ALB. L. REv. 55, 55 (1994).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 57.
73. Anthony M. Sabino, Awarding Punitive Damages in Securities Industry Arbitration:
Working for a Just Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 33, 33-34 (1992).
74. See Davis, supra note 70.
75. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994); Lee v. Chica,
983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.
1991); Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (lth Cir. 1988); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v.
Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affid, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
76. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
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enforcement of the contract even if state law does not allow punitive damag-
es.' The customer/broker agreement in Mastrobuono stated that the inherent-
ly conflicting New York law and NASD rules would apply to the agree-
ment.7" To determine if the arbitration agreement reflected an implicit intent
by the parties to include or exclude punitive damages, the choice of law and
arbitration provisions first must be considered separately, and then construed
as a whole.79 Taken separately, neither clause precluded punitive damages.0
Taken together, the provisions conflicted."' The Court concluded that New
York law would apply to the contract in general, but not to the provisions of
the arbitration clause. 2
2. Kelley v. Michaels3
a. Facts
William Michaels, a broker with PaineWebber, handled two accounts for
the Kelleys. The Kelleys entered into a Resource Management Account Agree-
ment covering each account.8 4 One year later, in October 1989, Michaels left
77. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217 (emphasis added). The FAA ensures that "private
agreements are enforced according to their terms." Id. (citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
78. Id. at 1214-15. Before Mastrobuono, New York law did not allow arbitrators to make
punitive awards. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 794. NASD, however, does allow such awards. See infra
note 107 and accompanying text.
79. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217. The court in Mastrobuono interpreted the choice of
law provision as a substitute for a conflict of laws analysis that otherwise would determine what
law should be applied. Id. As such, the clause did not unequivocally preclude a punitive damages
claim. Id. The arbitration clause, on the other hand, strongly suggested the appropriateness of
punitive damages because it explicitly authorized arbitration under the NASD rules. Id. at 1218.
The NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, in turn, states that arbitrators may award "damages and
other relief." NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure I[ 3741(e) (1993). The court interpreted this
broad provision to encompass punitive damages. Id. Moreover, the NASD Arbitrator's Manual
states that an arbitrator may make punitive awards. Id.
80. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Court stated:
[T]he best way to harmonize the choice of law provision with the arbitration provision is
to read "the laws of the State of New York" to encompass substantive principles that
New York courts would apply, but not to include special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators. Thus, the choice of law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties,
while the arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other.
Id. at 1219.
The Court employed fundamental contract principles when applying the second prong of
the test-analyzing the meaning of the provisions taken together. The choice of law clause created
ambiguity in an agreement that otherwise permits punitive damages: such ambiguities in the scope
of an arbitration agreement are resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. at 1218 (citing Volt Info. Sci-
ences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 476); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Additionally, common law contract principles dictate that any ambiguity
be construed against the drafter. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219. Finally, if the choice of law
and arbitration clauses contradict, as asserted by Shearson-Lehman, the agreement violated another
cardinal rule of contract construction requiring an interpretation that gives effect to all provisions
and renders them consistent with one another. Id. Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the intent
to preclude punitive damages was made clear through the choice of law clause because New York
law explicitly prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages while NASD rules merely im-
plicitly allow such awards. Id. at 1223 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. 59 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1995).
84. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1051-52. Paragraph 12 of the PaineWebber agreement provided: "This
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PaineWebber and joined Merrill Lynch, taking the Kelleys' accounts with
him.85 The Kelleys again signed Customer Agreements covering each ac-
count. 6 In 1991, their attorney sent Michaels a demand letter alleging churn-
ing,8" unauthorized trading, unsuitable investments leading to portfolio losses,
and needless liquidating commissions.88 They settled with Merrill Lynch for
$290,000 but the agreement specifically left open the possibility of pursuing
claims against Michaels individually.
The Kelleys filed a state action against Michaels alleging stockbroker
fraud and federal securities violations.9 The Kelleys dismissed the suit with-
out prejudice after Michaels removed it to federal court.9' The Kelleys filed a
second state action which did not include the federal securities allegations.
9 2
When Michaels sought to compel arbitration, the Kelleys dismissed the second
action without prejudice and instead filed a claim with NASD.93 The NASD
claim alleged breach of fiduciary duty, churning, unsuitable investments, and
negligence. The Kelleys sought both actual and punitive damages from
Michaels. 94 The arbitrators awarded the Kelleys $292,750 in actual damages
and $505,217.50 in punitive damages.95 After the Kelleys confirmed the
award in federal district court, Michaels appealed."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the arbitral award of punitive damages.9"
agreement and its enforcement shall be construed and governed by the laws of the State of New
York." Id. at 1052. Paragraph 15 of the agreement provided in part:
I agree... that all controversies which may arise between you and me . . . concerning
any transactions ... shall be determined by arbitration. Any arbitration shall be in accor-
dance with the rules in effect of either the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., American
Stock Exchange, Inc., [or] National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc....
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Paragraph 12 of the Merrill Lynch agreement stated in part: "This Agreement...
will be governed by and interpreted under the laws of the State of New York." Id. Paragraph 11
of the agreement stated in part:
I agree that all controversies which may arise between us ... shall be determined by
arbitration. Any arbitration under this agreement shall be conducted only before the New
York Stock Exchange, Inc., the American Stock Exchange, Inc ... the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc ... and in accordance with its arbitration rules then in
force.
Id.
87. "Churning" occurs when a broker engages in transactions to generate unjustifiable com-
missions from the customer's loss or transaction costs. THOMAS L. HAzEN, THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIEs REGULATION § 10.10 (2d ed. 1990).
88. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1052. Michaels charged for the commissions when transferring the
Kelleys' accounts from PaineWebber to Merrill Lynch. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1052-53.
92. Id. at 1053.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1051.
96. Id. at 1053.
97. Id. at 1050. The court rejected Michaels's arguments that (1) the arbitrators exceeded
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First, the court determined that in awarding punitive damages, the arbitration
panel did not reach outside the specific claims made by the Kelleys." The
Kelleys' second state action clearly requested punitive damages for Michaels's
conduct while at Merrill Lynch."
Second, the court addressed whether the PaineWebber agreement or the
Merrill Lynch agreement precluded an award of punitive damages."re Both
agreements provided for arbitration in accordance with NASD rules, which do
not preclude the possibility of punitive damages.'0 ' Both agreements, howev-
er, also provided for enforcement under New York state law, which does not
allow arbitrators to award punitive damages. In light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Mastrobuono, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the punitive damag-
es award was proper.'0 2
3. Analysis
Many brokerage agreements contain New York choice of law clauses.
0 3
As a result, Mastrobuono and its progeny, including Kelley, have far-reaching
implications in the securities industry. 4 It is unlikely, however, that the de-
cision will extend beyond the securities context because of the unique nature
of securities arbitration.0 5 To preclude arbitral punitive damages awards in
the future, brokerage houses may attempt to draft documents more carefully,
specifically precluding punitive damages awards."° The NASD, however,
has attempted to divert this result by enacting a rule prohibiting its members
from drafting agreements that preclude arbitral awards of punitive damages."
their authority because the Kelleys did not request punitive damages for Michaels's conduct while
at Merrill Lynch; (2) the punitive damages award went against the choice of law clause; and (3)
the award was excessive. Id. at 1051.
98. Id. at 1054. Michaels argued on appeal that because the language of the Demand for
Relief did not specifically mention punitive damages for conduct while at Merrill Lynch, the arbi-
trators went beyond their authority. The court, in rejecting this reasoning, stated that the relief
requested fairly sought punitive damages from Michaels, regardless of his place of employment.
The Demand for Relief in the NASD claim, which formed the basis of the arbitrator's award, stat-
ed: "Based upon the foregoing, Claimants are entitled to the following relief: From PaineWebber
and Michaels: a. Actual damages of $30,000; b. Interest as allowed by law; [and] c. Punitive dam-
ages in an amount that will deter others from doing what Respondent did to Claimants." Id. at
1054 n.3. The arbitration panel, paraphrasing the Demand for Relief, stated, "Claimants requested
actual damages in the amount of $30,000.00, interest as allowed by law, punitive damages, legal
fees, and costs against PaineWebber and Michaels." Id. at 1054.
99. Id. These allegations were incorporated into the NASD claim because the Kelleys dis-
missed that action in deference to the arbitration. Id.
100. Id. Michaels based his argument on the choice of law clause in the brokerage agree-
ments: New York law does not allow arbitrators to award punitive damages. Id. (citing Garrity v.
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)). Mastrobuono, directly on point, disposed of this
argument. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218; see supra text accompanying notes 73-82.
101. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1054; see CODE OF ARBrrRATION PROCEDURE pt. 1, para. 3741 (Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers 1995).
102. Kelley, 59 F.3d at 1055.
103. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
104. Carroll E. Neeseman & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of Securities Arbitration, in SECU-
RITtES ARBrrRATION: 1995, at 263 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 899,
1995).
105. Id.
106. Isham R. Jones, III, Exemplary Awards in Securities Arbitration: Short-Circuited Rights
to Punitive Damages, 1995 J. DiSP. RFSOL. 129, 152.
107. RuLEs OF FAR PRACrIcE Rule 21(f)(4) (National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
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4. Other Circuits
Two other circuits, following the Mastrobuono/Kelley reasoning, recently
addressed the power of arbitrators to award punitive damages in securities
disputes. The Seventh Circuit, in Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell,' held that an
arbitration agreement identical to that in Mastrobuono dictated reversing a
district court's injunction preventing an arbitration panel from considering
punitive damage claims." 9 Similarly, in Davis v. Prudential Securities,
Inc.," o the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the arbitrator's authority included
awarding punitive damages."' The arbitration clause in Davis was also virtu-
ally identical to that in Mastrobuono."2 These cases, like Kelley, did little to
augment the basic holding in Mastrobuono given the similarities of the lan-
guage used in each of the four contracts.
II. SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
A. Background
When construing arbitration clauses, courts often cast them as "broad" or
"narrow.""' Interpretation of the scope of an arbitration clause determines
what issues will be arbitrated." ' A broad clause"5 subjects all disputes that
1991). The new rule applies only to agreements enacted after 1989. Id. at Rule (0(5).
108. 53 F.3d 807 (7th Cit. 1995).
109. Smith Barney Inc., 53 F.3d at 809.
110. 59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
111. Davis, 59 F.3d at 1196.
112. Id. at 1189. In addition, the Davis court considered whether punitive damages awards by
arbitrators violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because arbi-
tration lacks procedural protections and meaningful judicial review. Id. at 1190. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that a private arbitration contract lacks the required state action element of a due
process claim. Id. at 1191.
113. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825,
832 (2d Cir. 1988).
114. The Second Circuit has remarked:
Simply stated, a court should compel arbitration, and permit the arbitrator to decide
whether the dispute falls within the clause, if the clause is 'broad.' In contrast, if the
clause is 'narrow,' arbitration should not be compelled unless the court determines that
the dispute falls within the clause. Specific words or phrases alone may not be determi-
native although words of limitation would indicate a narrower clause.
Prudential Lines v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1983).
115. When a clause employs broad, encompassing language such as "arising out of," "relating
to," or "connected with," a court should order arbitration of claims involving the formation, per-
formance, modification, and termination of the contract. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, at §
20.2.2.1. Courts have interpreted the following language as broad: "any and all differences, dis-
putes or controversies arising out of," Folkways Music Publishers v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111
(2nd Cir. 1993); "any dispute," Hornbeck Offshore Corp. v. Coastal Carriers Corp., 981 F.2d 752,
754-55 (5th Cir. 1993); "any controversy arising out of the handling of any of the transactions
referred to in this agreement," R.M. Perez & Assocs., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir.
1992). Standard phrases seem to employ either "arising out of" or "related to/connected with"
language. "An arbitration clause covering claims 'relating to' a contract is broader than a clause
covering claims 'arising out of' a contract." International Talent Group, Inc. v. Copyright Mgmt.,
Inc., 629 F. Supp. 587, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Language such as "arising under" necessarily limits
the arbitrable disputes to those directly related to the interpretation and performance of the con-
tract. Mediterranean Enter. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1983). "Relating
to" language extends the scope of the arbitration clause to include all disputes relating to the
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arise out of a contract to arbitration, while a narrow clause limits the arbitrable
disputes to those specifically enumerated.'"
6
When parties draft a narrow clause, they open the door to the possibility
of litigation to determine if a specific dispute falls within the scope of the
arbitration clause." 7 The American Arbitration Association, for this reason,
does not encourage utilizing overly restrictive language." 8
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,'' the Su-
preme Court interpreted the scope of a broad arbitration clause to determine
the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. 2 ' Its holding affirmed the First
Circuit's determination that antitrust claims fell within the scope of the inter-
national contract at issue.' A later case in the Ninth Circuit extended the
Mitsubishi holding to domestic antitrust disputes.'22
B. Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries23
1. Facts
In 1985, Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) and Molson Breweries of Canada,
Ltd. (Molson) entered into an agreement allowing Molson to brew and dis-
tribute Coors's products in Canada.'24 This contract gave Molson access to
information such as Coors's trademarks, brewing processes, and marketing
data that Molson agreed to keep confidential.' 25 In 1993, Molson entered into
parties' agreement. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1987); Rhone-
Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The distinc-
tion between the disputes covered by the two different types of broad phrases, "arising under" and
"relating to/connected with," rests on whether arbitral disputes involve the parties' contract itself
or the relationship that arises from their contract.
116. McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 832
(2d Cir. 1988) The court construed as narrow the following clause:
If the Company should disagree with any Owner's computation of the amount of the
required indemnity payment or refund ... or if any Owner should disagree with such
good faith determination of the Company that there is substantial risk, then the Compa-
ny and the Owner shall appoint an independent tax counsel to resolve the dispute and, if
the parties cannot agree to the appointment of such counsel, said independent tax coun-
sel shall be appointed by the American Arbitration Association.
Id.; see also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 20.2.3.1.
117. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990s, at 142 (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991) [here-
inafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
118. Id. at 143.
119. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
120. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617. The clause stated, "All disputes, controversies or differences
which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V
of this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration .... ." Id.
121. Id. at 628-40. The First Circuit had concluded that the antitrust claims closely related to
the contract since they stemmed from specific provisions in the contract. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at
159-61. The antitrust claims resulted from Mitsubishi's concerns about trademark, reputation, and
goodwill. Because the contract addressed each of these factors, the arbitration clause applied to the
antitrust claims. Id.
122. Nghiem v. NEC Elecs., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. 51 F.3d 1511 (10th Cir. 1995).
124. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1512. The agreement contained a broad arbitration clause
stating, "Any dispute arising in connection with the implementation, interpretation or enforcement
of this Agreement" shall be arbitrated. Id. at 1513.
125. Id.
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a partnership with Miller Brewing Company (Miller), a competitor of Coors,
and gave Miller a seat on the Molson board of directors.'26
Coors filed two separate actions against Molson:' one to arbitrate vari-
ous contract claims stemming from breach of confidentiality, and the second to
litigate various antitrust claims. 2 Molson moved to stay the antitrust pro-
ceedings pending arbitration of the contract claims.'29 The district court de-
nied the motion, and Molson sought expedited appeal on the grounds that
"Coors ha[d] dressed up its contract claims in antitrust clothes" to avoid the
arbitration clause in their agreement. 31 Coors responded that the antitrust
and contract claims were distinct, and that Coors should be able to pursue an
antitrust suit unrelated to the contract.'
3
1
Molson contended that the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi indi-
cated that even if the arbitration clause did not specifically address antitrust
claims, antitrust disputes within the scope of the contract may be arbitrat-
ed.'32 Coors argued that Mitsubishi did not apply because: (1) the scope of
the arbitration clause in Mitsubishi was broad while the scope of the
Molson/Coors clause was narrow; and (2) even if antitrust claims generally
fall under the scope of the Molson/Coors agreement, Coors's specific antitrust
claims fell outside the scope of the contract and thus, were not subject to the
arbitration clause.'33
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that antitrust claims unrelated to the contract may
be litigated. 34 Specifically, it found that the antitrust claims regarding mar-
ket concentration did not relate to the licensing agreement and may be litigat-
ed. "'35 Antitrust claims regarding confidentiality and proprietary information,
however, did relate to the contract and, therefore, must be arbitrated. 36 In
reaching this decision, the court rejected Coors's unsupported contention that
the arbitration clause was "narrow" and instead determined that the arbitration
clause extended to the antitrust disputes within the scope of the agreement.'
126. Id.
127. Id. In particular, Coors alleged that the Miller-Molson relationship restrained trade and
lessened competition in the United States and North American beer markets. Second, Coors al-
leged that, as a result of Miller's seat on the Molson board, Miller would have access to confiden-
tial Coors's information. Finally, Coors alleged, also as a result of Miller's seat on the Molson





131. Id. Coors claimed it had two distinct interests: protecting its rights under the contract and
protecting its interest in competition in the North American beer market. It argued that the first
category of interests fell under the arbitration clause while the second did not. Id.
132. Id. at 1514.
133. Id. at 1515.
134. Id. at 1516.
135. Id. at 1517.
136. Id. at 1517-18.
137. Id. at 1515. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on the all-inclusive na-
ture of the contract terms "implementation" and "enforcement." Id. By using the talasmanic word
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Next, basing its analysis on Mitsubishi, the court examined the individual
antitrust claims to determine which, if any, fell within the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement)38 The court ruled that Coors could litigate only those anti-
trust claims that lacked a reasonable factual connection to the contract and
must arbitrate those antitrust claims that were sufficiently connected to the
contract. 39
C. Analysis
When litigating the scope of an arbitration clause, lawyers should recog-
nize that arbitration cannot be avoided by "labelling."'" As the Second Cir-
cuit put it, "In determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of
the parties' arbitration agreement, we focus on the factual allegations in the
complaint rather than the legal causes of action asserted."'' To avoid litiga-
tion, the attorney and client should pay close attention to the specific language
of the contract.
As with any contract, the exact wording of an arbitration clause should be
the result of close consultation between attorney and client. Lawyers should
also draw on their own experiences, as well as that of others, to anticipate the
disputes that are likely to occur in the course of a legal relationship. 42 In
addition to these resources, lawyers may base arbitration clauses on existing
contracts, gaining the experience of previous drafters. However, attorneys
should take care to address the unique aspects of each situation."'
"narrow," Coors attempted to limit the scope of disputes subject to arbitration under the agreement
but did not provide any support for this claim. Id. But see JEFFREY BARIST, COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION LAW AND CLAUSES: A DRAFTER's GUIDE § 3.02[B] (1994) (stating that a narrow clause
might read "[any dispute, controversy, or claim arising under this contract shall be finally settled
by arbitration").
138. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1515. Mitsubishi held that only antitrust claims touching
specified provisions of the agreement fell within the scope of the contract and therefore within the
agreement's arbitration clause. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723
F.2d 155, 159-61 (1st Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The arbitration
clause in the Coors Brewing Co. agreement provided that "all disputes, controversies or differenc-
es which may arise ... out of or in relation to [specific parts of the contract]" shall be decided by
arbitration. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1515.
139. Coors Brewing Co., 51 F.3d at 1516. In other words, the claims that did not relate to the
continuing contractual relationship between Coors and Molson could be litigated. Id. at 1517. In
particular, Coors's claims about market concentration could be litigated while its claims regarding
confidential and proprietary information could not be arbitrated. Id.
140. For example, Molson claimed that Coors attempted to avoid arbitration by labelling
contractual claims as antitrust claims. Id. at 1513.
141. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987).
142. For example, discussing the quality and quantity of possible disputes with litigators in
the field often provides contract drafters with special "hindsight." COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 117, at 143-44.
143. Some of the factors which should bear on this analysis include the characteristics of the
case, attributes of the parties, features of the environment, and the presence of settlement barriers.
EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.03 (1994).
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D. Other Circuits
A recent Second Circuit case, Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. Building
Systems"' addressed the scope of an arbitration agreement using both "aris-
ing out of' and "relating to" language.'45 The court, applying the "piecemeal
principle,"" analyzed which claims raised arbitrable issues under the broad
arbitration clause. 47 It found a claim for tortious interference with an em-
ployment contract not arbitrable because it did not "arise under" or "relate to"
the agreement that contained the arbitration clause.'" The court held that a
tort claim for trade libel fell within the scope of a broad arbitration clause,
however, because it was sufficiently related to the agreement. 49
A Ninth Circuit case, Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental
Services Co.,5° involved an arbitration agreement containing "arising out of'
language.'' The court held that a misappropriation of trade secrets claim
was not arbitrable, reasoning that the misappropriation constituted a wrong, in-
dependent from the licensing and nondisclosure agreement, even though the
claim would not have arisen without the agreement. 5
III. ARBITRATOR'S JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
A. Background
1. Determining If the Party Agreed to Arbitrate
Just as the terms of the contract control the scope of arbitration,'53 they
also control who must arbitrate. Courts normally use state law contract princi-
ples to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a specific dispute.1
5 4
144. 58 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. Collins & Aikman Prods. Co., 58 F.3d at 18. The arbitration clause specifically stated,
"Any claim arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be settled by arbitration." Id.
146. "The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [Arbitration] Act was to enforce
private agreements ... and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation." Id. at 20 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 22. "[T]he employment contracts were third party contracts with no logical connec-
tion to the ... agreements containing the arbitration clauses." Id.
149. Id. at 23. In summary, the court concluded:
[If the arbitration clause is broad, there arises a presumption of arbitrability; if, how-
ever, the dispute is in respect of a matter that, on its face, is clearly collateral to the
contract, then a court should test the presumption by reviewing the allegations under-
lying the dispute and by asking whether the claim alleged implicates issues of contract
construction or the parties' rights and obligations under it. If the answer is yes, then the
collateral dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; claims that present
no question involving the construction of the contract, and no questions in respect of the
parties' rights and obligations under it, are beyond the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment.
Id.
150. 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994).
151. Tracer Research Corp., 42 F.3d at 1295.
152. Id.
153. See supra part II.
154. First Options v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995) (stating, however, that an impor-
tant qualification is that courts cannot assume an agreement to arbitrate absent clear and unmistak-
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In determining whether arbitration is required, the court ascertains whether
the party has a duty to arbitrate the dispute.5 ' Generally, absent an arbitra-
tion agreement, a party cannot be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration.'56
The court has the exclusive right to interpret the arbitration agreement to de-
termine who is subject to arbitration, unless the parties agree otherwise.'57 If
a court does not make its own determination that a party must arbitrate, but
accepts the arbitrator's decision binding the party to arbitrate, the court will
remand the case on appeal so that it can make its own finding.' In contrast,
once the court has made a threshold determination about arbitrability, it cannot
evaluate the arbitrator's decisions regarding the substantive merits of the case
itself."'
2. The Alter Ego Doctrine
Under certain circumstances, even a nonsignatory to an agreement may be
bound by that agreement."6 For example, a court may pierce a corporate veil
by applying the alter ego doctrine in order to reach a nonsignatory and force
them to arbitrate a dispute.'
A litigant may demonstrate the alter ego doctrine by showing that a share-
holder, overlooking their separate entities, used the corporation as an instru-
mentality to conduct his own personal affairs.'62 The alter ego doctrine stems
not from an individual's actions but from misuse of the corporate form by its
owners.'63 The advantages of limited personal liability for corporate share-
holders encourages individuals to invest, because the "corporate veil" protects
able evidence that an agreement was made).
155. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960)).
156. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989); AT&T Technologies, Inc., 475 U.S. at 648 (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
157. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 475 U.S. at 649 (citing United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-
83). Contra Ralph Andrews Prod., Inc. v. Writers Guild of Am., 938 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating that parties may agree to submit to the arbitrator the question of arbitrability and
consent to grant the arbitrator that authority may be implied from the parties' conduct).
158. See American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886-87 (3d Cir.
1984) (remanding to the district court the question whether a party should be subject to arbitration
under veil-piercing principle).
159. Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42-43 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he court is not authorized to
decide the merits of an issue committed by the parties to arbitration.").
160. See BARIST, supra note 137, § 4.03.
161. Id. For example, nonsignatory agents, including partners and employees may be bound to
arbitrate. See also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 15, § 18.3.1.
162. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685-87
(4th Cir. 1976) (stating that factors to consider in applying alter ego theory are: gross
undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, non-payment of dividends, the insol-
vency of the debtor corporation at the time, siphoning of funds of the corporation by the dominant
stockholder, non-functioning of other officers or directors, absence of corporate records, and the
fact the corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the dominant stockholder). See gener-
ally MARTIN M. WEINSTEIN & JAMES J. DOHENY, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
§ 54A.13.50 (Supp. 1995).
163. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978), affd, 633 F.2d 209 (3d
Cir. 1980).
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an investor so that risk is borne by the corporate entity, not the individual
shareholder."6 As a result, individuals may be tempted to form sham corpo-
rations to avoid obligations such as arbitration.
Determining whether the corporate veil should be pierced depends largely
on the specific facts of a case. 6 The federal common-law alter ego doctrine
is based on a two-part test."6 Not every disregard of separateness justifies
piercing the corporate veil. The corporation also must be a sham.'67
B. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre"6
1. Facts
Spyridon Armenis was the president and sole shareholder of ARW Explo-
ration Corp. (ARW).'" Twenty individual investors (plaintiffs) purchased in-
terests in oil and gas ventures promoted by ARW 70 Each of the plaintiffs
entered into at least one of six joint venture agreements.' Five of the agree-
ments contained an arbitration clause and were signed by Armenis in his ca-
pacity as ARW president.' The sixth agreement, however, did not contain
an arbitration agreement, and was signed by Armenis as an individual rather
than as a representative of ARW.'73
The plaintiffs moved to compel ARW to arbitrate disputes connected with
the six agreements, and also sought, through a third-party complaint, to require
Armenis to arbitrate in an individual capacity.'74 The Oklahoma district court
initially dismissed the third-party complaint.'75 However, the court later
164. EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND Di-
RECTORS: RIGHTS, DUNES AND LIABILITIES § 20:01 (1986). In this way, personal assets of an
individual shareholder cannot be reached if the corporation is liable. Id.
165. Id. § 20:02.
166. NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the test consists of (1) determining whether the separate personalities and assets of the corporation
and individual are blurred from unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate entities,
and (2) deciding whether the sanction of the corporate fiction would promote fraud, injustice, or
evasion of legal obligations). Specific factors in the first prong of the test are:
(1) whether a corporation is operated as a separate entity; (2) comingling of funds and
other assets; (3) failure to maintain adequate corporate records or minutes; (4) the nature
of the corporation's ownership and control; (5) absence of corporate assets and
undercapitalization; (6) use of the corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit
of an individual or another corporation; (7) disregard of legal formalities and the failure
to maintain an arms-length relationship among related entities; and (8) diversion of the
corporation's funds or assets to noncorporate uses.
Id. at 1052 n.6 (quoting United States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960, 965 (10th Cir. 1987)).
The second prong of the test requires inequitable behavior such as fraud, injustice, or un-
fairness. Greater Kansas Roofing, 2 F.3d at 1052; see also Doyn Aircraft v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1971) (stating that when identities of the corporation and the individual merge and
separation would lead to inequitable result, veil should be pierced).
167. Kaplan v. First Options, 19 F.3d 1503, 1520-21 (3d Cir. 1994).
168. 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995).
169. ARW Exploration Corp., 45 F.3d at 1457.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1458.
173. Id.




consolidated the case with ARW's claim for injunctive relief, and transferred it
to an Oklahoma federal district court. 76 After oral argument, the Oklahoma
court ordered arbitration of all claims against ARW, as well as against
Armenis individually.'"' During the subsequent arbitration, the arbitrator
found that Armenis used ARW as an alter ego, and therefore decided in favor
of the plaintiffs."' On appeal, Armenis contended that the district court, not
the arbitrator, frst must pierce the ARW corporate veil and determine that
Armenis is an alter ego of ARW before he can be compelled to arbitrate as an
individual. 79
2. Decision
Although addressing the alter ego issue in its confirmation order, the
district court essentially accepted the arbitrator's factual findings that Armenis
used ARW as his alter ego.80 The Tenth Circuit held that the responsibility
for determining whether a party may be compelled to arbitrate belongs to the
court, not the arbitrator."' The Tenth Circuit held that the district court must
apply principles of corporate law, including the corporate veil doctrine, to de-
termine whether Armenis should be forced to arbitrate individually.'82
C. Analysis
ARW represented the first time the Tenth Circuit has applied the alter ego
doctrine in the arbitration context. The court followed existing circuit prece-
dent with regard to both corporate83 and arbitration law.8 4
An attorney may assist a client to avoid arbitration imposed by the alter
ego doctrine because many of the factors in the first prong of the test, mainte-
nance of separate entities, can be controlled through careful planning and
implementation of corporate structure and procedures. The second prong,
inequitable behavior, is more difficult to control. The client perpetrating a
fraud, for example, will likely manipulate otherwise adequate procedures. The
best avenue for the attorney in this situation may consist of counseling the
client on possible risks incurred from unscrupulous behavior.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1461.
179. Id. at 1458.
180. Id. at 1461.
181. Id. The district court erroneously concluded that it lacked the authority to overturn the
arbitrator's finding that Armenis used ARW fraudulently and therefore must arbitrate individually.
Id. This error resulted from mischaracterizing the rule that a district court cannot evaluate the sub-
stantive decisions of the arbitrator. Id.
182. Id. at 1460.
183. Id. at 1460-61 (citing Frank v. U.S. West, 3 F.3d 1357 (10th Cir. 1993); Quarles v.
Fuqua Indus., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974)).
184. Id. at 1461 (citing Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986)). However, the particu-
lar combination of issues in ARW-applying the alter ego principle in the arbitration context-had
not been addressed previously by the Tenth Circuit.
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D. Other Circuits
Other circuits did not address the alter ego concept in the arbitration con-
text during the survey period. Though beyond the time period of this survey,
the Second Circuit, with little discussion of the arbitrator's authority, remand-
ed a case in which the district court held that the arbitrator, not the court,
should determine if two companies were alter egos.'85
CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed in this Survey illustrate the increasing use of
arbitration in different contexts. In Metz, the court did not establish new prece-
dent but rather refined previous trends. For better or worse, it further extended
the reach of arbitration into the statutory arena. In Kelley, the court also culti-
vated existing precedent by further defining the scope of arbitrators' power.
By giving more power to the arbitrator, Kelly, like Metz, extended arbitration.
Coors, while not fostering the application of arbitration into new areas, refined
the interpretation of arbitration clauses, emphasizing the importance of precise
drafting. In contrast to these three cases that advance the application of arbi-
tration, ARW reinforces the limitation on the power of an arbitrator to compel
a party to arbitrate. As the use of alternative dispute resolution continues to
evolve, the courts and the legislature must work to define its role as a
substitute for adjudication.
Lisa M. Horvath
185. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, Nos. 94-9207, 9293, 9209, 7183, 1995 WL 540584, at




The United States Constitution expressly grants to states the authority to
conduct and regulate elections for public officials.' State election codes may
define the time, place, and manner of holding elections, as well as require-
ments for voting and the selection of candidates.2 While the Supreme Court
has recognized the need for such regulation to effectively implement the dem-
ocratic process,3 constitutional tensions arise when such regulations invade the
rights of voters. The Supreme Court's review of state election laws, specif-
ically ballot access laws,4 has received harsh criticism5 for failing to employ
a consistent standard of review.6 In 1983, however, the Court set out to end
the confusion with its decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze.7 In Anderson, the
Court announced that the proper approach for determining the level of scrutiny
in ballot access cases is a balancing of interests test.8
1. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Federal Judicial Review of State Ballot Access Regulations: Es-
cape from the Political Thicket, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87, 90-103 (1994) (providing a thor-
ough discussion of the constitutional framework of election laws).
2. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
3. Id. ("[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they
are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the demo-
cratic processes.").
4. "Ballot access laws" refer to those requirements that a candidate must satisfy in order to
have his/her name printed on an election ballot (e.g., a showing of some degree of public support
through nominating petitions signed by voters). See Jacqueline Ricciani, Burdick v. Takuski: The
Anderson Balancing Test to Sustain Prohibitions on Write-in Voting, 13 PACE L. REv. 949, 950-
57 (1994).
5. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITlTIONAL LAW 849 (12th ed. 1993) ("[T]hese cases...
show an especially pervasive degree of uncertainty and instability regarding the appropriate level
of scrutiny."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-20, at 1106 (2d ed.
1988) (characterizing the Court's inconsistency as "striking" and "positively delphic"); Alan
Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 898-919 (1994) (describing frequent shifts in the Court's focus
throughout the cases); Zywicki, supra note 1, at 88-89 (lambasting the Supreme Court's opinions
so viciously as to imply utter incompetence in this area). But cf. Ricciani, supra note 4, at 956
("In deciding the first ballot access cases, the Court formulated an analytical framework that sur-
vived for fifteen years.").
6. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (initial balancing test determines level of scru-
tiny); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (vague, but resembling rational
basis); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (balancing of interests); Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982) (combination balancing test and rational basis); American Party v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974) and Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (purported strict scrutiny, but
actually a mix of strict and minimal scrutiny, according to TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1107); Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (strict scrutiny); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (strict scruti-
ny); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (rational basis); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968) (strict scrutiny).
7. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). The Court granted certiorari to resolve
"conflict among the Circuits on an important question of constitutional law." Id. at 786.
8. Id. at 789. For a discussion of the balancing test, see infra note 49.
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The Anderson test, as refined in Burdick v. Takushi,9 now stands as the
definitive standard for evaluating any constitutional challenge to a state elec-
tion scheme.0 The Tenth Circuit has applied the balancing test in cases chal-
lenging petition signature requirements," early filing deadlines, 2 and most
recently, Oklahoma's ban on write-in voting.'
3
This Survey focuses on the elements and structure of the Ander-
son/Burdick balancing test and then critiques the Tenth Circuit's application of
the test in Coalition for Free and Open Elections v. McElderry,4 the only
ballot access case decided in the Tenth Circuit during the survey peri-
od-September 1994 through September 1995. Part I introduces the constitu-
tional rights at issue in these cases, followed by an overview of the develop-
mental history of the current test. Part II discusses the Tenth Circuit's han-
dling of ballot access cases since Anderson, then critically analyzes the Coali-
tion decision.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Rights Implicated by Election Regulations
While no fundamental right to candidacy exists, 5 the Supreme Court has
recognized an overlap between the availability of candidates in an election and
the rights of voters to select a candidate of their choice. 6 Ballot access laws,
by their very nature, restrict voter choice by screening out those potential
candidates who do not satisfy the requirements. 7 Restricting voter choice
9. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
10. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 ("The appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that a state
law burdens the right to vote is set forth in Anderson."); McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of
Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The appropriate standard governing constitutional
challenges to specific provisions of state election laws begins with the balancing test that the Su-
preme Court first set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze."); see also David Perney, The Dimensions
of the Right to Vote: The Write-in Vote, Donald Duck, and Voting Booth Speech Written-off, 58
Mo. L. REv. 945, 953-54 (1993) (citing to the method of analysis used in Anderson).
11. Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 741 (10th Cir. 1988)
(upholding requirement that petitions for recognition of a political party bear the signatures of
registered voters equal to at least five percent of the total votes cast in the previous general elec-
tion for governor or president).
12. Hagelin For President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 957 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding
requirement that independent candidates file their nominating petitions 91 days before the general
election).
13. Coalition for Free and Open Elections v. McElderry, 48 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1995) (up-
holding Oklahoma's refusal to honor, or even count, votes for candidates not appearing on the
printed ballot).
14. 48 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1995).
15. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982); Thournir v. Meyer, 909 F.2d 408, 412
(10th Cir. 1990); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrruTIONAL LAW § 14.32(a)
(5th ed. 1995).
16. See e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("Election laws will invariably
impose some burden upon individual voters."); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983)
("The impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional
rights."); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("Mhe rights of voters and the rights of
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at
least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."); see Ricciani, supra note 4, at 955.
17. Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 743 (10th Cir. 1988)
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encroaches on two fundamental rights implicated by the First Amendment, 8
the right to cast an effective vote, and the right of freedom of political associ-
ation.'9 In addition, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 0 becomes an issue in these cases when the laws create impermissible
classifications as to who may qualify for candidacy.2'
Since voting rights are deemed fundamental under the United States Con-
stitution," strong arguments exist that laws affecting them should be subject-
ed to strict scrutiny. 3 In fact, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny in
many cases to strike down state ballot access laws. 4 The Constitution also
gives the states broad authority to regulate elections, however,25 and resolving
the conflict between these competing constitutional privileges has proven to be
a thorn in the Court's side for nearly twenty-five years.26
B. The Search for a Standard of Review
1. Troublesome Beginnings
Prior to 1968, ballot access regulations were considered non-justiciable
political questions27 within the exclusive domain of the states.2" Indeed, the
Supreme Court characterized voting rights issues as a "political thicket"29 into
which it seldom ventured. When it did decide these cases, the Court afforded
(quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)) ("State statutes that restrict
'the access of political parties to the ballot impinge upon the rights of individuals to associate for
political purposes, as well as the rights of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively.").
18. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The First Amendment was applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2444 (1995).
19. E.g. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 14.32(a), at 832.
20. "[N]or shall any state.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, § 14.31(a), at 866-68, § 14.32(a), at 881-82; TRIBE,
supra note 5, § 13-19, at 1098.
22. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-56 (1964); Perney, supra note 10, at 952-53. But
see Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1904) (declaring that a right to vote is not guaran-
teed by the federal Constitution, but instead is a privilege conferred and controlled by the state).
23. E.g., Clements, 457 U.S. at 977 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
But cf Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 ("Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all re-
strictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally-
suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates.").
Strict scrutiny refers to the high standard of review imposed by courts in cases involving
fundamental rights. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(referring specifically to legislation that restricts political processes). In order to survive strict
scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Burdick, 504 U.S. at
433.
24. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979);
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715-18 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973);
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-44; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-32.
25. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
26. See Brownstein, supra note 5, at 914-19; Pemey, supra note 10, at 953; Zywicki, supra
note 1, at 108. Between Williams v. Rhodes in 1968 and Burdick v. Takushi in 1992, the Supreme
Court applied the gamut of scrutiny levels, including some hybrids. See supra note 6.
27. Zywicki, supra note 1, at 108-09.
28. Id. at 90-107.
29. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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great deference to the state legislatures' judgments in addressing various politi-
cal goals related to elections." In 1968, however, a new era in ballot access
jurisprudence began with Williams v. Rhodes,3 and the thorny nature of the
Court's plunge into the political thicket emerged almost immediately.32
Williams involved a challenge to Ohio's stringent requirements for candi-
dates of new political parties to gain access to a presidential ballot.
3 Specifi-
cally at issue was the high number of signatures required. Ohio required that a
new party submit a nominating petition containing signatures of qualified
electors totaling 15% of the ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial elec-
tion.34 The Court examined this regulation, and the election code as a whole,
in terms of impact on Ohio voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
and found the burden so onerous as to be unconstitutional.35 Since fundamen-
tal rights were at stake, the majority subjected the laws to strict scrutiny.36
Only three years after the Supreme Court's strict defense of First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights in Williams, however, the Court dramatically
retreated to applying no articulated standard at all.37 Jenness v. Fortson" in-
volved a class action suit by voters and prospective candidates attacking the
Georgia election code for its signature requirement.39 The majority, in a rela-
tively short opinion, merely reviewed the Williams reasoning,' then distin-
guished Georgia's code from Ohio's laws.4 The Court concluded that
"Georgia's election laws, unlike Ohio's, do not operate to freeze the political
status quo."'4 On this basis alone-that is, without applying any analysis for
rational basis or heightened scrutiny-the Court found Georgia's election
scheme acceptable.43
30. Zywicki, supra note 1, at 109 ("When the Court reviewed electoral issues, . . . it applied
rational basis scrutiny in deferring to the judgements of the states as to the balance of competing
political goals.").
31. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
32. Zywicki, supra note 1, at 109-13.
33. Williams, 393 U.S. at 24-27. The case involved George Wallace, the American Indepen-
dent Party's candidate for President in 1968.
34. Id. In 1968, this amount equaled 433,100. Id. at 24-26. In addition, Ohio required that
the petition be filed 90 days before the state primaries. Ohio additionally then imposed impossible
conditions upon the primary of a new party. Id. at 26 n.1, 35-38 (Douglas, J., concurring), 66 n.7
(Warren, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 25. The Supreme Court determined the impact on candidates and voters by looking
at this provision within the context of other Ohio ballot access laws. "The detailed provisions of
other Ohio election laws result in the imposition of substantial additional burdens .... Together
these various restrictive provisions make it virtually impossible for any party to qualify on the
ballot except the Republican and Democratic Parties." Id.
36. Id. at 31 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)) ("[O]nly a compelling
state interest ... can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.").
37. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 13-20, at 1105 ("In [Jenness], the Court dramatically reversed
field .... Although it did not explicitly indicate what standard of review it employed, it appeared
that the Court subjected the Georgia laws to only minimal scrutiny.").
38. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
39. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 432-33. Georgia law provides that an independent candidate may
have his name printed on the ballot by filing a nominating petition signed by "a number of elec-
tors of not less than five per cent of the total number of electors eligible to vote in the last elec-
tion for the filling of the office the candidate is seeking." GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010(b) (1970).
40. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 434-37.
41. Id. at 438-41.
42. Id. at 438.
43. Id. at 440 ("We can find in this system nothing that abridges the rights of free speech
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2. Settling on a Compromise
With Williams and Jenness setting the polar extremes of scrutiny for
subsequent ballot access cases, the Supreme Court spent the following two and
a half decades stumbling between standards of review." In 1983, in Anderson
v. Celebrezze,4 the Court began to regain its balance.
John Anderson sought to run for president as an independent candidate in
the 1980 November election.' He was denied access to the printed ballot in
Ohio because he failed to submit his nomination petition by the March 20
deadline.47 The Anderson Court did not talk about "scrutiny" or "levels of re-
view." Instead, the Court announced a balancing of interests test as the ap-
propriate analytical process for ballot access questions. A court must determine
the extent of the injury to the plaintiffs' rights and then weigh that injury
against the interests proffered by the state as justification for the burden im-
posed.49 The court must also consider to what degree the burden is necessary
to achieve the state's objectives."
In addition to this careful articulation of the now-preferred approach, the
Court also clarified that its main concern in ballot access cases is the First
Amendment rights of the voters." The strength of the Anderson decision lies
in the Court's recognition of the friction between voters' rights and the need
for state regulation of elections. 2 The Court's reasoning cut to the heart of
and association secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The appellants' claim under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment fares no better.").
44. For levels of scrutiny in cases during this time period, see supra note 6. Even after An-
derson announced a balancing test, the Court again waffled three years later in Munro v. Socialist
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986). Instead of weighing the competing interests, the standard put
forth in Anderson, the majority simply compared the Washington statute to other regulations that
had been upheld in previous cases. Id. at 196-99. The Court held that, since the effect of the law
on constitutional rights was "slight when compared to the restrictions ... upheld in Jenness and
American Party," there was no constitutional violation. Id. at 199. It was not until 1992 that the
Court firmly adopted the Anderson standard. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
45. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
46. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
47. Id. at 783. The deadline that year fell 229 days in advance of the general election.
48. See id. at 789 (stating that "[c]onstitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's
election laws ... cannot be resolved by any 'litmus-paper test' that will separate valid from inval-
id restrictions") (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
49. The Court outlined the balancing test as follows:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vin-
dicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must
not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide
whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 782 ("The question presented by this case is whether Ohio's early filing deadline
placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of Anderson's support-
ers."); id. at 806 ("We began our inquiry by noting that our primary concern is not the interest of
candidate Anderson, but rather, the interests of the voters who chose to [support him].").
52. See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1352 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Anderson ... recog-
nize[s] the precious nature of the individual and state rights at issue and the delicate balancing
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the inherent difficulty in election ballot law: constitutional infringement in
these cases is a matter of degree.53 Thus, the Court first determined the extent
of the asserted injury,54 then compared this injury to the legitimacy and
strength of each of the state's interests.55
3. Refining the Anderson Approach
In Burdick v. Takushi,56 the Supreme Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit de-
cision upholding Hawaii's ban on write-in voting. 7 The Court applied and
further expanded the Anderson test. Whereas the Anderson court only evaluat-
ed the specific law challenged," the Burdick Court examined the entire state
ballot access scheme to determine the extent of the hardship on the petitioner-
voter's rights. 9 The Court established a standard of review for judging
whether a state's interest justifies the burdens it imposes.' If the "extent of
the burden" portion of the test reveals that the law imposes severe restrictions
on voters' rights, then the "regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance.""'6 However, if the law imposes "rea-
sonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" on voters' protected rights, the law
need only be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
62
After defining the state's burden, the reviewing court must examine the
state's asserted justifications for constraining voting rights. 63 The Burdick
Court takes this second part of the analysis a step further than Anderson. If a
court finds the state's reasons for the election laws strong enough to survive
the scrutiny, meaning the overall ballot access scheme passes constitutional
muster, then the challenged law is presumed valid.'
required to achieve electoral harmony."); see also supra notes 2-3, 15-19, and accompanying text.
53. "The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens 'the
availability of political opportunity' and, as such, focuses on "the degree to which the challenged
restrictions operate as a mechanism to exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral
process." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Libertarian
Party v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1994) (remarking that according to Anderson, "[t]he
issue is the severity of the handicap").
54. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790-95 (discussing the impact of Ohio's ballot access laws on
independent-minded voters, ultimately depriving everyone of valuable political discourse).
55. Id. at 796-805 (examining and rejecting three proffered justifications: voter education;
equal treatment of candidates; and political stability).
56. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
57. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441. Hawaiian election law made no provision for the casting and
counting of write-in votes. A voter, not wishing to vote for the one candidate running in his legis-
lative district, filed suit. Id. at 430.
58. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790-94 (examining the impact of the early deadline for filing
nominating petitions).
59. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-39 (incorporating the Court's occasional practice of considering
ballot access provisions within the larger picture of accompanying election laws).
60. Id. at 434 ("[Tihe rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law
depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights.").
61. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
62. Id. at 434, 440 (citing Anderson).
63. Id. at 439.
64. Id. at 441 (holding that Hawaii's policy of not tallying write-in votes was constitutional).
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C. Present State of the Law
In recent years, the Supreme Court has given increased consideration to
the legitimacy of states' interests in regulating elections, 65 retreating from the
strict scrutiny of earlier cases.' The Anderson decision appears to represent a
settling of the Court's own collective mind concerning the preferred approach
for these cases.67 Even though the voters' rights in Anderson were given high
regard, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny to the state action.'
Write-in voting, the issue in the Burdick case,6' has long been considered
an indispensable avenue of political expression." In upholding as constitu-
tional Hawaii's complete ban on write-in voting,7 the Burdick majority
seized the opportunity to clarify its position on the relationship between the
right to vote and First Amendment rights of political expression.72 The Court
explained that a voter's right to self-expression through the ballot is not abso-
lute.73 Instead, the Court defined the right to vote as "the right to participate
in an electoral process," not as a forum for voicing generalized dissention
from it.74 In other words, the Court considers voting a fundamental right, but
not all forms of its exercise merit First Amendment protection.
65. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479
U.S. 208 (1986); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); see also Hagelin for
President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Burdick, supra) ("[T]he
states retain the power to regulate elections, and their election laws invariably will impose some
burden on voters.").
66. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979);
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The Tenth Cir-
cuit discussed this shift in Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740 (10th
Cir. 1988). The Court noted:
In [Illinois State Bd. of Elections], the Court, in evaluating an equal protection challenge
to a ballot access restriction, did require the state to establish a compelling interest and
to use the least drastic means to achieve its goal. However, other and more recent Su-
preme Court cases have neither demanded a compelling state interest nor insisted that
the state demonstrate it has achieved this end by the least restrictive means available.
Id. at 743 (citations omitted).
67. The four dissenting justices did not object to the analytical process used in the case;
rather, their point of disagreement was simply that Ohio's filing deadline was judged too harshly.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In fact, the Anderson test was applied in
Burdick with Justice White writing the majority opinion (Justice White having been among the
dissenters in Anderson). Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430; see also GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 854 n.8.
68. The Court identified the burden to rights as "significant," yet proceeded to strike down
Ohio's March filing deadline for independent candidate petitions because the law was not rational-
ly related to the state's asserted interests. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795-806.
69. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
70. For discussions about the prominent role of write-in voting in American political history,
see Elizabeth E. Deighton, Burdick v. Takushi: Hawaii's Ban on Write-In Voting Is Constitutional,
23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 701, 703-04 (1993); Jeanne M. Kaiser, Constitutional Law-First
Amendment-No Constitutional Right to Vote for Donald Duck: The Supreme Court Upholds the
Constitutionality of Write-In Voting Bans in Burdick v. Takushi, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 129,
129-31, 147-52 (1993); Michele Logan, The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGs LJ. 727, 732-36 (1993).
71. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
72. Id. at 433.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 441.
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While Anderson set forth the analysis to be used in ballot access/voting
rights cases, Burdick established the standard of review. 5 It is still possible
that a state election law will be subjected to strict scrutiny; whether strict or
minimal, however, the Court systematically determines the level of scrutiny in
the first part of the balancing test.76
D. Conclusion
The current trend in Supreme Court ballot access cases departs from the
strict defense of First Amendment rights that characterized earlier cases.'
The Anderson/Burdick approach represents the Court's resumption of its ap-
propriate judicial role-respecting both state autonomy and individual liber-
ties.7" The Court of the current era hesitates to invade the sphere of state con-
trol over state affairs.79 Thus, state election laws are likely to be upheld un-
less they place severe restrictions on voters and cannot be justified by com-
pelling state interests.'
II. TENTH CIRCUIT TREATMENT SINCE ANDERSON
A. Background
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has handed down a number of deci-
sions following the Anderson and Burdick methodology."' The cases prior to
the survey period were well reasoned, adhering strictly to the newly articulated
test. 2 Each case opinion described the formula, evaluated the law's burden
on protected rights, and then examined the legitimacy and strength of the
state's interests furthered by the law.83 In 1995, however, the Tenth Circuit
professed to apply the Anderson/Burdick test, yet clearly strayed from that
pattern of analysis.
75. "Despite its explicit endorsement of the Anderson approach, the Burdick Court also reaf-
firmed a single modification, that election laws which place 'severe' burdens upon constitutional
rights are subject to strict scrutiny ... McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d
1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1995).
76. Id. at 1220-21.
77. For cases demonstrating this progression, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
78. See Zywicki, supra note 1, at 87-107; supra note 52 and accompanying text.
79. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (commenting that subjecting every voting regulation to strict
scrutiny would essentially "tie the hands of States" in their efforts to run efficient elections);
Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) (recognizing that states must retain power
to regulate their own elections).
80. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
81. Hagelin for President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959 (10th Cir. 1994); Rainbow
Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 743 (10th Cir. 1988); Populist Party v.
Herschler, 746 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1984); Blomquist v. Thomson, 739 F.2d 525, 527 (10th
Cir. 1984).
82. See supra note 81.
83. A summary of the holdings of these cases would not be useful, since each is unique to
the specific law challenged and the overall election scheme of the state within which it operates.
Each challenge is evaluated on a case-by-case basis depending on many factors. The point is sim-




B. Coalition for Free and Open Elections v. McElderry84
1. Facts
A coalition of voters and minor party candidates brought suit against the
Oklahoma State Election Board, challenging Oklahoma's total ban on write-in
voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections. 5 The coalition framed
the issues according to Burdick, arguing that the ban violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments when considered in conjunction with the state's other
ballot access laws. 6
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit, purporting to apply the Anderson model, held that
Oklahoma's overall ballot access scheme was constitutional and that the ban
on write-in voting was, therefore, presumed valid under Burdick.7 The court
only feigned adherence to the AndersonlBurdick approach, however, because it
did not in fact follow the three-part pattern. Instead, the court rearranged the
order of tasks and created a new final step. 8
C. Analysis
In the Coalition opinion, the Tenth Circuit began with an outline of
Oklahoma's ballot access scheme as a whole.89 This survey took place in the
abstract, without consideration of the scheme's impact on voters' rights.'
Next, the court recited the test and guidelines from the Anderson and Burdick
cases.9 In briefly summarizing this approach, however, the court reversed the
order of the steps.92 Instead of determining the extent of the laws' burden on
voters in order to establish the appropriate standard of review, the court con-
sidered the state's interests first, without articulating the standard upon which
84. 48 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 1995).
85. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 495.
86. "Appellants reason that the constitutionality of a ban on write-in voting cannot be judged
in a vacuum, and that the more restrictive a State's other means of ballot access are, the more
critically such a ban must be viewed." Id.; see Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434-49 (1992).
Oklahoma requires that in order for a "nonrecognized party elector" to gain access to the printed
ballot in a general election, the candidate must submit a petition of support by July 15, containing
signatures equal to at least three percent of the total votes cast in the last presidential election.
Coalition, 48 F.3d at 496.
87. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 499.
88. Id. at 496-97; see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
89. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 495-96 (Ebel, J.).
90. Id. The whole reason for examining the state's other election laws is to put the chal-
lenged law into context, in order to evaluate the actual and total burden on voters' rights. Burdick,
504 U.S. at 436-47 (noting that Hawaii's "system ... provides for easy access to the ballot," and
concluding that "any burden imposed by Hawaii's write-in vote prohibition is a very limited
one").
91. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 496-97.
92. "Accordingly, a court must first review the State's overall ballot access scheme, weigh-
ing the State's interests in ballot access restrictions against the burdens those restrictions impose
on voters' interests." Id. at 497. This re-prioritizes the state's interests to be considered first, which
directly contradicts the order of steps quoted from Anderson in the immediately preceding para-
graph of the opinion. Id. at 496.
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it relied.93 The Tenth Circuit then noted the Burdick Court's presumption of
validity when an overall scheme passes constitutional muster.94 The court
erroneously perceived this presumption to be the second step in the Burdick
structure.95 The court summarized the approach as a two-part test requiring
an initial review of the legitimacy of the ballot access laws and then a deter-
mination of whether the resulting presumption should be overcome. 96
In this prefatory summary, the appellate court did not mention any exami-
nation of the magnitude of the injury to protected rights, the determination of
which should define the level of scrutiny for the subsequent state justifications
proffered by a state.9" Instead, the Coalition court collapsed the two stages
into one and proceeded to invent its own second step.9"
The court's reasoning began with section I, titled "Oklahoma's Ballot
Access Laws." In this section, the court reviewed its earlier holding in
Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Boardl"m and found the re-
quirements of the case at bar less severe than those previously upheld.' The
court gave no consideration to the extent of the burden imposed by the regula-
tion on voters' rights."r Based solely on this comparison to a previous case
93. Id. at 497. When a ballot access law comes under attack, a court must review the law to
determine whether it places an unreasonable restriction on the plaintiff's rights. The level of scru-
tiny that the court will apply to its review of the law depends on the severity of the restriction.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Thus, determining the extent of the burden and the resulting stan-
dard of review must necessarily take place first, or else the examination of state justifications will
have no basis.
94. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 497.
95. Id. ("Thus, a court must determine, secondly, if the competing interests are such that this
presumption should be overcome.").
96. The Coalition court's restatement of the Anderson/Burdick balancing test:
Following this two-step process outlined in Burdick, we first review the legitimacy of
Oklahoma's ballot access laws for Presidential electors and conclude in Part I that, as in
Burdick, those laws "pass constitutional muster." In Part II, we then address whether the
resulting presumption that Oklahoma's ban on write-in voting is valid should be over-
come, and conclude that the presumption prevails in this case.
Id.
97. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
98. Part A of the Burdick opinion assesses the impact of Hawaii's ballot access laws on the
petitioner-voter's rights and finds the burden to be light. Part B then weighs Hawaii's interests
asserted to justify the burden imposed. The presumption of validity for the law in question arises
because the law is part of a total package that has just been deemed acceptable. There is no Part C
in which the Burdick Court conducts a second round of balancing to rebut the presumption.
99. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 497. Given the actual format of the Burdick analysis, perhaps a
more appropriate title might have been "The Extent of the Burden Imposed by 'Oklahoma's Ballot
Access Laws' on Voters' Rights." See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434-37.
100. 844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that a five percent signature requirement and a
May 31 filing deadline for gaining access to the ballot as a recognized party were constitutional).
101. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 498. Oklahoma provides four avenues for an elector to gain access
to the printed ballot in a presidential election: (1) as an elector for a recognized political party; (2)
as an uncommitted elector; (3) as an elector for an independent candidate; or (4) as an elector for
an unrecognized political party. Id. at 495-96. Even though the Rainbow court only addressed the
constitutionality of the first alternative, the court in Coalition felt that the case was instructional in
evaluating the remaining three alternatives. Id. at 498.
102. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (requiring that a court "first con-
sider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate").
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involving a different challenged provision, 3 the court declared the laws at
issue "constitutional."'' The court omitted the second stage of Burdick, ap-
parently forgetting that even light burdens must be justified by legitimate,
reasonably related state interests.'"5
Section I of the opinion concludes by stating that the particular ballot
access laws at issue "impose only reasonable burdens on Appellants' First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights."'"' The positioning of this statement renders it
moot, however, since it immediately follows two express findings that the
laws were constitutional.' 7 Rather than conducting any balancing at all, the
court leapt to the conclusion that light burdens indicate constitutionally accept-
able regulations.
Section II of the opinion begins with yet a third pronouncement that
Oklahoma's ballot access laws are constitutional and then presumes the validi-
ty of the ban on write-in voting, citing Burdick."~ The next paragraph in the
opinion purported to examine the state interests in by the ban,'" but in fact
merely recited the alleged interests without addressing the issues of legitimacy
and reasonableness.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the appellants' contentions." ' The
court considered their arguments in the rebuttal phase of its modified version
of the Burdick analysis."' All three arguments failed, and the presumption of
103. See supra note 101.
104. "Thus, we find that the July 15 deadline for the signature petitions of nonrecognized
party electors, like the May 31 deadline for recognized party electors upheld in Rainbow, 'passes
constitutional muster'.... " Coalition, 48 F.3d at 498. "Because the 3% [signature] requirement is
less burdensome than the 5% requirement we upheld in Rainbow, we find the 3% requirement
constitutional as well." Id.
105. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439-40.
106. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 498-99.
107. See supra note 92.
108. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 499.
109. The state offered the following interests to justify its ban on write-in voting: (1) "dis-
couraging unrestrained factionalism"; (2) "limiting the general election to recognized parties and
to those parties and candidates that are well supported"; (3) "focusing the voters on major issues
and candidates"; (4) "conserving state resources" by not having to resort to hand-counting of
ballots; and (5) voter education. Id. Although the court never expressly declared these interests
legitimate, it implicitly did so by finding that they "still outweigh the voters' diminished interest
in write-in voting." Id. at 501.
110. Id. at 499-501. Appellants argued that the Burdick presumption should not apply because
Oklahoma's ballot access requirements were more onerous than Hawaii's. The court's response to
this point demonstrates how truly circular its reasoning was:
For Burdick's presumption not to attach, Appellants would have to show not just that
Oklahoma's ballot access laws are more restrictive than Hawaii's, but that Oklahoma's
ballot access laws are so restrictive as to burden impermissibly voters' constitutional
rights-a proposition that we have already concluded is not the case.
Id. at 500.
111. "To overcome Oklahoma's asserted interests and Burdick's rebuttable presumption that
Oklahoma's ban on write-in voting is valid, Appellants challenge Burdick's applicability on three
grounds." Id. at 499. In addition to asserting that Oklahoma's laws were more onerous than
Hawaii's, appellants also argued two more points: (1) since Burdick involved a state election, its
presumption should not be applied to the presidential and vice-presidential elections at issue in
this case; and (2) a state has less interest in a presidential election than it does in a state or local
election and thus should not be allowed to maintain the same stringent ballot access requirements.
Id.
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validity stood." 2 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared Oklahoma's
total ban on write-in voting constitutional.
' 3
D. Other Circuits
A review of the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reveals
widespread application of the AndersonlBurdick balancing approach in ballot
access cases."4 These circuits have not only relied on the test, but have done
so with meticulous accuracy as to its structure. " -'
E. Conclusion
Despite Coalition's analytical shortcomings, its principles align with the
Supreme Court's current posture on ballot access and voting rights issues."6
Elections provide methods for selecting representatives, not platforms for
voicing dissention.' 1 Under this premise, only those practices contributing to
that end are considered defensible." ' Write-in voting, in particular, is not an
effective means of furthering this process."9 In light of Coalition and Tenth
Circuit cases cited earlier, the court seems to grasp, in a general sense, the
philosophical tenets of the Supreme Court's position. The practitioner, howev-
er, should not assume that all the circuit judges will implement the balancing
test as it is presented in Anderson and Burdick.
112. Id. at 499-501.
113. Id. at 495.
114. See McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1995);
Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 1994); Libertarian Party v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 761
(9th Cir. 1994); Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d 388, 394 (11th Cir. 1994); Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d
1344, 1352 (4th Cir. 1993); Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1543 (lth Cir. 1992).
115. The Tenth Circuit in Coalition evaluated the case under the subheadings "I. Oklahoma's
Ballot Access Laws" and "II. Ban on Write-In Votes," indicating its misunderstanding of the
proper analysis. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 497, 499. On the other hand, the cases cited supra note 114
indicate clear understandings of the method. For instance, the court in Schulz divided its opinion
as follows: "1. Assessing the burden"; "2. Assessing the state's interest"; and "3. Assessing the
means employed." Schulz, 44 F.3d at 56-58. Fulani's subtitles are even more precise: "A. Charac-
ter and Magnitude of the Asserted Injury"; "B. The Precise Interests Put Forward by the State";
and "C. Necessity of the Provision to Advancing the State's Interests." Fulani, 973 F.2d at 1544-
47.
116. The Coalition court, quoting from Burdick, points out that the purpose of elections is
"'to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates, not to provide a means of giving
vent to short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrels."' Coalition, 48 F.3d at 501.
117. Id.
118. Given the improbability of write-in voting producing a competitive candidate in a nation-
al election, demand for the right "amounts to nothing more than the insistence that the State re-
cord, count, and publish individual protests against the election system or the choices presented on
the ballot." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441. Furthermore, "reasonable regulations advancing the primary
function of the election process will be upheld." Coalition, 48 F.3d at 501.
119. Coalition, 48 F.3d at 501 ("In the context of a Presidential election, the function of actu-




The trend in ballot access cases suggests that courts should give attention
to both individual and state interests but should not intervene unless the state's
laws are both onerous and unnecessary.' The right to vote in an election no
longer qualifies as an exercise of protected speech.' Rather, courts perceive
voting as the opportunity to participate in one's government and protect the
right only on that ground. Write-in voting, as an exercise of political expres-
sion, is especially vulnerable since it does not effectively further the objectives
of the election process. Thus, claims of injury to First or Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights may, but will not automatically, merit strict scrutiny. 2
Darla L. Shaffer
120. Professor Laurence Tribe summarizes the jurisprudence:
Whatever its doctrinal roots, there is a principle to be distilled from the Court's ap-
proach in the ballot access cases: in order to keep ballots manageable and protect the
integrity of the electoral process, states may condition access to the ballot upon the
demonstration of a "significant, measurable quantum of community support," but cannot
require so large or so early a demonstration of support that minority parties or indepen-
dent candidates have no real chance of obtaining ballot positions.
TRIBE, supra note 5, § 13-20, at 1110-11.
121. Plaintiffs continue to demand strict scrutiny when challenging ballot access and voting
restrictions, and the courts consistently chide that heightened scrutiny is not necessarily appropri-
ate. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 ("Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous assumption that a
law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do
not so hold."); Rainbow Coalition, 844 F.2d at 742 ("Plaintiffs begin their argument on this point
by contending that we must apply strict scrutiny to state statutes restricting the ballot access of
minority parties. We are unable to agree.").
122. "The Supreme Court has recently made clear that while voting enjoys constitutional
protection, every law that imposes a burden on the right to vote need not be subject to strict scru-





Civil rights law attempts to resolve tension between inconsistent individu-
al and public interests.' This Survey examines how the Tenth Circuit has bal-
anced these important interests in several decisions handed down from Sep-
tember 1994 to September 1995. Part I analyzes three cases involving the
constitutional right to privacy. Two of these cases addressed the privacy right
to avoid state dissemination of personal information.2 For the first time, the
Tenth Circuit found a state action violating this right.3 The other case4 ad-
dressed whether a Utah abortion statute violated the right to be free from
government intrusion into intimate decisionmaking in light of Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey!
Part II focuses on two decisions addressing discrimination under the Fair
Housing Act.6 In these cases, the Tenth Circuit joined other circuits in rec-
ognizing disparate impact as a way to prove housing discrimination.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Background
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly recognize a
right to privacy, its philosophical origins derive from the Bill of Rights.7 Pri-
vacy issues play a pivotal role in such areas as reproductive rights,' freedom
from technological surveillance,9 and freedom of association.' °
Defining constitutional "privacy" is perhaps impossible." In attempts to
capture the essence of the privacy right, scholars have termed it "the right to
1. Robert A. Destro, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 30 ARiz. L. REV. 785, 820 (1994).
2. Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cit. 1995); Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45
F.3d 1383 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995). Although not featured in this article, the
Tenth Circuit also decided F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1534-36 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting
qualified immunity to defendants who allegedly violated the plaintiffs' right to privacy when they
seized the plaintiffs' medical records).
3. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1383.
4. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No.
95-1242, 1996 WL 327446.
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cit. 1995); Mountain Side Mobile Es-
tates Partnership v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cit. 1995).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See generally DARIEN A. McWHIRTER & JON
D. BI LE, PRIVACY AS A CoNsTrrtrnoNAL RIGHT 33-88 (1992) (discussing the philosophical,
constitutional, and common law foundations of the right to privacy); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM 330-403 (1967) (discussing the history of privacy in American law).
8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
10. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
11. Phillip Kurland, The Private !, U. CH. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 12.
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be let alone," freedom "from unwanted intrusion," "the sum of all 'private
rights,' '. E "personality," "personhood," "autonomy," and "anonymity." 3 In
short, one cannot find a single operative definition for constitutional privacy.
The concept's meaning clearly changes in different settings.
Scholars credit an 1890 article by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. War-
ren as the first source entreating courts to recognize a common law right to
privacy in the United States. 4 A response to such intrusive new technologies
as still photography, The Right to Privacy defined legal privacy as "the right
to be let alone."' 5 Although at the time no legal precedent supported the rec-
ognition of privacy as a substantive right, 6 this work spawned a concept that
now pervades American legal theory.
Years later, Justice Brandeis emerged as the first member of the Court to
advocate a constitutional right to privacy. 7 His famous dissent in Olmstead v.
United States" urged the majority to broadly interpret the express liberties of
the Bill of Rights to include an implied right to privacy. 9 He viewed the
"right to be let alone" as a fundamental liberty deserving of constitutional
protection."0 Although this effort proved unsuccessful,2' Brandeis's dissent
in Olmstead laid the analytical foundation for Griswold v. Connecticut,22 in
which the Court finally recognized a general right to privacy.23
Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality in Griswold, explained that a gen-
eral right to privacy can be inferred from the overlapping "zones" or "penum-
bras" emanating from the liberties expressly reserved by the Bill of Rights."'
12. See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419 (1974).
13. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1337-38.
Still others have attempted to organize privacy rights into taxonomies like "solitude," "intimacy,"
and "reserve," WESTIN, supra note 7, at 31, or "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude." Gormley, su-
pra, at 1338.
14. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). For more information about the historical antecedents of constitutional privacy, see
MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE 1-23 (1962);
MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra note 7, at 61-62; Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233, 240 n.26 (1977).
15. See ERNST & SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 49.
16. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1979).
17. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
23 (1991).
18. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
19. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20. Id. ("[The framers of the Bill of Rights] conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
21. See id. at 455-56, 465 (refusing to expand the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures to include warrantless government surveillance of private tele-
phone conversations).
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
24. Id. at 483-84. These "penumbras" or "zones of privacy" emanated from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 484. For a discussion on the historical meaning of
the word "penumbra" and its use by Justice Douglas in Griswold, see Henry T. Greely, A Foot-
note to "Penumbra" in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1989). Webster's
definitions for "penumbra" include: "a space of partial illumination between the perfect shadow on
all sides and the full light," and "an area containing things of obscure classification: an uncertain
middle ground between fields of thought or activity." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIO-
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Despite division over the source of the new privacy right,' the Court recog-
nized a general right of privacy encompassing freedom from state intrusion
into the marriage relationship and struck down a law forbidding married
couples' use of contraceptives. 6
Today, debate continues regarding the scope of the general right to priva-
cy.21 The prevailing modern view concerning constitutional privacy's source
is that the right to privacy is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
After Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized two distinct privacy inter-
ests arising out of the general right to privacy: "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and "the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."2 9 Lower courts have character-
ized the first of these interests as the "confidentiality" branch of privacy, and
the second as the "autonomy" branch.3" The Tenth Circuit issued several de-
cisions during the survey period that addressed these two privacy rights.
NARY UNABRIDGED 1673 (3d ed. 1981).
25. Justices Harlan and White believed that the statute violated substantive Due Process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500, 502 (Harlan, J., concurring, and
White, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, wrote a separate concurring opinion emphasizing the Ninth Amendment's guarantee of
fundamental liberties not expressly reserved in the Constitution. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring). Justices Black and Stewart dissented. Id. at 507, 527 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
For a critical analysis of these theories, see Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Re-
view: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REv. 293, 304-12 (1986); Henkin, supra
note 12, at 1416-24.
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
27. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 748-49 (1989) (criti-
cizing the Supreme Court's more recent holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
where the Court held that homosexual sodomy fell outside the boundary of private activities pro-
tected from government intrusion).
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a right to privacy based on the "Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty"); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598
n.23 (1977) (quoting the Roe Court's determination that the right to privacy stems from the Four-
teenth Amendment). But see Gerety, supra note 14, at 239-40 n.25 (arguing that cases following
Griswold did not settle the "question of constitutional derivation" of the general right to privacy);
Henkin, supra note 12, at 1422 (arguing that subsequent decisions did not revisit the analyses jus-
tifying privacy as a constitutional right but have assumed the existence of such a right).
29. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. The Whalen Court cited Professor Kurland's article dis-
cussing "three facets" of privacy, one of which is protected directly by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 599 n.24; see also Gormley, supra note 13, at 1339-40 (organizing legal privacy into five cate-
gories, three of which parallel the constitutional privacy rights set out in Whalen); Rubenfeld,
supra note 27, at 740 (distinguishing between "informational" privacy, or limiting the ability of
others to access to information about the private aspects of one's life, and "substantive" privacy,
or limiting government interference with personal autonomy); cf MCWHIRTER & BIBLE, supra
note 7, at 104 (identifying "the right to engage in sex and marriage, the right to have an abortion
and the right to be free from searches that invade privacy" as the three major subdivisions of
privacy).
30. See Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1987).
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B. Informational Privacy: The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality
1. Supreme Court Decisions
The first category of privacy rights lurking within the "penumbras" of
Fourteenth Amendment privacy involves the individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. The Supreme Court expressly recognized this
right in Whalen v. Roe.3 The Supreme Court did not, however, recognize a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right on the facts of Whalen, nor has it
done so in any subsequent decision.32
The plaintiffs in Whalen challenged a statute requiring physicians to com-
pile prescription records containing detailed patient information for dangerous
drug prescriptions.33 During a five-year period, a limited number of health
officials could access these records.34 The Court held that the patient-identifi-
cation provisions did not violate the right to privacy.35 Given the limited ac-
cess and statutory safeguards against unwarranted disclosure, the importance of
providing necessary medical information to health care officials outweighed
the minimal risk of erroneous or fraudulent disclosure of personal informa-
tion.36
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,37 the Court recognized the
right to avoid disclosure of personal matters, but as in Whalen, the Court
refused to find a violation of that right on the facts of the case." President
31. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
32. See id. 429 U.S. at 600; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-56
(1977). Lower courts commonly cite Whalen and Nixon as the authority for the existence of the
"informational" privacy right. See, e.g., Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1990);
Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986).
33. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591-93.
34. Id. at 593-95.
35. Id. at 591.
36. Id. at 600-04. Critics assert that in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695-96 (1976), the Court
rejected a general right to privacy protecting individuals from state dissemination of personal in-
formation by the state. See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981). In Paul, police
officers distributed flyers identifying as an "active shoplifter" a man charged with shoplifting but
later acquitted. The Court refused to recognize the plaintiff's claim that the action infringed on
one of the "zones of privacy" protected by the Bill of Rights. Paul, 424 U.S. at 696. The majority
of courts and commentators, however, feel comfortable in construing Paul and Whalen as consis-
tent. See Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 133, 140 (1982) (offering a limited reading of Paul as merely rejecting an attempt to extend
the autonomy strand of privacy); Bruce E. Falby, Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Dis-
closure of Personal Matter: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 71 GEO. LJ. 219, 222-
24 (1982) (pointing out that Paul does not explicitly reject a right against disclosure in all cases
but only as against disclosure "of an official act such as an arrest" already appearing on the public
record); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-16, at 1396 (2d
ed. 1988) (interpreting Paul as imposing "federalism-based limits" on § 1983 liability rather than
repudiating "deep substantive principles under the Fourteenth Amendment").
37. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
38. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465. Critics have rejected Nixon as authority for a privacy right to
avoid disclosure of personal matters. See DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1089 n.4 ("[The Court's] analysis
of the privacy issue in Nixon appears to be based on the Fourth Amendment requirement that all
searches and seizures be reasonable, not on the scope of a general constitutional right to priva-
cy."); cf Falby, supra note 36, at 234 n.136, 240-41 n.185 (arguing that the Nixon court seemed
to confuse Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment privacy). Both Whalen and Nixon, however, in-
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Richard Nixon claimed that the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preser-
vation Act, which compelled him to disclose materials compiled during his
official activities as President, violated his right to privacy.39 Recognizing a
"legitimate expectation of privacy"'  in any personal communications, the
Court balanced Nixon's interest in confidentiality against the public's interest
in the majority of the materials, Nixon's status as a public figure, the small
percentage of material not relating to official presidential duties, and the diffi-
culty in separating official from private material without a comprehensive
screening process." Finding that the screening process which the act contem-
plated would cause minimal intrusion into Nixon's private affairs, the Court
found that the act did not violate Nixon's right to privacy."2
The Nixon Court's analysis suggests little about what types of information
fit within the definition of "personal matter." The Court's balancing analysis,
however, suggests an intermediate standard to review the government's justifi-
cation for compelled disclosure.43 This standard falls somewhere between the
strict scrutiny standard applicable in equal protection cases involving funda-
mental rights and suspect classes" and the minimum rationality standard ap-
plicable in many substantive due process claims.45
Although the Supreme Court has not examined the constitutional right to
avoid disclosure of personal matters since Nixon, the Tenth Circuit has decided
a line of cases addressing this "confidentiality" branch of privacy. The next
section introduces the Tenth Circuit's test for analyzing confidentiality cases.
volved a statute compelling disclosure of personal information outside the context of a criminal
investigation. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.32.
39. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455.
40. The Court referred to the Fourth Amendment privacy test, which analyzes the
individual's "legitimate expectation of privacy." See id. at 458 (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)). Commentators have suggested that the Court confused Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment privacy. See Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1987); Falby, supra
note 36, at 234. On the other hand, the Court may simply have been suggesting that the Fourth
Amendment test has applicability in the Fourteenth Amendment context. See Borucki, 827 F.2d at
844; see also discussion supra note 36.
41. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465.
42. Id.
43. See Igneri v. Moore, 898 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1990); cf. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d
1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The Court did not speak in usual terms of standard of review."). For
one commentator's analysis on what the proper level of scrutiny should be, see Falby, supra note
36, at 242-45.
44. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
45. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (adopting a
rationality standard in economic substantive due process claims, but intimating that a more strin-
gent standard of review might apply to statutes "directed at particular religious or national or
racial minorities"); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (applying minimum rationality to a claim that a law
prohibiting homosexual sodomy violated the due process right to privacy). Prior to Casey, the
Court applied heightened scrutiny when disclosure requirements had a "chilling effect" on
decisionmaking protected under the "autonomy" branch of privacy. Thomburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-72 (1986) (invalidating a statutory pro-
vision that required disclosure of a woman's political affiliation, among other information, before
she could obtain an abortion).
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2. Prior Tenth Circuit Decisions
In a 1981 opinion, Denver Policemen's Protective Ass'n v. Lichtenstein,'
the Tenth Circuit adopted a three-part test for analyzing claims under Nixon.
In Lichtenstein, a state judge issued a discovery order compelling disclosure of
police department personnel files.47 Under the order, the court would first
review the files in camera to determine whether the criminal defendant ac-
cused of assaulting a police officer was entitled to exculpatory evidence within
the files.' To analyze the claim that disclosure of the personnel records vio-
lated the individual officers' right to privacy, the Tenth Circuit employed a
three-part balancing test: (1) whether "the party asserting the right ha[d] a
legitimate expectation of privacy" in keeping the information confidential; (2)
whether "disclosure serve[d] a compelling state interest"; and (3) whether
"disclosure [was] made in the least intrusive manner."'49 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that even if the officers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
keeping the personnel records confidential, the state had a compelling interest
in ascertaining the truth in a criminal trial and in maintaining the defendant's
right to obtain exculpatory material in his defense." Furthermore, the state
judge had ordered the disclosure of the records in the least intrusive manner




In a subsequent case, Mangels v. Pena,52 the Tenth Circuit analyzed only
the first element of the Lichtenstein test and found in favor of disclosure. The
plaintiffs, city fire department employees, were terminated after a department
investigation for illegal drug use.53 They alleged that a city official's disclo-
sure to the media of the investigative report violated their right to privacy.54
Initially, the court noted that whether information falls within the scope of
constitutional protection "depends, at least in part, upon the intimate or other-
wise personal nature of the material."55 Relying on the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Paul v. Davis,56 the Tenth Circuit held "[vialidly enacted ... laws"
gave the plaintiffs notice that any conduct that violated those laws would not
46. 660 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1981).
47. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 434.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 435. The Lichtenstein court adopted this test from the Colorado Supreme Court in
Martinelli v. District Court, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 1980), which had in turn adopted the test
from Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d 83, 94-97
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs.,
379 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1980) (refusing to expand privacy rights to informational privacy).
50. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 436.
51. Id.
52. 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986).
53. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 837.
54. Id. Although not at issue in Mangels, when a plaintiff asserts a constitutional claim for
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), a defendant may raise the qualified immunity defense.
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see
also F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1532 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting defendants qualified immu-
nity when plaintiff claimed privacy violation in agency's action of seizing medical records during
an investigation into alleged Medicare fraud).
55. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839.
56. 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see discussion supra note 36.
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receive constitutional protection from disclosure.57 Because the report did not
contain any personal information unrelated to the investigation into the
plaintiffs' illegal drug use, the court found that the plaintiffs had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in relation to the investigative files.5
Thus, Mangels suggests one limitation on a plaintiff's ability to satisfy the
first Lichtenstein element. "Public" matters do not merit a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy." More fundamentally, Mangels redefined the Fourth Amend-
ment concept of the "legitimate expectation of privacy" for Fourteenth
Amendment privacy claims.59 When evaluating Fourth Amendment privacy
claims, courts apply a test with both subjective and objective components.'
In contrast, the Mangels court only asked whether the information in the report
was "intimate and personal" when determining the legitimacy of a privacy
expectation.6
Also apparent in Mangels is that the Tenth Circuit has recognized two
subinterests within the general interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters. Whalen, Nixon, and Lichtenstein involved government actions compelling
an individual to disclose personal information to the government.62 Claims of
a privacy violation in this context usually accompany a request for injunctive
relief.63 Mangels, on the other hand, involved government dissemination of
information previously obtained from the individual. Such cases often arise as
damages claims against a state official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' Cases
discussed in this Survey involve both scenarios.
57. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839.
58. Id.
59. In Schellenberg, the Florida court interpreted Nixon to adopt the Fourth Amendment
standard in the Fourteenth Amendment context, and, accordingly, the court adopted the two-part
Fourth Amendment test. Schellenberg, 360 So. 2d at 94; see Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
60. See Falby, supra note 36, at 240.
61. In several other cases addressing this issue, the Tenth Circuit has consistently held that
"public" matters, such as criminal conduct or a public employee's job performance, are not "inti-
mate and personal" and thus do not merit a "reasonable expectation of privacy." E.g., Flanagan v.
Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1570-71 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that police officers did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in facts contained within an internal investigation file). The court
has indicated, however, that sexual history, personal photographs, and other highly sensitive mat-
ters do fall within the zone of privacy. See Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627,
631 (10th Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's refusal to grant qualified immunity where officer
asked irrelevant questions concerning victim's sexual history during sexual assault investigation);
Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984) (reversing dismissal of privacy claim
where police officers exhibited previously seized "highly sensitive, personal, and private" photo-
graphs to acquaintances). Neither of these cases, however, involved a decision on the merits of the
claim.
62. Inherent in disclosure to state officials is the risk of dissemination of the same informa-
tion to the public. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600; Falby, supra note 36, at 241.
63. For example, a facial attack on the statute or an action to enjoin a court order would
fall within this category. See, e.g., Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 434.
64. See, e.g., Mangels, 789 F.2d at 836-37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) authorizes damage
claims against officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights. Similar claims can arise
against a federal official. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971);
Western States Cattle Co. v. Edwards, 895 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1990).
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3. Tenth Circuit Decisions
The Tenth Circuit decided two cases addressing the constitutional right to
avoid government dissemination of personal matters during the survey period.
For the first time, the Tenth Circuit found a government action violative of
this branch of constitutional privacy.
a. Nilson v. Layton City6"
In Nilson, the Tenth Circuit further described what matters are not "per-
sonal" enough to merit constitutional protection. Following the Mangels de-
cision, the Nilson panel held that the Constitution does not protect against
dissemination of information already considered public. In Nilson, even where
the plaintiff had expunged records of a prior arrest under Utah law, the
expungement did not truly remove the material from the public record for
constitutional purposes.
i. Facts
In 1981, plaintiff Demar Nilson, while employed as a schoolteacher in
Davis County, Utah, pled no contest to sexual abuse charges. 66 In 1984,
Nilson obtained a teaching position with the Jordan School District in Salt
Lake County, Utah.67 He later obtained an expungement order under a Utah
statute to seal records pertaining to his 1981 arrest.' The statute provided:
"Any agency or its employee who receives an expungement order may not
divulge any information in the sealed expunged records."69 The state court
did not file the order with any city of Layton official." In 1991, a Layton po-
lice officer with first-hand knowledge of the 1981 conviction spoke to a local
television station regarding the conviction. The discussion led to a report on
the evening news that "received substantial publicity."7'
Nilson filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the
officer's disclosure of the expunged conviction violated his right to privacy. 2
The district court found that because neither the officer nor any Layton official
knew of the expungement order, and thus had not violated the Utah statute
prohibiting an official from divulging such information, "they could not be
held liable under section 1983." 73
65. 45 F.3d 369 (10th Cir. 1995).
66. Nilson, 45 F.3d at 370.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 370 n.1; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-2(5)(a) (1990) (repealed 1994).
70. Nilson, 45 F.3d at 370. Between 1990 and 1991, the Jordan School District received
complaints about Nilson's past conviction and new complaints of sexual abuse by Nilson. Id. at
370-71. After an investigation, Salt Lake County officials filed charges against Nilson for sexual
abuse. Id. at 371. These charges did not result in a conviction but the Jordan School District dis-
charged Nilson in 1992. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).




On appeal, the Tenth Circuit analyzed Nilson's privacy claim under the
Lichtenstein test.74 The court held that Nilson failed to show a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy with regard to the expunged conviction." Citing
Mangels, the court emphasized that information must be highly personal or
intimate and not readily available to the public to warrant a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. 76 The expungement order did not create a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy regarding the arrest and conviction because those events were
recorded in documents not sealed by the expungement order and remembered
by the people present." Thus, the expungement order never "truly removed"
the arrest and conviction from the public record.78
Nilson illustrates a continued adherence to the court's reasoning in
Mangels: to merit protection under substantive due process, information must
relate to intimate and personal matters rather than public matters. After Nilson,
however, a workable definition of "intimate and personal" remained elusive.
Precedent had established only that "highly sensitive" materials might fall
within the scope of a "legitimate expectation of privacy" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that matters of public record or of public concern did not.79
b. Sheets v. Salt Lake County"
Sheets illustrates more precisely what types of information do create a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" under the Lichtenstein test's first element.
In Sheets, the Tenth Circuit recognized a violation of the right to privacy in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.
i. Facts
After a terrorist bomb killed plaintiff Gary Sheets's wife, police investiga-
tors asked Sheets for his wife's diary, a common practice in a murder investi-
gation." Believing the information in the diary would remain confidential,
Sheets gave it to the police.82 Investigators and detectives assigned to the
bombing case received copies of the diary, including one of the defendants,
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 372. The court emphasized that disclosed information must independently merit
constitutional protection as a "fundamental personal interest[ ] derived from the Constitution." Id.
(quoting Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839). State statutes and regulations are merely factors to consider in
determining the scope of constitutional privacy. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 76.
80. 45 F.3d 1383 (10th Cit. 1995).
81. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1386.
82. Id. The detective who received the diary did not remember whether he assured the
plaintiff that the information would remain confidential. Id. Another detective on the case, howev-
er, testified that he assured Sheets the diary would remain confidential. Id.
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Mr. George. 3 George took thorough handwritten notes from the contents of
the diary and made photocopies of the diary. 4 After the suspected bomber
was convicted, the department archived the diary and the rest of the investiga-
tive file, which made it available for public inspection. 5 Consistent with an
"unwritten policy" in the Salt Lake County Attorney's office allowing em-
ployees to speak freely with the press after a case was closed, George met
with three authors who were writing books about the bombing incident.'
George allowed one of the authors, Lindsay, to examine his notes, and he re-
sponded to the other authors' questions. 7 Some time later, Lindsay published
a book containing direct quotes from the diary. 8
In 1989, Sheets filed suit against the county and several investigators,
asserting a constitutional invasion of privacy. 9 After the district judge denied
the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of
plaintiff's case, the trial resulted in a jury verdict of $650,000 in favor of
Sheets.'
ii. Decision
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit initially noted
that Sheets had presented ample evidence for the jury to find that Sheets gave
the diary to the defendants with the understanding that they would keep the
diary confidential. 9 To meet the first Lichtenstein element, this understanding
must have created a "legitimate expectation that [the diary would] remain
confidential while in the state's possession. ' The court, therefore, directed
its focus to whether the diary displayed the "intimate or otherwise personal na-
ture" required to merit substantive due process protection.93
First, the inquiry should concentrate on the nature of the material dis-
closed, not on the author.94 The fact that Sheets' wife wrote the diary had no
bearing on whether Sheets had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
diary's contents.95 Furthermore, the information did not have to be "embar-
rassing to be personal."" The court listed other "personal" types of informa-







89. Id. Sheets later amended the complaint to include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against George and a Salt Lake County attorney, the only defendants remaining at trial. Id.
90. Id. at 1387.
91. Id. at 1388.
92. Id. at 1387.
93. Id. at 1387-88. The court did not make any reference to the two-part Fourth Amendment
inquiry adopted in Schellenberg. See supra notes 49, 59-60.
94. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1388.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that patients have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in medical records, but granting defendants qualified immunity
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involve embarrassing information but had nonetheless been afforded constitu-
tional protection.9" The Tenth Circuit concluded that whether the diary was
sufficiently personal to merit protection under the Due Process Clause was a
proper question for the jury."
The court rejected the defendants' contention that the plaintiff had no
reasonable expectation of privacy because he knew that many investigators
would have access to the diary." The court distinguished disclosure for a
limited purpose from public release through publication.'0 ' Addressing the
other Lichtenstein elements, the Tenth Circuit held that the government did not
have a compelling interest in disclosing the contents of the diary."°
In summary, the Tenth Circuit's analysis after Sheets looks first to wheth-
er the information in question is personal or public. If the information is not
public, the court lets the jury decide whether the information is sufficiently
personal to merit protection. If so, the government must show a compelling
interest and use the least intrusive means to compel disclosure or disseminate
the information.
4. Other Circuits
Led by the Third and Fifth Circuits, most other circuits have indicated an
acceptance of the right to privacy in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters.0 3 The Sixth Circuit continues to reject the general right to privacy
against government disclosure of private information,' ° and the First and
D.C. Circuits have questioned the doctrine. 5
To analyze claims involving the right to confidentiality, the Third,'
6
Fifth," Eleventh,' and Second"°  Circuits apply a pure balancing
where agency had seized medical records in an investigation for Medicare fraud).
98. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1388. To guide its analysis, the court referenced the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts and the common law tort of invasion of privacy. Id. at 1388 n.l. The Restatement
test looks to whether the information "involve[s] a matter of public concern," and whether public
disclosure "could be considered highly offensive to the reasonable person." Id. The court noted,
however, that the Restatement merely provides guidance for the constitutional analysis. Id.
99. Id. at 1388.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1388-89.
103. See James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1543 (1lth Cir. 1991); Doe v. Attorney
Gen. of the United States, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991); Western States Cattle Co., 895 F.2d
at 441-43; Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (Ist Cir. 1988); Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch.,
830 F.2d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Best, 746 F.2d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cit. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalas, 575 F.2d 1119, 1128 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979).
104. See Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d
733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981).
105. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(refusing to consider the privacy argument as part of a facial challenge to the National Agency
Questionnaire); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 838-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding for the purposes
of qualified immunity that no clearly established right against government disclosure of personal
matters existed as of June 17, 1983).
106. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577, 580.
107. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134.
108. James, 941 F.2d at 1544.
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test.'° This majority approach does not attempt to quantify the
"sensitivity""' of the individual's privacy interest, but simply balances what-
ever personal interests exist against the public or state interests present."' A
second approach, taken by the Eighth Circuit, focuses on whether the
individual's interest is sufficiently "fundamental," and then requires a compel-
ling interest to justify the action.'
3
Other courts have applied similar tests to the two tests above. The Ninth
Circuit has applied the Third Circuit balancing test, "  but has also recog-
nized a shifting standard of review, where "the more sensitive the information,
the stronger the state's interest must be."' ' The Fourth and Seventh Circuits
have refused to acknowledge a constitutionally protected confidentiality inter-
est when the information's subject matter relates to conduct not protected
under the "autonomy" branch of privacy."6
No court has drawn a distinction between cases involving compelled dis-
closure to the government and government dissemination of confidential infor-
mation.'' Those cases in which the individual's interest has prevailed
109. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559.
110. See Clark, supra note 36, at 134.
111. Rather than look to the nature of the information, most courts seem to apply the "inti-
mate and private" standard. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 93. In practice, this standard's
only requirement is that information be sufficiently confidential so as not to be already known or
knowable to the public. See Clark, supra note 36, at 134; Falby, supra note 36, at 240 (advocating
a requirement that considers if the information would remain confidential but for the government
action).
112. Some of the seven factors considered under the Third Circuit analysis include: the type
of record and information requested, the potential for harm and degree of potential injury in non-
consensual disclosures by the state, the "adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclo-
sure," the degree of need for state or public access, and the extent of any "recognizable public
interest militating toward access." Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578. The Fifth Circuit has not ar-
ticulated a seven element test, but has referred to the factors considered in Nixon and Whalen for
help in balancing individual versus public interests. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134. Similarly, the Sec-
ond Circuit has adopted a balancing test, where the government must show a "substantial" interest
in disclosure. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1559.
113. Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that disclosure must
constitute a "shocking degradation," "egregious humiliation," or constitute a "flagrant breech of a
pledge of confidentiality," to merit protection as a constitutional tort).
114. Doe, 941 F.2d at 795-96. For a discussion of the elements of the Third Circuit's balanc-
ing test, see supra note 112.
115. The Ninth Circuit has not adopted a clear standard by which to evaluate the "sensitivity"
of information. See Doe, 941 F.2d at 795-97 (analyzing defendant's qualified immunity defense
and deciding that it was reasonable for him to assume that disclosing information about the
plaintiff's AIDS infection did not violate plaintiff's due process right); Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that questions into plaintiffs sexual history
had no relevance to any legitimate interest of defendant police officers in conducting their investi-
gation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984).
116. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that facts
about homosexual relations are not the type of information that an applicant had a right to keep
private in light of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Hedge v. County of Tippecanoe,
890 F.2d 4, 7-8 (7th Cir. 1989) (granting qualified immunity to defendants where plaintiff alleged
violation of privacy when asked "sexually related" questions, since the interrogation occurred
while the Supreme Court was still contemplating Bowers).
117. Concerns about federalism, however, seem to affect outcomes. See Clark, supra note 36;
see also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981) ("As with the disclosure in Paul v.
Davis, protection of appellants' privacy rights here must be left to the states or the legislative
process."). Compare Alexander v. Peffer, 992 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (refusing to recog-
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involved either a government official's wanton dissemination of personal in-
formation"' or a mandatory disclosure of private information in exchange
for some public benefit.'
5. Analysis
The disparity between the Third and Eighth Circuit's approaches reflects a
fundamental disagreement about the source and scope of any constitutional
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.' Nevertheless,
both approaches recognize the need for protecting the individual's right to
confidentiality in some circumstances, but also give credence to the public
interest in limited disclosure when safeguards are present. The first approach
accomplishes this goal by imposing affirmative requirements that a state must
meet to justify disclosure. The second approach does it by imposing a high
threshold for an individual to establish a constitutional right balanced by an
equally high threshold for the government to compel disclosure.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit's analysis weighs heavily in favor of the
individual's interest. Although the Lichtenstein test purports to adopt the
Fourth Amendment "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard, subsequent
decisions have demonstrated that the Tenth Circuit follows the less exacting
"intimate and private" approach when evaluating the extent of the individual's
interest.' 2' To compensate for the lack of a bright-line standard in
nize a constitutional right to privacy protecting against state dissemination of personal information
unless the information disclosed is a "shocking degredation," "egregious humiliation" or the dis-
semination involves a flagrant breach of a pledge of confidentiality) with Western States Cattle
Co., 895 F.2d 438 (recognizing right to nondisclosure of personal information under Fifth Amen-
dment Due Process in a Bivens action, and applying the Fifth Circuit Plante analysis before find-
ing that no violation occurred).
118. See James, 941 F.2d at 1543-44 (deciding that defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity where the police exhibited personal video footage obtained in a criminal investigation);
Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895
F.2d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no violation where safety mechanisms in polygraph proce-
dure reduced the risk of unwarranted disclosure).
119. See Thorne, 726 F.2d at 468-72. But see Hedge, 890 F.2d at 7-8 (granting qualified
immunity to defendants where plaintiff alleged violation of privacy when asked "sexually related"
questions). In both of these situations, however, the defendant avoids liability by attempting to
limit the dissemination to a specific and legitimate government purpose. See, e.g., Hester v. City
of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11 th Cir. 1985) (control questions used during polygraph
examinations were general in nature, asked for the specific and legitimate purpose of maintaining
the reliability of the test, and left out the most personal of questions relating to marriage, family,
and sexual relations).
120. Critics of the balancing approach have difficulty recognizing a "fundamental" right in
avoiding disclosure of all "personal" information without regard to content. DeSanti, 653 F.2d at
1090 (discussing the requirement in Paul and Roe that a private interest must be "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" to merit protection under substantive due process).
These critics interpret the term "fundamental" as requiring that information be extremely sensitive
or involve conduct protected under the autonomy branch of privacy. Clark, supra note 36, at 139.
Critics of the autonomy-based approach are troubled by the prospect of heightened scrutiny. See
Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134 (adopting a balancing standard in light of the Supreme Court's warning
against establishing new "fundamental" interests) (referring to San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)).
121. Several commentators have suggested an inquiry similar to the Fourth Amendment's
"legitimate expectation of privacy" test as the appropriate standard to determine when information
is constitutionally protected. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967). The Fourth
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determining the types of information to be protected, the Third Circuit's bal-
ancing test weighs the individual's interest against the government's interest,
the existence of safeguards against unnecessary disclosure, and other fac-
tors.'22 Employing a hybrid of the balancing and autonomy-based ap-
proaches, the Tenth Circuit lets the jury decide what interests are intimate and
private (without a clear standard as guidance) and then requires what appears
to be strict scrutiny to justify the public's interest. As a result, the scenarios in
Mangels and Nilson present the only means by which the state can gain access
to private records under any circumstances. Nilson, however, only removes
publicly accessible matters from the scope of protected information," 3 while
Mangels only removes matters of public concern.
Despite these analytical problems, several factors indicate that Sheets,
Nilson, Mangels, and Lichtenstein would have been decided the same way
under the pure balancing test used by the majority of circuits. First, circuits
adopting the majority approach have also recognized the threshold requirement
in Mangels and Nilson that information be private, not public, to merit con-
stitutional protection.'24 Second, the defendant in Sheets could not have justi-
fied his disclosure to the media even if the court had applied intermediate
review since the facts indicate that he disclosed the diary for personal gain,
not for any state purpose. Finally, the defendants' victory in Lichtenstein sug-
gests that the Tenth Circuit did not apply the level of strict scrutiny applicable
in equal protection cases. 25
C. Reproductive Privacy
A woman's right to choose abortion falls within the "autonomy" strand of
due process privacy interests identified in Whalen, the "interest in indepen-
dence in making certain kinds of important decisions. ' The landmark abor-
tion case of Roe v. Wade'27 continues to spark heated controversy in the area
Amendment test looks to the individual's subjective intent to keep the information confidential
and the objective reasonableness of that expectation. See Lawrence J. Leigh, Informational Priva-
cy: Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by
Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229, 251 (1976); see also Falby, supra note 36,
at 240 (advocating a three-pronged analysis with both subjective and objective components).
122. See supra note 112.
123. For an example of ordinarily personal information potentially available to the state under
Nilson's public accessibility exception, see Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, 765 F.2d 490, 492-
93 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062 (1986), where the plaintiff's driver's license and
evidence she attended church regularly precluded any assertion that information concerning her
gender or religious beliefs was confidential and protected.
124. See, e.g., id.
125. Gerald Gunther has referred to strict scrutiny in the equal protection context as "'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection?, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Moreover, an earlier Tenth Circuit case directed the district court to
apply a balancing standard, rather than a compelling interest standard, to evaluate a due process
right to confidentiality claim. See Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1984)
(directing the district court on remand to determine whether plaintiff's "privacy interest ou-
tweighed the public need for ... disclosure").
126. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of reproductive freedom.2 Despite its erosion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,29 Roe remains authoritative in the area of reproductive privacy. 30
In Roe, the Court recognized a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause protecting a woman's right to decide "whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.""'' The Court upheld this privacy right in the
absence of a compelling government interest.'32 Because an unborn fetus was
not held to be a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state interest in protecting the health and safety of a fetus was not "com-
pelling" enough to override the woman's right to privacy. 3 Legally, the fe-
tus represented only the potentiality of life.'34 Once the fetus reached viabil-
ity, however, the government's interests in protecting the potential human life
and the mother's health became "compelling."'
' 35
To effectuate its holding, the Court set forth a trimester framework to
analyze a state government's power to regulate abortions.'36 During the first
trimester, the state could not regulate abortions.' Because the risk that abor-
tion posed to the health of the woman increased throughout the pregnancy, the
Court reasoned that after the first trimester, the state had a "compelling" inter-
est in protecting the life and health of the mother.3 Thus, after the first tri-
mester, the state could regulate abortions "to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."'1
39
Because the state had a compelling interest in preserving potential life at via-
bility, the Court held that the state may regulate abortions to protect the fetus
after viability.3" A regulation could even prohibit abortions after viability,
"except when ... necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."''
After Roe, issues arose regarding the extent to which a state could regu-
late abortions after viability. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists,4" the Supreme Court struck down a statute requiring
an abortion method that would give the child the best chance for survival
128. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709, 842 (1995).
129. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
130. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-70 ("We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a
constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate."). But see C. Elaine Howard, The Roe'd to
Confuision: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1457, 1475-76 (1993) ("[The
[Casey] Court defined the essential holding [of Roe] so narrowly that almost nothing fits inside.").
131. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
132. Id. at 155.
133. Id. at 162.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 162-63.
136. Id. at 163.
137. Id. When the Court decided Roe, current medical data showed that it was possible for the
mortality rate of women during childbirth to exceed the mortality rate of women having first tri-
mester abortions. Id.
138. Id. at 150, 163.
139. Id. at 163.
140. Id. at 163-64. The point of viability at the time of Roe was thought to be between 24-28
weeks, approximately the end of the second trimester. Id. at 160.
141. Id. at 163-64.
142. 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
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unless that method "would present a significantly greater medical risk to the
life or health of the pregnant woman" than another form of abortion.'4 3 The
Court found that this provision established a "trade-off' between the health of
the woman and the survival of the child.'" Instead, the right to privacy rec-
ognized in Roe required that "maternal health be the physician's paramount
consideration.' 45
In the early 1990s, responding to a perceived shift in the Court
disfavoring the privacy right recognized in Roe," several states passed abor-
tion statutes designed to limit a woman's right to privacy in electing abor-
tion.47 This burst of legislative activity culminated with the Supreme Court
addressing the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's abortion statute in Casey.
The Casey Court redefined the standard of review for state restrictions on
abortion. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, underscored that "Roe was
a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care."'" The opinion reaffirmed
Roe's "central holding that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions."' 49 The Court also "reaffirm[ed] Roe's
holding that 'subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother."" 5 The Court was troubled,
however, by later cases' that upheld Roe's requirement that government
regulations affecting abortion must always survive strict scrutiny.'
In light of this concern, the Casey Court modified Roe's strict scrutiny
standard and abandoned the trimester system. Instead, to justify a pre-viability
regulation, a state must show that the regulation would not "impose[] an undue
burden" on a woman's right to choose an abortion. 3 Before viability, the
143. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768.
144. Id. at 768-69.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Jan Gehorsam, In the Hands of Women, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 7, 1992,
at DI (discussing abortion groups organizing in fear that the Court was about to overrule or se-
verely limit Roe v. Wade in light of the Court's decision in Webster in 1989 and the appointment
of Clarence Thomas to the Court).
147. See Steve McGonigle, Near-ban on Abortion Is Rejected, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar.
9, 1993, at IA; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 491 (1989) ("Roe
implies no limitation on a State's authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion."). This statement in Webster sparked the movement to pass new abortion statutes in the
1990s. Karen S. Conway & Michael R. Butler, State Abortion Legislation as a Public Good,
ECON. INQUIRY, Oct. 1, 1992, at 609 (predicting the political stance of each state should the Court
overturn Roe).
148. Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 877-78 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
151. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 (1983) (hold-
ing unconstitutional statutory provisions requiring, among other things, parental and informed con-
sent), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-72. Justice O'Connor reasoned that Roe's trimester framework
misconceived the nature of the woman's interests and unnecessarily limited important state inter-
ests in preserving potential life and protecting maternal health. Id. at 872-74.
153. Id. at 874-75. The Court defined an undue burden as a state action having the "purpose
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state was still precluded from promulgating regulations prohibiting a woman
from making the ultimate decision of whether to terminate the pregnancy." 4
An informed consent requirement and a twenty-four hour waiting period provi-
sion, both aimed at ensuring an informed decision, did not impose such a
burden because they did not unduly interfere with a woman's ultimate deci-
sion. "'55 On the other hand, a provision requiring spousal notification prior to
abortion did impose an undue burden. Factual findings of spousal abuse con-
vinced the Court that mandatory spousal notification would foreclose "a signif-
icant number of women" from making the ultimate decision to have an abor-
tion. 6
In the aftermath of Casey, lower courts questioned how the undue burden
standard relates to facial attacks on statutes. In United States v. Salerno,'57
the Court had held that a facial challenge must be rejected unless there exists
no set of circumstances in which the statute can be constitutionally ap-
plied. ' The Casey court, however, invalidated the spousal notification pro-
vision even though the provision did not impose an undue burden on women
who would have informed their husbands anyway.'59 Despite Justice Scalia's
indication that he would apply the Salerno rule to the abortion context,' 6
Justices O'Connor and Souter have argued that Casey abandoned the Salerno
rule in considering the facial validity of abortion statutes. 161 The next section
discusses circuit court decisions addressing abortion restrictions after Casey
and their application of the undue burden standard.
1. Other Circuits
In Sojourner T v. Edwards,162 the Fifth Circuit addressed a Louisiana
abortion statute criminalizing abortions except in instances of rape, incest, or
to preserve the life or health of the unborn child or mother. 63 The Fifth
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonvia-
ble fetus." Id. See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue
Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 878-92 (1994) (attempting to
clarify the proper analysis under the undue burden standard and arguing that the standard looks to
both the legislative purpose and to the effect on the individual's right to choose abortion).
154. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-75.
155. Id.
156. Id at 889-95.
157. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
158. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
159. Casey, 505 U.S. at 892-97 ("The proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group
for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.").
160. Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that restricting facial challenges to statutes allows states to refine the legis-
lative process).
161. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of the expansion of the overbreadth doctrine and facial challenge issues,
see generally Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235 (1994). This example simply demonstrates the circuits' varied application of Casey.
162. 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
163. Sojourner T, 974 F.2d at 29. Although the Fifth Circuit found it "usually true that if a
case can be decided either on statutory or constitutional law, [the court] should address the stat-
utory issue first," the court decided that in light of the "clear holding of Casey," and the fact that
the plaintiffs brought a facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality, the court could address
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Circuit held that the statute, on its face, imposed an undue burden on a woma-
n's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 6'
In contrast, in a separate case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the facial constitu-
tionality of a Mississippi abortion law requiring parental consent before minors
could obtain abortions.'65 Because the minor could bypass the requirement
through a confidential judicial-bypass procedure, the court held that the provi-
sion did not, on its face, place an "undue burden" on the minor's privacy
interest." The Eighth Circuit similarly upheld as facially constitutional the
informed consent provision of a North Dakota statute. 67 The court held that
the statute was virtually identical to the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey
and did not impose an "undue burden" on the woman's right to privacy."6
2. Jane L. v. Bangerter69
a. Facts
In Jane L., the Tenth Circuit addressed a facial attack on a Utah statute
that severely limited access to abortions except in five specific circumstanc-
es. 70 The plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of the
Utah statute in 1991. 7 ' The Supreme Court's decision in Casey the follow-
ing year declared the statute's restrictions on abortions before twenty weeks
gestation' and its spousal notification provision'
73 unconstitutional. 171
Ruling on the remaining provisions in light of Casey, the district court
upheld a choice of method provision,' a serious medical emergency excep-
tion, 76 and severe limitations on post-twenty-week abortions." 7 Sections
307 and 308 of the statute related to choice of method7 7 and required that
the constitutional issues first. Id. at 30.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1338-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468
(1993).
166. Id. at 1341.
167. Fargo Women's Health Org., 18 F.3d at 532-33.
168. Id.
169. 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No. 95-1242, 1996 WL
327446 (U.S. June 17, 1996).
170. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1495.
171. Id.
172. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302(3) (1995).
173. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1995) (requiring a married woman to notify her hus-
band of an abortion).
174. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1496; see Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 873-77 (D. Utah
1992), affid in part, rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
175. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307, 308 (1995). These provisions provide that the medical
procedure used must give the unborn child the best chance of survival. Id.
176. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-315 (1995) (exempting a woman from certain restrictions in
the case of a serious medical emergency).
177. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1496; see Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 873-74. Section 76-7-302(3)
states, "After 20 weeks gestational age, measured from the date of conception, an abortion may be
performed only for those purposes and circumstances described in subsections (2)(a), (2)(d), and
(2)(e)." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-7-302(3). These circumstances occurred when the procedure was
"necessary to save the pregnant woman's life," "prevent grave damage to the woman's medical
health," or prevent "the birth of a child that would be born with grave defects." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-302(2)(a)-(e).
178. The discussion of the Jane L. case in this Survey will focus only on those claims impli-
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when a post-twenty-week abortion was allowed, the method of abortion should
be the one which "would best assure the unborn child's chances of survival
unless such a method would gravely damage a woman's medical health."'
79
The district court determined that sections 307 and 308 "bore 'a rational rela-
tionship to the legitimate state interest in the preservation of viable fetal life"'
and held the provisions facially valid.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first addressed section 302(3) of the Utah statute that
prohibits post-twenty-week abortions except to protect the mother's life, pre-
vents "grave" damage to her health, or prevents the birth of a child with grave
defects. 8 The court did not address the claim that section 302(3) facially
violated the right to privacy by imposing an "undue burden" on pre-viability
abortions. Instead, the Tenth Circuit held the provision invalid because the
section was not severable from section 302(2).8 In spite of the Utah
Legislature's express intent to make the statute severable, 8 3 the court rea-
soned that ambiguities in the legislative intent made it impossible to determine
whether the Utah legislature would have passed section 302(3) without passing
section 302(2).84
The sole privacy issue that the Tenth Circuit addressed was whether a
choice of method provision violated the constitutional right to privacy as rede-
fined in Casey. The court concluded that the Utah choice of method provision,
on its face, violated the right to privacy.' Although Casey modified Roe's
strict scrutiny standard of review, Casey reaffirmed Roe's holding that a state
may regulate post-viability abortion "except where it is necessary, in appropri-
ate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life and health of the moth-
er. 8 6 Therefore, Thornburgh still had precedential value in analyzing
whether a "choice of method" provision regulating post-viability abortions
violates the constitutional right to privacy.'87
cating the right to privacy. While plaintiffs asserted that a ban on "experimentation" of "[l]ive
unborn children" violated their constitutionally protected right to privacy, the court resolved that
issue by declaring the provision was unconstitutionally vague. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1500-02.
179. Id. at 1502; see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-307, 308.
180. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1503.
181. See supra note 177.
182. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1499.
183. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-317 (1995).
184. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1499. This Survey addresses the severability issue only to point out
that the Tenth Circuit avoided the underlying constitutional issue in adjudicating § 302(3). The
Supreme Court recently reversed, holding the provisions severable under Utah law. Leavin, 1996
WL 327446, at *4. The Court then remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings
in light of this determination. Id.
185. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1505.
186. Id. at 1504 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 877-79).
187. Id. To strengthen this holding, the court identified "the importance of maternal
health ... [as the] thread that runs from Roe to Thornburgh and then to Casey." Id. Whatever
Casey did to weaken Roe and Thornburgh, it only reaffirmed the idea that maternal health takes
precedence over fetal survival. Id.
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Thornburgh "emphasized that the woman's health must be the physician's
'paramount consideration."'"" The court concluded that the Utah statute's
"grave damage to [the woman's] medical health" standard was even more
oppressive than the "significantly greater" risk standard in the Pennsylvania
statute in Casey."8 9 Thus the court found the Utah statute unconstitutional
under Thornburgh."9
3. Analysis
a. The Post-Twenty-Week Abortion Ban
The district court held that the pre-twenty-week abortion ban imposed an
"undue burden" on pre-viability abortions but upheld the post-twenty-week ban
against a facial attack.'' Had the Tenth Circuit found the provisions sever-
able, the court would have had to address the constitutionality of the post-
twenty-week ban.'92
The Utah statute's twenty-week demarcation between viability and non-
viability imposes the same type of "rigid construct" as the trimester system in
Roe.9 3 When section 302(3) takes effect at the beginning of the twenty-first
week, most fetuses have not reached viability.'94 Thus, the section prohibits
some pre-viability abortions. Casey held that prohibiting abortion before via-
bility constitutes an undue burden.'95
188. Id. (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69).
189. Id. at 1503-04. The court found persuasive testimony by expert witnesses defining
"grave" as the "[l]oss of structure or function, shortening of life, irremedial pain and suffering....
[s]erious, complex, [and] threatening." Id. at 1503.
190. The defendants also contended that the "grave damage" standard was the same as the
"grave damage" standard a woman must meet to have a post-viability abortion in the first place.
Id. However, since the court had already reversed the district court and concluded that the post-
viability restriction was not severable from the pre-viability provisions and was thus invalid, the
defendant's argument lacked force. Id. at 1504-05.
191. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 871-72 (upholding the provision based on a facial challenge
analysis under Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). The district court refused to consider the possibility of a
non-viable fetus more than 21 weeks after conception. Id. However, the district court noted that
the majority in Casey had abandoned traditional facial challenge analysis in favor of an undue
burden standard combined with a facial challenge analysis. Id. at 872 n.10. Thus, at the very least,
the constitutionality of this provision is questionable.
192. The Tenth Circuit's analysis under Utah severability law is extremely tenuous. See supra
note 184. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1980), established a prudential limitation re-
quiring a federal court to avoid constitutional issues when alternative grounds are available. But
see Sojourner T, 974 F.2d at 30 (finding facts and procedural posture of facial attack on a similar
statute warranted dispensing with the Harris requirement).
193. Casey, 505 U.S. 870-72. Justice O'Connor's opinion repeatedly denounced the trimester
framework as being inconsistent with the "essential holding" in Roe, that a woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy before viability. Id. at 833-34. O'Connor found that although Roe had
been a "reasoned statement, elaborated with great care," its arbitrary act of "judicial line drawing"
demanded reconsideration. Id. at 870. But see supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
194. See John M. Swomley, Abortion and Public Policy, ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 409, 410
(1993) (identifying lung development as the most significant factor preventing medical technology
from reaching a viability point of less than about 24 weeks).
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-901; see Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden
Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2025, 2050-51,
2089 n.137 (1994) (arguing for a per se rule against facially undue burdens, and noting that the




The Tenth Circuit's finding that sections 302(2) and 302(3) were not
severable allowed the court to avoid addressing the constitutional issues impli-
cated in section 302(3). The Supreme Court's recent reversal on the severabil-
ity issue will force a determination of the constitutional issues on remand.
b. The Choice of Method Provision
Based on the court's rejection of strict scrutiny in Casey, the district court
upheld the choice of method provision as rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose on the belief that Casey meant the Court no longer considered
the woman's interest fundamental.'96 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit continued
to hold maternal health paramount over any state interest in potential life." 7
The Tenth Circuit's analysis reflects an understanding that Casey did not de-
value or recharacterize the fundamental nature of the woman's privacy inter-
est. It simply reminded courts that states also have legitimate interests related
to abortion which courts should protect when they do not burden the woman's
right to choose abortion.
D. Conclusion
In deciding Sheets and Nilson, the Tenth Circuit better defined the bound-
aries of the confidentiality branch of privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Lichtenstein test remains problematic after Sheets and Nilson be-
cause it fails to adequately consider legitimate state interests. This problem oc-
curs even when disclosure would cause little or no harm to the individual.
Although the test as applied in prior cases produced results similar to the
majority balancing approach, the Tenth Circuit's test may produce inconsistent
results in future cases.
Conversely, in Jane L., the Tenth Circuit heeded the Supreme Court's
directive to more thoughtfully consider both the individual's interest and legiti-
mate state interests. Perhaps, however, the court avoided an easily addressable
constitutional issue. Only when courts test the undue burden doctrine will its
true effectiveness as a balance between state and individual interests be re-
vealed.
II. THE FAIR HOUSING AcT
A. Background
1. General Background
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act ("FHA," "the Act," or "Title
VIII") in 1968.98 The declaration of policy in the statute states, "It is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
196. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 875-76 n.25.
197. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1504.
198. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1994))
[hereinafter FHAI.
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housing throughout the United States.""' This statement, coupled with com-
ments made during floor debate on the original act,2" clearly indicate that
Congress intended a broad interpretation of the Act's provisions. Originally,
the FHA prohibited discrimination in the rental and sale of any "dwelling"20 '
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. °2 In 1974, Congress
amended the Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender."3 In
1988, Congress drafted the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). °4 The
FHAA prohibited discrimination based on familial status or handicap in the
sale or rental of housing or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of such sale
or rental.2 5 The cases in Part II focus on two of the protected classes, fa-
milial status2" and handicapped persons.2 7
199. Id. § 801.
200. For Senator Mondale's comments during the Senate floor debate, see infra note 243.
201. Congress defined the term "dwelling" as "any building, structure, or portion thereof
which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more fami-
lies, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon
of any such building, structure, or portion thereof." FHA § 802(b).
202. Id. § 804.
203. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
204. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620 (1988).
205. Id. § 6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (1994)).
206. The FHAA defines "familial status" as
one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled
with-(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individ-
uals; or (2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody, with the
written permission of such parent or other person.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(k). The definition also applies to persons who are pregnant or "in the process of
securing legal custody of any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years." Id. § 3604(k).
The Act places a single individual within the definition of "family." Id. § 3602(c) (1994). The
Act, however, does not protect that individual from discrimination unless she falls within the
definition of "familial status." Id. § 3604(k). Marital status is not a basis for protection unless the
couple has standing as members of another protected class. See id. §§ 3604-06 (1994); James A.
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1106-07 (1989).
207. The Act defines "handicap" as
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of the
person's major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does not include current, illegal
use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). Congress suggests a broad definition of "handicap," as the Act protects not
only actual physical and mental disabilities but also protects persons who may be perceived by
others as having such disabilities. Although the definition specifically leaves out "current" use of
illegal controlled substances, courts have held that patients in drug rehabilitation programs fall
within the statute. See United States v. Southern Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992);
Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N.J. 1992).
Other examples of persons having "handicaps" within the meaning of the FHA include
persons infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). See Support Ministries for Per-
sons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Baxer v.
City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. II1. 1989). Persons suffering from multiple sclero-
sis are also "handicapped" under the FHA. See Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 844 F. Supp.
116, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Last, elderly persons under daily care are included under the FHA. "K"
Care, Inc. v. Town of Lac du Flambeau, 510 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). See general-
ly William D. McElyea, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: Potential Impact on Zoning
Practices Regarding Group Homes for the Handicapped, ZONING AND PLAN. L. REP., Sept. 1989,
at 148 (stating that "[t]he definition of 'handicap' in the Fair Housing Act Amendments ... is
broad, and designed to protect a wide range of people from housing discrimination").
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2. Discrimination Under the FHA
The Act prohibits several types of discriminatory conduct. °" Owners or
brokers may not refuse to sell or rent property, or negotiate for sale or rental,
on a discriminatory basis.2" Owners and brokers may not discriminate in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction,2 misrepresent
housing availability, " ' or discriminate in advertising the sale or rental of
property. In addition, brokers may not engage in "blockbusting. '
The Act may also impose liability on municipal defendants.2 4 Plaintiffs
have successfully challenged discriminatory municipal zoning laws and official
policies under the FHA.2 5
3. Exemptions
Although the FHA sweeps broadly, prohibiting a wide variety of discrimi-
natory practices in the sale and rental of housing, the Act provides for several
exemptions. Two exemptions are relevant to this Survey.2 6 First, government
entities may pass restrictions reasonably limiting the number of occupants in
dwellings." 7 Second, provisions prohibiting discrimination based on familial
status do not apply to "housing for older persons."'211 Courts, however, inter-
pret these exemptions narrowly.1 9
208. For a more detailed discussion on what types of discriminatory practices are prohibited
by the Act, see Jennifer J. Ryan, A Real Estate Professional's and Attorney's Guide to the Fair
Housing Law's Recent Inclusion of Familial Status as a Protected Class, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1143, 1148-54 (1995).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)(f)(2). This type of conduct is commonly known as "steering." See
Ryan, supra note 208, at 1148.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); see Ryan, supra note 208, at 1149-50.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); see Ryan, supra note 208, at 1150.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); see Ryan, supra note 208, at 1150-53.
213. "Blockbusting" means inducing a landowner to sell or rent property by representing to
that landowner that renting or selling to a particular class of people will cause adverse effects,
such as reduced property values. See Ryan, supra note 208, at 1154; see also 42 U.S.C § 3604(c)
(discussing the prohibition of "[a]ttempt[ing] to induce any person to sell or rent a dwelling ...
[to] persons of a race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin).
214. A municipality is a "person" as defined in §§ 3602 and 3613 of the FHA and can thus
be liable under the Act. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
215. See, e.g., id. at 1186. In similarly postulated cases, plaintiffs have alleged a violation of
§ 3604(a), claiming that the city has denied them an opportunity to rent or buy housing, or have
alleged a violation of § 3617, claiming that the city interfered with their right to "equal housing
opportunity." See id. at 1181; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights
(Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1287 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
216. In addition to the exemptions discussed in this section, religious organizations and pri-
vate clubs who own dwellings may limit the sale, rental, or occupancy of those dwellings or give
preference to their members. Id. § 3607(a). Also, owners may refuse to sell or rent property to any
person who has previously been convicted of "the illegal manufacture or distribution of a con-
trolled substance as defined in § 802 of Title 21." 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4) (1994).
217. Id. § 3607(b)(1).
218. Id.
219. See City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802, 804 (9th
Cir.) (holding "a broad remedial statute ... must be read narrowly"), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1176
(1995).
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4. Administrative Procedure
When seeking redress for injuries caused by discriminatory housing prac-
tices, "aggrieved person[s]" may file an administrative claim or bring a civil
cause of action under the FHA."' Because the Act provides for both admin-
istratijve and judicial remedies, a plaintiff may pursue either course without
exhausting administrative remedies.22' However, when a claimant chooses to
file an administrative claim with the Secretary of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), specific procedures of the FHA apply.2
The individual claimant may also seek an adjudicatory administrative hearing
under § 3612.223
5. Theories of Discrimination Under the FHA
Courts have recognized two theories of discrimination under the FHA:
disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact discrimination. 24 The
cases surveyed in this article address both theories.
a. Disparate Treatment Discrimination
The most obvious type of housing discrimination arises where a defendant
intentionally discriminates against a plaintiff with protected status. 2 ' To in-
tentionally discriminate, the defendant's policy must, on its face, treat the
harmed party differently from other persons. A tenancy policy in which
220. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1994). An '"aggrieved person' includes any person who-
(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such
person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur." 42 U.S.C. §
3602(i). Thus, even individuals who are not a members of one of the classes against which the
Act expressly prohibits discrimination may still find protection as "aggrieved person(s]." See HUD
v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 874 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding violation of FHA where white lessors
preferred to sell a house to a white family over an African-American family). Of course, the plain-
tiff must also meet constitutional standing requirements to maintain an action under the FHA. See
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
221. See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1260 (E.D. Va.
1993). However, plaintiffs who have already entered into a conciliation agreement concerning the
allegedly discriminatory conduct or initiated proceedings at the administrative level may not seek
relief in federal court before exhausting the administrative process. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(2)-(3)
(1994).
222. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(a)-(g) (1994) (establishing, in part, period of limitations, notice
requirements, and proper conciliation procedures).
223. Id. § 3612(a). The Act affords the parties the opportunity to "be represented by counsel,
present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and obtain the issuance of subpoenas." Id. § 3612(c).
The hearing takes place before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), "no later than 120 days fol-
lowing the issuance of the charge, unless it is impracticable to do so." Id. § 3612(g)(1). Within 60
days after this hearing, the Act directs the AJ to make "findings of fact and conclusions of law"
and issue the appropriate civil penalty or dismiss the case. Id. § 3612(g)(2)-(7). The Secretary has
the power to review these findings and conclusions for up to 30 days after the ALT issues them.
Id. § 3612(h)(1). If the Secretary does not review the order within 30 days, the order becomes
final. Id. At this point, "[any party aggrieved by a final order for relief... granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order." Id. § 3612(i)(1).
224. Different sources have referred to the concept of disparate impact as discriminatory im-
pact, discriminatory effect, and disproportionate impact. For a discussion of the various names for
the doctrine, see Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act: A
Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REv. 398 n.8 (1979) [hereinafter Comment].
225. See supra text accompanying notes 202-05.
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prospective tenants must be white to qualify, for example, clearly falls within
this category. This type of discrimination is known as "disparate treatment"
discrimination because it involves "differential treatment of similarly situated
persons. 22 6 A plaintiff may recover under the FHA by demonstrating that
the defendant intended to discriminate and that the defendant committed one
of the discriminatory actions prohibited by the FHA.227
Plaintiffs may prove discriminatory intent in several different ways. Pro-
viding actual evidence of intent to discriminate is the surest way to meet the
standard. The Act does not require malevolent or unlawful intent, but simply
intent to treat a protected class differently than other persons.2 8 Courts may
also infer intent by examining circumstantial factors, such as discriminatory
effect on the injured party.22 9 Once a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent, defendants may avoid liability if they can justify their
actions based on a "legitimate nondiscriminatory business purpose."23 ° The
FHA does not require, however, that a plaintiff show discriminatory intent as
the sole motivating factor for the challenged practice or conduct. Under the
Act, a plaintiff must merely prove that discriminatory intent was a "significant
factor" in the decision to initiate the discriminatory conduct.
23
Proving intent in FHA discrimination cases is often difficult.232 More-
over, actions not motivated by a discriminatory purpose often cause minorities
as much or more harm than blatantly discriminatory actions.233 For these rea-
sons, courts have allowed plaintiffs to prove FHA discrimination by showing a
discriminatory effect on a protected group. 34
226. NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir. 1988), affd in part, 488
U.S. 15 (1988).
227. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The ultimate question in a dispa-
rate treatment case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against [the] plaintiff.").
228. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (discussing discriminatory
intent in the employment context); United States v. Reece, 457 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D. Mont. 1978)
(explaining how complainants can prove discriminatory intent in the context of renting apart-
ments).
229. Two circuits have addressed claims involving private defendants and facially neutral
policies where other evidence indicated discriminatory motives. United States v. Mitchell, 580
F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying disparate impact as a way to prove unlawful steering
where evidence suggested an apartment owner confined blacks to a specific area of the complex);
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.) (considering fact that developer's policy
to sell lots only to approved builders who would not build for blacks was "fraught with racial
overtones" in finding disparate impact discrimination), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974). But see
Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1534 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that with private
defendants, evidence of discriminatory impact is merely evidence of intent).
230. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 989 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-44 (1989) (recognizing "significant factor" doctrine in em-
ployment context).
231. Burris v. Wilkins, 544 F.2d 891, 891 (5th Cir. 1977).
232. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (recognizing "clever men may easily conceal their motiva-
tions").
233. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (noting that "some em-
ployment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination").
234. See, e.g., Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85 (discussing how a protected group can prove
discriminatory effect to demonstrate FHA discrimination).
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b. Disparate Impact Discrimination
The concept of disparate impact or disparate effect as proof of discrimina-
tion finds its roots in the context of employment discrimination under Title
VII as discussed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 35 In Griggs, the employer
required applicants to have a high school education and pass standardized tests
in order to qualify for employment. 36 This policy resulted in whites obtain-
ing nearly all jobs in the most desirable departments.2 37 Finding that the pur-
pose of Title VII was to eliminate discriminatory preference for any group
over another,238 the Supreme Court held the Act not only proscribed overt
discrimination but also practices "fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion." '239 Mindful of the defendant's interest in qualified employees, the Court
required that defendant show a "business necessity" to justify the policy.2"
The Court held the policy violated the Act because the defendant had not
sufficiently demonstrated that its hiring policy reasonably measured an
applicant's ability to perform on the job.24
The Court's analysis in Griggs set forth the disparate impact doctrine that
later emerged in FHA law. In applying Griggs to Title VIII housing discrimi-
nation cases,242 the appellate courts have found many similarities between
Title VIII and Title VII, including legislative history,243 purpose, and struc-
ture. 24 Based on these similarities, courts have concluded that the employ-
ment law approach should apply in the housing context.
2 4
The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case in a disparate impact
discrimination claim under the FHA." Courts will then either shift the
235. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
236. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
237. Id.




242. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934; Betsey, 736 F.2d at 987; Halet v. Wend Inv. Co.,
672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Mitchell, 580 F.2d at 791; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147-48;
Arlington Heights l, 558 F.2d at 1288-89; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
243. Legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend to require proof of discriminato-
ry intent to sustain a violation of the FHA. During floor debate on the FHA, Senator Mondale
remarked that the best way to ensure fair housing is to eliminate segregation. 114 CONG. REC.
3422 (1968). One commentator reasoned that unless the courts interpret the statute to prohibit all
de facto discrimination, they could not ensure an end to segregation. Comment, supra note 224, at
406. Thus, a discriminatory effect approach is necessary to honor legislative intent. The Seventh
Circuit accepted this reasoning in Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934. Furthermore, the Senate
rejected an amendment that would have made proof of intent a necessary element in any case of
discrimination under the FHA. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147; cf Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935
(narrowing Rizzo by pointing out that the proposed amendment would only have applied to single-
family owner-occupied houses).
244. Courts have noted many similarities between Title VIII and Title VII. Town of Hunting-
ton, 844 F.2d at 935. Congress enacted both statutes as part of a scheme of civil rights legislation
intended to end racial discrimination. Id. The two statutes also have similar proof requirements. Id.
245. Courts have also pointed to practical concerns, such as the difficulty in proving motiva-
tion for a discriminatory practice, as a final reason why the disparate impact analysis from Title
VII should apply under the FHA. Id.; Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185.
246. E.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that "the
concept of 'prima facie case' applies to discrimination in housing").
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burden to the defendant to show some level of nondiscriminatory justification,
like a "business necessity,"" or they will apply a balancing test" to
determine whether the defendant is liable under the FHA.
The Eighth Circuit announced the basic elements of a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination in United States v. City of Black Jack.249 To
show disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a spe-
cific policy of the defendant actually results or predictably will result in racial
discrimination.25 The Black Jack court determined that plaintiffs established
a prima facie case where a zoning ordinance banned multiple family dwellings
in an area with a 99% white population."'
Plaintiffs often use statistical evidence to show discriminatory effect. The
circuit courts do not agree, however, on what statistics sufficiently demonstrate
a prima facie case of discriminatory impact. There are at least two ways to
show discriminatory effect.252 The first way to show a measurable adverse
impact on a specific racial group.253 The second is to show that the action
resulted in harm to the community by perpetuating segregation. 54
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of housing discrimination
under the Act, some courts apply a balancing test to determine whether to
impose liability for the practice having a discriminatory effect.255 The Sev-
enth Circuit, in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II),256 adopted the first of these tests.
The Arlington Heights II four-part test examines: (1) the strength of the
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) the evidence of some discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the defendant; 257 (3) the defendant's interest in
247. See, e.g., Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988-89.
248. See, e.g., Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1291-92 (applying a four-part test).
249. 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
250. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
251. Id. at 1186. Although the city passed the ordinance before the construction of such
dwellings, the court found "ample proof' that blacks would have lived in the planned development
of townhouses had the plaintiffs been allowed to construct them. Id. Thus, discrimination was
predictable because the zoning ordinance perpetuated segregation and limited the opportunities of
blacks to live in Black Jack. Id.
252. Arlington Heights H, 558 F.2d at 1290 (citing effects on a racial group and effect on a
community).
253. See, e.g., Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 143 (finding prima facie case of discrimination where mi-
norities constituted 95% of the waiting list for public housing).
254. See Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937 (finding prima facie case of discrimination
because, although proposed housing project intended a minority population of 25%, allowing it to
be built would serve to begin desegregating a community which was currently 98% white). In
Black Jack, instead of looking at the statistical data to see what percentage of blacks compared to
whites living in the metropolitan area would be barred from living in the area to which the zoning
ordinance applied (which was 32% of blacks compared with 29% of whites), the court focused on
years of "deliberate racial discrimination" which effectively barred 85% of blacks living in the
metropolitan area from being able to live in Black Jack. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186.
255. See, e.g., Arlington Heights I, 558 F.2d at 1290 (applying a four-part test).
256. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
257. Even when adopting the test, the Seventh Circuit admitted that the second element, evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, merits the least weight in the test. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at
1292. Subsequent decisions adopting the other elements of the test have left out the second ele-
ment completely. Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Cir-
cuit has noted that when evidence of intent presents itself, such evidence inevitably weighs in
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taking the action complained of; and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks "to compel
the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups
or merely restrain the defendant from interfering with individual property
owners who wish to provide such housing."" The Fourth and Sixth circuits
have adopted similar tests in cases involving municipalities." 9
Although the requirements for a prima facie case also apply to the first
element of the Arlington Heights 11 test, courts do not use the test as an alter-
native to the prima facie case requirement from Black Jack.2" Instead, courts
weigh the evidence the plaintiff presents when establishing a prima facie case
as part of the determination on the merits. 6' In jurisdictions applying this
test, the minimum evidence needed to prevail on the merits provides the
threshold for a prima facie case.
Courts that apply some version of the Arlington Heights II balancing test
consider the defendant's justification in evaluating her interest. 62 Other
courts shift the burden to the defendant to show some business necessity or
other justification when the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimi-
natory impact. 63 The Black Jack court required a "compelling government
interest" to overcome a prima facie case. Subsequent decisions by the courts
reserve such an onerous burden for equal protection analysis and apply a less
stringent standard.t" The Third Circuit, in Resident Advisory Board v.
Rizzo,265 first articulated the majority view which later courts have used to
evaluate cases involving municipal defendants.2" This approach analyzes
favor of the plaintiff when viewing the other considerations. Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at
1292; see also Matthews Co., 499 F.2d at 828 (considering "racial overtones" in rejecting
defendant's business justification for a practice which was racially discriminatory in effect).
258. Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1290.
259. See Arthur, 782 F.2d at 575 (refusing to adopt the second element); Smith v. Town of
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit, although applying the Eighth
Circuit's burden-shifting test to a municipal defendant, considered the third and fourth factors of
the Arlington Heights I1 test. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936. The Fourth Circuit has ex-
pressly refused to apply the test to cases involving private defendants. Betsey, 738 F.2d at 989 n.5.
260. See Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935-36; Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148 n.32. The Second
Circuit said that the test is to be considered in a "final determination on the merits," not when
considering the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
at 935.
261. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 935-36.
262. See Arthur, 782 F.2d at 577; Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065.
263. E.g., Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 940 (considering the fourth Arlington Heights 11
factor in a burden-shifting analysis); Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988-89. The Eighth circuit has consistent-
ly applied the burden-shifting approach to cases involving both private and public defendants. See
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d at 828-29 (involving a private defendant).
264. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148.
265. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
266. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148-49; see Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939. In Griggs and
other employment cases, courts have considered whether the test having a discriminatory effect
was "substantially related to job performance." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148. The Rizzo court could not
identify a single objective in the housing context by which to analyze all of a defendant's poten-
tial legitimate justifications. Id. at 149; see also Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936 (noting that
"in Title Vm cases there is no single objective like job performance to which the legitimacy of
the facially neutral rule may be related"). The provider of housing is principally interested only in
the tenant's ability to pay, maintaining the value of her property, and maintaining the health and
safety of her tenants. The court in Rizzo noted that "the consequences of an error in admitting a
tenant do not seem nearly as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in hiring an
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defendant justifications on a case-by-case basis26 under two guidelines. First,
the housing practice complained of must serve a "legitimate, bona fide interest
of the Title VIII defendant."" Second, the defendant must show that no al-
ternate, less discriminatory action was available to serve the defendant's inter-
est.2"
Only the Fourth Circuit has distinguished between private and public
defendants in evaluating the defendant's justification.27 In a case involving a
private defendant, the Fourth Circuit held that to rebut a prima facie case, the
defendant must show a "business necessity sufficiently compelling to justify
the challenged practice."27'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Town of Clarkton272 emphasiz-
es the importance of the final element of the Arlington Heights II test. The
Smith court held that by withdrawing from a joint low income housing authori-
ty, and thereby blocking the construction of a proposed low-income housing
project to be financed by HUD, the municipal defendant discriminated against
the plaintiff because of his race.273 At the same time, however, the court re-
versed that part of the lower court ruling requiring the city to build low-in-
come housing from its own local treasury.274
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp.
275
a. Facts
In Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., the Tenth Circuit addressed a claim of
housing discrimination based on both disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact. 276 A Utah state hospital discharged the mentally handicapped plaintiff
and placed him in a group home with two other mentally handicapped
men.277 The group home was located in a zoning district designated as "sin-
gle family" with a number of exceptions that allowed for group homes.278
unqualified airline pilot." Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148-49.
267. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Betsey, 736 F.2d at 985 (considering claim that an adults-only policy had a racially
discriminatory effect). For a related view, compare Smith, 682 F.2d at 1058-59, considering claim
against municipal defendant, Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 150, and Matthews Co., 499 F.2d at 828-29, re-
quiring less restrictive alternative analysis to justify a private developer's policy of selling to only
approved builders.
271. Betsey, 738 F.2d at 988.
272. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
273. Smith, 682 F.2d at 1055.
274. Id. at 1069. The court held that requiring a municipality to build the housing project
would "be an unwarranted intrusion into Clarkton's local governmental function, disproportionate
to the wrong committed." Id. at 1069-70. Subsequently, in Betsey, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the element to apply only to government defendants. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 n.5.
275. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
276. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1494.
277. Id.
278. Id. The exceptions included "nurses' homes, foster family care homes, convents, monas-
teries, rectories.., and group homes for the elderly." Id.
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The city allowed group homes for the mentally and physically handicapped in
this zoning district only on the condition that they obtain a conditional use
permit. 79 State statutory conditions.. also required the facility operator to
assure proper 24-hour supervision and the establishment of a community advi-
sory committee that allowed neighbors to address concerns. 8'
The home's operator, RLO, Inc., had not obtained a conditional use per-
mit when the plaintiff moved in but later applied for the permit at the city's
12insistence. The city granted the permit subject to the two restrictions noted
above.8 3 After the plaintiff was transferred out of the city, he filed an action
against Orem City alleging (1) that the FHA preempted the conditions the
Utah statute imposed and such conditions violated the FHAA, and (2) that the
application process violated the FHAA by requiring the plaintiff to subject
himself to threats and disparaging remarks in public hearings. 84
In granting defendant's motion to dismiss on both claims, the district
court characterized the claim as one of discriminatory effect.8 5 The district
court found that Bangerter had established a prima facie case by showing that
the statute treated handicapped persons differently from non-handicapped.
28 6
The district court ruled, however, that the requirements "rationally related to
the [city's] legitimate government interest of integrating the handicapped 'into
normal surroundings,"' and dismissed the complaint.
27
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court mischaracterized
the nature of the discrimination claim, applied the incorrect standard of re-
view, and improperly granted the motion to dismiss.288 Reviewing relevant
employment cases on the issue, the court first noted that "discriminatory treat-
ment" does not require malevolent intent,289 but rather a showing of "explic-
itly differential" treatment of a protected group."9 In light of this distinction,
the Tenth Circuit held that when a plaintiff challenges "facially discriminatory
actions," rather than "the effects of facially neutral actions," the court should
decide plaintiff's claim under a disparate treatment analysis and not a disparate
279. Id. According to the record before the Tenth Circuit, the conditional use permit require-
ment only applied to group homes for handicapped and not to any of the other types of group
homes listed. Id. at 1495 n.l.
280. Id. at 1495 n.2; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-2.5 (1992).
281. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1495 n.2.
282. Id. at 1495-96.
283. Id. at 1496 & n.6. A third restriction required psychiatric certification to ensure residents
were not violent. Id.
284. Id. at 1496.
285. Id. at 1497 n.9.
286. Id. at 1496.
287. Id. at 1497.
288. Id. at 1500.




impact analysis.29' The court concluded that the district court improperly
characterized Bangerter's claim as one of disparate impact. 92
Thus, the Tenth Circuit analyzed Bangerter's claims under a disparate
treatment analysis. First, Bangerter made out a prima facie case of disparate
treatment when he alleged that Orem imposed restrictions on group homes for
handicapped that it did not impose on other group homes.2 93 Next, the Tenth
Circuit held that the district court erred in applying a "rational relationship"
standard of review in analyzing the defendant's justifications for the discrimi-
natory policy.2 94 Instead, the Tenth Circuit looked to the FHAA itself, the
statute's legislative intent, and interpretive decisions to determine what justifi-
cations, if any, Congress thought adequate to support a facially discriminatory
law or policy.295
The Tenth Circuit identified two justifications for the discriminatory re-
strictions. First, § 3604(f)(9) of the FHAA permits "reasonable restrictions on
the terms or conditions of housing when justified by public safety con-
cers."'2 96 The court cautioned that such restrictions "must be tailored to par-
ticularized concerns about individual residents," not to "blanket stereotypes
about the handicapped."297 The restrictions must also bear a "necessary cor-
relation to the actual abilities of the persons upon whom it is imposed."29
Second, a defendant may impose special zoning restrictions applicable only to
handicapped persons where the restrictions benefit the handicapped.299 The
benefit such restrictions provide to the handicapped persons, however, must
"clearly outweigh" the burden they impose.30 Furthermore, like safety mea-
sures, restrictions intended to benefit the handicapped must be "narrowly tai-
lored" to the special needs of the particular individuals affected by them.3'
Thus, Bangerter distinguished between disparate impact and disparate
treatment and held that courts should look to the expressed and implied FHA
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1502; see Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "the
ultimate question in a disparate treatment case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated
against plaintiff").
294. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503. The "rational relationship" test, applicable to equal protec-
tion claims not involving a suspect class was inappropriate since the plaintiff's complaint sought
relief under the FHA, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9) (permitting denial of housing based on a "direct threat to
the health or safety"). The court reasoned that if a defendant may deny housing altogether for this
purpose, then certainly it may impose reasonable restrictions. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503.
297. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503; see H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2179.
298. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504 (quoting Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery Coun-
ty, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (D. Md. 1993)). On remand, the court directed the district court to
consider the extent of the residents' mental disabilities, the scope of the restrictions, and whether
the restrictions reasonably addressed safety concerns arising from the residents' handicaps. Id.
299. Id. The court stated that "the FHAA should not be interpreted to preclude special resiric-
tions upon the disabled that are really beneficial to, rather than discriminatory against, the
handicapped." Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. The defendant must also show that there is no less restrictive alternative that would
serve the same purpose. Id. at 1505.
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exemptions when analyzing a defendant's justification for a facially discrimi-
natory policy. The next case discusses the standard when dealing with justifi-
cations for facially neutral policies having a discriminatory effect.
2. Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. Secretary of HUD'
a. Facts
In Mountain Side, the Tenth Circuit adopted disparate impact as the test
for proving discrimination under the FHA 33 The defendants in Mountain
Side owned and operated a trailer park.3" The park, built in the 1960s, had a
density greatly exceeding modem parks." 5 The defendants leased the lots
individually "for placement of one mobile home," and provided "water, power,
telephone, and sewer hookups to each lot."3' 6 Until 1989, the defendants
maintained an adults only policy.30 7 When the FHAA became effective in
1989, the defendants decided to eliminate the adults only policy rather than
modify the policy to fall within the "housing for older persons" exemp-
tion."° The defendants hired a contractor to conduct a study on the effect of
an increase of population on the quality of life in the park.3" As a result of
this study, the defendants decided to adopt a limited occupancy policy allow-
ing no more than three occupants per trailer.1
Jacqueline VanLoozenoord, her three minor children, and Michael Brace,
her "roommate and companion," moved into the park in 1991.2 " The plain-
tiffs purchased their mobile home from a third party who did not advise them
of the occupancy limit."2 The plaintiffs also did not apply for tenancy with
park management.313 The resident manager discovered that five people occu-
pied the trailer and confronted Brace.3 4 Management then initiated eviction
proceedings against the plaintiffs, and prevailed solely on the grounds that the
tenants had failed to apply for residency.3"5  Plaintiffs Brace and
VanLoozenoord filed separate complaints with HUD, asserting that Mountain
Side had discriminated on the basis of "familial status" in violation of the
F HA.
316
HUD issued charges against Mountain Side for discriminating against the
plaintiffs on the basis of their familial status.317 After a full evidentiary
302. 56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995).
303. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1250.






310. Id. at 1255-56.




315. Id. at 1246-47.
316. Id. at 1247.
317. Id. Attempts at conciliation failed when the tenants refused to attend. Id. Thereafter,
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hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (AU) dismissed the discrimination
charges.3 The Secretary of HUD remanded the case twice to the ALJ to
reconsider the dismissal.3"9 Both times the AUJ rejected HUD's claims.32 °
Finally, the Secretary reversed the decision and entered a judgment for
HUD.3"' The AU then granted damages and injunctive relief to the com-
plainants after making several factual findings.322
b. Decision323
Before reversing the final order, the Tenth Circuit initially reaffirmed
Bangerter's dictum that a claimant may prove FIA discrimination by dispa-
rate impact.324 Finding the occupancy limit facially neutral, the court charac-
terized the case as one of disparate impact.325
The court did not fully address whether the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case by showing national statistical evidence that the three-person
occupancy policy disproportionately excluded families with children.2 6 In-
stead, the majority assumed without deciding that the plaintiffs had met their
burden of establishing a prima facie case, as recognized in Black Jack.32'
The majority adopted a modified form of the Arlington Heights 11 test,
adopting three of the four factors, but refusing to adopt the element which
looks to evidence of discriminatory intent.32 The court added, "we are





322. Id. The majority opinion lists these findings of fact in detail. Id. at 1255-56. First, after
the FHAA took effect in 1989, Mountain Side considered modifying the policy to allow families a
more "viable opportunity." Id. at 1255. Second, in 1988, Mountain Side conducted its own survey
in which it considered "the condition and age of the utilities, the density of homes, and the overall
size of the Park," and determined that the park could not support a population beyond a three-
person per trailer maximum. Id. Nor did it consider feasible any alternatives to the occupancy
limit. Id. In 1991, on the advice of counsel, the park hired an expert contractor to perform a simi-
lar study to evaluate the "legitimacy" of the three-person occupancy policy. Id. After evaluating
only resident health and safety based on infrastructure limitations and resident comfort based on
size and density, the expert recommended a two person per bedroom limit in addition to a maxi-
mum population limit of 916. Id. at 1256. Third, the park had historically experienced low water
pressure and sewage problems. Id. Fourth, the park was almost twice as dense as new parks. Id.
323. The case came to the Tenth Circuit on direct appeal from the ALJ's final order. Id. at
1246.
324. Id. at 1250.
325. Id. at 1252.
326. Id. at 1253 (expressing doubt that national, rather than local, statistics were appropriate
to prove a discriminatory effect in this case).
327. Id. at 1251-52; see supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
328. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1252. The court stated:
The three factors we will consider in determining whether a plaintiff's prima facie case
of disparate impact makes out a violation of Title VIII are: (1) the strength of the
plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) the defendant's interest in taking the ac-
tion complained of; and (3) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant affirma-
tively to provide housing for members of a protected class or merely to restrain the
defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing.
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mindful of the Seventh Circuit's admonition that 'we must decide close cases
in favor of integrated housing."'329 In discussing the first element of the test,
the court gave little weight to the national statistical evidence the claimants
had presented and on which the Secretary had relied.33
As to the second prong, the defendant's interest in the complained-of
action,... the Secretary had required that defendants show "'compelling need
or necessity' to justify the occupancy policy.332 The majority disagreed,333
looking instead to Griggs and the "business necessity" defense for the proper
standard. 34 Adapting this standard to the housing context, the court held that
the defendant must show a "manifest relationship" between the discriminatory
practice and the housing in question.333 Applying the "manifest relationship"
test, the court held that the two reasons given by the defendant for the occu-
pancy limit: "sewer capacity" and "concern over the quality of park life," had
a manifest relationship to the housing in the trailer park.336
Although the majority expressly adopted the fourth prong of the Arlington
Heights II test in its holding (as the third prong in the Tenth Circuit test), the
court did not discuss that prong of the test in its analysis of the facts.33
329. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights 1I, 558 F.2d at 1294).
330. Id. at 1253. Remember that the majority had already assumed that this statistical evi-
dence could establish a prima facie case of housing discrimination. See supra text accompanying
note 330. According to the majority, the Secretary, in making his decision to remand, had relied
on national statistics indicating:
At least 71.2% of all U.S. households with four or more persons contain one or more
children under the age of 18 years; ... at least 50.5% of U.S. families with minor chil-
dren have four or more individuals; and ... at least 11.7% of households without minor
children have four or more persons.
Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253. The majority did not agree with the claimants that national statis-
tics of family composition accurately reflected the composition of the local housing market. Id.
331. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253.
332. Id. at 1254.
333. "[Tlhere is no requirement that the defendant establish a 'compelling need or necessity'
for the challenged practice to pass muster since this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossi-
ble to satisfy." Id. at 1254-55.
334. Id. at 1254. In the Title VII context, the employer has a burden of showing a "manifest
relationship to the employment in question." Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). The court
stated, "[O]nce plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the
defendant to produce evidence of a 'genuine business need' for the challenged practice." Id. "The
touchstone is business necessity." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
335. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1254 (emphasis added). To clarify the threshold of this stan-
dard, the court stated that "a mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because
such a low standard would permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious,
seemingly neutral practices." Id.
336. Id. at 1255-57. To reach that conclusion, the majority applied the facts of the case from
the record established by the ALU on the third remand. Id. Although the analysis is cursory at best,
the crucial facts the majority relied upon seem to include the park's historical sewage problems
and the conclusions in both studies that an occupancy limit was necessary in light of the structural
limitations of the park. Id.; see supra note 322.
337. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253. The court simply noted that when a plaintiff seeks to
require a defendant to "take affirmative action to correct a Title VIII violation, plaintiff must make




In his dissenting opinion, Judge Henry made three arguments in response
to the majority. First, he believed that the national statistics on which the
Secretary had relied sufficed to meet the standard for a prima facie case of
disparate impact discrimination.3" Second, Judge Henry feared that the engi-
neering study the defendants presented to justify their policy was a "post-hoc"
rationalization for an otherwise discriminatory policy because the study had
actually suggested an alternative policy.339 Finally, Judge Henry disagreed
with the majority for making the trade-off between the "quality of life" and
providing equal access to housing for families with children.3" In his view,
Congress, in passing the FHAA, "chose to protect children and resolved this
question in favor of nondiscrimination. '
C. Analysis
While the two cases reflect consistency within the Tenth Circuit, the hold-
ings diverged from the trend in other circuits regarding housing discrimination
issues. In Bangerter, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff may prove
discrimination by disparate impact, but then held that where a policy was
facially discriminatory, a plaintiff may only recover on a disparate treatment
theory. Mountain Side's refusal to adopt the intent element of the Seventh
Circuit's test for disparate impact thus seems consistent with the court in
Bangerter.
The majority's approach in Mountain Side, however, imposes an eviden-
tiary problem for claimants. Because the test does not consider proof of dis-
criminatory intent, the court must accept as true any business justification the
defendant proffers, as long as that justification flows logically from the facts.
In contrast, a consideration of discriminatory motives would aid in a disparate
impact analysis by giving the plaintiff an avenue to refute "post hoc" rational-
izations. Because the disparate treatment analysis adopted in Bangerter asks
only whether the policy is facially discriminatory, it also does not examine
intent. As a result, "clever" defendants in the Tenth Circuit can "easily conceal
338. Id. at 1257 (Henry, J., dissenting); see Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146,
1148 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that when a plaintiff presents any statistical evidence tending to
show discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut that evidence); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (explaining that national height and weight statistics could
be used to meet a prima facie case of employment discrimination when "there was no reason to
suppose" that the national statistics would not reflect the characteristics of the local population).
339. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1257. The limited occupancy plan recommended by the ex-
pert, which would have limited "occupancy to two-people-per-bedroom in each unit," would have
allowed the plaintiffs to stay. Id. at 1258. At the time of the dispute, the actual occupancy limit
was less than half of the "maximum" suggested by the expert, and there was no evidence of an
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their motivations" and get away with it.342 Thus, the court should reassess its
refusal to consider a subjective element in its disparate impact analysis.
Another issue on which the Tenth Circuit diverged from other courts was
in the standard for evaluating defendants' justifications for discriminatory
policies. Mountain Side's "manifest relationship" test does not reflect recent
refinements of FHA disparate impact analysis which require, in part, that a
defendant's policy employ the least restrictive means of furthering its business
(or municipal) interest. As the dissent pointed out, the expert study suggested
the Mountain Side defendants could have met their business goals by limiting
occupancy to two persons per bedroom. Therefore, even though the plan they
did adopt had a "manifest relationship" to the needs of the trailer park, they
could have adopted a less restrictive policy to meet the same goals.
Finally, for the first time in any circuit, Mountain Side applied the
Arlington Heights II test to analyze claims against a private defendant.343 Re-
jecting the test in a similar context, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the final
element only makes sense when applied to public defendants. In contrast, the
Tenth Circuit modified this element, applying it in the private context.3" The
Tenth Circuit's analogy is problematic since in every disparate impact case
involving a private landlord or property owner, the defendant can characterize
the plaintiff's claim as seeking to require the defendant to modify a neutral
practice. Thus, either the last element will never apply to a private defendant
because it contemplates a municipality, or, in every such claim, the Tenth
Circuit will require "a greater showing of discriminatory effect."345
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has taken a step forward by recognizing the right of a
plaintiff to prove housing discrimination by disparate impact. This advance,
however, is marred by the court's failure to consider many issues in formulat-
ing the test for analyzing such claims. Unfortunately, the court will be forced
to confront these matters again when its test fails to adequately address the
issues in a different factual scenario. As with the right to informational priva-
cy, the Tenth Circuit has set forth a disparate impact analysis that jealously
protects one interest to the exclusion of almost all competing interests.
Paul Karlsgodt
342. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 (recognizing that "clever men may easily conceal their
motivations").343. The majority did not address the Fourth Circuit's express refusal to apply a test in a case
involving a private defendant. See supra text accompanying notes 270-71.
344. Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1253. The court of appeals framed this element: "'where
plaintiff seeks a judgment which would require defendant to take affirmative action to correct a
Title VIII violation [rather than enjoin the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's rights],
plaintiff must make a greater showing of discriminatory effect."' Id. (quoting Casa Marie, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (lst Cir. 1993)).
345. Id. The fact that the majority did not analyze this element does not more strongly sup-




Disability laws seek to incorporate persons with disabilities in the main-
stream of American society. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)' is the most widely-recognized and sweeping disability law promul-
gated by Congress. While it represents a common avenue for disability suits,
other interesting issues arise under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).2 IDEA requires that states provide a "free appropriate public
education" (FAPE)3 to all children with disabilities. Part I of this Survey ad-
dresses the only IDEA case decided in the Tenth Circuit during the 1994-95
Survey period. Murray v. Montrose County School District examined IDEA's
"least restrictive environment" mandate and its effect on placing children with
disabilities in neighborhood schools.5 The Murray court concluded that, by
failing to specifically require placement in neighborhood schools, IDEA regu-
lations create a preference, rather than a presumption, that children with dis-
abilities attend either a school as close to their home as possible or the school
they would attend if not disabled.6
Part II analyzes the ADA, which expands the requirements of the Rehabil-
itation Act7 to nearly all areas of the economy. Congress intended the ADA to
not only bring persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life,
but also "to facilitate the transition of eight million Americans with disabilities
from the ... welfare system into the labor market."8 During the survey peri-
od, the Tenth Circuit decided three significant ADA cases which clarify the re-
quirements of a prima facie ADA case.9 Basically, the Tenth Circuit requires
an individual who asserts disability based upon a substantial limitation in
working to submit evidence demonstrating disqualification from "'a class of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994) (formerly the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)).
3. For a definition of free appropriate public education, see infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
4. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 278 (1995).
5. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928-30.
6. Id. at 929.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
8. Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Finan-
cial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REv.
391, 393 (1995); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22
N.M. L. REv. 13, 46 (1992) ("The practical effect of the ADA's employment provi-
sions-assuming they are enforced adequately-could be to enable over eight million workers
with disabilities to enter the work force, thereby removing those individuals from government
subsidy rolls and empowering them to become contributing, taxpaying members of society.").
9. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995); White v. York Int'l, 45 F.3d 357
(10th Cir. 1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1104 (1995).
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jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.""' Furthermore, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that reasonable and available accommodations ex-
ist, and that she is otherwise capable of performing a job to qualify for relief
under the ADA." Taken together, these opinions clarify the burden of proof
placed on plaintiffs. They also, however, erect substantial barriers to gainful
employment for persons with disabilities.
I. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: IDEA
A. Background
Historically, the educational system segregated children with disabilities
by excluding them from public schools and placing them in separate schools
and classrooms. Although the landmark 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of
Education3 established that all schoolchildren have a right to an equal edu-
cation despite their race, 4 the Supreme Court never interpreted Brown to en-
compass the educational rights of children with disabilities. In fact, the
Court has never found that segregating children with disabilities from other
children at school violates either equal protection or due process guarantees. 6
Nor has the Court construed the Constitution as requiring that states provide
the "least restrictive environment" when educating children with disabilities. 7
Instead, the legislature extended the equal protection and due process provi-
sions in Brown to children with disabilities via federal statutes," including
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'9 the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 (now part of IDEA)," and the ADA.2'
This section specifically addresses the sole Tenth Circuit decision inter-
preting IDEA during the survey period, Murray v. Montrose County School
10. See Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995)).
11. For a discussion of the requirements of the ADA, see infra notes 192-217 and accompa-
.nying text.
12. Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44
DEPAuL L. REv. 599, 603-05 (1995).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
15. Melvin, supra note 12, at 612.
16. Id.
17. Id. The term "least restrictive environment" was adopted by regulations under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and IDEA. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 104.34 (1996) (requiring recipi-
ents of funds under § 504 to mainstream handicapped persons "to the maximum extent appropri-
ate") with 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-.556 (1995) (discussing the mainstreaming requirements mandated
by IDEA). "The term 'least restrictive environment' is often referred to as the 'mainstreaming'
mandate." Melvin, supra note 12, at 671 n.99.
18. Melvin, supra note 12, at 612.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Section 794(a) provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States ... shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity... conduct-
ed by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id. § 794(a).
20. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amending the Education of the Handicapped
Act, codified with subsequent amendments at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994)).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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District.22 The Murray decision primarily addresses whether the "least restric-
tive environment" (LRE) mandate of IDEA presumes that the education of
children with disabilities take place in their neighborhood schools.23
1. The Least Restrictive Environment
IDEA applies only to children with educational disabilities,24 and in-
cludes an exhaustive list of recognized educational disabilities.25 Children
with such disabilities share a need for special education services, including
instruction specifically designed to meet their unique needs. 6 IDEA does not
require education in a regular classroom, recognizing that special education
may take place in a variety of locations, including the home, hospital, insti-
tution, or other setting.27
IDEA specifies, however, that states must provide children with disabili-
ties a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) in the "least restrictive envi-
ronment" (LRE).2' This provision requires that state education agencies en-
sure, to the "maximum extent appropriate," that they educate disabled children
with nondisabled children. Placement in special classes or separate facilities
should occur only when the disability's severity does not permit education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services.3"
Ideally, inclusion3 provides that students with disabilities, regardless of
22. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 278 (1995).
23. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928. The LRE mandate is required by IDEA's implementing regula-
tions. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.550-.556 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Doe v. Board of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding that a boy
with behavioral problems was not emotionally disturbed under IDEA because his difficulties did
not adversely affect his educational performance); Hiller v. Board of Educ., 743 F. Supp. 958
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a boy's learning difficulties were not educationally disabling).
25. The list includes children "with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deaf-
ness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or
specific learning disabilities ... who, by reason thereof, need special education and related ser-
vices." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (1994).
26. Id. § 1401(a)(16).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1401(a)(18). The Act defines free appropriate public education as "special educa-
tion and related services" that
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the
State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under
section [1414(a)(5)].
Id.
29. Id. § 1412(5)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(1) (1995); Martha M. McCarthy, Commentary,
Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is It Required?, 95 EDUC. L. REP. 823, 823-24 (1995).
30. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(2).
31. Although the terms "inclusion" and "mainstreaming" are often used synonymously, they
are not the same. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 824. "Mainstreaming" refers to the participation of
disabled children in some activities with nondisabled children. These activities usually include
nonacademic classes such as physical education, music, assemblies, and lunch, with instructional
support. Id.; Allan G. Osborne, Commentary, The IDEA's Least Restrictive Environment Mandate:
A New Era, 88 EDUc. L. REP. 541, 542 (1994). "Inclusion," a term of art not found within the
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severity, participate in a regular classroom with children of their same age and
grade, while receiving needed educational support within that classroom.32
IDEA creates a presumption of integration,33 allowing schools to remove a
child from her regular classroom only when absolutely necessary.34
IDEA soundly supports the principle that schools educate children with
disabilities in the least restrictive environment appropriate to meet their needs,
even though the term "least restrictive environment" does not appear on the
face of the act.35 The LRE mandate acknowledges that some students need a
more restrictive environment than others, and, therefore, compliance does not
always result in "mainstreaming." 36 Regulations promulgated pursuant to
IDEA require that public agencies supply a variety of alternative placement
options that provide necessary special education and related services to chil-
dren with disabilities.37
2. The Standard for IDEA Compliance: Board of Education v. Rowley"
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the LRE doc-
trine, in Board of Education v. Rowley, the Court established both the substan-
tive standard for compliance with IDEA's FAPE requirement and the proper
scope of review for IDEA cases.39 Circuit courts continue to struggle with the
question of whether the FAPE requirement encompasses the LRE mandate, or
if the two depict separate constructs requiring different review criteria. The
tension created by this issue has resulted in a circuit split regarding the appro-
priate standard of review for IDEA cases.'
Rowley limited the standard of review to two inquiries: first, whether the
state complied with IDEA's procedures, and secondly, whether the individual-
ized educational program (IEP)4 provided reasonable educational benefits to
the child. 2 Furthermore, under Rowley, a court should determine only wheth-
er these two basic requirements are met, leaving questions of educational
text of IDEA, refers to placing students in regular classrooms with educational support. McCarthy,
supra note 29, at 824.
32. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 824.
33. Osborne, supra note 31, at 547.
34. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(2).
35. The term "least restrictive environment" does appear in the regulations promulgated
under the Act. Id. §§ 300.550-.556; Melvin, supra note 12, at 621.
36. Osborne, supra note 31, at 542.
37. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551.
38. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
39. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209-10 (supporting the school district's decision not to require a
sign language interpreter because the statute requires only access to the educational process);
Melvin, supra note 12, at 626.
40. For a discussion of the position of other circuits, see infra notes 44-45, 90-98 and ac-
companying text.
41. IDEA's IEP is "a written statement that sets forth the child's present performance level,
goals and objectives, specific services that will enable the child to meet those goals and evaluation
criteria and procedures to determine whether the child has met those goals." Association for Com-
munity Living v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1043 (10th Cir. 1993); see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)
(1994).
42. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07.
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methodology and policy to the states."' In essence, this deferential approach
precludes courts from second-guessing the decisions of school districts.
While some circuits extend Rowley's two-part FAPE inquiry to placement
cases," other circuits decline to do so, noting that such decisions are better
left to educational professionals.45 Findings by courts that refuse to extend
Rowley recognize a distinction between decisions involving the use of a partic-
ular educational methodology and those involving a child's placement.' De-
cisions extending Rowley, by contrast, focus on the practical difficulty in dis-
tinguishing the two issues, because decisions concerning an educational
environment may affect an educational outcome. 7 If considered a question of
methodology, Rowley limits judicial review of placement decisions in LRE
cases. Unfortunately, this approach leaves placement decisions in the hands of
43. Melvin, supra note 12, at 628-29. The act leaves primary responsibility for determining
the educational method most suitable to the child's needs to the state and local educational agen-
cies. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
44. Melvin, supra note 12, at 629, 662-66; see Briggs v. Board of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 691-
92 (2d Cir. 1989) (purporting to follow the test established by the Supreme Court in Rowley, but
holding that the proper test is whether placement recommended by the school district is reasonably
calculated to provide an educational benefit). While following the "reasonably calculated" test,
other circuit courts give great deference to the decisions of school districts. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 735 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1984) (characterizing the placement
decision as one of educational policy and holding that transferring a child to a more restrictive
setting was permissible provided the transfer was reasonably calculated to provide a free appropri-
ate education).
45. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983) (distinguishing Rowley on the basis that the appropriateness of a disabled child's education
is different from the issue of whether the child has been placed in compliance with the LRE man-
date). Roncker adopted a feasibility test for use when a segregated facility is considered superior
to a nonsegregated facility. Id. at 1063. The test requires a court to determine if the services that
make the segregated facility superior could feasibly be provided in the nonsegregated facility. Id.
If educating the child in the nonsegregated setting is feasible, segregation is inappropriate. Id. The
Fourth and Eighth Circuits adopted the Roncker test. See Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882
F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Rowley test was inappropriate for LRE cases and ex-
plicitly rejected Roncker, finding it too intrusive into the educational policy decisions of local
school districts. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989). Dan-
iel advanced its own two-part test, first asking if education in the regular classroom with the use
of supplementary aids and services can be achieved satisfactorily. Id. at 1048. If it cannot, and the
school intends to provide special education or remove the child from the regular classroom, the
court next asks if the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate. Id. at
1050. This approach has been adopted by the Third and Eleventh Circuits. Oberti v. Board of
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); Greer v. Rome Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th
Cir. 1991).
The Ninth Circuit adopted yet another balancing test, this one involving four factors courts
should consider when making placement decisions. See Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel
H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994). The four factors include:
(1) the educational benefits available in the regular classroom as compared to the special educa-
tion classroom; (2) the non-academic benefits of interaction with children who are not disabled;
(3) the effect of the child with a disability on the teacher and other children; and (4) the cost of
mainstreaming. Id.
For an in-depth treatment of these tests, see Melvin, supra note 12, at 630-42.
46. Ralph E. Julnes, Commentary, The New Holland and Other Tests for Resolving LRE Dis-
putes, 91 EDUc. L. REP. 789, 792 (1994).
47. Id.
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school officials who must consider factors extrinsic to a specific child's right
to an education in the least restrictive environment.
B. Murray v. Montrose County School District'
1. Facts
In Murray, a 12-year-old boy with multiple disabilities lived approximate-
ly five blocks from his neighborhood school.49 Pursuant to statute, 0 in April
and October of 1988, a multi-disciplinary staffing team of school district pro-
fessionals convened to formulate the requirements of Murray's special educa-
tion program." Working with input from Murray's parents, the staffing team
developed an educational plan designed to meet the child's special needs.52
At that time, the group determined that the district could meet Murray's edu-
cational goals at his neighborhood school, Olathe Elementary.53
Because Murray did not progress as expected, the staffing team reviewed
his IEP in January 1990."4 To address the district's concerns, the team modi-
fied Murray's curriculum and increased special education services.55 In July
1990, Murray underwent surgery which entailed spending six weeks in a cast.
As a result, his progress regressed in some areas, and he failed to complete his
IEP.56 At a meeting in August 1990, members of the staffing team suggested
Murray move to another school better suited to the needs of students with
multiple disabilities. 7 Because Murray's parents strongly preferred that he
remain at his local school, they failed to reach a consensus with the staffing
team about proper placement. 8 Consequently, the district's Director of Spe-
cial Education made an executive decision to move the child59 and informed
the Murrays by letter of their right to challenge the decision in a due process
hearing.' The staffing team reconvened in March 1991, but made no further
progress.6
48. 51 F.3d 921 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 278 (1995).
49. Murray's various disabilities resulted from cerebral palsy. Id. at 922. According to the
administrative law judge, his condition caused spastic quadriplegia and severe mobility and coor-
dination deficits, impaired vision due to an inability to focus his eyes together, difficulty climbing
stairs and writing, and speech impairments. Id. at 923 n.1.
50. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(18), 1414(a)(5) (1994).
51. Murray, 51 F.3d at 923.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 924.
55. Id.
56. Id. The record does not address the nature or the extent of Murray's regression.
57. Id. At the time of review, Murray was in the second grade, but functioning intellectually
at a kindergarten level in some areas and at a first grade level in others. Id. Murray's strengths
were social skills and interaction. Id.
58. Id. Staffing team members, including Olathe's psychologist, resource teacher, principal,
and Murray's classroom teacher, recommended moving Murray. Id. His parents, occupational
therapist, physical therapist, and speech therapist opposed the move. Id.
59. Id. at 924 n.6.
60. Id. at 924.
61. Id. at 925.
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At the due process hearing,62 the hearing officer determined that the
neighborhood school provided Murray with an appropriate education, and the
district appealed. 63 The administrative law judge reversed the hearing
officer's decision, finding that Murray had not achieved "any meaningful edu-
cational progress" at his neighborhood school, and holding that a transfer was
appropriate.' As provided by statute, 65 the Murrays filed a complaint in dis-
trict court.' The school district moved for summary judgment, which the
court granted and the Murrays appealed.67
Throughout the due process hearing, the litigation, and the appeals proce-
dures, Murray remained at his neighborhood school.68 The district re-evaluat-
ed his special education program in November 1993, and agreed that it could
implement his revised IEP without moving him to a different school.69
2. Decision
Noting that the Supreme Court had not addressed how lower courts should
evaluate satisfaction of the LRE mandate and acknowledging the emerging
standards adopted by other circuits, the Tenth Circuit specifically declined to
adopt a standard of review for LRE cases.7° Instead, the court determined that
a single legal issue controlled the outcome of this case: whether the LRE man-
date of section 1412(5)(b) includes a presumption favoring the neighborhood
school with its supplementary aids and services."
In a de novo hearing on the issue,72 the court of appeals held that
IDEA's LRE mandate presents no presumption of neighborhood schooling.73
The decision indicated that the plain meaning of the term "regular educational
environment" does not imply neighborhood schools.74 Furthermore, according
to the Tenth Circuit, the requirement of mainstreaming disabled children to the
maximum extent possible fails to indicate a location in which that inclusion
must take place.75 Thus, while IDEA provides that the "educational place-
ment of each child with a disability [shall be] as close as possible to the
62. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(B)(2) (1994).
63. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925.
64. Id.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
66. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925.
67. Id. The school district originally moved for full summary judgment. Id. When the court
denied the motion, however, the district asked that the court either dismiss the complaint in part or
grant a partial summary judgment. Id.
68. Id. Murray's continued presence at the neighborhood school was part of the "stay put"
provision of IDEA, which requires that students stay where they were at the time the conflict
arose rather than being moved while litigation is in process. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A).
69. Murray, 51 F.3d at 925.
70. Id. at 926-27. For a discussion of the split in the circuits, see supra notes 44-45, infra
notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
71. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928.
72. De novo hearings are held at the appellate level without relying on the decisions made at
the lower level. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 721 (6th ed. 1990).
73. Murray, 51 F.3d at 930.
74. Id. at 928.
75. Id. at 929.
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child's home,"76 such language at most denotes a preference, not a require-
ment, that education take place in a neighborhood school.77
The court, looking to the plain meaning of the statute, reasoned that while
IDEA clearly requires inclusion of children with disabilities in the regular
education process, it does not address the appropriateness of removing a child
with disabilities from a neighborhood school.7" The court specifically rejected
the Murrays' arguments that "'regular educational environment' implicitly
includes neighborhood schools, that 'special classes' means non-regular class-
es, and that 'separate schooling' means non-neighborhood schools."79
C. Analysis
The difficulty in interpreting IDEA cases stems from the somewhat con-
tradictory goals of the Act."0 IDEA requires that children with disabilities
receive different treatment via an individualized education designed to meet
their unique needs." At the same time, the Act advances a strong preference
for integration, emphasizing the commonalities disabled children share with
other children. 2
The manner in which states must implement IDEA provisions remains a
source of confusion. The LRE mandate is silent as to which schools enable a
child to receive a FAPE, and thus does not expressly require that disabled
students be placed in neighborhood schools. 3 The regulations do, however,
require placement "as close as possible to the child's home,"" and, unless
another arrangement is necessary, "in the school that he or she would attend if
nondisabled." 5 Under IDEA, the school district must provide children with
disabilities an appropriate education. A district, however, need not place these
children in neighborhood schools if it can provide a free appropriate public
education elsewhere.' To efficiently use resources, a district may exercise
discretion and concentrate services at particular schools to address students'
specific needs and disabilities.8 7
76. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(3) (1995).
77. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929.
78. The salient portion of IDEA examined by the Murray court reads:
mo the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities... are educated with
children who are not disabled, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other re-
moval of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only
when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily ....
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
79. Murray, 51 F.3d at 928-29.
80. Melvin, supra note 12, at 643.
81. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(20), 1414(a)(5).
82. Id. § 1412(5)(B); Melvin, supra note 12, at 643.
83. Osborne, supra note 31, at 543.
84. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(a)(3).
85. Id. § 300.552(c).
86. See Murray, 51 F.3d at 929 (holding that a district may place a student in a school other
than the neighborhood one when the student's IEP so recommends).
87. See, e.g., Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 151-52 (4th Cir.), cert.




The regulations, as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Murray,
imply that districts should educate disabled students in their neighborhood
schools unless the student's IEP recommends otherwise.88 If a district can
best satisfy an IEP through placement at a location other than the
neighborhood school, proximity to a child's home becomes less important 9
even though such a decision might perpetuate segregation.
D. Other Circuits
Courts have consistently upheld school districts' practice of centralizing
special education services, thereby allowing placement of children with dis-
abilities away from neighborhood schools. 9' At least three cases addressing
the issue of placement in neighborhood schools, including Murray, support a
school district's prerogative to place children with disabilities in schools other
than those they would attend if not disabled.9'
The Fourth Circuit, in Barnett v. Fairfax County School Board, approved
a centralized cued speech program even though it required a hearing-impaired
student to attend school several miles from his home.92 The court, recogniz-
ing the limited resources available to schools and noting that the successfully
mainstreamed student participated in extracurricular activities and earned satis-
factory grades,93 acknowledged that the centralized program better served the
needs of all students.94 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit also concluded that a
school district need not modify a neighborhood school for a student using a
wheelchair because another building in the district was accessible.95
On the other hand, the Third Circuit noted in Oberti v. Board of Educa-
tion that federal regulations requiring states to place disabled children "as
close as possible to the child's home" create a presumption favoring placement
in neighborhood schools.96 Oberti, however, involved removal of a disabled
child from a regular classroom to a self-contained classroom for children with
disabilities, not removal from a neighborhood school.97 The Tenth Circuit in
Murray soundly rejected the Third Circuit's approach, noting that even Oberti
qualified the presumption by stating that placement in a neighborhood school
may not be feasible; if it is not, placement should occur as close to home as
88. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929.
89. Id.
90. Osbome, supra note 31, at 543.
91. Murray, 51 F.2d 921; Barnett, 927 F.2d 146; Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist., 937
F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992).
92. Barnett, 927 F.2d at 149.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 149-50.
95. Schuldt, 937 F.2d at 1358-59 (noting that the school district met the requirement of
providing the student with a free appropriate public education).
96. Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1224 n.31 (3d Cir. 1993). The school district
challenged a decision prohibiting it from placing a disabled child in a special education program
outside the school district. Id. at 1206-07. The court held the school district failed to meet its
burden of showing compliance with IDEA's LRE mandate. Id. at 1207.
97. Id.
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possible.98 Given these decisions, the ability of children with disabilities to
attend school in their own neighborhoods with their peers and siblings remains
fully within the discretion of school districts.
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ADA
A. Background
The ADA, the most widely recognized and far-reaching antidiscrimination
statute, prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in nearly all
areas of the public and private sector." The ADA expands the scope of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973," which applied only to entities that received
federal aid. The ADA prohibits discriminatory conduct by those who do not
receive federal financial assistance as well.' Congress closely related the
two acts, as evidenced by the legislature's clear intention that the relevant case
law and regulations developed under the Rehabilitation Act generally apply to
the ADA.
°0 2
A prima facie case under the ADA requires that a plaintiff establish she:
(1) is disabled within the definition adopted by the ADA; (2) is "otherwise
qualified," meaning that she can perform the essential functions of the position
with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) was discriminated against
on the basis of her disability.' 3
The Tenth Circuit decided three employment cases brought under the
ADA during the survey period, each of which addressed issues regarding the
definition of terms and elements of proof required in ADA cases. Bolton v.
Scrivner, Inc."'4 examined the definition of an "individual with a disability"
in the "major life activity" of working, and clarified the required proof that
one is "substantially limited" in her ability to work. Likewise, White v. York
International5 and Milton v. Scrivner, Inc."°6 considered the definition of
a "qualified individual with a disability," addressed the plaintiff's burden to
provide evidence of "reasonable accommodation," and adopted a two-step
process by which courts may qualify a person under the ADA.0 Together,
these three cases refine the elements a prevailing plaintiff must demonstrate
under the ADA.
98. Murray, 51 F.3d at 929 n.13 (quoting Oberti, 995 F.3d at 1224 n.31).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). For the statutory language of section 794(a), see supra note 19.
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
102. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(g) (1995) (citing S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1989); H.R. REP. No. 485 pt. 3, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990)); see also School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (treating Rehabilitation Act regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services as "an important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504" of
the Rehabilitation Act) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
103. See Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 318-19 (8th Cir. 1994); Tyndall v. National Educ.
Cirs., 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994).
104. 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
105. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
106. 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
107. White, 45 F.3d at 360-63; Milton, 53 F.3d at 1123-25.
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B. Individual with a Disability
The ADA covers individuals with a "a physical or mental impairment that
'substantially limits' one or more 'major life activit[ies]." ''  ° Courts analyze
three factors to determine whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity: "(i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or
expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term im-
pact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of ... the impair-
ment." 09
Although claims based on Title I of the ADA invariably involve an
employee's actual or perceived ability to work, the statutory definition of "dis-
abled" also applies to persons with impairments which restrict activity in other
areas of life."' Recognizing the inherent complexity of defining "work," the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) treats working separate-
ly from other major life activities."' EEOC regulations consider whether ma-
jor life activities other than work are substantially limited by the impairment.
Whether the impairment substantially limits working is considered only if
another area is not substantially affected." 2 Regulations note three additional
factors, which courts "may" consider when addressing whether one is substan-
tially limited in her ability to work: (1) the geographical area to which the
individual has access; (2) the class of jobs from which the individual has been
disqualified; and (3) the broad range of jobs from which the individual has
been disqualified because of her impairment."3
Courts have consistently held that the inability to perform a certain job
with a particular employer does not constitute a substantial limitation." 4
108. Under the ADA, an individual with a disability is one who has "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B)
a record of such impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2). Major life activities include physical tasks such as "caring for oneself, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i) (1995). The ADA does not define major life activities, but adopts the definition con-
tained in EEOC regulations. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (requiring the EEOC to issue regulations
to implement Title I of the ADA). The ADA regulations adopt the definition found in the Rehabil-
itation Act regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1995). 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i). Major life
activities also include sitting, standing, lifting and reaching, id., as well as thinking, concentrating,
interacting with others, and reading. Michael Faillace, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Statutory Requirements, Legislative History, Regulations, Technical Assistance Manual, Rele-
vant Case Law under the ADA, and 1973 Rehabilitation Act, and Practical Recommendations, in
24TH ANNUAL INsTrrtJTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 490 (Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5219 1995).
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2).
110. Faillace, supra note 108, at 498.
111. Id.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (requiring the EEOC to issue regulations to implement
Title I of the ADA).
113. The regulations provide that substantial limitation with respect to working includes sig-
nificant restriction "in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abili-
ties." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1995). In contrast, the "substantial limitation" in other life ac-
tivities involves either the inability to perform a major life activity or severe restriction on the
ability to perform a major life activity as compared to the general population. Id. § 1630.2(1)(i)-
(ii).
114. See, e.g., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
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Furthermore, evidence of a disability requires more than an employer's mere
perception that an impairment limits an individual's ability to perform only
one job.' 5 Rather, a claimant must prove exclusion from many jobs, not just
the job the claimant had at the time of the discrimination."6
1. Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc."
7
a. Facts
Bolton suffered a work-related injury to his knee that required him to take
a leave of absence from his job as an order selector at Scrivner's grocery
warehouse.' Following his leave, the company doctor examined Bolton and
concluded that he could not perform his previous job."9 Scrivner therefore
refused to rehire Bolton as an order selector. 2 ° Bolton filed suit, alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA, claiming substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.'
2'
b. Decision
The district court granted Scrivner's motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing that Bolton was not an individual with a disability as defined by the
ADA.'22 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that although Bolton could not
work as an order selector, his ability to work was not substantially limited.
23
Bolton clarifies the definition of disability as it relates to the specific
major life activity of working. 24 Bolton argued that his injury significantly
115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995) (finding that an asthmatic blood bank administrator was not substantially
limited in working because, while she experienced difficulty breathing in the blood bank, her
ability to work in other areas of the hospital was not impaired); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979
F.2d 560, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that, under the Rehabilitation Act, a teacher who was
precluded from teaching in a school because of allergies was not handicapped solely because of
her inability to work in a particular position for a particular employer).
115. Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. Relevant factors to consider include:
(A) [t]he geographical area to which the individual has access;
(B) the job from which the individual has been disqualified because of the impairment,
and the number and types of jobs using similar training, knowledge, skills, or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of
the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) [tlhe job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment,
and the number and types of other jobs not using similar training, knowledge, skills, or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)).
117. 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995).
118. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 941.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Bolton also claimed discrimination on the basis of age under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Bolton, 36 F.3d at 941. The court
held that Bolton failed to meet his burden of proof on the ADEA claim. Id. at 944.
122. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 941.
123. Id. at 941, 944.
124. Id. at 942-43. A secondary issue in Bolton concerned the application of definitions pro-
mulgated under the Rehabilitation Act to ADA cases. Id. at 942. Bolton argued that the district
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restricted him in working, as defined by Welsh v. City of Tulsa'25 and ADA
regulations. 2 6 He presented evidence of his inability to return to his position
as a grocery selector without reasonable accommodation.' 27 The Tenth Cir-
cuit applied the six factors listed in the ADA regulations which help clarify
"substantial limitation" in the context of work.'28 Although Bolton presented
evidence that addressed the severity, duration, and impact of his impairment,
he failed to establish that the impairment significantly restricted his ability to
perform either a particular class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. 29 The court asserted that, to substantiate his claim, Bolton should
have shown evidence as to his "vocational training, the geographical area to
which he has access, [and] the number and type of jobs demanding similar
training from which Bolton" was also disqualified."3
2. Analysis: Individual with a Disability
While Bolton dealt with a claimant alleging disability only in working, the
court did not clarify whether its ruling applies to claimants who assert disabili-
ty in other major life activities. A broad reading of Bolton would encourage
courts to apply the six-factor analysis to all cases, regardless of the alleged
disability. In all likelihood, such a reading would result in fewer ADA claims
surviving summary judgment proceedings. A more narrow interpretation, con-
sistent with EEOC regulations, would require evidence of all six factors only
in cases where a plaintiff alleges disability in working.
In either case, to prevail under Bolton, a plaintiff must show more than a
mere inability to perform one job. Instead, a plaintiff must prove that the se-
verity of her impairment significantly impacts her ability to work in a class of
jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes in a particular geographical area.
court applied an improper definition of disability in granting Scrivner's motion for summary judg-
ment. Id. The court, comparing the definitions and effecting Congress's intent that Rehabilitation
Act case law be generally applied to ADA cases, found that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
define disability in substantially the same terms. Id. at 942-43. Furthermore, the court held that
these principles were consistent with the applicable ADA regulation. Id. at 943; see 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (defining disability for the ADA). Thus, the court held the application of Rehabili-
tation Act terms and case law to ADA cases appropriate. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943.
125. 977 F.2d 1415, 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992). The Welsh court stated that "[w]hile the
[Rehabilitation Act] regulations define a major life activity to include working, this does not nec-
essarily mean working at the job of one's choice." Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1417. The Welsh court held
that "an impairment that an employer perceives as limiting an individual's ability to perform only
one job is not a handicap under the [Rehabilitation] Act." Id. at 1419.
126. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 942; supra notes 114, 117.
127. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943-44. Bolton presented evidence including: two medical opinions
which stated that he could not return to his previous or other employment; a notice from the Okla-
homa Employment Opportunity Commission awarding unemployment benefits on the basis of
medical information regarding his limited ability to stand, walk, and lift overhead; and an opinion
from the Oklahoma Worker's Compensation Court which found he was "temporarily totally dis-
abled" and sustained a "permanent partial disability" to his left foot. Id.
128. Id. at 943 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2), (j)(3)(ii)); supra text accompanying notes
108, 114.
129. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i)).
130. Id. Contra Delida Costin, Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir. 1994), 4 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 488, 491 (1995) (concluding that the Bolton decision does not explain what evi-
dence would have sufficiently met the required factors).
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Although the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence presented by Bolton failed
to meet this standard, 3' it did not give specific guidance regarding what type
of evidence might be dispositive. Rather, the court implied that additional
information relating specifically to training and other vocational factors, in-
cluding the number and types of jobs for which an impairment disqualifies a
plaintiff, may help establish the element of substantial limitation in work-
ing.
132
The court implied that Bolton should have presented evidence of his ex-
clusion from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes in his
geographical area in order to avoid dismissal via summary judgment. An ex-
pert in vocational rehabilitation may be required to provide this information on
behalf of ADA plaintiffs in similar cases.133
3. Other Circuits
Other circuits that use the six-factor analysis have consistently held that a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to perform a variety of jobs to make a
prima facie case.'34 For example, the Second Circuit held that an individual
deemed unfit for the position of police officer due to the individual's poor
judgment, irresponsible behavior, and poor impulse control was not substan-
tially limited in working. 35 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision
holding that a person with a knee problem who could not perform jobs requir-
ing him to climb a telephone pole, but who could perform other activities, was
not substantially limited in working and was therefore not handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act.'36 While the Tenth Circuit in Welsh held that working
at the job of one's choice is not a major life activity, 37 the Sixth Circuit has
held that substantial limitation in working does not require complete inability
to work.'38
C. Qualified Individual with a Disability
Like its precursor, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA provides protection for
"otherwise qualified" individuals with disabilities. 39 The Supreme Court, in
131. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (discussing Bolton's failure to survive
Scrivner's motion for summary judgment).
132. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944.
133. See id. (describing the types of evidence Bolton might have produced).
134. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
135. Daly v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989).
136. Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff d,
863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988) (unpublished opinion).
137. Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1417 (holding that a firefighter with decreased sensation in two fin-
gers was not substantially limited in major life activities and therefore not "handicapped" under
the law).
138. Everette v. Runyon, 911 F. Supp. 180, 183 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (noting that a person com-
pletely unable to work, and therefore not "otherwise qualified," cannot claim discrimination based
on a disability).
139. Compare "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance .... " 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (the Rehabilitation Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (the ADA)
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one of the first Rehabilitation Act cases, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis," narrowly interpreted the qualification requirement, finding that an
otherwise qualified individual must meet all of a program's requirements de-
spite her handicap. 4' This decision required that claimants demonstrate an
ability to participate fully despite their disability before becoming entitled to
an accommodation.'42 Paradoxically, such a showing negates the need for an
accommodation.'43 This view gradually changed as the Court considered
whether reasonable accommodations would help make a disabled person other-
wise qualified.'" The Court's basic struggle, which continues today, is to
determine which comes first, consideration of accommodation or the determi-
nation of qualification.
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline 5 expanded the definition of a
qualified individual to include consideration of an individual's ability to per-
form essential job functions.'" This change led to the current requirement
that a claimant establish herself as a qualified individual by presenting evi-
dence of her ability to perform the essential functions in question.'47 So,
while the ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" separately from
"essential functions" and "reasonable accommodations," in practice the two
prongs form a single inquiry."
Arline recognized a two-part analysis for determining qualification in
Rehabilitation Act cases. 49 The first inquiry advanced in Arline, and later
adopted by the ADA, asks whether an individual can perform the essential
functions of her job. 5° If the individual cannot perform the essential
functions solely because of her disability, 5' a court advances to the second
inquiry, whether reasonable accommodations would enable her to do so.'52
(stating that an otherwise qualified individual with a disability can perform the essential functions
of a job with or without reasonable accommodation).
140. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
141. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406 (holding that a nursing program need not make accommodations
which would fundamentally alter the nature of the program). Disability rights advocates and com-
mentators widely criticized the Davis decision. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 411-12.
142. Sarah 0. Sparboe, Comment, Must Bar Examiners Accommodate the Disabled in the Ad-
ministration of Bar Exams?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 394 (1995).
143. Id.
144. Id. Courts can no longer literally apply the Davis standard that an otherwise qualified
individual is one who can satisfy the job requirements in spite of a disability, but must now con-
tend with the "rather mushy" question of "whether a reasonable accommodation could satisfy the
interests of the employer and individual with a disability." Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248,
1261-62 (5th Cir. 1988); Eric W. Richardson, Who Is a Qualified Individual Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 189, 205 (1995).
145. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
146. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; Richardson, supra note 144, at 204-05.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1995).
148. Richardson, supra note 144, at 191 n.18.
149. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287-88.
150. White, 45 F.3d at 361-62. The ADA does not require an employer to fundamentally alter
the nature of the job. Id.
151. In summary judgment proceedings, a plaintiff must establish that the answer to the first
inquiry creates a material question of fact.
152. White, 45 F.3d at 361-62.
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A court must identify the essential functions of a job before comparing an
individual's qualifications for a particular job with the job's requirements."'
In making this determination, the ADA requires the court to consider the
employer's judgment, written job descriptions, and whether employees in the
position actually perform the identified functions. 54
Generally, courts defer to an employer's assessment of essential functions
even though the ADA does not consider such evidence conclusive.'55 The
need to distinguish between the type, amount, and manner in which work is
done exemplifies the complexity of the ADA. Since an employer possesses
greater expertise in determining the skills necessary to successfully complete a
particular job, a court will not usually second-guess production standards that
establish quality or quantity of work.'56 Clearly, ADA regulations do not
require employers to lower production standards in order to accommodate
persons with disabilities.'57
Unlike the deferential treatment accorded employers in the determination
of the essential functions of a job, Congress did not intend for courts to defer
to an employer's judgment regarding the manner in which employees accom-
plish their work. Few employers possess the skill necessary to identify alterna-
tive ways of completing tasks.'58 Despite this, the ADA permits an employer
to re-evaluate and restructure jobs and to add or change tasks at its discre-
tion,'59 even though such changes may result in workers with disabilities
153. Essential functions include tasks that are more than marginal to the job. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(1). "Marginal functions," while not defined by EEOC regulations, include job duties
that are neither fundamental nor essential to the position. See id. For example, a company's chief
executive officer (CEO) is typically presumed to be able to drive to work or business meetings;
however, driving is not considered an essential function of a CEO's position. Richardson, supra
note 144, at 192 n.30.
154. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).
155. Lucinda A. Castellano, Surviving Summary Judgment in the ADA Employment
Case-Part 11, 24 CoLo. LAW. 1785, 1785 (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i); see also
Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that, although cer-
tain types of heavy work were an essential function of the plaintiff's job group, those functions
were nonessential to any particular individual's performance of one job); Henchey v. Town of N.
Greenbush, 831 F. Supp. 960, 966 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that where discrepancies exist be-
tween the job description and actual job duties, the job description is not conclusive).
156. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1123; Castellano, supra note 155, at 1785; see also D. Todd Arney,
Survey of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title 1: With the Final Regulations In, Are the Criti-
cisms Out?, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 522, 535 (1992) (discussing lingering problems with the ADA).
157. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
158. Castellano is careful to note that:
[iun its deliberations on the ADA, Congress defeated an amendment that would have cre-
ated a presumption in favor of the employer's judgment regarding essential functions of
the job. Such deference to the employer's judgment was rejected because of the belief
that although employers are used to certain ways of performing job functions, they may
not have considered other ways a result might be accomplished.
Castellano, supra note 155, at 1785 n.15 (citing H.R. JuD. REP., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136, re-
printed in The Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 1990, LRP Pub. at 584
(1990)).
159. The ADA does not specifically state that an employer may change job functions at its
discretion. The courts, however, rely heavily on an employer's judgment in determining what
functions are essential and generally will not second guess the employer's statements. See, e.g.,
John A. Conway, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: New Challenges in Airline Hir-
ing Practices, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 945, 963 (1994) ("Because courts are required to defer to
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being unable to perform the revised job with its new tasks.
Once a court establishes the tasks essential to a job's function, it must
determine if the plaintiff can perform those tasks without reasonable accom-
modations. If she cannot, the court must consider the availability of reasonable
accommodations including modification of existing facilities, work schedules,
equipment, job restructuring, or any other change that would allow a disabled
employee to perform a job's essential tasks."6 The ADA compels only
accommodations that will enable a disabled employee to perform the essential
functions of a job' and not those that will impose an "undue hardship" on
the business.'62
A plaintiff must produce evidence at trial sufficient to make an initial
showing regarding the availability of accommodations.'63 Once a plaintiff
makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must present
evidence of its inability to accommodate." This burden, if met by the de-
fendant, then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defendant's con-
tention with suggestions for possible accommodations.'65 The courts give lit-
tle guidance, however, to the type of evidence a plaintiff must present to meet
her burden.
1. White v. York International"6
a. Facts
York initially hired White as a unit assembler and, seven years later,
transferred him to the position of machine operator.'67 Both jobs required
employers' job requirements if the description represents an accurate portrayal of the essential
functions, the ADA encourages employers to develop written descriptions."). But see Sue A.
Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1969, 1981 (1994) ("Al-
though courts have tried to defer to an employer's decision about what constitutes the essential
functions of a job, the employer's determination has not always been accepted uncritically.")
(footnotes omitted).
160. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(2)-(3).
161. This limitation does not appear in the ADA but has been the subject of cases brought
under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 288; Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d
473, 477-78 (11th Cir. 1983); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir.
1981).
162. The ADA defines undue hardship as "significant difficulty or expense." 42 U.S.C. §
1211 1(10)(A). The following six factors may be used to determine if a particular reasonable ac-
commodation may be refused because it causes undue hardship: (1) the nature and cost of the
accommodation; (2) the overall financial resources of the facility; (3) the overall financial resourc-
es of the covered entity; (4) the type of operation(s) of the covered entity; (5) the impact of the
accommodation upon the operation of the facility; and (6) the number of employees or applicants
the accommodation will potentially benefit. R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmentalism and Utili-
tarianism: An Examination of Theoretical Frameworks for Enforcing Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1163, 1181-84. The first four factors are listed in the ADA
itself; the EEOC regulations add the fifth factor; and the final factor is suggested by the ADA's
legislative history. Id.
163. White, 45 F.3d at 361.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308).
166. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
167. White, 45 F.3d at 358-59.
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lifting and continuous standing."6 Following his transfer to the machine op-
erator position, White sustained a non-work-related injury to his right an-
kle. 69 He underwent an ankle fusion, which resulted in a twelve-month
medical leave of absence.' White's physician released him to return to
work with restrictions including "work as tolerated, no standing for longer
than four hours, and no lifting more than fifteen pounds."'
7
1
York requested an independent medical evaluation, which determined that
White could not return to work due to incomplete fusion of his ankle."1
2
Shortly thereafter, York terminated White by letter, citing White's year-long
absence, and further stating that the company was unaware of any accommo-
dations it could reasonably make that would allow White to perform his job in
light of his medical limitations."3
White sued York both on the basis of discrimination under the ADA and
an Oklahoma antidiscrimination law.'74 The district court granted York's mo-
tion for summary judgment, finding that even if White met the definition of an
individual with a disability (a factual issue not determined by the court), no
evidence supported the allegation that he could perform the essential functions
of his position with reasonable accommodations."5 Thus, White failed to es-
tablish that he was a qualified individual with a disability." 6
b. Decision
In a de novo hearing on the issue, the Tenth Circuit adopted the two-part
analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in Arline to determine qualification
under the ADA.177 After determining that White could not perform his job's
essential functions, the court turned to the issue of reasonable accommoda-
tions."7 The court concluded that White failed to carry his burden of proof
by not providing information regarding the availability of specific accommoda-
tions which would allow him to continue his employment with York.' 79
2. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc.'80
a. Facts
Scrivner employed both plaintiffs as grocery selectors.'' Both received








176. Id. at 359-60.
177. Id. at 361-62.
178. Id. at 362.
179. Id.
180. 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
181. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1120.
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injuries during the course of their job duties.' Following the plaintiffs' inju-
ries, Scrivner increased the productivity level required of employees. 3
When the plaintiffs could not meet the new production standards, Scrivner
discharged them, and they sued under state and federal antidiscrimination
laws." 4
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Scrivner discriminated against
them in violation of the ADA, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting wrongful ter-
mination, provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the union
and Scrivner, and other assorted state and federal statutes prohibiting unlawful
discrimination."5 Ultimately, resolution of all claims hinged on a determina-
tion of the alleged disability discrimination.8 6 The district court concluded
that the state law claims were preempted and that the plaintiffs were not eligi-
ble for relief under the ADA.
8 7
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment order
based upon the claimants' failure to establish their status as otherwise quali-
fied individuals with disabilities. 8 In its decision, the court applied the
Arline analysis for determining qualification under ADA. 89 As described in
White, the burden rested with the employees to show the availability of
reasonable accommodations."9 Because the plaintiffs provided no evidence
that reasonable accommodation was possible, the court upheld the defendant's
motion for summary judgment. 9 '
3. Analysis: Qualified Individual with a Disability
Because the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the definition of a qualified
individual with a disability embodies the concepts of essential functions and
reasonable accommodations,'92 a plaintiff seeking to establish that she is
qualified under the ADA bears a tremendous burden. First, she must show that
she can perform the essential job functions with or without
accommodation.' If she requires accommodation, she must then demon-
strate that specific, available accommodations exist.' Finally, she must







188. Id. at 1121.
189. Id. at 1123.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1124.
192. Id. at 1123.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1124-25.
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In light of White and Milton, it appears that the court will accept an
employer's description of essential tasks unless a plaintiff proves that the tasks
are unrelated to a business necessity. 96 Therefore, a claimant who disagrees
with an employer's assertion of essential functions must, at a minimum,
present specific evidence rebutting the essential nature of the tasks.'97 At its
discretion, however, an employer can establish or change the content, nature,
or functions of a job, as seen in Milton.' There, the court found that the
employer's decision to change its business to increase profits was permissible
under the ADA, even though the court never determined the essential func-
tions of the job in question.'
EEOC guidelines apparently require that an employer initiate an informal
process to identify specific accommodations once it becomes aware of the
need.2" The White court, however, interpreted the regulations as triggering
the interactive process only if an employee is otherwise qualified."' There-
fore, an employer must make a threshold determination regarding qualification
before engaging in a dialogue regarding accommodation,2 2 much like the
controversial Supreme Court decision in Davis."3
In the Tenth Circuit, before an employer need consider making accommo-
dations, an employee must first establish the availability of specific accommo-
dations.2" Although the court clearly places the burden on a plaintiff to
show that reasonable accommodations exist, it fails to clarify the specific type
of evidence required for such a showing.2 5 For example, although White
maintained that York could modify White's former job or reassign him to
another position, the court flatly rejected these suggestions as insuffi-
cient--even though EEOC regulations identify both as potential accommo-
dations.2 7
196. White, 45 F.3d at 362; Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
197. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
198. Id.
199. Id. Likewise, the defendants in White contended that the job required the ability to lift
more than fifteen pounds and stand more than four hours at time. White, 45 F.3d at 362. The
plaintiff presented no evidence to the contrary, and did not contest the employer's assertion that it
could not eliminate the job requirements without fundamentally changing the nature of the job. Id.
Because no rebuttal evidence was presented, the court accepted the employer's description of
lifting and standing requirements as essential. Id.
200. White, 45 F.3d at 363.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
204. White, 45 F.3d at 360-61.
205. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124. The Tenth Circuit declined to address whether the unsupported
personal conclusions regarding accommodations are sufficient to make a facial showing. Id.
206. White, 45 F.3d at 362; see also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994) (finding that diabetic plaintiffs who required an ac-
commodation because they posed a substantial risk without the accommodation, were not "other-
wise qualified"); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1126-27 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding
that firefighters' suggested elimination of the "no beard" rule was an unreasonable accommoda-
tion). But see Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 438-39 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that dia-
betic plaintiffs met their burden of asserting reasonable accommodation by proposing they conduct
self-administered blood tests and carry snacks).
207. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o). Clearly, accommodation through job restructuring does not
require an employer to reallocate essential job functions, because such functions are the very ones
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The Milton decision goes even further, placing a greater burden on a
plaintiff to also show that the suggested accommodations are reasonable.'a
For instance, the court found the plaintiffs' suggestions, which included lower
required production, a lessened workload, or possible transfer within the com-
pany, unreasonable." Though the court specifically held that the alteration
or reduction of the workload was unreasonable for the defendant in Milton, it
further suggested that reallocation of job duties or reassignment are per se
unreasonable."°
These Tenth Circuit decisions, in practical terms, grant employers com-
plete discretion to determine the availability of an accommodation and, in the
opinion of at least one commentator, "return the system to pre-ADA days
when an employer's fair, biased, or simply uninformed judgment on accom-
modation was the final word." '' Based upon the uniqueness of disability
claims,2 2  and the requirement that employers provide reasonable
accommodation, some argue that courts should place higher burdens on em-
ployers.2 3 This approach would ensure that, when making qualification de-
terminations, employers fully consider a disabled individual's abilities, rather
than her limitations.2 4 Since many employees with disabilities lack knowl-
edge of how they could accomplish their job performance through alternative
means, 215 placing the burden on them effectively serves to defeat a claim at
its onset."' By failing to require that employers prove a plaintiff unqualified,
or that reasonable accommodations would cause undue hardship, the Tenth
Circuit prevents persons with disabilities from reaching their full potential in
the workforce.2 7
that the individual holding the job would have to perform with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion. See Buko v. American Medical Lab. Co., 830 F. Supp. 899, 905 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff d, 28
F.3d 1208 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion). Generally, existing employees may be accom-
modated by transfer or reassignment; however, an employer should consider reassignment only
when accommodation of the current position poses an undue hardship. Reassignment need not be
limited to a position of the same grade as the employee's current position, but may be to a lower
position if no equivalent job is available. Id. § 1630.2(o). Reassignment to an equivalent position
in terms of pay, status, responsibility, and other conditions of employment represents reasonable
accommodation. Id.
208. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o); Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
209. Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124.
210. Id. "An employer is not required by the ADA to reallocate job duties [or] change the
essential functions of a job." Id.; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o).
211. Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
212. Lianne C. Knych, Note, Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas to Employment
Discrimination Claims Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 MINN. L. REv.
1515, 1535-36 (1995). Unlike other forms of employment discrimination, i.e. race and gender,
which are not based on a rational relationship between the discrimination and the ability to per-
form the job, the ADA recognizes that disability may actually affect job performance. Id.
213. Id. at 1546.
214. Id. at 1545 n.157.
215. Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
216. See Knych, supra note 212, at 1538. "[Al disabled plaintiff faces a virtually insurmount-
able barrier under the McDonnell Douglas test because its allocation of the burden of proof is too
rigid." Id.
217. Id. at 1546.
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
4. Other Circuits
Because the Supreme Court has offered little guidance, circuit courts
inconsistently allocate the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases
brought under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.2 8 Regulations im-
ply that employers should be responsible for initiating inquiries into availabili-
ty of reasonable accommodations,"!9 yet courts do not universally require
employers to carry this burden.22° For example, the Ninth Circuit places the
initial burden of raising the accommodation issue on the employer, characteriz-
ing the plaintiff's burden as one of coming forward to rebut an employer's
showing that no reasonable accommodation is available."'
The Second Circuit in Gilbert v. Frank,"22 however, found that since the
term "otherwise qualified" by definition includes the concept of reasonable
accommodation, a plaintiff's prima facie burden includes showing that she can
perform the job's essential functions in spite of her handicap, with or without
accommodation.223 The Gilbert court indicated that the burden was not
heavy, as it only requires that a plaintiff produce evidence regarding her
capabilities as well as some suggestions for reasonable modification from the
employer.224 Once a plaintiff meets this initial showing, her employer must
prove the accommodation impossible.225 The Gilbert court, acknowledging
the goals of the Rehabilitation Act and the greater access to information
regarding the feasibility of various modifications, ultimately allocated the
burden of proof to the employer on the issue of reasonable accommoda-
tion.226
CONCLUSION
Some believe that courts in future ADA cases will adopt the view of the
Illinois court that decided the first ADA case.227 The Illinois District Court in
EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigation Ltd.2"' indicated only marginal concern
about how an employee performs a job, but placed primary emphasis on the
completion of the job tasks.229 Should courts adopt such an approach,
218. Id. at 1541.
219. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9. EEOC guidelines contemplate that an employer will determine
the essential functions of a job, consult with the individual to identify potential barriers and ac-
commodations, and, considering the individual's preference, select the best accommodation. In
cases in which the accommodation is not obvious, the employer should consider a defined deci-
sion-making process. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1603.9; Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
220. To prevail, an employee must show that the handicap can be accommodated or that the
employer denied employment based on reasons not related to the job. Richardson, supra note 144,
at 198-99.
221. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the "burden
of persuasion in proving the inability to accommodate always remains on the employer").
222. 949 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1991).
223. Gilbert, 949 F.2d at 642.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Castellano, supra note 155, at 1786.
227. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp 1060 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Louis
Pechman, Coping with Mental Disabilities in the Workplace, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 24 (1995).
228. 820 F. Supp. 1060 (N.D. I11. 1993).
229. AIC, 820 F. Supp. at 1064; cf. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,
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employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities will substantially in-
crease.
Disability laws, purporting to address the issue of segregation of persons
with disabilities, strive to provide opportunities for those individuals to fully
participate in the mainstream of the American economy. Yet, on the whole,
these laws have done little to encourage integration. Ostensibly, the least re-
strictive environment requirement of IDEA means that schools should educate
children with disabilities with their nondisabled peers. Yet, across the country,
school districts continue to exclude students with disabilities from the regular
classroom and segregate them from their peers, siblings, and neighbor-
hoods.23 Like prior cases in other circuits, Murray continues the tradition of
segregation by placing greater emphasis on the rights of school districts rather
than on the rights of children.
Likewise, Congress took strong action toward eliminating segregation by
passing the ADA and adopting as its statutory purpose a "clear" mandate to
end all forms of segregation in employment, access to governmental services,
communications, and public accommodations."' Unfortunately, recent deci-
sions in the Tenth Circuit erect barriers which make implementation of this
promise difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
Stephanie Jae Stevenson
545 (7th Cir. 1995) ("An employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home,
where their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced.").
230. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 394 (1991).





Come, come, you wasp, i' faith, you are too angry.
- Petruchio
If I be waspish, best beware my sting.
- Katharina'
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment claims stir up a range of emotions and create some of
the most contentious and impassioned lawsuits in our justice system. Statistics
gauging the extent of the problem vary widely,2 but one thing is clear: no one
is immune to accusation. Allegations of sexual harassment have found their
way into the United States Senate,3 congressional hearings for Supreme Court
nominees,4 and even the office of the President of the United States
The Supreme Court has recognized a claim of sexual harassment under
Title VII,6 but has left many important issues to the circuits. This Survey re-
views four Tenth Circuit decisions addressing Title VII sexual harassment
claims handed down from September 30, 1994, through September 30, 1995.'
These four cases address three recurrent issues in Title VII jurisprudence.
After Part I provides a general background, Part II of this Survey examines
the principles upon which a court will hold both employers and their employ-
ees liable for established sexual harassment claims. Part III looks at the
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 2, sc. 1.
2. Robert J. Aalberts & Lome H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by Non-Em-
ployees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 447, 449 n.3 (1994) (com-
paring an article in The Journal of Psychology estimating that between 42% and 90% of women
have been sexually harassed in the workplace, to a poll conducted by the Roper Org., Inc. indi-
cating that most Americans believe that sexual harassment in the workplace is not a problem).
3. Katharine Q. Seely, Tearful Packwood Resigns, DENV. POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at Al (de-
tailing Sen. Packwood's resignation from the U.S. Senate after an ethics committee investigation
of numerous sexual harassment charges).
4. 137 CONG. REc. S14,951-01 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Deconcini) (re-
ferring to Professor Anita Hill's charges of sexual harassment against then Judge Clarence Thomas
as extremely serious and speculating that both of them would be scarred for life).
5. Michael Isikoff et al., Clinton Hires Lawyer as Sexual Harassment Suit Is Threatened,
WASH. POST, May 4, 1994, at Al.
6. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (analyzing the requirements for a
hostile work environment claim); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (affirming
that sexual harassment constitutes unlawful sex discrimination).
7. In addition to the four cases covered in this Survey, the Tenth Circuit heard two other
cases involving sexual harassment claims. See Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345 (10th
Cir. 1994) (involving a claim for sexual harassment that was dismissed on mootness grounds);
Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269 (10th Cir. 1994) (addressing a sexual harassment claim asserted
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Constitutional claims under § 1983 for sexual harassment are beyond the
scope of this Survey. For an excellent article discussing this type of claim, see George Likourezos,
Sexual Harassment by a Public Official Gives Rise to a Section 1983 Claim: A Legal Argument, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 93 (1995).
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definition of a "hostile" work environment. Finally, Part IV explores the doc-
trine of "appropriate remedial action" by which employers can negate liability.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes sexual harassment as
a form of gender discrimination in employment As originally drafted, Title
VII's discrimination prohibitions did not include a reference to gender.9 After
a rather peculiar debate in the House, however, an amendment to include the
word "sex" among the list of protected classes passed by a narrow margin,
0
thus it became illegal for employers to discriminate on the basis of sex. By
1976, courts began recognizing sexual harassment as a form of gender dis-
crimination under Title VII."
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines define
sexual harassment generally as unwelcome sexual conduct that: (1) is a term
or condition of employment; (2) affects employment decisions about the target
individual; or (3) unreasonably interferes with the individual's job perfor-
mance. 2 Two types of sexual harassment claim developed in the case law.
The first type, "quid pro quo" harassment, 3 occurs when an employer de-
mands sexual favors in exchange for job benefits. 4
A second type of harassment, "hostile work environment," also developed
in case law. 5 In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized this form of harassment
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 6 To prevail under Meritor, a plaintiff
must show that gender related conduct (harassment) was severe or pervasive
and altered the conditions of employment, thereby creating an abusive working
environment. 7
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
9. Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court's Standard Response: Creating an Effective Test
for Determining Hostile Work Environment Harassment Under Title VII, 24 STETSON L. REv. 719,
724 (1995).
10. Id. at 725-26 (stating that the amendment passed by a margin of 168 to 133, and noting
that the amendment's sponsor spoke of a woman's right to a husband to justify the bill, but failed
to give any reason why ending employment discrimination might meet that end).
11. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976) ("[R]etaliatory actions of a
male supervisor, taken because a female employee declined his sexual advances, constitutes sex
discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title VII."). Professor Catharine MacKinnon
has explained the link between harassing behavior and discriminatory behavior. CATHARINE A.
MACKiNNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32 (1979) (detailing the theoreti-
cal basis for treating sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination warranting protection
under Title VII).
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
13. Buff, supra note 9, at 727-28 (stating that quid pro quo harassment occurs when an
"employee is fired, demoted, or otherwise denied employment benefits for refusing sexual advanc-
es").
14. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657.
15. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that a
hostile environment, standing alone, can constitute a violation of Title VII).
16. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
17. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. For a discussion of the application of the hostile work environ-
ment test, see infra part III.
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II. HOW AND AGAINST WHOM DOES TITLE VII LIABILITY ATTACH?
A. Background
The inquiry into liability cuts to the core of a sexual harassment claim.
Without legal principles upon which to base the liability of an employer or
employee, the substantive issues are meaningless." Title VII explicitly pro-
hibits discrimination in the workplace based on sex and allows monetary dam-
ages and injunctive relief.'9 It does not, however, specify exactly who may be
sued.2" Two questions arise in this dilemma.2' First, under what circumstanc-
es will courts hold employers vicariously liable for the acts of their employ-
ees? Second, will courts hold the harassing employees personally liable? For
claims of quid pro quo sexual harassment, courts have generally held employ-
ers strictly liable for the acts of their supervisory employees.22 Courts have
not, however, established clear or uniform guidelines for imposing employer
liability in hostile work environment claims.23 The Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,24 but declined, on the facts
18. See Hannah K. Vorwerk et al., Special Project, Current Issues in Sexual Harassment
Law, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1009, 1105 n.10 (1995). As counsel for the respondent in Meritor, Patri-
cia Barry and Catharine MacKinnon argued that liability "is not an abstract contest over whether
sexual harassment is sex discrimination, which is undisputed .... [Rather] it is a concrete conflict
over whether sexual harassment will be treated as if it is sex discrimination: whether the employer
will be responsible so that its victims receive relief." Id. (quoting Respondent's Brief at 26,
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979)).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988); see Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by
Managers and Supervisors: Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 571,
572 (1994) (noting that Title VII expressly provides both injunctive relief and damages for vic-
tims). The 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 create a right to recover compensa-
tory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S.
Ct. 1483, 1488 (1994). In Landgraf, the Supreme Court held that these amendments would not
apply retroactively. Id. at 1508. Therefore, only Title VII claimants alleging conduct occurring
after the enactment of the amendments may recover these types of damages. Id. The Tenth Circuit
acknowledged this Supreme Court ruling in Manard v. Fort Howard Corp., 47 F.3d 1067, 1067
(10th Cir. 1995) (denying money damages to the plaintiff because the action arose prior to the
1991 amendments).
20. Goldberg, supra note 19, at 572.
21. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71 (discussing the circumstances under which employ-
ers will be liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by their employees); Paroline v. Unisys Corp.,
879 F.2d 100, 104 (6th Cir. 1986) (analyzing the conditions under which individual employees
may be sued for sexual harassment under Title VII). A third question regarding liability concerns
whether employers may be liable when third parties, such as clients or customers, harass employ-
ees. For a thorough discussion of this doctrine, see David S. Warner, Note, Third-Party Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace: An Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 361
(1995); Peter J. Honigsberg et al., When the Client Harasses the Attorney-Recognizing Third
Party Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 715 (1994); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1995) (stating that employers "may also be responsible for the acts of non-
employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace").
22. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71 (noting that "courts have consistently held employers
liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the
employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor's actions"); Peter M. Panken et
al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Employer Liability for the Sins of the Wicked, in C874
ALI-ABA 386, 392 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor).
23. Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of Agen-
cy Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 589 (stating that reliance on
agency law has not resulted in the establishment of a clear standard).
24. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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presented, to make a definitive rule regarding employer liability." In Meritor,
the Court refused to impose strict liability on an employer on the facts pre-
sented.26 The Court agreed with EEOC guidelines that Congress intended for
courts to utilize agency principles in determining employer liability.2 Con-
versely, the Court noted that under agency principles the district court erred in
requiring actual notice before imposing liability; conversely, the court of ap-
peals erred in finding strict liability.2" The Court thus remanded the issue of
liability to the trial court for a determination in light of agency principles.29
In subsequent decisions, the circuit courts have looked to section 219 of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency.3" Under the Restatement, employers may
be liable for acts of their employees in one of three scenarios: where the em-
ployee (1) acted within the scope of his or her employment; (2) has apparent
authority and purports to act or speak on the employer's behalf or is aided by
the agency in accomplishing the sexual harassment; or (3) commits sexual
harassment with respect to which the employer was negligent or reckless.3 '
Application of this test has brought widely divergent results among the
circuits. 2 Courts addressing the issue of a hostile work environment created
by a non-supervisory co-worker, however, usually require that the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment and did not take proper reme-
dial action.33
Title VII does not directly address whether the alleged harassers may be
personally sued.34 In addition, the EEOC has not promulgated guidelines on
this issue.35 Though the circuits are split, a majority will not allow defendants
to be sued in their personal capacities.36 The Tenth Circuit, in Sauers v. Salt
25. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Court's agreement with EEOC guidelines did not seem to rise to the level of a
direct holding that courts employ specific agency principles in addressing liability. Id. To explain
his reasoning for applying agency principles from the Restatement to sexual harassment claims,
Justice Rehnquist noted that "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an
employer ... surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id.
28. Id. Rather than issue a specific holding as to the standard of liability to be used, the
Court merely held that standards at both extremes were inappropriate. Id.
29. Id. at 73.
30. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that
liability attaches to an employer for an employee's tort while acting in the scope of employment).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Com-
munications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (setting out principles of agency law from
the Restatement to guide the liability analysis).
32. See Lutner, supra note 23, at 599 (canvassing the circuits and finding negligence, fore-
seeability, scope of employment, and other tests used in interpreting Meritor).
33. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R. 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring no-
tice before an employer may be liable for sexual harassment under Title IX); Jones v. Flagship
Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (directing that an employer will not be liable unless
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and did not take prompt remedial
action); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (1995) (describing guidelines for sex discrimination).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988); Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1995)
(noting Title VII's silence on the issue of individual liability).
35. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1995) (establishing guidelines for sex discrimination but failing
to discuss whether individuals may be held liable).
36. Compare Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 74 F.3d 1439, 1443 (3d Cir. 1996)
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Lake County,37 held that Title VII does not allow individual capacity suits.3
The court's recent reading of Sauers in Ball v. Renner,39 however, indicates
that perhaps the Tenth Circuit has not entirely settled the question.'
Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Fifth and Ninth Circuit
cases that squarely addressed the issue of individual liability under Title
VII.4' In both cases, the circuit court had held that there was no such indi-
vidual liability under Title VII.42 Thus, individual employee liability remains
a live issue among the circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, until such time as
the Supreme Court addresses it.
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.43
a. Facts
The plaintiff alleged that Kenneth Coleman, a directory assistance opera-
tor for U.S. West, had, in the span of his first four months on the job, made
sexually offensive remarks and requests for sex to as many as eleven different
female co-workers, including his female supervisor and the plaintiff.' Some
of the women reported Coleman's behavior to his supervisor and a union
representative; others did not.45  Plaintiff Hirase-Doi, a co-worker of
Coleman's, observed the harassment of other women and was herself subject-
ed to sexually offensive remarks, both written and verbal.' Coleman also
(following the weight of authority in the circuits that employees may not be sued under Title VII);
Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that Congress
obviously included agents under Title VII in order to ensure respondeat superior liability), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir.) (concluding
that Title VII does not allow liability for the actions of employees unless they meet the statutory
definition of "employer"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d
1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that Title VII provides a remedy against employers, not indi-
vidual employees); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
the statutory scheme of Title VII indicates that Congress did not intend personal liability), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991)
(proclaiming that plaintiffs must properly recover through the employer, not the employee) with
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a supervisory individual
may qualify as an "employer" under Title VII) and Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1125,
1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that a plaintiff may properly seek recovery against individuals under
Title VII).
37. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
38. See infra note 78.
39. 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995).
40. For a discussion of the Ball opinion and its implications, see infra notes 59-100 and
accompanying text.
41. See Grant, 21 F.3d at 653; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
42. See Grant, 21 F.3d at 653 (finding no personal liability under Title VII); Miller, 991
F.2d at 587 (holding that supervisors could not be sued personally under Title VII).
43. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995).
44. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 780-81.
45. Id. at 781. One of the women asked Coleman to stop; another told Hirase-Doi, but not
the supervisor, about Coleman's behavior, and a third simply avoided Coleman. Id. One of the
incidents involving a non-plaintiff included an attempt to kiss her and touch her breast Id.
46. Id.
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attempted to touch Hirase-Doi's breast." Hirase-Doi reported Coleman's be-
havior to a union vice-president, a procedure specified in the U.S. West em-
ployee policy manual.' Some time after the report, Coleman "grabbed
[Hirase-]Doi between her legs."49 She reported the incident on July 15, which
resulted in Coleman's prompt suspension, followed by his resignation." The
district court granted summary judgment to U.S. West, finding that Coleman
had not acted within the scope of his employment.5 The court reasoned that
Coleman was a co-worker and not in a management or supervisory position.
Therefore, U.S. West could only be liable if it knew or should have known of
the situation and failed to remedy it."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether U.S. West knew or should have known about Coleman's alleged
conduct. 3 In analyzing the liability issue, the court reaffirmed its earlier
holding in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,54 in which it applied agency princi-
ples 5 from the Restatement (Second) of Agency.56 Under one element of the
Hicks test, liability attaches to an employer for any tort committed by an em-
ployee in which the employer was negligent or reckless." The Tenth Circuit
found that a reasonable finder of fact might conclude that U.S. West knew or
should have known of Coleman's alleged conduct based on: (1) the reports of
two women to Coleman's supervisor; (2) the report of another woman to her
union representative; (3) allegations that the supervisor herself was harassed;
(4) the overall pervasiveness of complaints regarding Coleman; and (5) Hirase-
Doi's report to the union vice-president.58
47. Id.
48. Id. at 785. U.S. West argued that the union representative did not pass on the informa-
tion; therefore, it could not be liable unless an agency relationship existed between U.S. West and
the union. Id. The court, however, found that U.S. West's inclusion of the union in the policy
manual constituted the apparent authority necessary to create an agency relationship. Id.
49. Id. at 781.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 781-82.
53. Id. at 784. The plaintiff did not dispute that Coleman had not acted within the scope of
his employment or purported to act as an agent of U.S. West. Id. at 783. The court also addressed
the issue, not reached by the district court, of the existence of a hostile work environment. See
discussion infra notes 142-60 and accompanying text.
54. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
56. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 783. The court opened its discussion of the use of agency princi-
ples by referring to the Supreme Court's language in Meritor. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 785-86. The case was therefore remanded to determine whether U.S. West knew or
should have known about the harassment. Id.
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2. Ball v. Renner9
a. Facts
In a second case addressing liability under Title VII, Ball v. Renner, the
Tenth Circuit directly addressed the issue of an employee's personal liabili-
ty.' Sharon Ball, a former police dispatcher for the Cheyenne Police Depart-
ment, brought a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment against
both Sergeant David Renner and the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming.6 Ball pre-
sented evidence of harassment by Renner,62 as well as substantial evidence
suggesting that Renner had supervisory authority over her.63 The district court
entered summary judgment for both defendants.'4 The district court granted
summary judgment for Renner individually because the plaintiff failed to name
him in her EEOC complaint and because Renner was not an "employer" with-
in the meaning of Title VII.65 Ball appealed only that part of the order dis-
missing her complaint against Renner individually.'
b. Decision
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that Renner was not individually
liable because he was not Ball's supervisor.67 The court did not resolve the
question of individual liability for supervisors, but analyzed both sides of the
question, indicating agreement with courts finding that liability attaches to
individual supervisors.'
59. 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995).
60. Ball, 54 F.3d at 664.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 665. Ball alleged that Renner had followed her home from work in the middle of
the night numerous times, had twice accosted her in a dark closet, and had "placed his crotch on
[her] right leg just below the knee." Id.
63. Id. at 668. Ball's affidavit asserted that:
5. Through my training and my experience, it was my understanding that, as a
dispatcher and a communication coordinator, my direct supervisor on night shift was the
patrol sergeant on duty ....
6. It was my understanding that, due to the fact that the patrol sergeant on duty
was the only available person above me in the chain-of-command, the patrol sergeant on
duty was in charge of the radio room.
7. The patrol sergeant on duty has supervisory authority over all dispatchers
including the dispatch supervisor.
8. As the communications coordinator on duty and being in control of the radio
room, the patrol sergeant on duty could, in fact, send me home if he believed it was
necessary.
9. As the communications coordinator on duty, my chain-of-command was
through the patrol sergeant and this was made clear to me through my training.
10. As commissioned supervisor, the patrol sergeant on duty had authority over
all civilian personnel.
11. In the Spring of 1991, Sgt. David Renner was assigned to night shift as a
patrol sergeant on duty and had supervisory authority over me.
Id.
64. Id. at 664. The opinion did not discuss the grounds for the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for defendant, the City of Cheyenne, because plaintiff did not appeal this issue. Id.
65. Id. at 664-65.
66. Id. at 664.
67. Id. at 668.
68. Id. at 667 (stating that it "makes good sense" to limit liability to those who "wield em-
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At the outset, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that Title VII itself is silent
on the question of employee liability.69 Title VII refers to legal action against
"employers"; the definition of "employers" includes agents.0
In determining the meaning attached to the word "agent," the court identi-
fied two discrete theories of interpretation.7 The first broadly construes the
word "agent" to increase the number of potential defendants, and imposes
liability on discriminatory supervisors along with their employers. 7' The sec-
ond approach views "agent" in a way that imputes an employee's discrimina-
tory conduct to his employer through the doctrine of respondeat superior.73
Judge Shadur,74 a visiting judge writing for the panel, opined that the first
approach was far more rational.75 The second approach, in his view, created a
redundancy and was analytically flawed.76
The court noted that opinions diverge about whether employees may be
held personally liable under Title VII. 77 According to Judge Shadur, Tenth
Circuit cases treating personal liability did not present a clear picture.7 ' Those
ployer-like authority").
69. Id. at 666.
70. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (defining the term employer as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce... and any agent of such a person") (emphasis added).
71. Ball, 54 F.3d at 666.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Senior District Judge, sitting by assignment. Id. at 664.
75. Id. at 667 (stating that "making the responsible agent a statutory 'employer'... is emi-
nently sensible as a matter of statutory structure and logical analysis").
76. Id. (explaining that interpretation of the word "agent" as applying respondeat superior
principles to ensure employer liability "makes little sense in analytical terms"). "[An] employer
can act only through its agents in any event (what other meaning can be given to the concept that
Mammoth Enterprises, Inc., has engaged in employment discrimination?" Id.
77. Id. at 666-67.
78. Id. at 667. One Tenth Circuit case, Sauers v. Salt Lake County, held that agents for em-
ployers could be sued only in their official capacity, precluding personal liability. Sauers, 1 F.3d
1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993). Another, Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Corp., indicated that
agents for employers could be personally liable for age discrimination. Brownlee, 15 F.3d 976,
978 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2743 (1994).
Judge Shadur described Tenth Circuit precedent regarding individual Title VII liability as
unclear. Ball, 54 F.3d at 666-67. District courts in the Tenth Circuit, however, often cite Sauers as
squarely holding that individuals may not be personally sued under Title VII. See, e.g., Davidson
v. MAC Equip., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Kan. 1995) ("The Tenth Circuit has squarely held
that individual capacity suits are inappropriate under Title VII."); Redpath v. City of Overland
Park, 857 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (D. Kan. 1994) (referring to a "square holding" in the Tenth Cir-
cuit of no personal liability under Title VII). It is questionable, particularly in light of the Ball
opinion, whether or not these courts have identified the "square" holding of Sauers. In Sauers, the
specific issue was whether the plaintiff's amended complaint, properly naming the county rather
than the county attorney as defendant, related back to the original filing. Sauers, I F.3d at 1125.
The court cited an Eleventh Circuit case for the proposition that Title VII suits may proceed
against individuals only in their official capacities and not personally. Id. (citing Busby v. City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (lth Cir. 1991)). In this context, the court held that naming Ted
Cannon individually in the first filing was tantamount to naming the County as a defendant. Id.
Therefore, Sauers's claim was not time-barred. Id.
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circuits finding personal liability under Title VII restricted such liability to
supervisory personnel,79 an approach that the court found sensible."0
The Tenth Circuit characterized Ball's evidence regarding Renner's super-
visory capacity as too generalized.8' The court reasoned that Renner, a co-
worker, could not be liable under any theory of personal liability.8" Because
the facts of this case did not squarely present the question of the personal
liability of supervisors, the court deliberately and explicitly left the question
unresolved. 3
C. Analysis
Technically, the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively to the issue of
employer liability for either supervisors or co-workers under Title VII. In
Meritor, the Court held that for hostile work environment claims, employers
would be neither always strictly liable nor always insulated from liability by
absence of notice.84 Both Hirase-Doi and Ball reflect an expansion of federal
protection for victims of sexual harassment, but a narrow definition of supervi-
sory capacity might severely limit those to whom the court will extend liabili-
ty.
In Hirase-Doi, the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's suggestion
in Meritor to apply agency principles. 5 The Tenth Circuit confirmed that
agency principles (specifically, the "knew or should have known" standard)
govern the question of employer liability for acts of co-workers in hostile
work environment claims.86 The court applied these principles even though
Meritor involved a harassment claim against a supervisory employee, and
Hirase-Doi involved a claim against a co-worker. 7
The Supreme Court also has not addressed the issue of individual liability
under Title VII. The Tenth Circuit clearly will not impose individual liability
when the harasser is only a co-worker of the plaintiff.8 Several district courts
in the Tenth Circuit have interpreted Sauers as firmly holding that individuals
may not be personally sued for Title VII violations. 9 Ball, however,
79. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667 (noting that all courts imposing personal liability distinguish be-
tween co-workers and supervisors and limit liability to those who wield "employer-like authori-
ty").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 668; see supra note 63 (specifying Ball's evidence of Renner's supervisory capaci-
ty).
82. Ball, 54 F.3d at 668 (stating that nothing "demonstrate[s) the existence of employer-like
power in Renner").
83. Id. at 667. Note that Ball, a police dispatcher for the City of Cheyenne, was a public
employee. Had she brought her claim for sexual harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Renner
could clearly have been sued in his personal capacity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); Starrett v.
Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that sexual harassment by public employees
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
84. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
85. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 783.
86. Id. at 781.
87. Id.
88. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667 (limiting liability to those who wield employer-like authority).
89. See, e.g., Davidson, 878 F. Supp. at 188 (describing a square holding against personal
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describes the question of personal liability in the Tenth Circuit as open and
unresolved.' Although the Ball court does not reach the question of personal
liability under Title VII for supervisors, its dicta specifically eschews the rea-
soning of courts which do not extend personal liability to supervisors.9 The
court implies that it may impose personal liability on supervisors in the future.
Note, however, that the court rejected a fair amount of evidence that Renner
acted as Ball's supervisor.92 Thus, Ball establishes a high threshold of proof
for demonstrating supervisory capacity.
The Tenth Circuit may remain open to arguments regarding personal
liability under Title VII. A literal reading of Title VII's language supports a
finding of individual liability." The Ninth Circuit, however, found that by
using the word "agent" in the statute, Congress plainly intended to create
respondeat superior liability for employers.94 The Ninth Circuit also reasoned
that because Title VII does not cover small employers, Congress could not
have intended to treat individuals differently from small employers." Policy
arguments against personal liability include an alleged "chilling effect" on
employees' and economic inefficiency." On the other hand, the broad ob-
jectives of Title VII, to eradicate discrimination and provide redress for vic-
tims, militate in favor of imposing personal liability." Individual liability may
further congressional goals of deterrence." Also, plaintiffs may have no other
recourse if an employer is bankrupt or is not found liable under agency theo-
ries."°
liability); see supra note 78.
90. Ball, 54 F.3d at 667-68. The court compares Brownlee to Sauers to demonstrate that
confusion exists regarding individual liability. Id. at 667. This is a peculiar reference by the court,
as Brownlee is an age discrimination suit brought under ADEA, not Title VH, and merely alludes
to the possibility of personal liability under ADEA. Brownlee, 15 F.3d at 978.
91. See Ball, 54 F.3d at 666-67; supra text accompanying note 76.
92. See supra note 63 (detailing the evidence).
93. See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 575. As Goldberg points out, liability turns on who is an
employer. Id. Goldberg defines an employer as a person engaged in industry and agents of such a
person. Id. Therefore, it would follow that agents may be held liable. Id.
94. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the
"obvious purpose of [including 'agent' in the definition of employer] was to incorporate responde-
at superior liability into the statute"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
95. Id.
96. See Goldberg, supra note 19, at 590.
97. Id. at 591.
98. Id. at 580-81.
99. Id. at 590.
100. Id. at 591. An extreme example of the legal quagmire plaintiffs may face regarding lia-
bility is found in the case of Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569
(1995). In Gary, the court accepted as true, for purposes of summary judgment, that the plaintiff
was subjected to severe harassment over a period of two to three years culminating in a rape. Id.
at 1393-94. Because of the employer's well-established grievance procedures, the court rejected all
theories of employer liability through agency principles. Id. at 1398. The D.C. Circuit did not hold
the harasser liable because it adhered to the "respondeat superior" interpretation for personal liabil-
ity of agents. Id. at 1399; see discussion supra part II.B.2.b. The court denied the plaintiff any




Some circuits interpret Meritor in conjunction with Title VII to impose
strict liability in hostile work environment claims.'0 ' Others, before imposing
employer liability, require a finding that the employer had actual or construc-
tive notice and failed to remedy the situation.' 2
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have imposed individual liability under
Title VII.V O3 In contrast, the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have refused to
impose individual liability. 4 In addition, the Fifth Circuit held that only su-
pervisors in charge of staffing and assignments may be held liable. 5 In cir-
cuits which have not decided this issue, the decisions of the district courts
have been inconsistent."06
III. DEFINING THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
A. Background
The Eleventh Circuit first acknowledged a hostile work environment claim
in 1982 in Henson v. City of Dundee. 7 Although the analysis in Henson
closely mirrored the established "quid pro quo" analysis, the new theory did
not require the plaintiff to show loss of a tangible job benefit such as firing or
demotion." Thus, the court required that the harassing conduct be gender-
motivated and affect a "term, condition or privilege" of a victim's employ-
ment." 9 The Henson court borrowed language from a Title VII racial dis-
crimination case to assert that an employee's psychological well-being is a
"term, condition or privilege" of employment.
' '
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,"'
affirming that non-economic, hostile work environment claims are actionable
101. See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "sex discrimi-
nation can best be eradicated by enforcing a strict liability rule that ensures compensation for vic-
tims and creates an incentive for the employer to take the strongest possible affirmative measures
to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors").
102. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986) (requiring "that the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt
remedial action"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Vorwerk et al., supra note 18, at 1061.
103. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Continental
Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986).
104. See Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 74 F.3d 1439, 1443 (3d Cir. 1996);
Gary, 59 F.3d at 1399; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
105. See Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1986).
106. See Ball, 54 F.3d at 667.
107. 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
108. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.
109. Id. The court in Henson listed five elements necessary for a hostile work environment
claim: (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee did not invite the
harassment; (3) the employee was harassed because of [his or] her sex; (4) the harassment affected
a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) a respondeat superior relationship existed
between the employer and employee. Id. at 903-05.
110. Id. at 901 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972)).
111. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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under Title VII.12 Meritor noted with approval both the EEOC guidelines
and Henson in affirming this cause of action."3 While Henson listed five
elements necessary to establish a claim of hostile work environment discrimi-
nation," '4 the Court in Meritor did nothing to establish or clarify the
standards for evaluating this claim." 5 The Court did state that the conduct
must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.""' 6 Sub-
sequently, the circuits have disagreed on exactly what constitutes a hostile
work environment. 17
In 1993, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of hostile work
environment sexual harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc."' In Har-
ris, the Court specifically held that actual psychological injury was not re-
quired. Justice O'Connor purported to strike a middle path between merely
offensive conduct and conduct resulting in a discernable psychological inju-
ry.' 9 The Court articulated a two-part, objective/subjective test, requiring
courts to determine whether a reasonable person would perceive the environ-
ment to be hostile and whether the plaintiff actually perceived it as such.2 '
Following Harris, the circuits returned to the difficult task of defining a hos-
tile work environment.
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co. 2'
a. Facts
Patricia Gross worked as a water truck driver for Burggraf Construction, a
road construction company, for two May-to-October seasons in 1989 and
1990.22 In September of 1993, she filed a Title VII gender discrimination
claim alleging ten instances of harassing conduct by her supervisor.'23 The
alleged conduct included calling Gross a "cunt," asking a male employee over
a CB radio within Gross's hearing, "'Mark, sometimes, don't you just want to
smash a woman in the face?"' as well as a series of vulgar criticisms of
112. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-68.
113. Id. at 65-67.
114. See supra note 109.
115. See Buff, supra note 9 (noting that while Meritor is the source of the oft-quoted lan-
guage that conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter working conditions, the
Court neglected to define a clear test for hostile work environment harassment).
116. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) (bracketed text in original).
117. Compare Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "employees
need not endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously affected to the
extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation") with Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,
418 (7th Cir. 1989) (requiring conduct to be both pervasive and psychologically debilitating).
118. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
119. Harris, 114S. Ct. at 370.
120. Id.
121. 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
122. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1535. Gross did not dispute that at the end of each season she was laid
off for lack of further work. Id.
123. Id. at 1535-36.
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Gross's work.'24 The district court granted summary judgment to Burggraf,
and Gross appealed."
b. Decision
In analyzing the claim, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the objec-
tive/subjective test set forth in Harris,'26 but then focused on prior Tenth
Circuit decisions to resolve the issue.'27 The first case that the court exam-
ined held that harassment occurring only because of an employee's gender
may be actionable under Title VII. 2s The second case explained that regard-
less of the unpleasantness of the workplace, no sex discrimination occurs un-
less the harassing conduct is based on gender. 29 Interestingly, the court ana-
lyzed the merits of Gross's claim by first "examin[ing] her work environment"
with specific reference to the construction industry. 30 The court stated, "In
the real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not perceived
as hostile or abusive. Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or endured
as normal human behavior."'' The court, quoting a Sixth Circuit decision,
said that standards for harassment will vary depending upon the nature of the
work environment.'32 "[I]n some workplaces ... [s]exual jokes, sexual con-
versations and girlie magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or
can-change this."'33
The Tenth Circuit then explained that Bolden v. PRC, Inc.,'34 a Title VII
racial discrimination case, contained the controlling test for gender
discrimination. 3 ' To prevail under the Bolden test, as set forth in Gross, a
plaintiff must prove that the "alleged conduct was: (1) pervasive or severe
enough to alter the terms, conditions or privileges of employment; and (2)
whether the admissible evidence demonstrates that the words used were gender
based or stemmed from sexual animus."'36
The court refused to consider Gross's supervisor's use of the word "cunt"
because of hearsay concerns.'37 Furthermore, the court dismissed all of the
124. Id. at 1536 (detailing each specific allegation).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1537.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987)).
129. Id. (citing Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir. 1994)).
130. Id.
131. Id. Deposition testimony from Gross indicated that she also used profanity on the job. Id.
at 1538.
132. Id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), afd,
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
-133. Id. (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430).
134. 43 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994).
135. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1539.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1539-42. Gross submitted testimony that she had been told by co-worker Ed
Durfee that her boss, George Anderson, had said to him, "I hate that fucking cunt." Id. at 1539
(internal quotations omitted). Gross offered no exception to the hearsay rule in support of admis-
sion of this evidence and the court found no applicable exception. Id. at 1541-42. Gross also of-
fered testimony of a co-worker that someone had told him that Anderson had called Gross a cunt.
Id. at 1539-40. The court rejected Gross's unexplained assertion that as an admission by a party
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alleged instances of verbal harassment as "crude and rough comments used by
a construction boss in reprimanding or motivating his employees."'M The
court described the terms used, such as "dumb," "ass," and other epithets, as
being gender-neutral.' With regard to the supervisor's remark about want-
ing to smash a woman in the face, the court held, citing Meritor, that this
single incident would not sufficiently affect the conditions of Gross's employ-
ment to sustain a Title VII claim." °




Hirase-Doi and her co-worker, Coleman, were directory assistance opera-
tors at U.S. West. 42 Hirase-Doi alleged that her co-worker, Coleman, ha-
rassed her by making verbal and written offensive remarks, attempting to
touch her breast, and grabbing her between the legs. 43 She also alleged that
Coleman harassed other women at the company.' 4 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant because it found that Coleman had not
acted within the scope of his employment and there was no viable evidence
that the company knew or should have known of the harassment. 45 Thus,
the district court never reached the issue of whether a hostile work environ-
ment existed at U.S. West. 1 6
b. Decision
On appeal, U.S. West raised the issue of hostile work environment as an
alternative basis for affirming the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment. 47 In analyzing this issue, the Tenth Circuit first addressed U.S. West's
contention that Hirase-Doi could not use Coleman's alleged harassment of
others as evidence of a hostile work environment for Hirase-Doi." Citing
their decision in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 49 the court found that Hirase-
Doi could indeed use this evidence to bolster her claim.'5
opponent, this statement was an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 1542.
138. Id. at 1547.
139. Id. at 1543.
140. Id. at 1542-43.
141. 61 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 780. For a discussion setting forth the facts of Hirase-Doi, see
supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
143. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 781.
144. Id. (describing the actual incidents of harassment directed at other women).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 782.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
150. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 782 (citing Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415-16). Hirase-Doi could only
use evidence of Coleman's harassment of others of which she was aware during the time she was




The court applied the two-part objective/subjective test from Harris v.
Forklift Systems,' emphasizing that Hirase-Doi must have been aware of
the harassment of others in order to use it in her claim.'52 The Tenth Circuit
found that the alleged harassment of Hirase-Doi, coupled with the alleged
harassment of others, were sufficient for her claim to survive U.S. West's
motion for summary judgment.'53 In addition, the court stated that the evi-
dence of harassment of Hirase-Doi alone would have sufficed to preclude
summary judgment on the issue of a hostile work environment.'54
C. Analysis
In defining hostile work environment, the Tenth Circuit adheres to the
two-part objective/subjective test set out in Harris. The Tenth Circuit will also
consider, however, the nature of the industry in which the plaintiff works. Dis-
crimination actionable under Title VII must be "gender-based." This "gender-
based" requirement may mean that no claim will lie if men are also subjected
to harassment in an industry, like construction, where higher levels of abuse
may pervade the workplace."'
This lenient standard may give considerable latitude to companies in cer-
tain industries. Under the Bolden test, courts may only consider gender-specif-
ic remarks. In Gross, the Tenth Circuit found that the women were not sub-
jected to gender-specific vulgarities and the gender-neutral terms used were
acceptable in the construction industry context. This holding raises two issues.
First, to support the notion that a higher degree of abuse was acceptable in the
context of Gross's facts, the court cites Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
5 6
in which even gender-specific harassment-sexual jokes and girlie maga-
zines-was deemed tolerable in that specific work environment. Thus, the
court in Gross appears to be setting the stage for companies to argue that
because sexual harassment is common and ostensibly accepted in certain in-
dustries, proving interference with work may be more difficult for employ-
ees. "'57 Ironically, as a result, where an industry as a whole has exhibited a
151. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
152. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 782.
153. Id. at 783.
154. Id. at 782-83.
155. Adjusting the view of reasonable behavior in accordance with what is tolerated in the
particular environment raises several intriguing questions. What data will the court use to evaluate
a work environment and determine whether higher levels of abuse are reasonable? In Gross, the
court reproduced deposition testimony indicating that the plaintiff had herself used profanity and
possibly told "off-color" jokes to support its broader conclusions about the construction industry.
Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537-38. Additionally, what constitutes a work environment? Will the court
look at entire industries, such as construction, or might certain companies be able to demonstrate
this type of environment and qualify for different treatment? May large companies argue that the
work environment in the mail room is different from that in executive offices?
156. 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
157. The EEOC has issued policy guidance indicating that it agrees with the dissent in
Rabidue that a traditionally abusive work environment will rarely be relevant. Jollee Faber, Ex-
panding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Ha-
rassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN's LJ. 85, 133-34 (1992). The policy guidance goes on to assert that
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historical pattern of discrimination through harassment, the companies within
that industry may enjoy relative immunity from Title VII claims.
Second, the court did not consider whether the plaintiff was subjected to a
high level of abuse, gender-neutral or otherwise, because of her sex. The
Tenth Circuit has previously held that harassing behavior under Title VII need
not be overtly sexual in nature.'58 In Gross the court did note that numerous
vulgar epithets directed at a woman because of her gender could establish a
claim under Title VII.'59 The total number of incidents in Gross, including
the gender-neutral remarks, may not have been sufficient to alter the plaintiff's
working environment; however, the court considered only the gender-specific
remark and did not analyze the possibility that the gender-neutral remarks
were directed towards women with greater frequency because of their gender.
The Bolden test, requiring "a steady barrage of opprobrious racial [or sexual]
comments, ' ' "W does not capture the notion of a particular gender singled out
for "generic" abuse.
In Hirase-Doi, the plaintiff alleged sufficient evidence of harassment to
survive summary judgment. The court reaffirmed that a plaintiff may use
harassment of others to bolster a Title VII claim, but pointed out that Hirase-
Doi alleged sufficient evidence of harassment against herself. Thus, the court
left open the possibility of proving a hostile work environment entirely upon
showing pervasive harassment of others of which she was aware. This type of
claim, of course, would represent a significant expansion of the hostile work
environment claim.
D. Other Circuits
Most circuits agree that conduct need not be "overtly sexual" to support a
hostile work environment claim. 6' This is true despite language in the
EEOC guidelines that harassing conduct includes "[u]nwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature."' 62 In contrast, some circuits have held that evidence of con-
duct that is not overtly sexual may not be as persuasive.'63
Title VII's exact purpose is to prevent the behavior common in these types of environments. Id.
For a detailed and informative indictment of the reasoning in Rabidue, see Nancy S. Ehrenreich,
Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law,
99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1193-234 (1990).
158. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). In Hicks, the harassing
behavior, while not overtly sexual, was physically aggressive. Id. at 1415.
159. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1539 (citing Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th
Cir. 1993)). Gross indicates that harassment "'that would not occur but for the sex of the employ-
ee... may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment
under Title VII."' Id. at 1537 (quoting Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415). EEOC policy guidance specifi-
cally cites Hicks for the proposition that "sex-based harassment-that is, harassment not involving
sexual activity or language-may also give rise to Title VII liability." Faber, supra note 157.
160. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1539.
161. See, e.g., Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir. 1995); Intlekofer
v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cit. 1992); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,
1485 (3d Cit. 1990); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988); Bell v.
Crackin' Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1503 (11th Cir. 1985).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1995).
163. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir.
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Few courts have directly addressed whether a plaintiff may use evidence
of the harassment of others in the workplace to bolster a hostile work environ-
ment claim. In Vinson v. Taylor," however, the District of Columbia Circuit
stated that "[e]ven a woman who was never herself the object of harassment
might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere
where such harassment was pervasive.""
IV. WHAT CONSTITUTES APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL ACTION?
A. Background
Generally, for a court to impose employer liability in a hostile work envi-
ronment claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer knew or should have
known about the conduct and failed to take appropriate remedial action."
Most circuits have held that remedial action must be "reasonably likely" or
"calculated" to stop the harassment.'67 Courts differ widely as to what types
of employer actions satisfy this requirement. For example, the Fourth Circuit
has found sufficient an employer's written notice to the alleged harasser to
refrain from offensive conduct or contact with the alleged victim."6 Yet, the
Sixth Circuit has imposed liability on an employer who had a policy against
sexual harassment and conducted an internal investigation because the court
found the procedures did not function effectively. 69
The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,"' noted that the
"mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination,
coupled with [the victim's] failure to invoke that procedure," will not insulate
an employer from liability. 7' The Court required thorough procedures de-
signed to encourage victims to come forward.'72 Many of the cases
1995) (dismissing plaintiff's hostile work environment claim and noting that "no physical or sexu-
al advances were made" toward plaintiff); Dey v. Colt Constr. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir.
1994) (concluding that incidents of harassment were extremely offensive and noting that they were
overtly sexual, but not requiring them to be).
164. 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
165. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 146.
166. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1995) (stating that an employer is liable for sexual harassment
where it "knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action"). See generally Jana H. Carey & Theresa C. Mannion, New De-
velopments in the Law of Sexual Harassment from Meritor to Harris, Karibian and Steiner, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 1995 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No.
524, 1995).
167. See, e.g., Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that "an
effective grievance procedure---one that is known to the victim and that timely stops the harass-
ment-shields the employer from Title VII liability for a hostile environment"); Koteher v. Rosa
& Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring remedial procedures to be
more than a mere sham or pretext); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting
forth the court's belief that remedies should be "reasonably calculated to end the harassment").
168. Swentek v. USAir, 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987).
169. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding inefficient procedures
where accused harasser was a first level supervisor responsible for rectifying harassment).
170. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
171. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
172. Id. at 72-73. The Court found that Meritor's procedures were severely lacking and not
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addressing remedial action center around the nature and effectiveness of an
employer's discrimination policy.'7 3 Transfer of either the victim or the ha-
rasser to another department or location often constitutes proper remedial ac-
tion. '74
B. Buchanan v. Sherrill
75
1. Facts
Shoney's restaurant, one of the defendants, employed Juanita Buchanan as
a waitress from October of 1989 until September of 1990, when she took a
leave of absence after falling at work in June of 1990.76 After returning to
work in May of 1991, Buchanan complained that she was sexually harassed
and received poor treatment because of her worker's compensation claim.
77
Additionally, an African-American cook at the restaurant accused Buchanan of
directing a racial slur toward him.' Because of these complaints, the man-
agement transferred Buchanan to another location. 79 She declined the trans-
fer and resigned in August of 1991 bringing, among other claims, a Title VII
sexual harassment claim.'80 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant on the Title VII claim."8 '
2. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit conducted an extremely brief analysis of the
Title VII issue and failed to detail any evidence of harassment. 2 The court
found that the plaintiff's transfer ended the alleged harassment.'83 It conclud-
ed that the transfer was reasonably likely to prevent further harassment; there-
fore, the defendant engaged in appropriate remedial action and no liability
well-designed to encourage victims to come forward. Id.
173. See generally Nancy Abell & Marcia N. Jackson, Sexual Harassment Investiga-
tion-Cues, Clues and How-To's, in NEW FRONTIERS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 1995
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 533, 1995) (discussing cases dealing
with employer remedial measures).
174. For a list of cases where transfer constituted "proper remedial action", see supra note
172; see also Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining that alleged
victim transferred at her request); Bouton, 29 F.3d at 108 (noting that the alleged victim was
promptly transferred to another supervisor); Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526, 535-36 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that the alleged harasser was promptly transferred, eliminating contact with alleged vic-
tim); Nash v. Electrospace Sys., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that without corroborat-
ing evidence of harassment, alleged victim was transferred to another department with no loss of
pay or benefits); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that
the transfer of alleged victim was proper where the victim was only on temporary assignment).
175. 51 F.3d 227 (10th Cir. 1995). Named defendant Penny Sherrill was an owner of the
holding company for Shoney's, Inc., also named as a defendant. Buchanan, 51 F.3d at 227.
176. Id. at 229.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. It appears from the court's opinion that Shoney's considered both Buchanan's com-
plaints and the complaints of the African-American cook in making the transfer decision. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 228.
182. Id. at 229 (stating that the evidence of harassment was irrelevant in view of the remedial




could attach." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon Saxton v.
AT&T,85 in which the Seventh Circuit held that transfer of the alleged ha-
rasser constituted proper remedial action. 8 6 The court added that Buchanan
offered no evidence that the harassment would continue at the new loca-
tion."'
C. Analysis
The court's opinion did not describe the evidence offered in support of the
plaintiff's Title VII claim. The court may have found the evidence lacking or
credited the testimony concerning the plaintiff's racial slur. In any event, the
court did not hesitate to find the plaintiff's transfer to be a satisfactory remedy
to the situation. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Saxton'88 is unpersuasive
because it involved transferring the alleged perpetrator, not the victim.'89 The
Seventh Circuit acknowledged the importance of this distinction, finding that
victim transfer may indeed be an inadequate remedial measure if the transfer
reduces the victims privileges in any way."'
The Tenth Circuit found the transfer adequate, regardless of whether Bu-
chanan was indeed a victim of sexual harassment. The court focused on the
plaintiff's refusal to leave the objectionable workplace, but did not consider
whether the new location presented problems for her. At least two problems
with the new location could exist. First, the opinion does not report whether
Buchanan's transfer required her to move or greatly increase her commute."'
Second, the court made no mention of the need for an employer to investigate
whether its employee was sexually harassing the plaintiff.'92 If no internal
investigation whatsoever is required of employers when employees claim
sexual harassment, can employees reliably assume that a new location will be
free from harassing behavior? An employer's failure to investigate claims of
184. Id.
185. 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993).
186. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 535-36.
187. Buchanan, 51 F.3d at 229. The constructive retaliatory discharge claim failed as well. Id.
Under Oklahoma law, a constructive discharge arises when employers deliberately create or permit
working conditions that a reasonable person would find so intolerable as to compel resignation. Id.
Here, because the plaintiff rejected the offer to transfer out of the offensive workplace, the court
concluded that a reasonable person would not find resignation her only option. Id. From the
court's perspective, this lack of evidence caused her Title VII and state claims to fail. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Saxton, 10 F.3d at 535.
190. Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990). According to Guess,
[a] remedial measure that makes the victim of sexual harassment worse off is ineffective
per se. A transfer that reduces the victim's wage or other remuneration, increases the
disamenities [sic) of work, or impairs her prospects for promotion makes the victim
worse off. Therefore such a transfer is an inadequate discharge of the employer's duty of
correction.
Id.
191. It is possible that either no hardship to the plaintiff existed or that she failed to plead
facts to support hardship.
192. The court may have assumed that the fact of transfer indicated that some type of investi-
gation took place. However, the court said absolutely nothing about the need for, much less the
adequacy of, such an investigation.
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sexual harassment increases the possibility that harassers, whether themselves
transferred or left in place while victims are transferred, will continue their
illegal behavior."3 There is much at stake concerning both alleged victims
and accused harassers. A 1994 California court awarded a plaintiff almost
$10,000,000 in a case where an employer failed to conduct a thorough investi-
gation, 94 and a 1988 New Mexico decision awarded $1,000,000 to a dis-
charged and falsely-accused co-worker. 95
D. Other Circuits
Promptly transferring either the alleged victim or the alleged perpetrator
generally operates to shield an employer from Title VII liability.' 96 In the
Fifth Circuit, transferring the victim was sufficient when the employer investi-
gated the allegations and could not corroborate them. 197 However, the Fifth
Circuit requires some investigation of the complaint; transfer of the victim
alone will not always suffice. 9 ' The Third and Sixth Circuits have both held
that prompt transfer of the victim will prevent liability."l In the District of
Columbia Circuit, transfer of the victim at her request as part of the grievance
procedure was sufficient."°° Finally, in the Ninth Circuit, transfer of the vic-
tim to a new shift was inadequate, and the court suggested that either transfer
or outright termination of the harasser was warranted.2 '
CONCLUSION
Agency principles from the Restatement (Second) determine employer
liability for a hostile work environment created by a non-supervisory co-work-
er. Personal liability of supervisors for a hostile work environment under Title
VII may be an open question. The Tenth Circuit suggests that the reasoning of
193. The determination of whether an employer has engaged in appropriate remedial action
assumes that illegal and otherwise actionable behavior has, in fact, occurred. Thus, this concept
amounts to a legal defense which allows employers to escape liability for proven sexual harass-
ment. Ostensibly, the reason we allow employers to escape liability for proven sexual harassment
is to encourage good faith efforts to rid the workplace of a hostile sexual environment. See Samu-
el E. McCargo, Responding to the Hostile Sexual Environment: Cure or Legal Defense?, 74 MiCH.
B.J. 1168, 1168-72 (1995) (explaining that the doctrine of appropriate remedial action is a legal
defense and questioning the capabilities of employers to remedy hostile sexual environments).
194. Abell & Jackson, supra note 173 (describing Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043,
1994 WL 774633 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994) (not certified for publication)).
195. Id. (describing Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1109 (1989)).
196. See, e.g., Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
prompt transfer shields an employer from liability).
197. Nash v. Electrospace Sys., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993).
198. Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1989).
199. Bouton, 29 F.3d at 108; Kent County Sheriffs Ass'n v. County of Kent, 826 F.2d 1485,
1495 (6th Cir. 1987).
200. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1398-99. The court was impressed with the thoroughness and effec-
tiveness of the company's grievance procedures in finding the employer not liable. Id. at 1399.
There was no discussion of whether a victim transfer would have been a satisfactory remedial
action if it had not come at the request of the victim. Id.




other circuits upholding supervisor liability is sound. Plaintiffs may not, how-
ever, personally sue co-workers for sexual harassment.
Plaintiffs may find it more difficult to sustain hostile work environment
claims brought against defendants in an industry historically perceived as
tolerating a higher degree of vulgarity and abuse. Plaintiffs may bolster a
hostile work environment claim with evidence of harassment against others of
which they were aware. Furthermore, the court leaves open the possibility that
a plaintiff might sustain a hostile work environment claim entirely upon show-
ing the harassment of others of which she was aware. Finally, the Tenth Cir-
cuit will likely consider that prompt transfer of the victim constitutes remedial
action sufficient to negate employer liability.
The past year's decisions have brought a mixed-bag for plaintiffs and
defendants in the Tenth Circuit. The range of incidents plaintiffs may use to
support a hostile work environment claim widened, while the nature of allow-
able incidents narrowed. 2 The court made it easier to impute liability to
employers when co-workers harass fellow employees. These employers, how-
ever, may ultimately escape liability if they take proper remedial action. The
court shows a willingness to allow employers to exercise discretion in this re-
gard.
Allison H. Lee
202. The narrowing occurs either by virtue of looser standards for certain industries or as a





The Tenth Circuit handed down several important decisions in the field of
environmental law between September 1994 and September 1995.' This Sur-
vey focuses on two substantial decisions on environmental law issues. The
first case, United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad,2 discussed the com-
plex, and as yet unsettled, distinction between cost recovery and contribution
as governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980.? Secondly, Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v.
Browner,' a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, treated the issue of
pre-enforcement judicial review of a Clean Water Act (CWA)5 compliance
order issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).6
Part I of this Survey discusses the Colorado & Eastern decision in light
of the statutory and case law that preceded it. Part II examines Laguna
Gatuna. Finally, this Survey argues that these two decisions have affected
environmental law inconsistently, even though both case opinions attempt to
follow congressional intent. On the one hand, the Tenth Circuit eroded the
structure of CERCLA with its holding in Colorado & Eastern, and created
substantial legal uncertainty in future cost recovery and contribution actions.
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit's holding in Laguna Gatuna provides
needed legal certainty by barring pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA
compliance orders under the CWA.
1. Other Tenth Circuit decisions in the survey period relating to environmental law but not
discussed include: Leadville Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 55 F.3d 537 (10th Cir.
1995) (affirming dismissal of an indemnity claim for failure to abide by notice provisions of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) liability
insurance policy); Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522 (10th
Cir. 1995) (interpreting a pollution exclusion clause); Pueblo of Scandia v. United States, 50 F.3d
856 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing and remanding summary judgment against a Native American
claim for bad faith failure to preserve Forest Service land used for cultural and religious purposes
as required by the National Historic Preservation Act); Red Panther Chem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 43 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994) (resolving an interpretation dispute regarding an insurance
policy excluding pollution); Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119 (10th Cir. 1994) (re-
versing dismissal of a federal whistleblowing claim stemming from the FBI investigation of the
Rocky Flats Superfund site in Colorado).
2. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
4. 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
6. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 564.
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I. COST RECOVERY VS. CONTRIBUTION UNDER CERCLA:




CERCLA is arguably one of the most significant environmental statutes in
existence Its comprehensive structure allows the federal government to take
control of an environmentally dangerous site; clean it or require the potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) to clean it; and, under CERCLA's cost recovery
provisions, hold each PRP responsible for the cleanup costs.9 Under both
court-imposed and statutory joint and several liability,0° a party may be held
liable in a cost recovery action for the full cost of a site's remediation, regard-
less of the party's culpability or the amount of contamination the party actual-
ly contributed."
In 1986, Congress added the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) 2 to CERCLA. These new provisions codified a remedy which
already had been made available to PRPs by the courts: a fight to contribution
from other PRPs for a completed cleanup. 3 Furthermore, SARA also provid-
ed a "contribution bar" for PRPs that settle with the EPA, at least for the
"matters addressed" in their consent decree.'4 As a result, CERCLA's com-
plex and controversial structure juxtaposed two extremes: protection contribu-
tion from claims for settlors and joint and several liability for nonsettlors.
These sharply contrasting options provide substantial incentive for PRPs to
7. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. See Michael V. Sucaet, Contribution Protection Under CERCLA: What Have You Settled
and Not Settled?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(9), 9607(a) (1994); Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1479; Gregory J. Walch,
Note, Burlington Northern Railroad v. Time Oil: Contribution Protection Under the 1986
Superfund Amendments, 22 ENVTL. L. 757, 758 (1992).
10. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535. For a sampling of various court interpretations of
joint and several liability under CERCLA, see County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508,
1515-16 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). See generally Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under
CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 299 (1995). For a discussion of statutorily imposed joint and
several liability, see Sucaet. supra note 8, at 1481-83.
11. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535; Allen Samelson, "Whose Liability Is This Any-
way?": The Allowability of Environmental Clean-up Costs Potentially Attributable to Other Re-
sponsible Parties, 24 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 293, 304 (1995).
12. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)); see
Karen L. DeMeo, Note, Is CERCLA Working? An Analysis of the Settlement and Contribution
Provisions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493, 494-95 (1994).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. Courts were concerned about the inequity of holding a single defen-
dant liable for the cost of an entire site cleanup with no way to recoup expenditures from other
PRPs. Id. Courts therefore implied a right of contribution between PRPs in CERCLA cases before
Congress actually codified the right in SARA. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535.
14. SARA states, "A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in
an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (emphasis added). A con-
sent decree is a cleanup agreement entered in a federal district court settling remedial action issues
with the PRP. Id. § 9622(d)(1)(A)-(C).
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settle with the EPA as early as possible in the overall cleanup process. 5 By
entering into a protective consent decree with the EPA quickly, a PRP can
indemnify itself from further liability. 6 Absent a settlement, a PRP may find
itself financially responsible for all costs of cleanup which are uncollected or
uncollectible by the EPA. 7
The distinction between cost recovery and contribution is complex.'
Cost recovery actions reimburse those who cleanup a CERCLA site for costs
associated with the cleanup.' 9 Courts hold defendants in cost recovery suits
jointly, severally, and strictly liable. ° Contribution actions, however, appor-
tion liability between guilty parties.2' Defendants subject to joint and several
liable may, in contribution actions, invoke defenses such as equity and divisi-
bility to divert some or all of their liability. 22 Additionally, the statute of limi-
tations differs for each action.23
15. DeMeo, supra note 12, at 500-03; Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1484-85.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622(d)(1)(A)-(C).
17. Id.; see also Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1484-86.
18. For examples of cases in which courts have addressed the differences between two meth-
ods of recovery, see United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761
(7th Cir. 1994); County Line Inv. Co., 933 F.2d 1508; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck
Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
19. Section 9607(a)(4)(B) provides the statutory basis for cost recovery by a party that has
already financially contributed to a cleanup. It states that another PRP shall be liable for "any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (em-
phasis added); see also General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415
(8th Cir. 1990) (addressing the ability of appellants to obtain cost recovery), cert. denied, 499 U.S.
937 (1991); Walch, supra note 9, at 758. Under § 9607, the EPA can initiate a cleanup and then
seek recovery from a later-identified PRP. Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1479.
20. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535. A PRP liable in a cost recovery action can, on its
own initiative, find and sue other PRPs under a contribution theory to recoup any portion of the
cleanup costs that it alleges were another PRP's responsibility. Id. A cost recovery action is riskier
for a PRP than a contribution action, because cost recovery is a matter of strict liability. Id. If
other PRPs have settled and properly worded their consent decrees, a PRP may not be able to
recover from them. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0; Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1536.
22. Oswald, supra note 10, at 334-42. CERCLA's contribution provisions instruct that "the
court may allocate response costs among the liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). The Tenth Circuit has pointed to the use of
the "Gore Factors" proposed by Senator Albert Gore as a moderate approach. Colorado & East-
ern, 50 F.3d at 1536 n.5. The Gore Factors are:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release
or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished; (ii) the amount of the hazardous
waste involved; (iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; (iv) the
degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage,
or disposal of the hazardous waste; (v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with
respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such
hazardous waste; and (vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with the Federal,
State or local officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id. (quoting Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508-09 (7th Cir.
1992)). On the other hand, the Second Restatement of Torts offers a bright-line test allowing ap-
portionment only when a court may adequately determine the divisibility of the harm. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)-(3). Parties have six years in which to file a cost recovery action
but only three years to file a contribution action. Id.
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2. Case Law Background
Since CERCLA's enactment, courts have struggled with interpreting and
applying it. Specifically, courts approach the cost recovery and contribution
provisions of CERCLA inconsistently.24 Some courts have held that only in-
nocent parties may sue under a theory of cost recovery, limiting lawsuits be-
tween PRPs to contribution actions. 2 Other courts, however, have held that
any party that actually cleaned up a private or governmental site may bring a
cost recovery action against a PRP.26 Under this approach, PRPs not partici-
pating in a site's cleanup may only pursue contribution actions against other
PRPs." Most courts agree, however, that consent decrees may bar subse-
quent contribution actions against the settling party, depending on the factual
situation.2" Courts consider a consent decree's wording29 as well as other
factors3" in determining which "matters" it "addresses."'"
B. United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad32
1. Facts
The Colorado & Eastern Railroad Company (CERC), its holding compa-
ny, and its former president and sole shareholder (collectively "the CERC par-
ties") owned land purchased from Farmland Industries.33 Both the CERC
parties and Farmland bought the land after substantial initial contamination had
occurred.34 Upon discovering the contamination and performing a remedial
24. DeMeo, supra note 12, at 496; Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1489; Walch, supra note 9, at
760.
25. For examples of cases in which PRPs were limited to contribution actions, see United
Technologies Corp. 33 F.3d at 101-03; Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 763; County Line Inv. Co.,
933 F.2d at 1515-17; General Elec. Co., 920 F.2d at 1417-21.
26. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 814 F. Supp. at 1277.
27. See United Technologies Corp., 33 F.3d at 103.
28. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 766; DeMeo, supra note 12, at 512-17; Sucaet, supra
note 8, at 1492-99; Walch, supra note 9, at 759-61.
29. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 765 ("Our starting point, naturally, is the consent decree
itself."); Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1490-91.
30. Courts are inconsistent in both their delineation of these factors and in an overall con-
ceptual approach to their determination:
Other courts have suggested that the 'matters addressed' by a consent decree be deter-
mined with reference to the particular location, time frame, hazardous substances, and
clean-up costs covered by the agreement .... [But] this [list] should not be treated as
an exhaustive list of appropriate considerations, for the relevance of each factor will
vary with the facts of the case.
Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 766 (citations omitted). The statute is silent on how we are to de-
termine what particular "matters" a consent decree addresses. Some courts have used balancing
tests. "Other courts have concluded that [the contribution bar provision] was intended to encourage
settlement while providing settling PRPs with a measure of finality in return for their willingness
to settle." Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1537 (citations omitted). The court later noted that it
was taking "a fact-specific approach." Id. at 1538; see also Sucaet, supra note 8, at 1493-94 (ex-
plaining that courts have used "fact driven test[s]," "flexible and fact based approach[es]," and
tests involving "equitable apportionment of costs").
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
32. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
33. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1532-33.
34. Id. at 1532. Both pesticides and metals were found in the soil at the site. Id.
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investigation and feasibility study, the EPA sued Farmland, the CERC parties,
and other PRPs for response costs and future cleanup costs.35 Farmland and
another party, McKesson Corporation, entered into a consent decree with the
EPA, in which they agreed to pay $700,000 and clean the entire site-includ-
ing the CERC parties' land.36
Farmland and McKesson cleaned up the site at a total cost of over $15
million.3 Two months before completion of the cleanup, the CERC parties
entered into a consent decree with the EPA, paying $100,000 to the EPA and
acquiring absolution of further liability to the EPA.3" The CERC parties later
defaulted on their consent decree with the EPA.39
Farmland alleged that almost $1.5 million of its cleanup costs were a
direct result of the CERC parties' actions and cross-claimed in the EPA action
under a theory of cost recovery.' The district court awarded Farmland over
$734,000.4'
2. Decision
The CERC parties appealed the district court's decision, which was based
on a cost recovery theory.42 The Tenth Circuit held that actions between
PRPs are claims for contribution and not for cost recovery, regardless of how
they are worded.43 The court found enough validity in Farmland's claim for
contribution to survive summary judgment and therefore remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with a contribution action."
C. Analysis
The Colorado & Eastern court based its holding on two primary issues:
cost recovery versus contribution, and indemnification due to matters ad-
dressed in the consent decree.45 The facial distinction between what consti-
tutes a cost recovery claim as compared to a contribution claim under
CERCLA can be easily determined. Courts find it more difficult to articulate
who may use which claim, and the degree to which causation may enter into
each theory is even more difficult to articulate, and, unfortunately, courts have
not provided a consistent answer.'
The Colorado & Eastern court attempted to explain clearly the difference
between a cost recovery action and a contribution action.47 Specifically, it











46. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
47. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535.
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sought to identify which types of parties could recover under each action."
First, citing one of its own cases and several cases from other jurisdictions, the
Tenth Circuit established that cost recovery actions are governed by both strict
liability and joint and several liability. 9 Then, after analyzing the contribution
provisions of CERCLA, the court concluded that "any claim that would reap-
portion costs between [PRPs] is the quintessential claim for contribution. 50
Finally, noting that Farmland sought reapportionment, the court limited Farm-
land to a contribution action, and further stated that the district court's allow-
ance of a cost recovery claim under the facts of the case constituted error."'
The second major issue the court addressed was the CERC parties' claim
of immunity as a result of its judicially approved consent decree with the
EPA. 2 A consent decree indemnifies a PRP from contribution actions only if
the consent decree expressly addresses matters forming the basis of the contri-
bution actions. 3 In determining what constitutes such a "matter addressed,"
the court noted that some courts use balancing tests and that others use settle-
ment incentives.54 Taking a "fact-specific approach," the court concluded that
Farmland could not have expected contribution indemnification because of the
late execution of the CERC parties' consent decree and the relatively small
settlement involved.5 The CERC parties could have specifically placed lan-
guage in the decree providing indemnification, but as they failed to do so, they
must pay their share of the cleanup costs.56 Furthermore, the CERC parties'
default on the consent decree through nonpayment did not affect CERCLA's
contribution protections. 7
Ultimately, based on the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that any
action for reapportionment of costs between PRPs constitutes a contribution
action.5" Additionally, the court held that a judicially approved consent decree
will not automatically indemnify the settlor unless it specifically includes
indemnification. 9
D. Other Circuits
Ironically, the various attempts made by other circuits to uphold and en-
force CERCLA have undermined the statute's effectiveness. Though many
district courts have ruled on these issues,' ° decisions by the two circuits that
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Farmland Indus. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain, 987 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1993);
County Line Inv. Co., 933 F.2d at 1508; Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 802).
50. Id. at 1536.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1537.
54. Id. For a discussion of the various factors that courts employ, see supra note 30.
55. See Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1538.
56. See id. at 1537-38.
57. Id. at 1538.
58. Id. at 1539.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., United States v. SCA Serv., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 533, 546 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(holding that hazardous waste site owner who cleaned up site pursuant to consent decree had
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have taken a stance fail to paint a complete picture. In United Technologies
Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries,61 the court relied on the canons of statu-
tory construction, legislative intent, and statutory history to limit only PRPs to
contribution actions.62 In the First Circuit, therefore, both the EPA and inno-
cent parties may bring cost recovery actions for their respective response
costs. All other claims must be for contribution among the guilty parties.
Similarly, in Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,63 the Seventh Circuit
held that any suit between PRPs must be based on contribution.' In deciding
whether the consent decree barred the action in that case, the court referred to
"both the reasonable expectations of the signatories and the equitable appor-
tionment of costs."
Thus, though not fully settled, the views of both the First and Seventh
Circuits are on par with those of the Tenth. The trend indicates that courts will
limit all PRPs to contribution actions to recover their costs. Furthermore, the
EPA will always possess the power to use CERCLA's cost recovery provi-
sions to recoup costs of site cleanup. In the First Circuit, innocent parties who
clean up a site may also sue under the cost recovery provision.' In the re-
maining circuits, whether or not such an innocent actor may maintain a cost
recovery action remains unclear.
The additional "matters addressed" controversy surrounding settlement
serves to intensify an already complex conceptual conundrum. 67 Though the
Tenth Circuit seems firm in its stance toward barring contribution actions via
express provisions in consent decrees, other circuits employ various, somewhat
more nebulous approaches.' Furthermore, because the statute of limitations
differs for each action, a party who has missed the deadline for a contribution
pursued a cost recovery as opposed to contribution action); General Time Corp. v. Bulk Materials,
Inc., 826 F. Supp. 471, 478 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (stating that a consent decree did not bar contribu-
tion action against signatory under the facts presented therein); Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
825 F. Supp. 1132, 1138 (D. R.I. 1992) (holding that de minimus settlors were not subject to
contribution actions by other PRPs); United States v. Asarco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 957 (D.
Colo. 1993) (holding that contribution provision in consent decree absolving party of liability to
government barred contribution action by another codefendant); Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic
Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1090 (D. N.J. 1992) (stating that settlement with government for its
costs did not bar actions for contribution), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 2692 (1994); United States v. Alexander, 771 F. Supp. 830, 841 (S.D. Tex. 1991),
vacated, 981 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that de minimus settlors were not subject to
contribution actions and that Rule 11 sanctions could be leveled against parties who brought con-
tribution actions against them).
61. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
62. See United Technologies Corp., 33 F.3d at 99-100.
63. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 30 F.3d at 764-65.
65. Id. at 766.
66. See United Technologies Corp., 33 F.3d at 96.
67. In fact, just filing a CERCLA contribution action in some jurisdictions could be consid-
ered dangerous. At least two district courts have sanctioned or threatened to sanction PRPs under
FED. R. Civ. P. II for filing contribution actions against settling parties. See Avnet, 825 F. Supp.
at 1142-43; Alexander, 771 F. Supp. at 841; DeMeo, supra note 12, at 525 n.155.
68. For a discussion of the various approaches taken by courts, see supra note 30.
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claim will likely attempt to characterize its action as one for cost recovery,
thereby adding to the confusion.69
As a result of these inconsistent holdings, PRPs, as well as other parties
required to assist in a cleanup of a CERCLA site, will be subject to substantial
uncertainty with regard to their respective liability for cleanup-associated costs.
Furthermore, parties will be reluctant to settle if they cannot be assured in-
demnity from further liability. These varied holdings frustrate the very struc-
ture of CERCLA. Instead of encouraging quick settlements, parties will proba-
bly wait until other PRPs are identified before seriously considering a settle-
ment. By holding out until the last minute, PRPs will be better able to gauge
their potential exposure based on the number, solvency, and other attributes of
additional exposed PRPs.
II. AVAILABILITY OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT JuDICIAL REVIEW OF AN EPA
COMPLIANCE ORDER UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
LAGUNA GATUNA, INC. V. BROWNER70
A. Background
1. Statutory Background
The Federal Water Pollution and Control Act, commonly referred to as
the Clean Water Act (CWA), broadly aims to preserve the quality of the Unit-
ed States' waters.7 Its provisions impose responsibilities on entities whose
actions may harm water" and provide the federal government enforcement
authority to stop acts harmful to the integrity of the water.73 The CWA's ex-
pansive jurisdictional provisions encompass bodies of water ranging from
navigable waterways to "wet meadows."7 Two enforcement methods specifi-
cally afforded to the EPA are the power to bring a civil suit against an offend-
er and the power to issue a compliance order.75 Should the EPA unilaterally
find that a violator has failed to obey a compliance order, it may elect to bring
suit to enforce its order,76 but it incurs no obligation.77
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70. 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The objective ... is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.").
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1344(f)(2) (1994) (requiring permit for "discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters"); Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter,
Environmental Law, 1992 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1187, 1194-95 (1993).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1994) (requiring the EPA to "issue an order requiring ... [com-
pliance] or ... [to] bring a civil action"); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (authorizing a "civil action for
appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction").
74. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1995). As a result, the parties that may be subject to a CWA action
can be similarly diverse.
75. 33 U.S.C § 1319(a)(6)(b); Andrew I. Davis, Comment, Judicial Review of Environmental
Compliance Orders, 24 ENVTL. L. 189, 189-90 (1994). A compliance order must be served on the
violator, must explain the nature of the violation, and must specifically provide a deadline for
completion. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(A).
76. 33 U.S.C § 1319(b). For a general discussion of how a potential defendant responds to
an impending suit, see Symposium, Responding to a Government Environmental Investigation:
Shaping the Defense, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 509 (1992).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). Courts have unanimously interpreted this provision to preclude
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Administrative orders issued by federal agencies (such as EPA compliance
orders) are governed by both the agency's enabling legislation and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA).7 s Under the APA, a final agency action is
generally presumed reviewable provided the party bringing the action has
standing and meets other prudential requirements such as ripeness.79 The
APA rarely allows de novo review and normally commands a higher standard
for judicial review of administrative orders.8"
2. Case Law Background
Courts must presume that final agency actions are reviewable."s This pre-
sumption is rebuttable by strong, persuasive, or clear and convincing evidence
of legislative intent to preclude judicial review.8 2 Despite this apparently nar-
row exception allowing preclusion of review, courts which have heard cases
asking for judicial review of compliance orders prior to EPA enforcement
have unanimously refused review.83 Because of this interpretation of the
EPA's permissible enforcement provision, parties who receive compliance
orders find themselves in a difficult dilemma. A party served with a compli-
ance order must either comply or risk incurring penalties if it fails to comply.
The party may not invoke judicial review until the EPA seeks enforcement.84
Three cases provide a foundation for analysis: Southern Pines Associa-
tions v. United States,85 Rueth v. EPA,' and Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Of-
fice of Surface Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement.7 Southern Pines in-
volved an EPA compliance order prohibiting Southern Pines from dumping in
judicial review of the compliance order before the EPA seeks enforcement. See infra notes 120-28
and accompanying text.
Many commentators believe that precluding pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA com-
pliance orders is not only unfair, but in conflict with both current Supreme Court precedent and
express congressional intent (notwithstanding the cases discussed infra). For a thorough and co-
gent argument of why pre-enforcement judicial review should be allowed, see Davis, supra note
75.
78. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994) [hereinafter APA];
David M. Moore, Comment, Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Orders to Abate Environ-
mental Hazards, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992).
79. APA §§ 702, 704; JOHN H. REESE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 533-34 (1995); Davis, supra
note 75, at 194-95; Moore, supra note 78, at 681.
80. APA § 706; see ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 543-
44 (1992). The primary standard for review is whether an agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
but other sources of jurisdiction exist including federal questions, ultra vires actions, etc. Id.
81. APA § 702; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). For an in-depth analysis
and critique of environmental statutes and their judicial review, see Edward W. Warren & Gary E.
Marchant, "More Good Than Harm": A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Review-
ing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379 (1993).
82. See APA §§ 701(a)(1), 706; Davis, supra note 75, at 196-97; Moore, supra note 78, at
684-85.
83. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation & Enforcement,
20 F.3d 1418, 1426-27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994); Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227,
231 (7th Cir. 1993); Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1990);
Davis, supra note 75, at 190; Moore, supra note 78, at 690-96 (addressing reviewability under
CERCLA).
84. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
85. 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990).
86. 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
87. 20 F.3d 1418 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
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certain Virginia wetlands." Southern Pines had previously filed an action for
both declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to avoid compliance on the
grounds that the EPA lacked jurisdiction over the dumping site.89 The district
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.'
To reach its decision, the court examined the legislative history of the
CWA9' and pointed out the similarities in structure92 and enforcement provi-
sions93 that the CWA shares with the Clean Air Act (CAA)94 and
CERCLA.95 The court concluded that Congress envisioned an EPA that could
respond to environmental crises quickly and efficiently without being subject
to immediate, debilitating, and time-consuming litigation.' Therefore, the
EPA compliance orders governed by the CWA (and likely the CAA and
CERCLA) were not intended to receive judicial review."
In Rueth, the second leading case in this area, the EPA issued a compli-
ance order to cease dumping into a wetland, and to begin restoration of the
area.9" Rueth filed an action for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment,
alleging that the EPA did not have jurisdiction over the wetland at issue."
The district court dismissed for its own lack of jurisdiction."° The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, concluding that EPA compliance orders are not reviewable
until the agency seeks to enforce them.' The circuit court adopted the rea-
soning of the district court and indicated that the CWA expressly provides for
judicial review at the enforcement stage, thereby precluding review before that
time. 2
A third significant case involving pre-enforcement judicial review of an
EPA compliance order, Southern Ohio Coal,"0 successfully challenged an
EPA threat to issue a compliance order in district court.' On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the holdings of both Southern Pines and
Rueth by stating that Congress had not intended to allow judicial review of
EPA compliance orders.
88. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 714.
89. Id. Southern Pines advanced an additional theory in support of its claim, alleging that the
EPA's order constituted an actual controversy under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1994). Id.
90. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 717.
91. Id. at 716.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). Courts have viewed the CAA and CERCLA as sharing
similar legislative histories with regard to legislative intent towards judicial reviewability of EPA
compliance orders. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565; Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d at 1426; South-
ern Pines, 912 F.2d at 716.
96. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 716.
97. Id.
98. Rueth, 13 F.3d at 228.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 230-31.
102. Id. at 229 (citing Rueth Dev. Co. v. EPA, No. CIV.A.H91-152, 1992 WL 560944, at *5
(N.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 1992)).
103. 20 F.3d 1418 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994).
104. Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d at 1422.
105. Id. at 1426. The Southern Ohio Coal court endorsed both the Fourth and Seventh
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B. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner"°
1. Facts
In 1987, Laguna Gatuna's "predecessor in interest" asked the EPA if a
sinkhole on its land was considered water subject to EPA jurisdiction. 7 The
EPA responded in the negative." In 1991, the EPA discovered dead migra-
tory birds in the vicinity of the sinkhole and issued a compliance order the fol-
lowing year, which prohibited Laguna Gatuna from further dumping into the
sinkhole." Laguna Gatuna complied with the order." '
2. Decision
After Laguna Gatuna sought declaratory relief in federal district court
asserting that the EPA did not have jurisdiction to issue the compliance order,
the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction." On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the same ground."2
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit found that the issue of pre-enforcement judicial review-
ability of EPA compliance orders under the CWA was one of first impression
in the circuit.' It qualified this statement, however, by indicating that other
circuits had uniformly dealt with the issue and that it would follow their
Circuit's holdings, even though both circuits used different rationales to reach their respective
conclusions. Compare Southern Pines, 912 F.2d at 715 (using statutory structure and legislative
history and intent to reach its holding) with Rueth, 13 F.3d at 229-31 (analyzing both legislative
intent and the express wording of the CWA to make its decision) and Hoffman Group, Inc. v.
EPA, 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on CWA statutory language to reach its holding).
The Southern Ohio Coal court further stated, "Congress provided one forum in which to
address all issues, including constitutional challenges, raised by the issuance of a[n EPA] compli-
ance order: an enforcement proceeding." Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d at 1426. Therefore, judicial
review of an order after an enforcement proceeding is constitutionally mandated. Until the en-
forcement proceeding actually occurs, however, review is neither available nor constitutionally
required. Id. at 1427.
106. 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996).
107. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565.
108. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations includes in its definition of "waters of the United
States":
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands," sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or
could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters ....
(g) "Wetlands" adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) iden-
tified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this definition.
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1995). Wetlands are further defined as "those areas that are inundated or satu-
rated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." Id.
109. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 564, 566.
113. Id. at 565.
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lead."4 The court then dismissed the arguments put forth by Laguna
Gatuna. "
In reaching its decision, the court followed the reasoning of the three
leading cases discussed above." 6 In short order, it cited Southern Pines,
Rueth, and Southern Ohio Coal, and presented a brief summary of each case's
facts, holding, and rationale." 7 Concluding that the reasoning from these oth-
er jurisdictions was sound, the Laguna Gatuna court announced that it would
follow them."'
Thus, the Tenth Circuit established that pre-enforcement judicial review of
an EPA compliance order under the CWA is unavailable on two bases: legisla-
tive intent and the constitutional requirement that judicial review occur after a
party seeks actual enforcement of a compliance order."9
D. Other Circuits
As discussed previously, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
have all prohibited pre-enforcement judicial review of EPA compliance orders
under the CWA.2 ° The remaining circuits have not yet addressed this issue
as it relates to the CWA.'2' It appears, though, that given the three leading
114. Id. The court cited Southern Ohio Coal, 20 F.3d 1418; Rueth, 13 F.3d 227; and South-
ern Pines, 912 F.2d 713 as persuasive authority for its dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Laguna
Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565.
115. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565. Laguna Gatuna unsuccessfully argued that Rueth, South-
ern Ohio Coal, and Southern Pines were distinguishable. Laguna cited Riverside Irrigation Dist. v.
Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981) as binding authority, but the court found the case to be fac-
tually distinguishable. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565. Laguna Gatuna also failed to convince the
court that parties should not be forced to expose themselves to fines or penalties to receive judi-
cial review. Id. Even though Laguna Gatuna put forth such a "strong due process argument(]," the
court indicated that preclusion of judicial review of an EPA compliance order nonetheless passed
constitutional muster. Id. at 565.
In its petition for certiorari, Laguna Gatuna attempted to distinguish its facts, insisting that
the sinkhole was not a playa lake, was hydrologically isolated, and could not fall within the defi-
nition of "waters of the U.S." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner,
58 F.3d 564 (10th Cit. 1995) (No. 95-465), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996). Laguna Gatuna's
attorney insisted that although the area received abnormally high rainfall the year the dead birds
were found, water never stood in the sinkhole. Telephone interview with Todd Welch, Attorney
for Petitioner, Mountain States Legal Foundation (Dec. 3, 1995). He asserted, therefore, that the
sinkhole could not be defined as water of the U.S. Id. Furthermore, Laguna Gatuna's counsel ar-
gued that any discharges emanating from the sinkhole were ten times cleaner than natural dis-
charges. Id.
116. Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d at 565-66.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 566.
119. The court did not expressly state that pre-enforcement judicial review of an EPA order
under the CAA or CERCLA is not available, but the similarities of the three statutes indicate that
the legislative intent argument holds for all three statutes. See discussion supra, text accompanying
notes 92-96. The constitutional due process argument, presumably, rings true for all three statutes.
120. Southern Pines, 912 F.2d 713; Southern Ohio Oil, 20 F.3d 1418; Rueth, 13 F.3d 227;
Laguna Gatuna, 58 F.3d 564.
121. Two district courts have also issued opinions consistent with the conclusions of the four
circuits discussed above. See Child v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1527, 1536 (D. Utah 1994)
(concluding that the "CWA precludes review of... pre-enforcement action[s]"); Howell v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 794 F. Supp. 1072, 1074-75 (D.N.M. 1992) (applying Southern
Pines even though the acting entity under the CWA was the Army Corps of Engineers rather than
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cases as well as Laguna Gatuna this issue is now settled.
The Third Circuit, in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 2 2 supported this
trend. It held that, within the context of the CAA, pre-enforcement judicial
review of an EPA compliance order is specifically precluded by the statute
itself' 23 Also within the context of the CAA, the Eighth Circuit addressed
the issue in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA.'2' Lloyd A. Fry upheld the
district court's finding of want of jurisdiction.'25 The CAA's legislative his-
tory indicated a pre-enforcement bar against judicial review notwithstanding
the absence of an express prohibition.'26 The court stated that such review
would be inconsistent with the CAA's enforcement provisions.'27
The prevailing trend therefore establishes that an EPA compliance order is
not subject to judicial review until after an enforcement action has begun.
Parties who receive compliance orders must either comply or risk incurring
penalties that the party may not challenge unless and until the EPA decides it
wishes to enforce its order. 2 '
CONCLUSION
These two cases represent two drastically different approaches that courts
may take when interpreting environmental statutes. On one hand, the Tenth
Circuit has caused substantial uncertainty with its interpretation of CERCLA's
cost recovery and contribution provisions. By addressing the questions present-
ed in Colorado & Eastern narrowly, the partial answers provided not only
differ from the law of other circuits, but give rise to more questions that will
surely require answers in the future. Until the court addresses these questions,
parties potentially involved in CERCLA situations will be subject to substan-
tial risk and uncertainty.
On the other hand, Laguna Gatuna, has helped to increase certainty and
consistency by adding to a legal foundation shared by environmental law and
administrative law. By following three other circuits in its holding and dis-
missing constitutional due process arguments, the Tenth Circuit has endorsed
Congress's apparent intent that pre-enforcement judicial review of an EPA
compliance order shall not occur.
Cameron R. Getto
the EPA).
122. 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
123. Getty Oil Co., 467 F.2d at 356.
124. 554 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1977).
125. Lloyd A. Fry, 554 F.2d at 892.
126. Id. at 890.
127. Id. at 890-91.





In the absence of a national health care plan, it is not surprising that the
states play a crucial role in certain areas of health care. Although the federal
government has preempted state regulation of ERISA health insurance plans,
the states retain a significant amount of control. Three Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals cases discussed below illustrate this phenomenon.
The first case, Hern v. Beye,' addressed state funding of abortions for
women dependent on Medicaid. In Hem, the State of Colorado, in contraven-
tion of the current Hyde Amendment, refused to fund abortions in cases of
rape or incest. The court held that if Colorado chose to accept federal Medic-
aid funds, it could not refuse to comply with the federal mandate.2
The second and third cases, decided simultaneously, together address two
key provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).3 In Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital,' the court defined
"appropriate medical screening."5 In Urban v. King,6 it qualified EMTALA's
requirement that a hospital stabilize emergency medical conditions before
transferring a patient. Together, these cases help realize congressional intent
by preventing EMTALA from acting as a national malpractice statute.
I. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Background
1. Federal Funding for Abortions: Medicaid and the Hyde Amendment
Title XIX of the Social Security Act created the Medicaid Program in
1965.' This cooperative program allows a state to electively participate in the
Medicaid program provided the state meets specific requirements.8 Once these
requirements are met, participating states receive federal matching funds to
provide medical care for qualified individuals. Under Title XIX, states must
furnish categories of care deemed "mandatory." 9 Although Title XIX's
1. 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
2. Hem, 57 F.3d at 913; see also Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995),
rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No. 95-1242, 1996 WL 327446 (U.S. June 17, 1996) (finding un-
constitutional a Utah statute challenging the validity of abortion rights defined under Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)). Jane L. is discussed in the Civil Rights section of this Survey Issue at pp.
688-91.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
4. 43 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994).
5. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.
6. 43 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994).
7. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994).
8. Id.
9. Mandatory care categories include "inpatient hospital services... ; outpatient hospital
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preamble requires states to provide "necessary medical services," it does not
define what specific procedures fall within these mandatory categories.'"
States, however, are not limited to the provision of these mandatory services
and may, at their election, provide additional medical care."
Congress has not defined "medically necessary," but since 1976 has pro-
hibited or limited Medicaid funding for abortions. 2 Each annual renewal of
the Hyde Amendment specifies which types of abortions Medicaid will
fund. 3 Congress attaches these specifications to appropriation bills for the
Department of Health and Human Services. 4 In the past, Hyde Amendments
restricted Medicaid funding to those abortions necessary to save the life of the
mother. 5 President Clinton succeeded in lifting the virtual ban on federally
funded abortions only to the extent that the 1994 Hyde Amendment allowed
Medicaid funding for abortions in cases of rape or incest, as well as to save
the life of the mother.
6
In Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court settled the issue of whether the gov-
ernment may refuse to fund abortions. 7 In Maher, the Court upheld a Con-
necticut regulation that provided funding for childbirth, but limited state Med-
icaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those diagnosed as "medically
necessary."'" The Court concluded that a state can favor childbirth over abor-
tion provided the regulation does not constitute a governmental restriction on
access to abortions. 9
Three years later, in Harris v. McRae," the Supreme Court held that
states participating in the Medicaid program need not fund abortions for which
the Hyde Amendment restricts federal funds.2' Furthermore, the Court held
that the Hyde Amendment's funding restrictions do not violate a woman's
services ... ; other laboratory and X-ray services; nursing facility services ... ; early and period-
ic screening, diagnostic and treatment services [for minors]; family planning services...
physicians' services furnished by a physician." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l)-(5).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 1396d(a)(25).
12. Stephen C. Ferlman, Does the Illinois Medicaid Program Meet Title XIX's Requirement
That States Provide "Medically Necessary" Services?, 28 Soc. SECURITY REPORTING SERV. 708
(1990).
13. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
14. The original Hyde Amendment was enacted with Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat.
1418 (1976). The amendments are named for Henry Hyde, who is now the chair of the House
Judiciary Committee and is staunchly anti-choice. Carla M. DaLuz & Pamela C. Weckerly, Will
the New Republican Majority in Congress Wage Old Battles Against Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 501, 507 (1995) (examining how the 104th Congress may restrict access to abortion, impact
the Family and Medical Leave Act, alter military policies toward gay men and lesbians, and affect
welfare reform). The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld Congress's right to limit Medicaid funding
for abortions. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317.
15. DaLuz & Weckerly, supra note 14, at 512.
16. Id.
17. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
18. Maher, 432 U.S. at 466, 480 (using a physician's certification to define "medically nec-
essary").
19. Id. at 475-76. The Maher Court also rejected the argument that the Connecticut regula-
tion violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment on the basis that indigence
is not a recognized suspect classification. Id. at 470-71.
20. 448 U.S. 297, appeal dismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1980).
21. Harris, 448 U.S. at 309-11.
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liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor her
right to equal protection of the laws.2 No constitutional provision requires
that states fund all legally available medical services.23 Thus, the Court deter-
mined that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of
its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category." '24 Hence the Hyde
Amendment bears a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of
"protecting the potential life of the fetus."25
The McRae decision has prompted strong reaction from legal scholars,
many of whom criticize it for its narrow constitutional tailoring of the Hyde
Amendment.26 The foregoing cases provided the backdrop for the Tenth
Circuit's decision on the ability of the states to restrict abortion funds beyond
the limits of the Hyde Amendment.
2. Colorado's Constitutional and Statutory Ban on State-Funded
Abortions
Colorado, one of many states with pro-life legislatures, viewed the 1994
Hyde Amendment as an infringement on state authority.27 In April 1994, state
officials vowed to defy a federal order instructing them to comply with the
new funding guidelines, and instead swore to uphold the state constitution as
22. Id.
23. Id. at 326.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Id. at 324 (utilizing the minimum rationality standard of state action review).
26. There are two primary criticisms of the standards applied in McRae. First, the Court
refused to identify pregnancy as a gender issue, subject to suspect classification. See generally
Ruth Colker, Equality Theory and Reproductive Freedom, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 99 (1994) (ar-
guing that reproductive freedom should be a gender, not a privacy, issue because privacy does not
focus on the economic inequities faced by disadvantaged women); see also Julie F. Kay, If Men
Could Get Pregnant: An Equal Protection Model for Federal Funding of Abortion Under a Na-
tional Health Care Plan, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 349, 385 (1994) (proposing equal protection for gen-
der as a suspect class); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593,
618 (1990) (noting that abortion statutes are inherently discriminatory, as they uniquely burden
women). At least one commentator argues that the Hyde Amendment impacts women of color so
disproportionately that a strict scrutiny standard should be applied. David R. Baron, The Racially
Disparate Impact of Restrictions on the Public Funding of Abortion: An Analysis of Current Equal
Protection Doctrine, 13 B.C. TMRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1993). Second, by asserting that indigent
women have the same right to obtain an abortion as any other woman, the Court disregards the
economic reality of pregnant Medicaid recipients. See Colker, supra, at 1435; Donald P. Judges,
Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism, Sexual Difference and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REv.
1323, 1434-41 (1995); Kay, supra, at 351.
At least one state court has agreed with the commentators. In Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986), the court noted the paradox for a pregnant Medicaid recipient: she is
financially destitute by definition, and if she accepts an unreported personal loan to pay for an
abortion, she jeopardizes her benefits. "[TJhe state has boxed her into accepting the pregnancy and
carrying the fetus to term, notwithstanding the sometimes substantial impairment to her health."
This reality, the court observed, forced some women to "resort[] to desperate and dangerous acts
of self-abortion, criminal activity and illegal abortions in order to exercise their constitutional
rights." Id. at 154.
27. Robert H. Freilich et al., The Supreme Court and State and Local Government: Small
Change for a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAW. 623, 635 (1994). Similar state restrictions of the
Hyde Amendment were attacked in Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania. Id.
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amended by Colorado voters.28 The amendment in question added the follow-
ing language to the Colorado Constitution:
No public funds shall be used by the State of Colorado, its agencies
or political subdivisions to pay or otherwise reimburse, either directly
or indirectly, any person, agency or facility for the performance of
any induced abortion, PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the General
Assembly, by specific bill, may authorize and appropriate funds to be
used for those medical services necessary to prevent the death of
either a pregnant woman or her unborn child under circumstances
where every reasonable effort is made to preserve the life of each.29
Hern v. Beye ° was the first federal ruling addressing state funding restric-
tions which contravened the 1994 Hyde Amendment. Judge Nottingham of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado enjoined Colorado from en-
forcing the constitutional amendment.3
The Tenth Circuit had twice before addressed state regulations that were
more restrictive than federal rules for Medicaid-funded abortions. In D.R. v.
Mitchell,32 the plaintiff challenged a Utah statute limiting state funding of
abortions to those necessary to save the life of the mother. The Tenth Circuit
focused on the fact that Congress passed different versions of the Hyde
Amendment from 1978 to 1981, and changed restrictions on federally funded
abortions each year.33 The court found that Utah's statute required more re-
strictive funding than the Hyde Amendment in three of the four years exam-
ined.34 The appellant, an unmarried pregnant female, claimed that these re-
strictions violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by failing to
comply with relevant federal funding statutes.35 Because the plaintiff in D.R.
lacked standing, the Tenth Circuit did not reach the specific issue of whether
the Supremacy Clause applied.36
28. Bill Scanlon, State Officials Reject Federal Abortion Order; Colorado Joins Other States
in Refusing to Pay for Abortions in Cases of Rape, Incest, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 2, 1994, at
A20 (refusing to comply with the Hyde Amendment's "request") ("'Colorado is not going to com-
ply with the request,' Dr. David West, manager of health and medical services at the Colorado
Department of Social Services, said Friday.").
29. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50. The constitutional mandate is codified at COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 26-4-105.5 (repealed 1991), 26-4-512, 26-15-104.5 (1989), and 10 COLO. CODE REGs. § 2505-
10(8.733) (1977) (emphasis in original).
30. No. CIV.A. 93-N-2350, 1994 WL 192366 (D. Colo. May 12, 1994), affd, 57 F.3d 906
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
31. Hem, 1994 WL 192366, at *1.
32. 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. D.R., 645 F.2d at 853.
34. Id.
35. D.R. also claimed that the Utah statute violated her equal protection and privacy rights
under the U.S. Constitution. Id.
36. Id. at 854 (holding that a plaintiff who had not been certified as a member of a class did
not have standing to sue for the failure of the state to comply with the federal law during the three
years in question when the plaintiff fell into the year in which the state statute was less restric-
tive). The court noted that the Supreme Court had expressly passed over the Supremacy Clause
issue. Id. at 853. The Supreme Court "expressly did not determine whether 'a participating State
may not, consistent with Title XIX, withhold funding for those medically necessary abortions for
which federal reimbursement is available under the Hyde Amendment."' Id. (quoting Williams v.
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 364 n.5 (1980)). When faced with Hem v. Beye, a case where the Tenth
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Restrictive regulations arose again in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Dandoy.37 In Dandoy, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the State of Utah
could refuse to reimburse a certified Medicaid provider who, without parental
consent, gave family planning advice to Medicaid-qualified unmarried mi-
nors." Title XIX provided funding for "family planning services and supplies
furnished (directly or under arrangements with others) to individuals of child-
bearing age (including minors who can be considered to be sexually active)
who are eligible under the State plan and who desire such services and sup-
plies."39 The defendant, the executive director of the Utah State Department
of Health, based her official refusal to reimburse the plaintiff on a Utah statute
with parental consent provisions that conflicted with the federal statute.' The
court noted that "'the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling
constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its
money allotments to the States shall be disbursed, and that any state law or
regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and conditions is to that extent
invalid."' 4 Utah's more restrictive terms were inconsistent, the court ex-
plained, because a state which chooses to participate in a federal program
voluntarily relinquishes its right to enforce a conflicting state regulation or
statute.42
B. Hem v. Beye43
1. Facts
The plaintiffs, who included a doctor and three facilities that provided
abortions, sued to enjoin the Colorado Department of Social Services from
enforcing the portions of the Colorado Constitution, statutes, and regulations
which forbade Colorado to fund abortions except when necessary to save the
life of the mother." The State Department of Social Services claimed that a
state choosing to participate in Medicaid is not required to fund an abortion
for which federal funds are available. 5 The state asked the court to find that
the language of the Hyde Amendment is merely permissive, allowing but not
requiring participating states to fund abortions due to rape or incest.' At is-
sue was whether Colorado's funding restrictions contravened Title XIX and its
Circuit certainly could have invoked the Supremacy Clause, the court chose instead to define
Colorado's spending limits in terms of an inappropriate refusal to fund a medically necessary
procedure as defined by the current Hyde Amendment: See infra text accompanying notes 43-75.
37. 810 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1987).
38. Dandoy, 810 F.2d at 986.
39. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C)). The language of that section is still effective.
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1988).
40. Dandoy, 810 F.2d at 986.
41. Id. at 988 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)).
42. Id. The court also noted that federal funds are a "rather large carrot" to accomplish fed-
eral goals. Id.
43. 57 F.3d 906 (loth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995).
44. Hem, 57 F.3d at 907 (involving COLO. CONST. art. V, § 50, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 26-4-
105.5, 26-4-512, 26-15-104.5 and 10 COLO. CODE REGs. § 2505-10 (8.733)).
45. Id. at 908.
46. Id. The preamble to the Hyde Amendment merely imposed its goals "as far as practi-
cable under the conditions in such state." 42 U.S.C. § 1396.
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regulations.' The district court held that because Colorado participates in the
Medicaid program, the state must fund abortions in cases of rape or incest for
Medicaid-eligible women.'
2. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.49 Con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"0
the Tenth Circuit stated that protecting "the life of the fetus that may become
a child" and encouraging childbirth are legitimate state interests.5 Once a
state chooses to participate in the optional Medicaid program, however, it must
comply with the provisions of Title XIX." Because Colorado participated in
Medicaid," the only relevant issue was whether Colorado's refusal to fund
abortions in cases of rape or incest contravened the requirements of Title XIX
and the accompanying regulations.54
While a state need not fund all medical services under the "mandatory
coverage" categories," the court noted that a state's discretion is limited if it
bases the restriction on the "degree of medical necessity." 6 Concluding that
Colorado's restrictive abortion funding "impermissibly discriminate[d] in its
coverage of abortions on the basis of a patient's diagnosis and condition,"57
the court found that limiting Medicaid funded abortions to life-threatening
cases "violate[d] the purpose of the Act and discriminate[d] in a proscribed
fashion.""
47. Hern, 57 F.3d at 909.
48. The District Court held, in part:
[The State Department of Social Services] is enjoined, so long as the State of Colorado
accepts federal funds under the Medicaid Act, from enforcing the provisions of Article
V, Section 50 of the Colorado Constitution. Defendant is further enjoined from enforc-
ing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-4-512, or 26-15-104.5, or any rules and regula-
tions implementing these statutes, insofar as those statutes or rules are more restrictive
than the terms of the current Hyde Amendment.... Defendant is free to follow Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 26-4-105 by "complying with federal requirements for a program of medical
assistance necessary for the state of Colorado [sic] to qualify for federal funds under
Title XIX of the social security act," as amended by the current Hyde Amendment.
Hem, 1994 WL 192366, at *2.
49. Hem, 57 F.3d at 909.
50. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (recognizing an individual's constitutional right to choose a pre-
viability abortion, the state's power to restrict post-viability abortions, and the state's important
interests in protecting the health of the woman and the potential life of the fetus).
51. Hem, 57 F.3d at 913 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
445 (1977)).
52. Id. at 909, 913 (finding that Colorado must distribute funds "on the terms established by
Congress").
53. Id. Participation is enabled through the Colorado Medical Assistance Act, CoLo. REv.
STAT. §§ 26-4-101 to -704 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
54. Hern, 57 F.3d at 909.
55. The court noted that abortion falls under several of the mandatory coverage categories,
including inpatient and outpatient hospital services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), family
planning services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C), and physicians' services furnished by a physician,
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(5)(A). Herm, 57 F.3d at 910.
56. Hern, 57 F.3d at 910 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1995)) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979)) (finding the categorical refusal to fund only a specific, medically necessary procedure
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Participating states may deny funding for medically necessary procedures
"pursuant to a generally applicable funding restriction or utilization control
procedure," according to the court,59 but "a state law that categorically denies
coverage for a specific, medically necessary procedure except in those rare
instances when the patient's life is at stake is not a 'reasonable standard[]...
consistent with the objectives of [the Act] . . . ."" Since Colorado accepts
Medicaid funds, "it must do so on the terms established by Congress."'
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit found that Colorado's refusal to fund abortions in ac-
cordance with the Hyde Amendment was an unacceptable "limit based on the
patient's degree of medical necessity," rather than a Supremacy Clause viola-
tion.62 In discussing "medical necessity," the court distinguished between
"permissible discrimination based on degree of need and.., forbidden dis-
crimination based on medical condition."'63 Hem raises several questions,
however, when viewed in conjunction with a contemporaneous Tenth Circuit
abortion decision.
The Tenth Circuit held in Jane L. v. Bangerter" that a state's post-Casey
interest in protecting the life of a post-viability fetus does not justify jeopar-
dizing a mother's health for the sake of the fetus.65 "The importance of ma-
ternal health is a unifying thread that runs from Roe to Thornburgh and then
to Casey." Jane L. and Hern together posit the question whether a state
may permissibly refuse to fund a therapeutic abortion if the state funds
abortions at all. Hem creates a paradox: courts prohibit states from discrimi-
nating based on the diagnosis or condition of a patient,67 yet the Hyde
Amendment discriminates in this proscribed manner when it funds abortions in
cases of rape or incest, but not other medically necessary abortions.
Hem also raises the issue of whether, in the absence of a Hyde Amend-
ment definition of the medical necessity and funding requirements of certain
to be unreasonably inconsistent with Title XIX objectives).
59. Id at 911. Cited examples include: a reasonable definition and application of a funding
denial for "experimental" procedures, id. (citing Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (7th
Cir. 1993)), limits of 12 annual inpatient days and 18 annual outpatient hospital visits, id. (citing
Charleston Memorial Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 1982)), or a limit of three
physician visits per month. Id. (citing Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1980)). The
court noted that the limit of 12 inpatient days met the needs of 88% of Medicaid recipients, the 18
outpatient visits met the needs of 99%, and the three physician visits per month had met the needs
of 96.1% of recipients in the year preceding Curtis. Id.
60. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)) (citation omitted).
61. id. at 913.
62. Id. at 910.
63. Id. (quoting Preterm, 591 F.2d at 126).
64. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Leavitt v. Utah, No.
95-1242, 1996 WL 327446 (U.S. June 17, 1996).
65. Id. at 1504.
66. Id.
67. Hem, 57 F.3d at 910,
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abortions, states may refuse to fund abortions, whether therapeutic or
nontherapeutic. 8 The court noted that
Title XIX "confers broad discretion on the States to adopt standards
for determining the extent of medical assistance" offered in their
Medicaid programs.... In addition, federal Medicaid regulations
expressly permit participating states to "place appropriate limits on a
service based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization
control procedures."69
The Tenth Circuit has stated unequivocally that a mother's life may not be
jeopardized for the sake of the fetus.70 However, the court may allow states
to characterize refusal to fund abortions, particularly nontherapeutic abortions,
under some neutrally worded rubric (i.e., "outpatient elective surgical proce-
dures") that qualifies as a utilization control procedure.
D. Other Circuits
All federal courts that have addressed the Hem issue have held that states
may not act more restrictively than the Hyde Amendment's provisions. The
circuits are split, however, with regard to the rationale for that result.7' Some
courts rely upon the Supremacy Clause, while others apply the "medical ne-
cessity" test.
The Third and the Eighth Circuits have invoked the Supremacy Clause. In
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for Women v. Knoll, 2 the Third Circuit
determined that a state's reporting and physician notification requirements in
rape and incest cases may not be more restrictive than the Hyde Amendment
requirements. 3 The court stated that "[t]he Supremacy Clause requires inval-
idation of any state constitutional or statutory provision that conflicts with
federal law ... and compels compliance by participants in Title XIX federal
aid programs with federal law and regulations."' 4 The Eighth Circuit held that
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Beal, 432 U.S. at 444, and 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d)).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
71. District courts are similarly split, with some invoking the Supremacy Clause and some
applying the "medical necessity test." Three courts have invoked the Supremacy Clause. Fargo
Women's Health Org. v. Wessman, Civ. No. A3-94-36, 1995 WL 465830 (D.N.D. 1995); Planned
Parenthood v. Wright, No. 94 C 6886, 1994 WL 750638 (N.D. I11. 1994); Planned Parenthood
Affiliates of Michigan v. Engler, 860 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Mich. 1994). One court used the "medi-
cal necessity" test. Planned Parenthood of Missoula v. Blouke, 850 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mont. 1994).
One court held that the state may not fund in contravention of Title XIX "[i]n accordance with the
overwhelming weight of authority," without either invoking the Supremacy Clause or the "medi-
cally necessary" test. Stangler v. Shalala, No. 94-4221-CV-C-5, 1994 WL 764104, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. 1994). Finally, one court refused a request for pre-enforcement review and dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources v. Shalala, No. 94-47, 1995 WL 465673,
at *6 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
72. 61 F.3d 170 (3d Cit. 1995).
73. Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 172. Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute had no waiver
provision, while the Hyde Amendment did.
74. Id. at 178 (citations omitted). Elizabeth Blackwell reaffirmed the Third Circuit's earlier
decision in Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1980), which held that states must fund
abortions for those categories of pregnancies for which the Hyde Amendment allows funding.
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"the Arkansas state constitutional amendment and the Nebraska state regula-
tion prohibiting the use of public funds for abortions except to save the life of
the mother violate the federal Medicaid statute, as amended by the 1994 Hyde
Amendment, and are therefore invalid under the supremacy clause."75
The Fifth Circuit, like the Tenth, applied the "medical necessity" test in
Hope Medical Group for Women v. Edwards.76 That court found a Louisiana
statute
violate[d] the requirements of Title XIX because it categorically pro-
hibit[ed] funding for abortions in cases of rape or incest without re-
gard to whether the procedures might be medically necessary. The
defendants offer[ed] no medical basis for restricting abortions to life
and death situations, nor d[id] they contest the plaintiffs' position that
abortions in rape and incest cases are often medically necessary.77
II. EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ACTIVE LABOR ACT (EMTALA)
A. Background
1. EMTALA Generally
Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act (EMTALA) as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985 (COBRA)." Commonly known as the "emergency room anti-
dumping statute,"79 EMTALA's purpose is to assure that staffs of the
nation's emergency rooms accord all patients the same quality of screening,
regardless of their ability to pay.' Congress limited EMTALA's scope to
hospitals which receive Medicare or Medicaid payments.8 '
75. Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 497, 503 (8th Cir. 1995).
76. 63 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Jan. 16,
1996) (No. 95-1164).
77. Hope Medical Group, 63 F.3d at 428. Louisiana asked the Supreme Court to stay the
district court's decision in Hope Medical Group for Women v. Edwards, 860 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D.
La. 1994), which required the state to either fund abortions in rape or incest cases, in contraven-
tion of a Louisiana statute, or forego the receipt of federal funds. Edwards v. Hope Medical Group
for Women, 115 S. Ct. 1, 1 (1994). In denying the motion, Justice Scalia stated that under the
appropriate standard of review:
The only issue potentially worthy of certiorari is the premise underlying the District
Court's decision: that Title XIX requires States participating in the Medicaid program to
fund abortions (at least "medically necessary" ones) unless federal funding for those
procedures is proscribed by the Hyde Amendments. The Courts of Appeals to address
this question have uniformly supported that premise.... We have already denied cer-
tiorari in two of those cases, and it is in my view a certainty that four Justices will not
be found to vote for certiorari on the Title XIX question unless and until a conflict in
the Circuits appears.
Id. at 2 (citations omitted).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
79. Timothy H. Bosler & Patrick M. Davis, Is EMTALA a Defanged Cobra?, 51 J. MO. B.
165, 165 (1995).
80. John R. Penhallegon, What's Happening in... Medical Malpractice, 62 DEF. CoUNS. J.
426, 428 (1995).
81. Bosler & Davis, supra note 79, at 165.
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2. EMTALA's "Appropriate Medical Screening Requirement"
EMTALA mandates that anyone who enters an emergency room in need
of care receive an "appropriate medical screening. 8 2 If the hospital's staff
identifies an "emergency medical condition," 3 it may not transfer the patient
until stabilized." Among other terms, the act does not expressly define "ap-
propriate medical screening."
Courts do not limit the application of EMTALA to the indigent or unin-
sured. 5 The Tenth Circuit, in accord with other circuits,86 has held that
"[tihe fact that Congress, or some of its members, viewed COBRA as a so-
called 'anti-dumping' bill, i.e., a bill designed to prohibit hospitals from
'dumping' poor or uninsured patients in need of emergency care, does not
subtract from its broad term 'any individual." '
Although courts have expanded EMTALA to apply to anyone who goes to
an emergency room in need of care, and not merely the indigent, courts are
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). That section provides:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual
(whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency de-
partment and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment
for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening
examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department, including
ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department, to determine whether
or not an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this
section) exists.
Id.
83. "Emergency medical condition" is defined as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (in-
cluding severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reason-
ably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman,
the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or the
unborn child.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l).
84. 42 U.S.C.§ 1395dd(c). The definition section of § 1395 provides:
The term "stabilized" means, with respect to an emergency medical condition described
in paragraph (1)(A), that no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within rea-
sonable medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual
from a facility, or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in para-
graph (1)(B), that the woman has delivered (including the placenta).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B). The section also defines "transfer" as "the movement (including the
discharge) of an individual outside a hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed
by (or affiliated or associated, directly or indirectly, with) the hospital. " 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(e)(4).
85. Bosler & Davis, supra note 79, at 166.
86. In Collins v. DePaul Hosp., the Tenth Circuit cited the decisions of Gatewood v. Wash-
ington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Cleland v. Bronson Health Care
Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990). Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir.
1992).
87. Collins, 963 F.2d at 308 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)). For the statutory language,
see supra note 81.
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cognizant that Congress enacted the legislation primarily to prevent hospitals
from dumping unwanted patients, and to penalize hospitals that do engage in
dumping-not to create a federal malpractice standard."s In Delaney v.
Cade, 9 the Tenth Circuit held that "the Act does not create a private cause of
action against physicians."9' More significantly, the court held in Collins v.
DePaul Hospital"t that a patient admitted to the hospital's intensive care unit
(ICU) for treatment of head injuries could not bring an EMTALA claim on the
basis that the hospital did not appropriately screen for his injured hip.9" The
court stated that "[a]fter the hospital made its screening examination of Col-
lins, it is quite obvious that it determined that an 'emergency medical
condition' did exist."93 The court then stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) "is
not intended 'to ensure each emergency room patient a correct diagnosis, but
rather to ensure that each is accorded the same level of treatment regularly
provided to patients in similar medical circumstances."' 94 Therefore, a
plaintiff's EMTALA claim that a medical screening examination was "inap-
propriate" may not succeed if the hospital demonstrates that the examination
resulted in a diagnosis---even if problems remain undiagnosed or if the diag-
nosis was wrong. The Tenth Circuit has stressed that when doctors screen neg-
ligently, the appropriate remedy is a state medical malpractice suit.95
3. EMTALA's Requirement That Emergency Rooms Properly Stabilize
Patients Before Transfer
EMTALA claims also require a determination of whether the hospital
properly stabilized the patient before transfer. As noted previously, "transfer"
includes the discharge of a patient.96 EMTALA provides that stabilization
occurs if "no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable
medical probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the
88. Penhallegon, supra note 80, at 428-29.
89. 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 388. In Delaney, the patient was the victim of an automobile acci-
dent and the symptoms included complaints of chest pains. Id. She was transferred without diag-
nosis of the source of the pain, and subsequently required surgery to repair a transected aorta
which had clotted. Id. at 388-89. The patient was permanently paralyzed, and alleged that delay in
transferring her to a facility equipped to treat her contributed to the degree of her impairment. Id.
at 389. The Delaney court relied upon the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baber v. Hospital Corp.,
977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992), which held that "the enforcement section of § 1395dd only allowed
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to act against a doctor to prevent participation in
Medicare programs and to seek sanctions in the form of civil monetary penalties." Delaney, 986
F.3d at 393 (citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 876-78). The Tenth Circuit further noted that preclusion of
a cause of action against the physician is in line with the legislative history of the Act. Id. (citing
Baber, 977 F.2d at 876-78).
91. 963 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
92. Collins, 963 F.2d at 306-07. The court said, "The stated reason in 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)
for requiring a participating hospital to provide an 'appropriate medical screening examination' of
one suffering from injuries who presents himself at a hospital is to determine whether an 'emer-
gency medical condition exists.' Nothing more, nothing less." Id.
93. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
94. Id. (quoting Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041).
95. Id. at 308 (noting that the appropriate forum for a medical malpractice action was state
court, a recourse the plaintiff had pursued "and lost").
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4).
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individual from a facility." '97 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged in Delaney that
a patient is stable at the time of discharge when there is no acute distress, no
indication of a worsening condition, and no apparent life-threatening risk."
Additionally, when a patient refuses to consent to treatment, a hospital has no
further obligation under EMTALA. 9
To prevail under EMTALA, the plaintiff must establish either that the
hospital failed to provide an appropriate medical screening or that the patient
was transferred prior to stabilization, but not both."o EMTALA, therefore,
imposes strict liability on hospitals, "subject [only] to those defenses available
in the Act."'0 Thus, the burden is on the hospital to establish, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that it did not violate the requirements of
EMTALA.' 2
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Repp v. Anadarko Municipal Hospital 3
a. Facts
Mr. Repp, complaining of a rash, visited a physician who diagnosed
shingles and prescribed medication."° Later that day, Mr. Repp visited the
emergency room at Anadarko Municipal Hospital complaining of pain
throughout his left arm.0 5 Two nurses examined Repp and recorded his vital
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).
98. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 392 (quoting Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271).
99. Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(b)(2)).
100. Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Abercrombie court held that it was harmless error that the jury instructions seemed to infer
that the jury must find both in order for the plaintiffs to prevail. Id. The court noted that in re-
sponse to two special interrogatories, the jury responded that they found that the defendant hospi-
tal had provided an appropriate medical screening, and that they did not find that the deceased had
been transferred in an unstable condition. Id. at 681-82.
101. Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713. "Section 1395dd(a) contains mandatory language. Under the
statute, the hospital must provide for medical screening if a request is made." Id. (citing Reid v.
Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989)); see also
Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 680-81 (noting that while the word "negligently" appears in the part of
EMTALA addressing civil monetary fines, it is not in the part of the act which provides for civil
enforcement by an injured plaintiff). The court found the omission significant, noted that Congress
could have said "negligently" in the civil enforcement provision, but did not, and stated that the
court would not opt to rewrite the section. Id. at 681. The Abercrombie court further noted that the
word "negligently" does not appear in either § 1395dd(a) or (c), which provide for an appropriate
medical screening and stabilization before transfer. Id. Acknowledging the statute's "mandatory
language" as enunciated in Stevison, the Abercrombie court held that "these two requirements
impose a 'strict liability' on a hospital which violates those requirements." Id.
102. See Abercrombie, 950 F.2d at 681 (using the preponderance of the evidence standard for
both appropriate medical screening and stabilization before transfer); Stevison, 920 F.2d at 713
(holding that once plaintiff demonstrated she had requested a medical screening, she met the bur-
den, and that the burden then shifted to the defendant hospital to prove that the request for treat-
ment had been withdrawn, a showing which would defeat a claim that a hospital failed to stabilize
a patient prior to transfer).
103. 43 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994).




signs."° Mrs. Repp informed the nurses that her husband had a history of
cardiac bypass surgery. 7 Upon telephone consultation, the outpatient treat-
ing physician prescribed two medications administered in the emergency room
by injection." The emergency room staff released Repp, who died that night
in his sleep of cardiopulmonary arrest due to coronary artery disease." The
plaintiffs, Mrs. Repp and the couple's children, alleged that Repp did not
receive an "appropriate medical screening" in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(a)." ° They further alleged that the defendant hospital failed to prop-
erly stabilize Repp prior to his discharge, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§
1395dd(b) and (c)." The district court dismissed the malpractice cause of
action against the individual physician." 2 The only issue on appeal was
whether the emergency room failed to provide an "appropriate medical screen-
ing" in violation of EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)." 3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
case. In doing so, the court interpreted the term "appropriate medical screen-
ing."' ' 4 The plaintiffs contended that the word "appropriate" required "hospi-
tals to provide a uniform minimum level of care to each patient seeking emer-
gency room care.""' 5 The defendants, in turn, reasoned that a substantive
reading of "appropriate" would convert EMTALA into a national malpractice
statute, in contravention of Congressional intent."6 Noting that "the Act 'is
neither a malpractice nor a negligence statute,""' 7 the court stated that "sec-
tion 1395dd(a) precludes the adoption of a standard tantamount to a federal
malpractice statute.""' Rather, § 1395dd(a) requires that an appropriate med-
ical screening examination be "within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department."' Thus, the court stated, the section "does not re-
quire a hospital to provide a medical screening in the abstract," but, rather
"the statute's requirement is hospital-specific, varying with the specific cir-
cumstances of each provider."'' 0 The decision stated that:
[A] hospital defines which procedures are within its capabilities when







112. Id. The doctor asserted that he could not be sued as an individual physician under the
EMTALA. Id. The lower court relied on Delaney in granting his motion to dismiss. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 522. For statutory language, see supra note 82.
115. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 525 (10th Cir. 1994)). For a discussion of this
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emergency room. Indeed, hospitals, and not reviewing courts, are in
the best position to assess their own capabilities. Thus, a hospital
violates section 1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard
procedures.''
Slight or de minimus variations by a hospital from its standard screening pro-
cedures do not violate hospital policy.'
In dicta, the court noted Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America,'13 a Fourth
Circuit decision in which that court refused to "foreclose the possibility that a
future court faced with such a situation may decide that the hospital's standard
was so low that it amounted to no 'appropriate medical screening.""1 24 The
Tenth Circuit stated that its holding in Repp "clearly rejects the possibility left
open by the Fourth Circuit in Baber. A court should ask only whether the
hospital adhered to its own procedures, not whether the procedures were ade-
quate if followed."'25
The court found the Anadarko Hospital's policy required its emergency
room staff to compile a history for each patient including pre-existing condi-
tions, medication, and allergies.'26 The court also found that the hospital's
nurses knew Repp had a history of heart disease and that he was taking Zantac
and Phenaphen. 2' The plaintiffs argued that the hospital failed to take a
complete medical history and the nurses did not ask for a complete list of
medications.'28 The court determined these were "minimal variations from
the hospital's emergency room policy" and they "did not amount to a violation
of the hospital's standard screening procedures."'
' 29
2. Urban v. King 3'
a. Facts
Urban, diagnosed as having a high-risk pregnancy because she was carry-
ing twins, underwent periodic stress tests. 3' Urban's physician, Dr. King,
referred her to the Central Kansas Medical Center where she received a nonre-
active stress test which indicated no fetal movement, fetal heart tones in the
150s, and normal maternal vital signs.'3 2 Upon consultation with a physician,
the nurse who administered the test instructed Urban to return the next morn-
ing for another stress test.'33 She left the hospital at about 8 P.M. and re-
turned the next morning, when the biophysical profile indicated that neither
121. Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. Id. at 523.
123. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
124. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 n.4 (quoting Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7).
125. Id.




130. 43 F.3d 523 (10th Cir. 1994).





fetus was moving or breathing, and one fetus had no fetal heart tone.'34 A
Caesarean section resulted with one twin stillborn, and the other suffering
brain damage.'35 Urban and her husband alleged that the medical center vio-
lated EMTALA'3 6 by releasing ("transferring") Urban when an unstabilized
emergency medical condition existed.' The district court granted the medi-
cal center's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed. 3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The issue on
appeal was whether the defendant medical center released Urban with an
emergency medical condition which should have been stabilized under
EMTALA' 39 The court stated the statute requires actual knowledge of an
unstabilized emergency medical condition if a plaintiff is to prove liability."4
"The hospital cannot be held to stabilize an emergency situation without
knowing an emergency exists .... A facial reading of section 1395dd(e)(1)
requires some manifestation of acute symptoms so the hospital would know of
the condition.'1
4'
Under § 1395dd(e)(1)(A), the court found that an "emergency medical
condition" did not manifest itself in Urban's case because she was not in pain
and demonstrated no severe symptoms at the time the hospital released her
from the emergency room. 42 The court distinguished Abercrombie v. Osteo-
pathic Hospital Founders Ass'n143 from Urban, because the former "did not
address whether the hospital could be in violation of section 1395dd(c) if it
did not have the knowledge of the [patient's] emergency medical condi-
tion."'" Thus, the court stated, "The statute's stabilization and transfer re-
quirements do not apply until the hospital determines the individual has an
emergency medical condition."' 
45
134. Id. at 524-25.
135. Id. at 525.
136. The language of the Act on which the court relied provides:
(c) Restricting transfers until individual stabilized
(1) Rule
If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which has
not been stabilized .... the hospital may not transfer the individual unless-
(A)(i) the individual . . .after being informed ... in writing requests
transfer to another medical facility,
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency depart-
ment at the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medical
person . . . has signed a certification ... after a physician ... coun-
tersigns the certification ....
Id. at 524 n.l (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)).




141. Id. at 525-26.
142. Id. at 526.
143. 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991).
144. Urban, 43 F.3d at 526.
145. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit found further support for its holding in § 1395dd(c),
which applies only after the requirements of § 1395dd(b) are satisfied." The
latter section provides that a hospital must comply with the § 1395dd(c) stabi-
lization requirements if it "determines that the individual has an emergency
medical condition.' 47 Thus, "[t]he statute's stabilization and transfer require-
ments do not apply until the hospital determines the individual has an emer-
gency medical condition."" In arriving at its holding, the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to read the language of § 1395dd(c) in isolation of the other sections of
the statute as the Urbans urged. 49
The court further rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that holding hospitals to
an "actual knowledge" standard would result in a deliberate failure to diagnose
at all, in order to avoid EMTALA liability. 5 ' Section 1395dd(a), which re-
quires that the hospital conduct an appropriate medical screening, should pre-
clude such a result.'' Furthermore, the court noted that if a hospital con-
ducts an appropriate screening and fails to diagnose, the plaintiff would have a
state malpractice claim.'52
C. Analysis
When the Tenth Circuit stated in Repp that "a hospital violates §
1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard procedures,"'53 it cited
authority which also determined that a plaintiff must show her treatment was
different from that of other patients,'54 or that the medical workers' motives
were "inappropriate."' 55 Because the burden of proof should be on the defen-
dant in these cases, a rejection of the premise that the plaintiff must show
disparate treatment is appropriate. The Tenth Circuit's standard does not re-
quire the plaintiff to prove "bad motive" in order to prevail, but requires only
a showing that the hospital did not follow its own procedures. The fact that
the Tenth Circuit has rejected the Fourth Circuit's determination that low
standards may not constitute "appropriate medical screening" means that state
tort actions are the only assurance that hospitals will promulgate and adhere to
adequate procedures for emergency rooms.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)).
148. Id. (finding that the hospital's lack of actual knowledge of the emergency medical condi-
tion absolved it of liability in conjunction with § 1395dd(b)).
149. Id. (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 219 (1991)). The court agreed with
the Urbans that reading the EMTALA sections in isolation of each other, the facts that (1) Urban
went to a hospital, (2) there was an emergency condition, (3) she was not stabilized, and (4) she





153. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522.
154. Id. at 522 n.6 (citing Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1994)).




Urban relies on a hospital to admit to "actual knowledge" of an emergen-
cy condition in order for a court to find that a hospital violated § 1395dd(c)
by transferring an unstabilized patient. The Urban court stated hospitals are
not likely to abuse the "actual knowledge" standard because of the screening
requirements of § 1395dd(a). 5 6 But in almost the same breath, the court
stripped the screening requirements to a more-than-minimal violation of the
hospital's own operating procedures. 5 Because hospitals determine what
constitutes adequate procedures, they will weigh low standards for EMTALA
claims so as to avoid liability under the Tenth Circuit, yet not admit to such a
low standard of care that they will be vulnerable to potential state malpractice
suits.
D. Other Circuits
1. Appropriate Medical Screening
In defining "appropriate medical screening," circuit courts split on the
question of whether a plaintiff must prove an improper motive or nonmedical
reason for a hospital's disparate treatment. The Sixth Circuit required an im-
proper motive showing in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group.'58 Cleland
involved a fifteen-year-old with cramps and vomiting, who was misdiagnosed
with the flu and died due to complications resulting from his undiagnosed in-
testinal disorder. 9 In holding for the hospital, this oft-cited opinion stated
that:
"Appropriate" is one of the most wonderful weasel words in the dic-
tionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in the
drafting of legislation. Who, after all, can be found to stand up for
"inappropriate" treatment or actions of any sort? Under the circum-
stances of the act, "appropriate" can be taken to mean care similar to
care that would have been provided to any other patient, or at least
not known by the providers to be insufficient or below their own
standards .... "[A]ppropriate" must... be interpreted to refer to the
motives with which the hospital acts. If it acts in the same manner as
it would have for the usual paying patient, then the screening provid-
ed is "appropriate" within the meaning of the statute."
The primary case rejecting Cleland's improper motive requirement is the
District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare
Corp.'6' In Gatewood, the hospital misdiagnosed and discharged a man who
156. Urban, 43 F.3d at 526.
157. Repp was decided on Dec. 19, 1994; Urban was decided on Dec. 20, 1994; and Repp
cites Urban as authority.
158. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
159. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268.
160. Id. at 271-72 (noting that reasons, other than indigence, for which an emergency room
might give less than standard care include "prejudice against the race, sex, or ethnic group of the
patient; distaste for the patient's condition (e.g., AIDS patients); personal dislike or antagonism
between the medical personnel and the patient; disapproval of the patient's occupation; or political
or cultural opposition").
161. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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complained of pain radiating down his left arm and into his chest and who
died the next morning of a heart attack. 62 The D.C. Circuit stated that:
[A] hospital fulfills the "appropriate medical screening" requirement
when it conforms in its treatment of a particular patient to its stan-
dard screening procedures .... The motive for such departure is not
important to this analysis, which applies whenever and for whatever
reason a patient is denied the same level of care provided others and
guaranteed him or her by subsection 1395dd(a). 63
The Fourth Circuit explicitly adopted the District of Columbia Circuit's
standard in Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'n.' 6 The Fourth Circuit noted
that EMTALA applies to "anyone," and stated if plaintiffs had the burden of
proving an improper motive, it would be "virtually impossible" for them to
prevail. 65 The court required the plaintiff, however, to make a threshold
showing of differential treatment."6 To rebut that showing, a hospital may
show either that the patient in fact received the same treatment as other pa-
tients or, in the alternative, that a physician did not order or perform a test or
procedure because, as a matter of medical judgment, she did not feel it was
necessary or reasonable. 67 The court also noted that, in accordance with
Baber, a hospital is required to have screening procedures and that failure to
have them could constitute a per se violation of EMTALA.' 6
The Tenth Circuit, in Repp, found itself in accord with the District of
Columbia and Fourth Circuits when it held that "a hospital violates section
1395dd(a) when it does not follow its own standard procedures."'" The
Tenth Circuit, however, expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's determination
that excessively low standards could expose the hospital to liability. 7
The Ninth Circuit did apply the Fourth Circuit's minimum standards rule.
In Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 7' the Ninth Circuit stated that courts
have unanimously held the test applied to screening standards to be an objec-
tive determination that the procedure was the same received by other patients,
162. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1039.
163. Id. at 1041.
164. 42 F.3d 851, 857 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F.
Supp. 538, 544 (E.D.N.C. 1991) and Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 769 F. Supp. 1030, 1034
(N.D. 111. 1991) as also adopting Gatewood's rejection of an improper motive requirement).
165. Id. at 857-58.
166. Id. at 858.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 858 n.4.
169. Power predates Repp by one week.
170. Repp, 43 F.3d at 522 n.4. The Fourth Circuit stated:
Some commentators have criticized defining "appropriate" in terms of the hospital's
medical screening standard because hospitals could theoretically avoid liability by pro-
viding very cursory and substandard screenings to all patients, which might enable the
doctor to ignore an emergency medical condition.... Even though we do not believe it
is likely that a hospital would endanger all of its patients by establishing such a cursory
standard, theoretically it is possible. Our holding, however, does not foreclose the possi-
bility that a future court faced with such a situation may decide that the hospital's stan-
dard was so low that it amounted to no "appropriate medical screening"....
Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7 (citations omitted).
171. 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995).
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and not whether the medical profession would deem the procedure as ade-
quate.'72 The court noted that EMTALA's statutory language precluded a
"national standard of care in screening patients,"'73 but held a hospital none-
theless has a duty under EMTALA to screen at more than a minimal level,
which would be inappropriate."'
The Eighth Circuit held, in Williams v. Birkeness'75 that "appropriate"
means "uniform treatment rather than correct diagnosis,"'7 6 and that the bur-
den is on the plaintiff to prove disparate treatment.'77 Likewise, the Eleventh
Circuit held the plaintiff must prove that the hospital administered substandard
screening procedures to an indigent patient vis A vis a paying patient.'
2. Proper Stabilization Before Transfer
With regard to stabilization before transfer, the Tenth Circuit agrees with
other circuits that a plaintiff must show that the emergency room staff had
actual knowledge of an unstabilized emergency medical condition. Courts
often cite Cleland for the proposition that "[i]f the emergency nature of the
condition is not detected, the hospital cannot be charged with failure to sta-
bilize a known emergency condition."'79 Cleland defines "the vague phrase
'emergency medical condition"" 8 as "a condition within the actual knowl-
edge of the doctors on duty or those doctors that would have been provided to
any paying patient."''
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baber agreed with Cleland that actual
knowledge must exist. The Baber opinion stated that to prevail on a claim that
a hospital violated EMTALA's transfer provisions, the plaintiff must show that
(1) there was an emergency medical condition; (2) there was actual knowledge
by hospital staff of that condition; (3) the patient was transferred without
stabilization; and (4) there was no patient consent to such transfer, nor were
certification and transfer procedures followed."2 The District of Columbia
Circuit also held that absent the diagnosis of an emergency medical condition,
EMTALA's stabilization and transfer requirements do not apply.
8 3
172. Eberhardt, 62 F.3d at 1258.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7).
175. 34 F.3d 695 (8th Cir. 1994).
176. Williams, 34 F.3d at 697.
177. Id. Disparate treatment is an "essential element" of the claim. Absent evidence presented
by the plaintiffs, the defendant need not "disprove the ... claim by showing all patients were
treated the same." Id.
178. Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994).
179. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Gossling v. Hays Medical Ctr.,
1995 WL 254269, at *9 (D. Kan. 1995); Richmond v. Community Hosp., 885 F. Supp. 875, 881
(W.D. Va. 1995).
180. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268.
181. Id. at 269.
182. Baber, 977 F.2d 883.
183. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
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CONCLUSION
Current case law indicates that plaintiffs must rely on state law for access
to quality health care. Hem requires Colorado to fund abortions in accordance
with the Hyde Amendment, but the benefit is illusory because of the extremely
low number of women affected. Further, in the absence of the Hyde Amend-
ment and its dictates of medically necessary categories of abortions, a state
may define medical necessity. Judicial relief in this area appears to be limited
to arguments that states make an arbitrary and discriminatory distinction in the
context of funding therapeutic abortions, between indigent women who are the
victims of rape or incest, and other indigent women who become pregnant.
Repp and Urban do not radically depart from other circuits; most courts
agree that EMTALA only restricts patient dumping, and is not a national
malpractice statute. Repp goes the furthest in allowing hospitals total discretion
in setting their own standards. Patients must rely on accreditation standards for
licensing emergency rooms to be assured that an adequate standard of care is
provided. Ultimately, state courts, through medical malpractice actions, must





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided several cases involving immi-
gration law during the 1994-95 survey period.' Because the Tenth Circuit
serves as the first level of judicial review of administrative decisions concern-
ing asylum and deportation,2 many cases presented to the court were little
more than judicial confirmation of administrative decisions. The Tenth Circuit
did, however, decide several noteworthy cases as well as a few issues of first
impression.
After a brief discussion in Part I of the background of the interlocking
statutory components of United States immigration law, Part II of this Survey
examines suspension of deportation and the standard of proof that an alien
must meet to remain in this country. This year, the court continued its trend of
narrow construction of the elements of discretionary relief. As a result, few
aliens met the required standard.
Part III discusses the court's interpretation of statutes providing for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. Both the discretionary grant of asylum
and the nondiscretionary withholding of deportation hinge on the applicant's
ability to articulate an objective fear of persecution. As in the cases involving
suspension of deportation, the court strictly followed the statutory standard,
denying applications based on general political upheaval and subjective fear of
persecution. In a matter of first impression, the court was asked to determine
the burdens of proof and production that both the applicant and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) must meet throughout the review pro-
cess. A vehement dissent suggests that American courts have not seen the last
of this issue.
Part IV examines a case involving the constitutional implications of the
immigration process as it applies to aliens who marry United States citizens.
The Tenth Circuit rejected a novel constitutional attack aimed at invalidating
an amendment to the immigration laws designed to flush out fraudulent mar-
riages. Finally, Part V examines an issue of growing importance in immigra-
tion law: the fate of naturalized citizens convicted of felony offenses. These
cases involve prisoners seeking to compel deportation as well as those wishing
to prevent deportation, and the effect of an aggravated felony conviction on
the deportation process.
1. The survey period covers decisions handed down between September 1, 1994, and Au-
gust 31, 1995.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1994). Upon review, the administrative determination is subject
only to procedural protections of due process. Courtney E. Pellegrino, Comment, A Generously
Fluctuating Scale of Rights: Resident Aliens and First Amendment Free Speech Protections, 46
SMU L. REV. 225, 229 (1992).
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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The term "immigration" refers to the movement of people from one coun-
try to another.3 Laws controlling entry into the United States are almost ex-
clusively the product of the twentieth century.' The earliest such restriction,
however, came about as a result of the depression of the 1870s and a concur-
rent increase in racial animosity toward Asian nationals.5
The statutes and decisions that constitute substantive immigration law
form only a part of the unique framework used to regulate immigration.6 In
the United States, executive and departmental orders, executive proclamations,
and treaties also affect immigration.7 This Survey focuses on the substantive
statutes, as interpreted and applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Relevant orders, proclamations, and treaties will be addressed, but only in the
context of cases presented to the Tenth Circuit during the 1994-95 survey
period.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)' provided the first
comprehensive scheme of immigration control in the United States.9 Congress
has amended the INA five times,' ° and current national immigration policy is
the product of over 150 years of cultural and societal development."
Immigration remains a complicated area of the law, comprised of many
elements. 2 Congress promulgates the controlling statutes,"' as in other areas
3. RICHARD A. BOSWELL & GILBERT P. CARRASCO, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW
4 (1991).
4. Joseph Minsky et al., Introductory Overview of Immigration Law and Practice, C394
ALI-ABA 1, 7-11 (1989).
5. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE
To LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 (1992). Congress enacted two statutes governing immigration prior to
1875. Id. The Alien Act authorized the President to deport "dangerous" aliens. Ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800). Id. In 1862, Congress passed a law prohibiting the import of
Chinese slave laborers. An Act to Prohibit the "Coolie Trade" by American Citizens in American
Vessels, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862) (repealed 1974); see FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra, at 1-2. To a
great extent, this racial animosity continues today. For example, one commentator referred to
immigration reform as the "snake oil" of the 1994 California state elections. Edith Z. Friedler,
From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States Deportation of Its Own Children, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492 (1995).
6. E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-
1965, at 383 (1981).
7. Id. By definition, international law concerns only the principles and rules of conduct
between nations. David D. Jividen, Comment, Rediscovering the Burden of Proof for Asylum and
the Withholding of Deportation, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 945 (1986). Therefore, although many
treaties and agreements between nations establish refugee rights, it is incorrect to analyze interna-
tional refugee rights in the context of rights within sovereign nations. Id.
8. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (cur-
rent version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994)).
9. The INA served to collect the numerous, scattered statutory provisions already on the
books. Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 9. The INA made no substantive changes other than the
creation of new, ideological bases for exclusion. Id. President Truman vetoed the bill because of
the exclusion provisions, but Congress overrode the veto. Id.
10. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1966); Immigration and Nation-
ality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1978); Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1981); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1987); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1991).
11. HUTCHINSON, supra note 6, at 3.
12. BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 7.
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of law, but four agencies of the executive branch are responsible for enforce-
ment of immigration laws: the Department of Justice (DOJ); the Department
of State; the Department of Labor; and the Public Health Service. 4 This Sur-
vey limits its discussion to the role of the INS, an agency within the DOJ, 5
in the enforcement of immigration laws. Although the other agencies men-
tioned play an important part in the overall functioning of immigration proce-
dure in the United States, they are beyond the focus of the Tenth Circuit deci-
sions in this Survey. 6
The INS is divided into four geographic regions providing administrative
direction to the district offices. 7 The regional directors' functions are primar-
ily managerial, with the INS Commissioner being responsible for determining
policy and overall management of the agency. 8 The Executive Office for Im-
migration Review (EOIR), the agency that presides over deportation hearings,
exclusion hearings, and other related matters at the administrative level, is di-
vided into two levels. 9 Immigration Judges (Us) preside over hearings, take
evidence, and determine deportability of alien applicants," while the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) exercises appellate review of the U decisions.2'
13. In forging a nation almost entirely from immigrants and first- or second-generation na-
tionals, the founding fathers might have been expected to explicitly address immigration issues.
The Constitution, however, is silent on these subjects. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MAR-
TIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 1 (2d ed. 1991); see also Katherine Tonnas, Comment,
Out of a Far Country: The Sojourns of Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, and Chinese to America, 20
S.U. L. REV. 295, 295 (1993) (discussing George Washington's view of America as an "asylum
for the unfortunate of other countries" and Thomas Jefferson's affirmation of the "hospitality...
extended to our fathers arriving in this land"). Although Congress has no explicit power to reg-
ulate immigration, the Supreme Court has held that the regulation of immigration falls within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority over the flow of commerce across national borders. See
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 288 (1849); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600
(1884). The Court has also read Congress's Article I, § 8 power "to establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization" to include immigration. Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 228-29. In addition, the Court
has held that immigration is a political question; therefore, congressional determinations regarding
the exclusion of aliens and the conditions placed upon entry of aliens are not subject to judicial
review. Id.
14. BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 7.
15. Id.
16. For a brief description of the agencies within each governmental branch responsible for
enforcement of immigration laws, see Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 11-14.
17. Id. at 11. The district offices receive applications and petitions for immigration benefits,
enforce immigration laws, and institute deportation and exclusion proceedings when necessary. Id.
18. Id.
19. Noel A. Ferris, Developments in Procedures Before the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAw 1993, at 213, 213 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. 466, 1993).
20. Id. The decision of the U, whether oral or written, includes a review of the evidence, a
statement of factual findings supporting deportability, and a discussion of any discretionary relief
requested by the alien. Samuel A. Yee, Survey, Final Exit or Administrative Exhaustion? The
Deported Alien's Catch-22, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 605, 614 (1994).
21. See generally Ferris, supra note 19. The deportation order is automatically stayed pend-
ing full disposition by the BIA. Yee, supra note 20, at 616.
19961
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II. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
A. Background
When the INS learns of a deportable alien22 within the borders of the
United States, the agency initiates deportation proceedings by issuing an order
to show cause (OSC), which requires the alien to "show cause" as to why she
should not be deported.23 Pending the outcome of the deportation hearing, the
INS may take the alien into custody and either continue to hold her in custody
or release her under bond or on conditional parole.24 The Attorney General
then has discretion to revoke the bond or parole.25 Suspension of deporta-
tion,26 a discretionary grant by the United States Attorney General, represents
one form of relief an alien can request.27 Such a grant requires the applicant
to show that, although she may be deportable under immigration laws: (1) the
alien has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
of not less than seven years; (2) the alien can offer evidence that during that
entire time she has been, and currently is, a person of good moral character;
and (3) the alien or the alien's spouse, parent, or child who is a United States
citizen would suffer extreme hardship as a result of the deportation." An
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). The INA enumerates 33 grounds for deporting resident aliens.
Because these grounds may be applied retroactively, an alien is, in effect, "perpetually subject to
expulsion." Denyse Sabagh, Deportation, Exclusion, Discretionary Relief and Waivers, C505
ALI-ABA 337, 345 (1990). In addition, delay will not prevent the INS from bringing charges at
any time; there is no statute of limitations for deportation. Id.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(1) (1994). The OSC notifies the alien of the deportation proceedings
and describes the grounds and factual allegations on which the proceedings are based. Sabagh,
supra note 22, at 346.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994).
25. Id. Historically, deportation proceedings began with an alien's arrest. Since changes in
INS procedures in 1956, however, they are more commonly initiated with the order, or motion, to
show cause. Yee, supra note 20, at 610.
Immigration laws now expressly provide for in absentia proceedings when an alien fails to
appear for a hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c); 8 C.F.R. § 3.26(a)-(b) (1995). A deportation order will
be issued if the INS establishes by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence that written
notice of the hearing was provided and that the alien is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1152b(c)(1). Pro-
vided that the notice was valid, review of an in absentia order is limited to whether the INS met
its burden and the reason for the alien's failure to appear. See Ferris, supra note 19.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).
27. The following applicants are, however, specifically excluded from eligibility for suspen-
sion of deportation:
(1) [A]liens who entered the United States as crew members after June 30, 1964; (2)
alien foreign medical graduates admitted in J nonimmigrant status, whether or not they
are subject to the two-year foreign residence requirement imposed on some J
nonimmigrants; (3) other J nonimmigrants who are subject to the two-year foreign resi-
dence requirement and have not received a waiver of it or fulfilled it; and (4) aliens who
are deportable under [8 U.S.C. § 1251](a)(4)(D) as persons who participated in Nazi-
directed persecution during World War II.
FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 7-73. A J nonimmigrant is an alien holder of a temporary
visa to enter the United States for scholastic reasons (i.e., a "student visa"). 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(15)(J) (1994).
28. Under the provisions of § 1254(a)(2), if an alien is deportable under § 1251(a)(2) (crimi-
nal offenses), § 1251(a)(3) (failure to register and falsification of documents), or § 1251(a)(4) (se-
curity and related grounds), the criteria for suspension of deportation are stringent. The applicant
must show: (1) continuous physical presence in the United States for not less than 10 years imme-
diately following commission of the act or assumption of the status which constitutes the grounds
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alien must demonstrate evidence of all three elements to qualify for suspension
of deportation.29
An alien requesting a suspension of deportation often faces difficult evi-
dentiary problems.30 Continuous physical presence may be impossible to doc-
ument because of the transient lifestyle of many aliens.3' Also, as the follow-
ing case illustrates, proving extreme hardship often presents a formidable
barrier.32 In determining "extreme hardship," the INS considers factors such
as the alien's familial connections, medical problems, and the presence or ab-
sence of abuse or fraud in the applicant's immigration history.33 The INS
may also consider economic conditions in the alien's country of origin; how-
ever, the relative weakness of the "home country's" economy will not suf-
fice.34 Finally, even if the alien meets the required elements, the Attorney
General has discretion to grant or refuse adjustment of status to that of a per-
manent resident.35
B. Amaya v. INS36
1. Facts
The United States deported Amaya from the United States on June 10,
1985." 7 She subsequently re-entered the United States without inspection, and
on December 20, 1991, the INS again initiated deportation proceedings against
for deportation; (2) good moral character; and (3) hardship. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2). If the alien is
deportable for another reason--e.g., entry without inspection, being excludable at the time of
entry, violating nonimmigrant status, alien smuggling, or becoming a public charge within five
years of entry-the alien may be able to apply for suspension of deportation under the relatively
looser standards of § 1254(a)(1). FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 7-72.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). Some have criticized this standard as "practically impossible" to
meet. Friedler, supra note 5, at 494.
30. Materials are available to assist an attorney in pursuing withholding of deportation
claims. See, e.g., Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 25-29 (offering pragmatic advice for proceeding
with a matter before the INS). Other sources offer suggestions for gathering important evidentiary
documentation. See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton, Gaining Status for Your Client Under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, in COPING WITH THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAW 123 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 329, 1987) (discussing the unique evidentiary problems
facing aliens). For guidelines on bolstering weak cases, see generally Margaret C. Makar & Philip
M. Alterman, Suspension of Deportation, in DEPORTATION DEFENSE (Continuing Legal Educ. of
Colo., Inc., 1994) and MATERIALS ON SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION 17-39 (National Lawyers'
Guild, Nat'l Convention Seminar, 1986).
31. The migratory lifestyles of many immigrant farm workers illustrates this problem. Al-
though they may have been in the United States for the required time period, many migrant farm
workers can not offer proof of continuous presence. To address the problems of these workers,
Congress created a legalization program for "special agricultural workers" (SAWs) and an admis-
sions program for "replenishment agricultural workers" (RAWs). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1161 (1994);
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 685-88.
32. Friedler, supra note 5, at 494.
33. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 7-74.
34. Id.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1254.
36. 36 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 1994).
37. Amaya, 36 F.3d at 993.
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her.3" At a hearing on June 30, 1992, she conceded her deportability, but re-
quested a suspension of deportation.39
The IJ found that, although Amaya had been continuously physically
present within the United States for seven years, she had failed to show either
good moral character or extreme hardship.' Because Amaya had pleaded
guilty to welfare fraud during the seven-year period, the IJ concluded she did
not establish good moral character.4 Amaya argued that deportation would
result in decreased educational opportunities for her citizen children. 2 The U
ruled this did not qualify as extreme hardship, 3 and the BIA affirmed."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision on narrow grounds. 5 The court
agreed that decreased educational opportunities did not constitute extreme
hardship.' The court chose to confine its ruling to that issue, however, with-
out discussing whether a welfare fraud conviction precludes an applicant from
asserting good moral character. Since suspension of deportation requires an
applicant to affirmatively prove all of the criteria, Amaya's failure to meet the
extreme hardship prong disqualified her from consideration for the requested
relief, regardless of her moral character."
C. Analysis
Applicants who have established sufficient ties to their community within
the United States and who prove themselves a positive attribute to that com-
munity may qualify for suspension of deportation.49 Because of the discre-
tionary nature of the relief, the Supreme Court has referred to it as "admin-
istrative grace."5 The statute providing this relief employs specific criteria
for evaluating the applicant and, absent a showing of all requisite elements,
the discretionary relief will not be granted.
D. Other Circuits
Several other circuit courts of appeals ruled on applications for suspension
of deportation in the past year. In many instances, the other circuit courts also




41. Id. at 994.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 994-95.




49. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 618.
50. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1957).
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an applicant, ruling that the BIA had not abused its discretion in denying
relief." In addition, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits squarely confronted the
issue the Tenth Circuit sidestepped.52 Both circuits held that evidence of
fraud precludes an applicant from showing good moral character, thus statuto-
rily barring the applicant from suspension of deportation. 3
In far more cases, however, appellate courts in other circuits found that
the agency had abused its discretion, and remanded the cases to the agency for
reconsideration based upon the appellate court findings.54
51. Hussein v. INS, 61 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that alien failed to show lawful
domicile for seven years); Raya-Ledesma v. INS, 55 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding seven-year
residency requirement not violative of equal protection principles); Miranda v. INS, 51 F.3d 767,
768-69 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting transsexual applicant's medical and social hardship claim);
Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming agency determination that appli-
cant did not show how joining him in Great Britain would cause extreme hardship to his family);
Salas-Velazquez v. INS, 34 F.3d 705, 707-08 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that applicant's previous
attempt to evade immigration laws through a sham marriage precluded a showing of good moral
character, despite his bona fide second marriage, and that applicant failed to show extreme hard-
ship to his resident wife and children since the wife knew at the time of the marriage the applicant
was deportable).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
53. Flores v. INS, 66 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving welfare fraud), withdrawn,
73 F.3d 258 (9th Cir. 1996); Izedonmwen v. INS, 37 F.3d 416, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1994) (involving
Pell Grant fraud). On rehearing in Flores, the Ninth Circuit filed an unpublished memorandum
disposition distinguishing between commission of and conviction for fraudulent acts in finding bad
moral character per se. Flores v. INS, No. 94-70178, 1996 WL 5569, at *1-*2 (9th Cir. Jan. 5,
1996) (citing 8 U.S.C. § l101(f) (1994)), on reh'g from, 66 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1995). The BIA
erred, the court held, in finding per se bad moral character based on acts committed outside the
seven-year continuous residency period, for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). Id. at *2. The
BIA could, however, find that the prior bad acts indicated "her moral character remained poor"
after the inception of the seven-year period. Id. This satisfied the "catchall clause" of § 1101(f).
Id. ("The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a find-
ing that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.") (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(f)).
54. Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that BIA improperly
failed to review all facts of alien's case, including political conditions in native country and partic-
ular and unusual psychological hardship alien would face upon deportation, and that BIA's order
failed to adequately articulate reasons for denying relief); Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 848 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding abuse of discretion in agency's failure to mention several relevant factors in
decision denying extreme hardship, to consider cumulative effect of factors, and to offer reasoned
explanation for decision); Acosta-Montero v. INS, 62 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (11 th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the agency abused its discretion when it did not consider new evidence of applicant's
changed family responsibilities); Castrejon-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that applicant's eight-day trip to Mexico did not interrupt required continuous presence);
Foroughi v. INS, 60 F.3d 570, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that an applicant does not lose
eligibility to apply for discretionary relief when lawful permanent resident status ended with final
deportation order after he had achieved seven years of continuous lawful residence); Rodriguez-
Gutierrez v. INS, 59 F.3d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that departures of one or two days
each did not interrupt continuous physical presence, and that the BIA abused its discretion by not
meaningfully addressing positive equities in denying relief); Avelar-Cruz v. INS, 58 F.3d 338, 341
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that in accumulating seven years of continuous residence an applicant need
not be a lawful permanent resident to be lawfully domiciled in this country); Biggs v. INS, 55
F.3d 1398, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that IJ abused discretion in essentially ignoring evi-
dence of serious illness and refusing to allow physician to testify by telephone); Delmundo v. INS,
43 F.3d 436, 438, 443 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that BIA did not adequately consider hardship that
applicant's deportation would cause to her family).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
III. ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Background
Before 1952, the United States had no mechanism in place for providing
sanctuary to persons in fear of persecution, other than through special legisla-
tion or by designating the person as a parolee.55 Since World War II, Con-
gress has frequently amended the statutory provisions governing refugee status
and asylum admissions.56 The Refugee Act of 1980, the most significant re-
cent legislation affecting refugees, incorporated U.N. convention standards in
an effort to improve the handling of refugee admissions.57 Despite these
changes, however, the United States is still far from having a truly adequate
and reliable system for processing the great number of immigration applica-
tions received each year.58
To qualify for either asylum or withholding of deportation, an applicant
must first show that she qualifies as a refugee.59 Under the statute, a refugee
is a person outside the country of her nationality who is unwilling or unable to
return to that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.' The applicant must show that a reasonable person in her position
would fear persecution; only once this is established does the applicant's sub-
jective fear become relevant.6
Applicants for refugee status and applicants for asylum must both satisfy
the statutory criteria expressed in § 1101(a)(42), but annual quotas are placed
only on refugee applications, not requests for asylum.62 Gaining refugee
55. BOSWELL & CARRAsco, supra note 3, at 143. A "parolee," as the term was originally
used, described an alien who could be removed from a vessel pending the ultimate outcome of her
case. Id. at 42. Statutory authority for parole is now contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(1994).
56. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 694.
57. BOSWELL & CARRAscO, supra note 3, at 145.
58. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 694; see infra note 187.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994). Although applicants for refugee status, asylum, and withhold-
ing of deportation must all show varying degrees of persecution based on the same statutory lan-
guage, each category faces different procedural hurdles. An application for refugee status differs
from that of asylum because it is based, in part, on the applicant's location at the time of applica-
tion. If the person is outside her home country, but not in the United States, the application must
be for refugee status. If the person is within the United States, the application must be for asylum.
BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 146. Asylum differs from withholding of deportation by
the degree of power that the Attorney General wields over the application. Asylum is available
only as a discretionary grant by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Conversely, withholding
of deportation is mandatory if an alien meets the statutory requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1994).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994).
61. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990). The narrow scope of current
immigration law governing refugee status has prompted intense litigation, especially where the
applicant's homeland is experiencing internal armed conflict. For a discussion of the current trend
toward disallowing generalized claims of fear of violence to satisfy the statutory persecution re-
quirement, see Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refugee
Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1989).
62. BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 145.
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status does not therefore necessarily guarantee admission into the United
States.63
Although both asylum and withholding of deportation prevent forcible
return to a country where persecution is likely, important differences distin-
guish the two forms of relief.64 The Attorney General is statutorily prohibited
from deporting an alien to a country where her life or freedom would be at
risk.' However, even if an alien meets the statutory requirements and estab-
lishes refugee status, the Attorney General can refuse to grant asylum and
order deportation of the applicant.' As a practical matter, when faced with
an application for both asylum and withholding of deportation, the decision-
maker reviews the asylum request first.67 If the applicant cannot meet the less
stringent standard for a grant of asylum, the agency denies the entire applica-
tion.6'
At first glance, withholding of deportation seems a more favorable status
for the alien than asylum; however, the scope of relief available under with-
holding of deportation is limited.' Asylum status confers upon the alien em-
ployment authorization,7 ° the opportunity to include her spouse and minor
children in the grant," and the possibility of an adjustment of status to per-
manent resident." Conversely, withholding of deportation does not provide
for inclusion of the alien's family, and the alien's status cannot adjust to that
of permanent resident.73
Tenth Circuit decisions during the past year demonstrate a reluctance to
grant asylum absent clear evidence of an objective basis for petitioner's fear of
persecution.74  As the following cases show, many obstacles prevent
63. Id. at 145-46.
64. Jividen, supra note 7, at 943. In practice, the INS treats all applications for asylum filed
during exclusion or deportation proceedings as applications for withholding of deportation as well.
8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1995).
65. The statute providing for withholding of deportation states: "The Attorney General shall
not deport... an alien ... if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened ... on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (emphasis added). This provision does not
apply to aliens who have participated in the persecution of other groups, or been convicted of a
"particularly serious crime." Id. § 1253(h)(2)(A)-(D). In addition, an alien is not eligible for with-
holding of deportation if the Attorney General finds "serious reasons" to believe the alien commit-
ted a "serious nonpolitical crime" in another country or represents a "danger to the security of the
United States." Id.
66. The statute providing for asylum states that it may be granted "in the discretion of the
Attorney General." Id. § 1158(a) (emphasis added).
67. Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 646-47 (10th Cir. 1995).
68. Id.
69. Evangeline G. Abriel, Presumed Ineligible: The Effect of Criminal Convictions on Appli-
cations for Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Under Section 515 of the Immigration Act of
1990, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 27, 33-34 (1992).
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id.
72. Jividen, supra note 7, at 944.
73. Abriel, supra note 69, at 34.
74. As increasing numbers of asylum-seekers have come to the United States from nations
such as Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the tension in American immigration law has
become more apparent, and the treatment of these asylum-seekers by the United States has be-
come highly controversial. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 690; see also Tonnas, supra
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applicants from meeting their burden because: (1) claimed persecution based
on subjective fear alone does not suffice;75 (2) evidence of firm resettlement
in a third country bars an application for asylum;76 and (3) in one instance,
the court even required a petitioner to carry the burden of negative proof of a
foreign law." In addition, the court remanded one case to the BIA because it
incorrectly required an alien to establish a nationality of origin as a prerequi-
site to a grant of asylum.78 Issues of credibility peppered many decisions,
causing the Tenth Circuit to stray from what sometimes appeared to be a
"rubber stamp" affirmation of administrative decisions. For example, in one
case, the court required the BIA to state with specificity the basis for its deter-
mination that certain testimony was not credible.79
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Hadjimehdigholi v. INS"°
a. Facts
Hadjimehdigholi served in the Iranian army from 1959 until 1986." In
1963, as a tank commander under the Shah, he led one of the four tank units
instrumental in quelling an uprising by supporters of the Ayatollah
Khomeini.82 He later received commendations for his part in putting down
this revolt. 3 Hadjimehdigholi's military records reflected his activities against
Khomeini supporters, but the new government failed to discover them when
the Ayatollah came to power.8 " In his application for asylum and withholding
of deportation, he claimed that it was only a matter of time before the Iranian
government discovered his early military activities.85 In support of his
claimed fear of persecution, Hadjimehdigholi offered evidence of other mili-
tary officers put to death because of their involvement in anti-Khomeini activi-
86ties.
note 13, at 308 (discussing how the 1990 INA "highlights the right of the sovereign to exclude
immigrants for any reason").
75. Hadjimehdigholi, 49 F.3d at 646.
76. Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1399 (10th Cir. 1994).
77. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1994).
78. Dulane v. INS, 46 F.3d 988, 997, 999 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. Id. In addition, the court remanded at least one decision to the BIA because of its failure
to articulate a reason for finding the petitioner's testimony not credible. Velis v. INS, No. 94-
9526, 1995 WL 66536, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 1995) (unpublished decision). Credibility deter-
minations are critical to the process because often an applicant's own testimony is essentially the
only evidence offered in support of the applicant's "well-founded fear of persecution." See, e.g.,
Deborah Anker & Carolyn P. Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurisprudence: The Aftermath of the
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, in 22ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 147 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 384,
1989).
80. 49 F.3d 642 (10th Cir. 1995).
81. Hadjimehdigholi, 49 F.3d at 644.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 644-45.
85. Id. at 645.
86. Id. at 648-49. Although the court was unpersuaded in this case, circumstantial evidence
involving persons similarly situated can be used to show the required objective fear of persecu-
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The IJ ruled that although Hadjimehdigholi had established a subjective
fear of persecution upon his return to Iran, he did not prove the required ob-
jective fear of persecution. 7 Unconvinced that a reasonable person in the
petitioner's position would fear persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
political beliefs, or membership in a social group, the U denied
Hadjimehdigholi's application.8
The BIA affirmed the U's decision, stating that Hadjimehdigholi's fear
was based on speculation 9 and that a grant of asylum requires hard evidence
of the likelihood of persecution." The BIA pointed out that Hadjimehdigholi
had served in the Iranian army for several years after the Ayatollah came to
power, and that the Khomeini government did not persecute him, but rather
promoted him several times and even granted him a pension upon his retire-
ment.9'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the BIA applied the correct standard for
determining asylum eligibility. 92 Although Hadjimehdigholi demonstrated a
subjective fear, he failed to provide evidence supporting an objective fear of
persecution on any of the enumerated statutory grounds.93
2. Abdalla v. INS94
a. Facts
Petitioner, a Sudanese national, lived for twenty years in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) under a "residence" visa/permit prior to entering the United
States.95 Denying Abdalla's application for asylum, the BIA held that under
recent regulatory amendments to 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2),96 an alien's firm
resettlement in a third country prior to entering the United States precludes a
grant of asylum based on persecution in his native country.97 The firm reset-
tlement in a third country presumably demonstrated that Abdalla found a safe
haven in the UAE, which undermined an asylum claim based on feared perse-
cution in his native country.9"
tion. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (1995).




91. Id. at 647.
92. Id. at 650.
93. Id. at 648.
94. 43 F.3d 1397 (10th Cir. 1994).
95. Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1398-99.
96. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (1995).
97. Abdulla, 43 F.3d at 1399.
98. Although immigration laws did not specifically contain provisions relating to firm reset-
tlement until the 1980 Refugee Act, the concept has "long been" a part of United States immigra-
tion policy. In re Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 19 (1981). However, an alien may be found not to
have "firmly resettled" if the third country restricted the alien's rights significantly more than
those of its own citizens. See generally Arthur C. Helton, Reform of Political Asylum, in 27TH
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit upheld the BIA's evidentiary finding that Abdalla had
firmly resettled in the UAE, and it therefore determined that Abdalla was pre-
cluded from a grant of asylum or withholding of deportation."
3. Sadeghi v. INS"e
a. Facts
Sadeghi, an Iranian national, sought asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion, asserting that the Iranian government was attempting to arrest him for
purposes of persecution, rather than for legitimate criminal prosecution, be-
cause he counseled a fourteen-year-old student not to enter the military.'
The IJ ruled that Sadeghi's fear was of criminal prosecution and not persecu-
tion based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or
political opinion, as required under the statute." 2 Consequently, the request
for asylum and withholding of deportation was denied.0 3 The BIA affirmed
the IJ's denial of asylum and withholding of deportation on the same grounds,
but further found the petitioner's testimony not entirely credible.1
0 4
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the BIA that the Iranian government's act
of seeking petitioner for arrest did not qualify as persecution based on statuto-
ry grounds. 5 Rather, the Iranian government was simply trying to prosecute
a criminal act under its laws."°6 Furthermore, the court stated that Sadeghi
was required to disprove the existence of a law that was the basis for his
criminal act, which he did not do.0 7
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kane argued that there was no evidence
that Sadeghi had violated any law." Furthermore, requiring Sadeghi to dis-
prove the existence of the very law upon which the INS rested its case re-
quired him to go far beyond his own burden."
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 145 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Pract. Course
Handbook Series No. 515, 1994) (discussing the asylum process in the United States).
99. Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399-1400.
100. 40 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1994).
101. Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1140-41.
102. Id. at 1141.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1142.
105. Id. at 1143.
106. ld. at 1142.
107. Id. at 1143. The majority concluded that requiring the government to produce evidence
of a foreign law would run contrary to the requirement that the petitioner bear the burden of proof
throughout the asylum hearing. Id.
108. Id. at 1145 (Kane, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1146. The dissent also pointed out a fact the majority did not address: Iran is a
signatory to an international treaty which prohibits participating countries from permitting or re-
quiring children to participate in wars. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25,
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4. Dulane v. INS...
a. Facts
Dulane entered the United States from Somalia on June 11, 1983, under a
student visa."' Although he possessed a Somalian passport, Dulane was ac-
tually an Ethiopian national." 2 He filed asylum applications in September
1983 and June 1988, but received no response from the INS to either applica-
tion."3 The INS denied his third application for asylum, filed in November
1988." ' After hearing the case, an IJ ruled that Dulane's deportability had
been established, and that he had only provided evidence of general political
upheaval in his native country, a ground insufficient to satisfy the refugee
requirement for a grant of asylum."5
Dulane then filed a motion to reopen" 6 with the BIA, alleging new facts
in support of his application.' The BIA denied the motion, stating that even
in light of the new facts Dulane failed to establish a prima facie case of eligi-
bility for asylum." 8
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the BIA had not sufficiently articulated its
reasoning for denying the motion," 9 reversed the decision, and reviewed the
art. 38, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448,
1470 (1989). The United States also signed this treaty on February 16, 1995. Sandra L. Jamison,
Proposition 187: The United States May Be Jeopardizing Its International Treaty Obligations, 24
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 229, 233 (1995). And although Congress must still ratify this treaty
before it becomes binding, the United States has demonstrated a clear intent to join the other 169
signatories worldwide. Id. If this Iranian law does, in fact, exist, its enforcement in this instance
would amount to a direct "conflict with fundamental human rights under both the Geneva Con-
vention and customary international law." Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1147 (Kane, J., dissenting).
110. 46 F.3d 988 (1995).
111. Dulane, 46 F.3d at 990.
112. Id. at 992. Petitioner explained that in order to flee Ethiopia, he had acquired a Somalian
passport on the black market. When filling out his application, he was instructed by INS staff that
his country of origin must match the passport in his possession. Id.
113. Id. at 990.
114. Id. at 990, 993.
115. Id.
116. A motion to reopen, available only in limited circumstances, requires the petitioner to
meet a heavy burden of proof. Barbara Hines, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, in IMMI-
GRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 411, 429-30 (R. Patrick Murphy et a]. eds., 1992).
The motion must be consolidated with any petition requesting review of a final deportation order,
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1994), and will not be granted unless the respondent offers material new
evidence unavailable during prior proceedings. Yee, supra note 20, at 615. Filing a motion to
reopen does not stay deportation proceedings, and the alien may be forced to leave the country
while the motion is pending. Id. at 622.
117. Dulane, 46 F.3d at 993.
118. Id. at 994. The new evidence, which the Tenth Circuit referred to as "significant," in-
cluded "an affidavit by ... a long-time family friend, explaining Dulane's father's position in
relation to the Ethiopian government, as a leader of the Ogaden secessionist movement... [and]
an affidavit of Dulane outlining facts which he had learned since the hearing before the U from a
friend who immigrated to Canada." Id. at 995.
119. As in cases involving credibility, discussed supra note 79, the Tenth Circuit demands
enough specificity for an adequate review of the administrative decision. See, e.g., Dulane, 46
F.3d at 994 (scrutinizing the BIA's decision for "procedural regularity" and consideration of all
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evidence presented by Dulane."2 ° Upon examination, the court concluded that
the BIA had failed to address whether Dulane had a well-founded fear of
persecution if he returned to either Ethiopia or Somalia, and remanded for
further proceedings on the issue."' Specifically, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
the BIA erred in requiring Dulane to establish his nationality as a prerequisite
to a granting of asylum. The statute lists no such requirement.'22
C. Analysis
Both asylum and withholding of deportation decisions rely heavily on the
quality of factual evidence the applicant puts forth, and can pose problems for
reviewing courts. Since review is necessarily limited to evidence submitted to
the agency during administrative proceedings, the circuit courts all demonstrate
a heavy reliance on the agency's judgment in making factual determinations.
As the decisions over the past year show, only when the agency's determina-
tion is clearly unsupported by evidence contained in the record will the Tenth
Circuit disturb the administrative ruling.
D. Other Circuits
A variety of issues faced other circuit courts during the past year in their
review of denials of asylum and withholding of deportation. On June 6, 1993,
a Chinese ocean liner, the M/V Golden Venture, ran aground on a sandbar 100
yards from the shore in New York harbor.'23 Several of the Chinese immi-
grants aboard presented applications for asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion, claiming persecution based on China's family planning policy.'24 The
circuit courts held uniformly that evidence of this national policy, on its own,
failed to establish evidence of persecution necessary for asylum or withholding
of deportation.'25
relevant factors).
120. Dulane, 46 F.3d at 996.
121. Id. at 999.
122. Id. at 997; 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
123. Approximately 300 illegal Chinese immigrants were aboard, each having paid approxi-
mately $35,000 to a Chinese gang for passage to the United States. Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48
F.3d 1331, 1334 & n.l (4th Cir. 1995). When the ship ran aground, hundreds of the immigrants
attempted to swim to shore. Id. INS officials apprehended most of the would-be immigrants, but
10 died before reaching the shore. Id. News of the Golden Venture refugees was widely reported
across the United States. See generally Malcolm Gladwell & Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Immigrant
Boat Tragedy Ended 4-Month Odyssey, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 8, 1993, at 10; 'Well-Coached'
Chinese Refugees Await Hearings, BALTIMORE SUN, June 8, 1993, at 12A.
124. The People's Republic of China imposes a "one couple, one child" policy on its citizens
and requires forced abortion/sterilization of those who violate the policy. Chen Zhou Chai, 48
F.3d at 1334-35.
125. Id. at 1334, 1339-40. In Chen Zhou Chai, for example, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the
applicant failed to show persecution for his political opinions despite his wife's forced abortion,
his sterilization, and the government's imposition of a fine equal to 12 times his annual salary. Id.;
see also Chang Lian Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the BIA's determi-
nation that applicants were not entitled to asylum because of China's population control policy
was not arbitrary and capricious). Some commentators have accused the INS and the Clinton
Administration of bias in asylum proceedings requested by the Golden Venture aliens. Robyn K.
Pretlow, Attorney General's Motion for a Protective Order Limiting the Scope of Discovery Depo-
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Numerous other decisions rendered by circuit courts over the past year
articulated a variety of reasons for denying relief to the applicants. 2 6 How-
ever, a significant number were remanded by the circuit courts to the BIA for
reconsideration.' 27 In one case, the Second Circuit ordered payment of
attorney's fees to the prevailing applicant when the court determined that the
government's position in litigation was not substantially justified. 2
sitions Is Denied in Golden Venture Litigation, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 221 (1995).
126. Hamzehi v. INS, 64 F.3d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that applicant failed to
establish requisite "selective and severe" injuries on which to base a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion); Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of political asylum de-
spite BIA's failure to consider the underlying circumstances of alien's conviction for first-degree
manslaughter); Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that evidence did not
establish well-founded fear of persecution despite alien's having successfully shown existence of
private discrimination against Coptic Christians); Adhiyappa v. INS, 58 F.3d 261, 263, 268 (6th
Cir. 1995) (finding that applicant who provided names of student activists to the government was
subject to persecution by separatists because of his activities, not his political opinions); Gomez-
Mejia v. INS, 56 F.3d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming that former soldier did not establish
possibility of persecution in Nicaragua because he had never expressed his political opinion);
Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that, although applicant demonstrated
that members of his ethnic group were treated as "second-class citizens," he failed to establish that
he had been "singled out" for persecution); Anton v. INS, 50 F.3d 469, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding that applicant's inability to refute evidence that Romania's current government allows the
free practice of religion precluded his showing of religious persecution); Bevc v. INS, 47 F.3d
907, 910 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that although this "may not be an ideal time for any non-Serbi-
ans to be living in Serbia," general unrest does not satisfy the requirements for fear of persecu-
tion); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling evidence that applicant received
a jail-cell beating and that his home had been stoned by ethnic Fijians unconnected with the gov-
ernment was insufficient to establish persecution); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
1995) (ruling that dramatic changes in applicant's country of origin since his departure prevented
demonstration of well-founded fear of persecution); Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F.3d 6, 7-8 (5th Cir.
1994) (affirming the BIA's conclusion that even if applicant's testimony was credible, he had
failed to establish past persecution based on one beating and two subsequent police questionings);
Cuevas v. INS, 43 F.3d 1167, 1169, 1171 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that harassment following
applicants' refusal to sell land to individuals suspected of acting on behalf of the "armed wing of
Communist Party of the Philippines" was not basis for well-founded fear of persecution); Jukic v.
INS, 40 F.3d 747, 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that applicant's fear of persecution based on
his having ignored a recall notice to serve in the Yugoslavian army did not warrant grant of asy-
lum or withholding of deportation); Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188-90 (5th Cir. 1994) (ruling
that Saudi Arabia's failure to grant citizenship to individuals of non-Saudi heritage born within its
borders did not reach level of individualized persecution because "statelessness alone does not
warrant asylum").
127. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an applicant
beaten by police for suspected military connections was not required to show nationwide persecu-
tion); Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding case due to the
BIA's failure to consider testimony regarding treatment of military deserters or whether applicant's
desertion based on "political neutrality" represented a political opinion); Singh v. Moschorak, 53
F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that in denying the petitioner's application, the BIA
wrongly assumed that fortitude in the face of danger demonstrated an absence of fear); Sanon v.
INS, 52 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1995) (criticizing the BIA's failure to demonstrate that it had
actually considered the fact that the applicant escaped from Burkina Faso, in West Africa, only
because of an error and was the only student to successfully immigrate to the United States);
Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1384 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the BIA's requirement that an
Ethiopian national demonstrate persecution of all members of her ethnic group, especially since
her grasp of English was such that she likely used the term "Oromo People" to mean "members of
the Oromo Liberation Front," a political group); Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 492 (1st Cir.
1994) (expressing "grave doubts" that a reasonable fact-finder could decide the applicant, a Guate-
malan national, was ineligible for asylum after disregarding 150 pages of information concerning
60 specific acts of persecution).
128. Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION
PROCEDURES
A. Background
Congress first provided for expedited processing of immigrant visa appli-
cations submitted by those aliens who married United States citizens when it
enacted the War Brides Act of 1945.29 By marrying a United States citizen,
an immigrant can obtain an immigrant visa, 3' obtain admission into the
United States (if not already present), and apply for permanent residency after
three years of residency. 3' The relative ease with which marriage conveys
an immigrant visa, and subsequent permanent residency, creates a tension be-
tween the objective of preventing fraud and abuse and that of facilitating fami-
ly unification.'32 In response to this concern, Congress complicated the pro-
cedure by enacting a two-year administrative process for deciding permanent
residency applications based on marriage."'
The BIA in In re Garcia,'34 an interim decision, established a rule that
"pending prima facie approvable visa petition[s] would be treated as though
[they] were already approved for purposes of reopening."'35 Thus, a marriage
between an alien and a United States citizen was considered prima facie valid
under the Garcia analysis.'36 Following the enactment of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 (IMFA)' and the Immigration Act of
1990 (IA), 3' however, the BIA modified this holding in In re Arthur,
39
Under the Arthur rule, the INS presumes that marriages entered into after
deportation proceedings have begun are fraudulent; hence, the BIA will reject
motions to reopen while visa petitions are pending.' The following case ex-
amined the constitutionality of the Arthur rule.
129. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 271, 59 Stat 659 (1946).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
131. Id. § 1430(a) (1994).
132. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 161.
133. See Mary L. Sfasciotti & Luanne B. Redmond, Marriage, Divorce, and the Immigration
Laws, 81 ILL. B.J. 644, 644-46 (1993) (suggesting that the IMFA creates an "administrative trap
for the unwary").
134. 16 I. & N. Dec. 653 (1978).
135. In re Arthur, No. A-29575767, 1992 WL 195807, at *3 (B.I.A. May 5, 1992) (citing In
re Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 653).
136. See, e.g., id.
137. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(1989) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a) (1994)). The IMFA was enacted to deter fraud
by aliens seeking to acquire lawful residency in the United States through marriage to a United
States citizen or lawful permanent resident by requiring a two-year foreign residence requirement
when the marriage was entered into after initiation of deportation proceedings by the INS. See
Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 133, at 645-48 (describing the provisions of the 1986 IMFA).
138. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1991). The IA exempted
qualified applicants from the two-year foreign residence requirement and the bar to adjustment
imposed by the 1986 amendments. See Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 133, at 648 (discussing
the 1990 revisions to the IMFA).
139. No. A-29575767, 1992 WL 195807 (B.I.A. May 5, 1992).
140. In re Arthur, 1992 WL 195807, at *4.
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B. Rezai v. INS' 4'
1. Facts
Petitioner Saeed Rezai, an Iranian national, arrived in the United States on
a student visa in 1986 after residing in Germany for seven years.42 He grad-
uated from college in 1990, but did not apply for asylum until eight months
after the INS initiated deportation proceedings against him for overstaying his
student visa.'43
During the proceedings with the INS, Rezai claimed that while residing in
Germany he participated actively in the Council of Iranian Royalists, an activi-
ty which would result in his persecution if the United States forced him to
return to Iran." The tribunal doubted the credibility of this assertion, how-
ever, because petitioner only raised this issue after the INS brought deportation
proceedings against him, not in his original residency application.'45
In addition to a claim for asylum, Rezai sought residency status through
marriage to two different United States citizens.'" The first marriage in 1988
ended in divorce in 1990.'7 In 1991, Rezai entered into a second marriage,
six months after the IJ had issued a deportation order.' The INS rejected
the subsequent application for an immigrant visa filed by his wife because the
evidence showed that Rezai had entered into his first marriage fraudulently,
for the purpose of receiving immigration benefits.' 9 The BIA denied the mo-
tion to reopen and reconsider this ruling based on the Arthur rule.' Rezai
appealed this decision, asserting that application of the Arthur rule was a
violation of his First Amendment right to familial association."'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected this constitutional attack, stating that the BIA's
decision not to reopen the proceedings was motivated by a bona fide desire
not to interfere with the role of the district director in adjudicating outstanding
visa petitions.'52 The court held that the BIA's decision not to interfere with
the district director's power to hear visa petitions did not violate petitioner's
First Amendment rights.
5 3
141. 62 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. Rezai, 62 F.3d at 1287.
143. Id. at 1288.
144. Id. at 1287-88.
145. Id. at 1288.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1288, 1290.
149. Id. at 1290.
150. Id. at 1290-91.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court stated that so long as the basis for the decision is facially legitimate, the
Arthur rule does not violate the First Amendment. Id. Note that in denying this motion, the BIA
did not foreclose all avenues of relief for petitioner. His visa application, filed by his new wife
after their marriage, was still pending. Id.
153. Id. at 1292.
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C. Analysis
Rejecting a visa application based on suspected fraudulent marriage is
consistent with other forms of deportation relief that rely on the applicant's
good moral character.'54 Because strong policy motivations support family
unity, aliens can qualify for permanent residency rather expeditiously through
marriage to a United States citizen. 5 This policy goal is tempered, however,
by the government's fear that ignoring evidence of "sham marriages" may lead
to a rash of visa applications based on marriages to United States citizens."6
D. Other Circuits
The Eleventh Circuit upheld a constitutional attack, on equal protection
grounds, of a decision in which the I ruled an alien ineligible to file for a
waiver of deportation based on his marriage to a lawful permanent resident
and the fact that his child was a United States citizen.'5' The court held that
the BIA had created two virtually identical classifications of aliens in waiver
of deportation decisions-the only difference being that one class departed and
returned prior to filing for the waiver.' As such, the BIA's interpretation
was unconstitutional as applied.'59
The Seventh Circuit decided two cases involving sham marriages entered
into for the purpose of circumventing immigration laws. In Yong Hong Guan
v. INS," the Court of Appeals upheld a BIA deportation order based on a
sham marriage, even though the applicant had subsequently remarried another
United States citizen and given birth to a United States citizen. 6' The court
cited "legitimate concerns regarding the administration of the immigration
laws" in support of its conclusion.'62 Ghaly v. INS6 ' involved another con-
stitutional challenge, based on the Fifth Amendment procedural due process
guarantee." Ghaly charged that the INS's failure to provide him with a
copy of his first wife's statement denying the validity of their marriage de-
prived him of the opportunity to address the evidence against him or
adequately prepare a defense.'65 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that the summary the agency provided sufficiently satisfied procedural
due process."
154. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
155. See Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 133, at 649. Some have criticized amendments to
the statutory scheme providing for residency through marriage as an attempt to "micro-manage the
problem of marriage fraud by an elaborate administrative process." Id.
156. In support of the proposed 1986 Marriage Fraud Amendments, the INS reported to Con-
gress that a full 30% of marriage-based visa applications were fraudulant. Sfasciotti & Redmond,
supra note 133, at 645. The basis for this study has subsequently been challenged. Id.
157. Po Shing Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337 (1 lth Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 339.
159. Id. at 344.
160. 49 F.3d 1259 (7th Cir. 1995).
161. Yong Hong Guan, 49 F.3d at 1260-61.
162. Id. at 1263.
163. 48 F.3d 1426 (7th Cir. 1995).
164. Ghaly, 48 F.3d at 1434.
165. Id.
166. Id. The Arthur rule has withstood attack in other circuit courts: Dielmann v. INS, 34
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V. DEPORTATION OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES
A. Background
Non-citizens" may be deported under U.S. immigration laws for crimes
committed within the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act
provides the Attorney General with the authority to denaturalize, and even
deport, undesirable citizens.'" Two statutes under Title 8 of the U.S. Code
compel the deportation of alien criminals: § 125169 and § 1253. '70 Section
1251 provides for deportation based on four criminal categories: 7 ' general
crimes,1 72 controlled substances violations,'
73 certain firearms offenses, 7 1
and miscellaneous crimes." '75 Section 1253 precludes relief of withholding of
deportation for an alien convicted of a particularly serious crime. 76 The pro-
visions applicable to the Tenth Circuit cases decided over the past year con-
cern general crimes (including aggravated felonies)'7 7 and controlled sub-
stances violations.
17 8
Under § 1253, the Attorney General is instructed not to deport any person
whose deportation would threaten that person's life or freedom on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 79 This withholding of deportation does not apply, however, if the
Attorney General determines that an alien convicted of a particularly serious
crime "constitutes a danger to the community.""'8 Although the Supreme
Court has recognized deportation as a drastic measure equivalent to
"banishment or exile,"'"' Congress has enacted several major pieces of legis-
lation to respond to growing concern about the relationship between
F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting due process challenge and finding "no deficit, constitu-
tional or otherwise" in the Arthur rule); Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir.) (upholding the
Arthur rule as an expression of policy in an "area where the BIA carries expertise and has been
bestowed with broad discretion"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 345 (1993).
167. This includes lawful permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and undocumented aliens.
Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 14.
168. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1451 (1994).
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i).
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994).
171. See generally Robert Frank, Criminal Defense of Foreign Nationals, 167 N.J. LAW. 36
(1995) (discussing deportation of immigrants through criminal procedures).
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A).
173. ld. § 1251(a)(2)(B).
174. Id. § 1251(a)(2)(C).
175. Id. § 1251(a)(2)(D).
176. Id. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
177. For purposes of § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), an aggravated felony encompasses conviction for a
crime of violence where the "term of imprisonment imposed ... is at least [51 years." 8 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(43)(F) (1994).
178. A violation of The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1994), renders an alien
deportable. Frank, supra note 171, at 37-38.
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
180. Id. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
181. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation may result in "loss of both property and life, or of all
that makes life worth living").
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immigration and crime. 82 As a result of this recent legislation, the INS be-
gan its Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP), an aggressive pilot
program created to expeditiously remove criminal aliens from the street, from
the community, and from the United States. 3
Even though conviction of a crime of requisite seriousness renders an
alien deportable under United States immigration law, the citizens of the Unit-
ed States have an interest in requiring the fulfillment of the imposed prison
sentence.' 4 In fact, the statute providing for deportation of criminal aliens
specifically mandates, "An alien sentenced to imprisonment shall not be de-
ported until such imprisonment has been terminated by the release of the alien
from confinement."'
85
The INS has often come under attack for inefficiencies in the system
causing cases to progress slowly.'86 Aliens convicted of qualifying crimes are
released from prison into INS custody to await deportation proceedings.8 7
Congress has articulated the goal, at least for aliens who commit aggravated
felonies, of completing deportation proceedings prior to the end of their prison
term.' However, the statute does not require prior completion of the pro-
ceedings.
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Aggravated Felony Conviction Bars a Withholding of Deportation
In AI-Salehi v. INS, 9 the Tenth Circuit decided an issue of first impres-
sion regarding whether an aggravated felony conviction, without an additional
finding that the alien posed a danger to the community, precluded withholding
of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)." Congress enacted § 1253
pursuant to Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which states in pertinent part:
182. Those Acts are: the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1989); the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1990); and the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1991). Abriel, supra note 69, at
39-40.
183. INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 955, 955
(1988).
184. Walford v. INS, 48 F.3d 477, 478 (10th Cir. 1995).
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h) (1994).
186. See Kenneth Y. Geman, Important New Asylum Regulations, in 27TH ANNUAL IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITrE 175 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. 515, 1994). In 1993, 150,000 asylum applications were filed. Of these, only 36,000 were
decided or administratively closed. The rest joined a backlog of nearly 400,000 cases. Id.
187. See Abriel, supra note 69, at 42. Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are presumed
deportable. Aliens awaiting deportation proceedings must remain in INS custody unless they law-
fully entered the United States and can demonstrate they pose no threat to society and are likely to
appear for any scheduled hearings. Id.
188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d)(1) (1994). As part of recent legislative reforms designed to
streamline the deportation of convicted aliens, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) enacted an institutional hearing program and began holding deportation hearings against
alien criminals in state and federal prisons. INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, supra
note 183, at 956.
189. 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
190. AI-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 396.
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1. No Contracting State shall expel ... a refugee ... to... territo-
ries where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee . .. who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country.''
For the decade following the Refugee Act of 1980, In re Frentescu'9 ' set the
standards for interpreting this provision. In re Frentescu did not require an
independent determination of the danger that the applicant posed to the com-
munity,'93 but required a case-by-case determination of whether the offense
was a crime of requisite seriousness.'94
In Arauz v. Rivkind,"' the Eleventh Circuit ruled that conviction of a
"particularly serious crime"' ' was the only evidence required for a showing
of dangerousness to the community. The conviction made the alien per se
statutorily ineligible for withholding of deportation.'9' Based on its interpre-
tation that all applicants have a right to a hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 208,'9'
however, the Arauz court held that an IJ, unlike a district director, must still
consider evidence other than conviction of a serious offense before denying an
application.' 9 In response to Arauz, the Attorney General revised the regula-
tions so that mandatory denial of asylum applications2 would not require a
hearing for aliens convicted of a "particularly serious crime. '2 ' The Immi-
gration Act of 1990202 further simplified the analysis by defining aggravated
191. See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556-57 (lst Cir. 1993) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
192. 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (1982).
193. In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. "Withholding of deportation as well as asylum
is not available to an alien who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 'particularly seri-
ous crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States."' Id. at 245 (citing 8
C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(iv) (1995)).
194. Id. at 247.
195. 845 F.2d 271 (11 th Cir. 1988) (superseded by regulation as stated in Narhns v. INS, 972
F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992)).
196. Arauz, 845 F.2d at 275 (citing Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir.
1986)).
197. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 276-77.
200. For the conditions required for mandatory denial, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(d) (1995).
201. Id. § 208.14(d)(1); see also Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 1992) (discuss-
ing the Attorney General's attempt to defeat the right to a judicial hearing created in the Arauz
line of cases).
202. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
felonies as "particularly serious crimes. ' 113 The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed this issue for the first time in the following case.
a. Al-Salehi v. INS
20 4
i. Facts
AI-Salehi pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute at least 500
grams of cocaine, a statutorily-defined aggravated felony. 25 When the INS
initiated deportation proceedings, AI-Salehi applied for asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation.2" The application included statements from the prosecut-
ing attorney and the presiding judge strongly supporting his request because of
his role in convicting a major drug dealer." 7 The IJ denied the application,
holding that, according to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d) and 1253(h)(2)(B), an aggra-
vated felony conviction absolutely barred the relief sought.2°" Al-Salehi ap-
pealed only the withholding of deportation to the BIA, which upheld the U's
decision." 9
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the statutory interpretation employed by
both the U and the BIA, ruling that Al-Salehi's conviction of an enumerated
aggravated felony conclusively disqualified him from seeking a withholding of
deportation.1 0 The circumstances surrounding the conviction, the court stat-
ed, cannot serve to mitigate the effect of the statute."'
203. "For purposes of subparagraph (B), an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime." 104 Stat. at 5053, 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994); see Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Con-
gress intended aggravated felony convictions to function as barriers to withholding of deportation);
Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 555, 559 (lst Cir. 1993) (stating that conviction for cocaine
possession with intent to distribute operates as an absolute bar to withholding deportation); Mar-
tins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying withholding of deportation on showing of
conviction for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute).
204. 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
205. AI-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 391; see 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(B) (1994) (defining drug traffick-
ing as an aggravated felony).
206. AI-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 391.
207. Id. The presiding judge noted that the evidence showed that petitioner had likely been
"prodded" by a "badgering" DEA agent to arrange for the sale, and that the supplier "would never
have been convicted without [petitioner's] assistance and testimony." Id. at 391 n.2 (quoting Re-
cord at 58, Al-Salehi (No. 94-9527)). The prosecuting attorney also wrote of petitioner's "minimal
criminal involvement, sincere remorse, and substantial cooperation in the conviction of a 'signifi-
cant cocaine supplier."' Id. (quoting Record at 56-57, Al-Salehi (No. 94-9527)).
208. Id. at 391.
209. Id.




2. The Legal Effect of the Prison Sentence Determines Deportability
Under § 1251
a. Nam Quoc Nguyen v. INS2 2
i. Facts
Nam, a native and citizen of Vietnam, entered the United States in 1989
and was granted permanent resident status in 1990."3 In 1993, a Kansas
court convicted Nam of aggravated assault and sentenced him to a prison term
of three to eight years.2 The INS subsequently charged Nam with deport-
ability under § 1251.2" Both the I and the BIA found Nam statutorily de-
portable under §§ 1251 and 1101.26 The IJ ruled, and the BIA agreed, that
the indeterminate sentence had the legal effect of at least a five year sentence,
barring Nam from a withholding of deportation.1 7
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the agency's decision. 2 " The court held
that where Congress has not specifically addressed an issue, an agency has
broad discretion in applying the law, provided its interpretation constitutes a
permissible construction of its enabling statute. 2 9 Furthermore, the statutory
construction employed by the agency need not be the only one it could have
permissibly adopted, or even the construction that the reviewing court would
have applied.22 The BIA did not err, therefore, in considering the maximum
term imposed to define the conviction as an aggravated felony.
2 1
3. Inmates Do Not Have Standing to Compel Their Own Deportation
Under § 1253(h)
a. Walford v. INS
222
i. Facts
An INS deportation order alerted prison officials that upon Walford's
completion of his prison term, they were to transfer him to the INS for pro-
cessing.223 Walford claimed the deportation order violated his due process
212. 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir. 1995).






219. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
220. Id. at 843 n.l 1.
221. Nguyen, 53 F.3d at 311.
222. 48 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1995).
223. Walford, 48 F.3d at 477.
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rights." 4 Since the notice resulted in a higher security classification, Walford
argued that it prevented him from participating in activities that could expedite
his release from prison.2" Walford requested relief in the form of either im-
mediate deportation or a lifting of the deportation order during incarcera-
tion. 26 The district court treated the habeas corpus application as an attack
on the merits of the final deportation order and dismissed the motion for lack
of jurisdiction.2"
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit treated Walford's petition as both a writ of habeas
corpus228 and a writ of mandamus.229 The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of the writ of mandamus, agreeing that an inmate cannot compel
deportation proceedings.23 An administrative decision by the INS to delay
deportation proceedings pending an inmate's release is immune from judicial
review.23" '
As for the habeas petition, Walford denied that the petition attacked the
merits of the final deportation order; he alleged, rather, that the existence of
the order violated his due process rights.232 The Tenth Circuit ruled that ab-
sent an attack on the merits of the order, the petition did not constitute a due
process violation.233 The detainer itself clearly instructed prison officials that
its existence did not limit their decisions affecting "the offender's classifica-
tion, work and quarters assignments or other treatment which he would other-
wise receive." '234
224. Id. at 477-78.
225. Id. at 477.
226. Id. at 477-78.
227. Id. at 478. Attacks on the merits of final deportation orders must be brought directly
before the circuit court of appeals, which serves as the forum for judicial review of agency de-
cisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1994).
228. Walford, 48 F.3d at 477. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) authorizes issuance of writs of habeas
corpus.
229. Walford, 48 F.3d at 477. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994) pertains to writs of mandamus.
230. Walford, 48 F.3d at 478.
231. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (stating that courts may not substitute their judg-
ment for an agency's reasonable interpretation). Appellate courts from other circuits have ruled
similarly on writs of mandamus. See Rodriguez v. INS, 994 F.2d 110, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that an alien may not be deported before completing term of imprisonment); Perez v. INS, 979
F.2d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that the INS cannot be compelled to deport a prisoner).
232. Walford, 48 F.3d at 478.
233. Id.; accord McDonald v. New Mexico Parole Bd., 955 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing writ of habeas corpus upon finding that an unexecuted detainer warrant does not deny
any constitutional rights, even though petitioner claimed it prevented him from taking advantage
of prison programs).
234. Walford, 48 F.3d at 478.
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b. Hernandez-Avalos v. INS23
i. Facts
Four aliens convicted of deportable offenses sought a writ of mandamus
compelling the INS to initiate deportation proceedings against them.236 The
district court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that no law
applied to the case because the Immigration Act itself did not contain any
criteria for evaluating the government's actions, and no relevant regulations
existed."7
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, at a minimum, no private right of action
exists under § 1252(i).2"' Additionally, since legislative history indicated
congressional intent that no one would be able to satisfy the "zone of inter-
ests" test in a suit to enforce § 1252(i), "no would-be plaintiff has standing to
bring suit, either directly under the statute or by way of the Mandamus
Act.9
239
As an alternative basis for denying the petitioners' relief, the court stated
that the "zone of interests" test under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
governs standing to seek mandamus 4.2 ' Both the APA and the Mandamus
Act compel "wrongfully withheld agency action, 24' with the analysis focus-
ing on whether the defendant agency has failed to discharge a duty owed to
plaintiff.242 The question, then, was whether these plaintiffs satisfied the zone
of interests test, and should therefore be heard,243 regardless of whom the
statute was enacted to benefit. 2" The court determined that Congress did not
235. 50 F.3d 842 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 92 (1995).
236. Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 843.
237. Id. The underlying statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1994), states only that deportation should
begin "expeditiously" after conviction.
238. Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 844.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 845 n.7.
242. Resilient Tile Layers Local Union No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564, 566-67 (10th Cir.
1981).
243. Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 847.
244. Id. at 847-48. The court stated that the legislative history behind § 1252(i) makes it clear
that the statute was enacted to benefit the taxpayer by avoiding the costs associated with main-
taining deportable criminal aliens:
These people are not being deported; the expedited procedure is not working; the local
and State jails are jammed up, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has no incen-
tive to give priority to these because the burden of inaction falls on State and local
governments and not on the Federal system.
Id. at 848 n.12 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. H9794 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep.
MacKay)). The court quoted Senator Alan Simpson:
Not only will the Federal prison system benefit from an enhanced program to deport
aliens in its custody, but even . . . greater benefits can be anticipated at the State and
local level, if the program can reach that far. It may well be that a supplemental request
may be necessary to provide for additional personnel and resources to expedite these de-
portations. However, any such increases would be but a small fraction of the cost to
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intend to create a duty to plaintiffs by enactment of the statute, nor that incar-
cerated aliens would enforce the statute. 45
C. Analysis
American citizenship is a precious right which some fear recent develop-
ments in United States immigration laws will dangerously erode.2" Compet-
ing policy considerations come into play when examining the issue of alien
criminals. Although United States citizens have an interest in seeing justice
served through incarceration of the alien criminal, imprisonment is expensive
and places an ever-increasing burden on the already overcrowded prison sys-
tem.
247
Immediate deportation of alien criminals also presents a host of problems.
In addition to negating the deterrence effect of incarceration, many deported
criminals may simply re-enter the United States. These returning criminal
aliens have the potential to further impact negatively on society, financially or
otherwise.
The current strategy of conducting deportation proceedings after the term
of the alien's incarceration, although resulting in longer periods of detention,
represents the most prudent approach. The valid interests of the United States
in maintaining the highest level of social order should subordinate any frustra-
tion experienced by aliens awaiting the slow process of deportation.
D. Other Circuits
When faced with aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, other circuits
have consistently ruled that a bar of discretionary relief from deportation does
not require a separate finding of dangerousness. 21 In a case of first impres-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the aggravated felony conviction language
contained in § 1251 referred to all aggravated felonies, regardless of the
provide prison and jail space for these individuals.
Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. S16,908 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson)).
245. Id. at 847-48.
246. See generally Jeffrey A. Evans, DenaturalizationlDeportation: What Standards for With-
drawing the Welcome Mat?, 23 U.S.F. L. REv. 415 (1989) (discussing the denaturalization and
deportation of "undesirable citizens" accused of committing serious crimes prior to entering the
United States).
247. See Walford v. INS, 48 F.3d 477, 478 (1995) (stating that Congress considered the deter-
rent effect of prison sentences, and the savings that could be realized by deporting aliens without
imprisoning them first, when enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h), which requires an alien criminal to
serve the entire prison sentence); see also New York Deports 86 Illegal Aliens, PATRIOT LEDGER,
Aug. 29, 1995, at 02 (reporting that criminal aliens comprise approximately 5% of the state's
"costly and overcrowded prison system").
248. See Kofa v. INS, 60 F.3d 1084, 1088-89, 1091 (4th Cir. 1995) (including survey of five
other circuits not requiring separate determination); see also Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 584
(11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that lewd assault was a "crime of violence" constituting an aggravated
felony for purposes of deportation); Samaniego-Meraz v. INS, 53 F.3d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that aggravated felony bar pre-dates enactment of Anti-Drug Abuse Act); Gjonaj v. INS,
47 F.3d 824, 826 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that assault with firearm with intent to murder qualifies
as a "particularly serious crime" to bar relief from deportation).
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date.249 Two other circuits decided cases involving the moral turpitude provi-
sion of § 1251, ruling that second-degree malicious mischief is not a crime of
moral turpitude,' ° but that first-degree incest is.25
In a case involving a writ of habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit, reversing a
view articulated in a previous decision, 252 ruled that incarcerated aliens do
not have standing to compel expedited deportation hearings.25 a In another ha-
beas action, the Ninth Circuit held that an excludable alien has no private right
of action to assert procedural due process rights concerning admission or ex-
clusion;254 rather, the Attorney General has the authority to detain an
excludable alien indefinitely if undeportable.255
CONCLUSION
At first glance, many of the Tenth Circuit's immigration rulings seem
somewhat harsh. Stories of political upheaval, warfare, and tragic economic
hardship strike a sympathetic chord in most. Analyzed in light of the legisla-
tive history and congressional intent underlying current immigration policy,
however, it becomes apparent that this narrow construction remained true to
the letter of the law during the 1994-95 survey period.
The United States, for very practical reasons, can only afford to welcome
aliens whom society deems beneficial and, hence, "worthy" of citizenship.
Immigration laws provide a structure for determining this worth based on
established public policy goals. The agencies and courts, on the other hand,
provide the mechanism which tests these goals. Combined, the structure of
these laws and enforcement mechanisms theoretically ensure that each appli-
cant is evaluated in light of both practical and idealistic goals.
Kathleen M. Kelly
249. Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d 614, 617 (11 th Cir. 1994).
250. Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238, 240 (9th Cir. 1995).
251. Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1994).
252. Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute as stated in
Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311,314 (9th Cir. 1995).
253. Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1995).
254. Barrera-Echavaria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 479
(1995).





The Tenth Circuit recently decided several cases on the issue of tribal
court jurisdiction over non-Indians. Following a brief general discussion of the
history of federal Indian policy, this Survey will explore the Tenth Circuit's
latest decisions regarding the tribal abstention doctrine and the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA).'
In Worcester v. Georgia,2 the Supreme Court recognized that Indian
tribes exist "as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive."' The decision in Worcester, howev-
er, did not stop the federal government from attempting to assimilate Indians
into white society.4 Such attempts blurred the territorial boundaries between
state and tribal authority.5
Congress gradually has abandoned its assimilation policies in favor of
self-determination.6 In the past, the laws, policies, and treaties of the United
States have compelled the integration of Indians and non-Indians. The policy
of self-determination represents a departure from tradition: an attempt to rec-
ognize the rights of Indians, and in some instances, to redress the wrongs in-
flicted on Indians over the centuries. As a result of self-determination, federal
Indian laws, policies, and treaties often separate Indians from non-Indians.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
2. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
3. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557.
4. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, §§ 1-11, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (cur-
rent version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)). "The ultimate purpose of the Dawes Act was to
break up tribal governments, abolish Indian reservations, and force Indians to assimilate into white
society." STEPHEN L. PEvAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 5 (Norman Dorsen ed., 2d ed.
1992). The Dawes Act created a checkerboard effect with respect to land within a reservation, and
non-Indians were allowed to purchase reservation land. Id. The changes that occurred as a result
of the Dawes Act continue to affect questions of tribal authority.
In 1934, Congress shifted gears and passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), ch. 576,
§§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)). The IRA prohibit-
ed further allotment of Indian land, added lands to existing reservations, created new reservations,
and restored tribal ownership to unoccupied "surplus" land. The act encouraged tribes to self-gov-
ern. See PEVAR, supra, at 6-7. In 1953, Congress again changed Indian policy. In an effort to re-
duce federal spending and responsibility, Congress adopted a policy of "termination" with respect
to Indian tribes. Termination effectively abolished both tribal government and landholdings. Be-
cause of the ensuing drastic effects on Indian culture, some scholars compare termination to
"genocide." Id. at 57. During termination, Congress granted jurisdiction over Indians tribes to
several designated states and provided an option for the rest of the states to assume jurisdiction at
a later time. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1994)); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 49
(1987) (discussing case law limitations on congressional jurisdiction under the act). During the
1960s and early 1970s, the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations worked with Congress
to end the "termination era" to promote Indian self-determination. DAVID H. GETcHES ET AL.,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 252 (3d ed. 1993).
5. See supra note 4.
6. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 4, at 252.
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Separation does not equal isolation, however, and controversies continue to
arise between Indians and non-Indians as well as between federal and local
governments.7
I. JURISDICTION
A. Tribal Abstention Doctrine'
1. Background
In National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,9 the
Supreme Court required a federal court to "stay[] its hand until after the Tribal
Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to recti-
fy any errors it may have made."" Tribal courts have the first opportunity to
determine jurisdiction before federal courts may examine the issue." The
Court articulated exceptions to this abstention doctrine where: (1) tribal juris-
diction is motivated by bad faith; (2) the action patently violates express juris-
dictional prohibitions; or (3) exhaustion would be futile. 2 Although federal
7. Nowhere is this fact more evident than in the recent Supreme Court decision, Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Seminole Tribe resolved a circuit split between a Tenth
Circuit case, Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 142 (10th Cir. 1994), an Eleventh Circuit case,
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), and a
congressional interpretation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2721 (1994).
Congress had enacted IGRA in reaction to California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987), in which the Court concluded that, so long as a state allowed any gambling,
it could not regulate tribal gaming. See Sidney M. Wolf, Killing the New Buffalo: State Eleventh
Amendment Defense to Enforcement of IGRA Indian Gaming Compacts, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CoNTEMP. L. 51, 56 (1995). IGRA attempts to promote cooperation between tribal and state gov-
ernments by providing a regulatory framework for gaming activities on Indian lands while balanc-
ing tribal, state, and federal interests. See id. In Ponca Tribe, the Tenth Circuit upheld the IGRA,
reasoning that the U.S. Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to bring states
into court. Ponca Tribe, 37 F.3d at 1427. In Seminole Tribe, however, the Eleventh Circuit held
that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment state immunity. Seminole
Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1028. The United States Supreme Court sided with the Eleventh Circuit, holding
that Congress may not force a state governor to enter into good faith negotiations with a tribe.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (referring to the doctrine announced in Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which allowed a federal court to enjoin the state Attorney
General from performing an unconstitutional discretionary act, regardless of whether the state con-
sented to the suit).
8. The tribal abstention doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from hearing a matter
until a tribal court has first had the opportunity to consider the matter. National Farmers Union
Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985). Challengers must exhaust all
tribal remedies before a federal court may review a challenge to a tribal court ruling. Iowa Mutual
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987).
9. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
10. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 856-57; see Frank R. Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues
of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARiz. L. REV. 329, 336-44 (1989) (discussing the factors that a tribal
court must consider in determining its jurisdiction). Two years after National Farmers, the Court
in LaPlante decided that "[r]egardless of the basis for jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting
tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a
'full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction."' LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16 (quoting National
Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).
12. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
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courts may hear a challenge to tribal jurisdiction, 3 a challenger must gen-
erally exhaust tribal remedies before raising the issue in federal court."
A tribe's authority to exercise jurisdiction within its territory is subject to
any limitations that Congress may seek to impose. 5 For example, tribes can-
not exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 6 Federal jurisdictional lim-
itations, however, do not extend to civil matters where the conduct in question
involves Indians, reservation land, or trust land that was once within the
boundaries of a reservation. 7 A non-Indian who challenges the authority of a
tribe to exert jurisdiction usually claims either that the action did not occur in
Indian country," or that the tribe lacks sufficient interest in the matter to ex-
ert jurisdiction." The term "Indian country" encompasses not only the formal
reservation, but Indian allotments and dependent Indian communities as
well.2" A tribe may exercise civil authority over Indian country as defined by
18 U.S.C. § 1151.2" The boundaries of Indian Country determine the extent
13. Id. at 855-57.
14. Id. at 856-57. The tribal abstention doctrine is based on the congressional policy of "sup-
porting tribal self-government and self-determination. That policy favors a rule that will provide
the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and
legal bases for the challenge." Id. at 856 (footnotes omitted).
15. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that tribal sovereignty "ex-
ists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance"); see PEvAR, supra
note 4, at 154; Pommersheim, supra note 11, at 335-36 (discussing the extent of tribal legislative
and regulatory authority over non-Indians). See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDER-
AL INDIAN LAW 47-206 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.) (discussing the history of United
States policy toward Indians).
16. Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). The exercise of tribal
jurisdiction in criminal matters does not extend to non-Indians unless Congress gives that power to
the tribe. Id. at 208. But see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (holding that
acts passed by Congress "manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political com-
munities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive").
17. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
152-53 (1980); PEVAR, supra note 4, at 155-56; Pommersheim, supra note 11, at 343-44 ("Does a
tribal court have civil jurisdiction over a civil transaction that took place outside the boundaries of
the diminished reservation but on trust land within the original borders of the reservation? The
apparent answer is yes.").
18. "Indian country" refers to:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the Unit-
ed States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-
of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territo-
ry thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allot-
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including ights-of-way
running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Section 1151 on its face defines "Indian country" solely for the purpose
of criminal jurisdiction. The Court, however, has held that § 1151 applies to questions of civil
jurisdiction as well. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). Diffi-
culties arise in determination of what constitutes "Indian country," due in part to the inconsistent
treatment of Indians by Congress. See supra note 4.
19. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). "[Al tribe may assert its
authority if the non-Indian activity threatens or has a direct effect on the political integrity, eco-
nomic security, or health and welfare of the tribe or if the activity is the result of a consensual
agreement, such as a business contract, with the tribe." PEVAR, supra note 4, at 156.
20. See supra note 18.
21. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427 n.2.
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of tribal court jurisdiction, tribal legislative and regulatory authority, and the
applicability of the tribal abstention doctrine.
2. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman22
a. Facts
The South McKinley Mine lies outside the Navajo Reservation (Reserva-
tion) and adjacent to a companion mine located within the Reservation bound-
ary. Five interests hold shares in the surface tide to the mine shaft.23 Three
interests have an ownership interest in the subsurface coal estate.24 The
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company (P&M) leased the right to conduct
mining operations from these titleholders.25
The Navajo Nation imposed a 5% levy on source gains26 in the form of a
Business Activities Tax.27 Under protest, P&M paid this tax, and, in 1986,
filed an action seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the Nava-
jo Nation (the Nation) lacked jurisdiction to impose this tax.2" The Nation
argued that the federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction due
to the tribal abstention doctrine and should allow the tribal court to hear the
matter first.' Finding that the mine was not on the Reservation, the district
court refused to defer to the tribal court.3"
The Nation offered two theories in support of its claim for federal court
abstention. It claimed that the mine was located on part of the Reservation,
and, in the alternative, that the area in question included Indian Country as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151."' The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding that the mine did not lie on the Reservation.32 Since the district court
failed to determine if the mine's location involved Indian Country, however,
the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to address this issue.33
22. 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
23. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1534. The United States holds 47% in trust for
individual Navajo allotees, non-Indian private parties hold 40%, the Navajo Nation holds 7%, the
United States holds 5% as public lands, and New Mexico holds title to less than 0.5%. Id.
24. Id. The United States holds title to 52%, Cerillos Land Company holds title to 47%, and
New Mexico holds title to less than 0.5%. Id.
25. Id.
26. "Source gains of a Branch are the gross receipts of that Branch from the sale, either
within or without the Navajo Nation, of Navajo goods or services .... Navajo Tribal Code, 24 §
404 (2). "Branch" means any person engaged in trade, commerce, manufacture, power production,
or any other productive activity whether for profit or not, wholly or in part within the Navajo
Nation." Navajo Tribal Code, 24 § 404 (1).
27. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1535. A Business Activity Tax is a tax "imposed
on the source-gains of a Branch at the rate established .... The tax due for a period is computed
by multiplying the source-gains of the Branch for the period by the tax rate." Navajo Tribal Code,
24 § 401; see also supra note 26 (defining source-gains).
28. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1534. See generally Pommersheim, supra note I1,
at 347 (discussing tribal taxation of non-Indians).







On remand, the district court held that the area in question did not include
Indian Country,34 and refused to dismiss P&M's complaint.35 The Nation
appealed again, raising three arguments: (1) the district court should abstain
from hearing the matter until P&M exhausts its tribal remedies because the
three exceptions to the tribal abstention doctrine are inapplicable; (2) the dis-
trict court erred in concluding that no part of the mine site was within a trust
allotment; and (3) the district court chose the wrong "community of reference"
for its dependent Indian community analysis.36
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that at least a portion of the mine existed in
Indian Country due to the state's trust holdings of individual Navajo allot-
ments.37 The court held, however, that the record was insufficiently devel-
oped to determine whether the mine's location included a dependent Indian
community." This determination was crucial: the Navajo's interests would
not be sufficient to invoke the abstention doctrine unless a dependent Indian
community existed in addition to individual allotments. Therefore, the court
reversed and remanded the matter again with new criteria for the district court
to consider as to whether the mine and surrounding area constituted a depen-
dent Indian community.39
P&M argued that the Nation's attempt to tax the mining company violated
express jurisdictional prohibitions because 18 U.S.C § 1151 did not confer civ-
il jurisdiction over Indian country to the Nation.' The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, holding that § 1151 is "an express Congressional delegation of civil
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1535-36. Community of reference refers to the fact that in order to determine if a
dependent community exists, the court must first ascertain what community to include in its analy-
sis.
37. Id. at 1541. "[T]he United States holds 47% of the mine site area in trust for individual
Navajo allotees. These Navajo trust allotments are Indian country by definition under 18 U.S.C. §
1151(c)." Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The court expanded the "community of reference" from that which the district court
had used in its initial determination. The Tenth Circuit also adopted the Eighth Circuit's four-
prong test for determining what constitutes a dependent Indian community:
(1) whether the United States has retained "title to the lands which it permits the Indians
to occupy" and "authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territo-
ry"; (2) "the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants in the area
to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice of govern-
ment agencies toward the area"; (3) whether there is "an element of cohesiveness ...
manifested either by economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the
inhabitants as supplied by that locality"; and (4) "whether such lands have been set apart
for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples."
Id. at 1545 (quoting United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982) (citations omitted)).
40. Id. at 1536. P&M dismissed as dicta the Supreme Court precedent set forth in DeCoteau
v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 428 n.2 (1975), which recognized that § 1151 generally
applies to civil jurisdiction as well as criminal jurisdiction. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at
1540 n.10.
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
authority over Indian country to the tribes,"'" which includes the authority to
tax.42
3. Analysis
Pittsburg & Midway Coal presents a question of first impression for the
Tenth Circuit regarding the appropriate "community of reference" for the
purpose of defining a dependent Indian community within Indian Country. 3
Jurisdiction turns on whether or not the mine is located within a dependent
Indian community. The question then becomes who determines the "commu-
nity of reference" for the purpose of jurisdiction.
As discussed above, the statutory definition of "Indian country" includes
Indian allotments." Here, both parties agreed that a portion of the mine lies
on Indian allotments.' Because the court held that the Nation has authority to
tax mining activities in Indian country, the Business Activities Tax did not
violate any express jurisdictional prohibitions.' Thus, the Tenth Circuit de-
cided that the tax did not fit the "express jurisdictional prohibitions" exception
to the abstention doctrine articulated in National Farmers. P&M, therefore,
had no grounds for escaping tribal court jurisdiction. The court, however,
upheld the district court finding that the Indian allotments alone provided an
insufficient basis for removal.47 In order for the tribal court to exercise juris-
diction, the mine site and surrounding community must be considered Indian
country: a dependent Indian community.' An initial determination that a de-
pendent Indian community exists is a prerequisite to the exercise of tribal
court jurisdiction.
National Farmers indicates that the tribal court should have the first op-
portunity to make initial jurisdiction determinations.49 The Tenth Circuit, in
Pinsburg & Midway Coal, acknowledged that a federal court should not rule
on tribal court jurisdiction until tribal remedies are exhausted." In Pittsburg
& Midway Coal, the Tenth Circuit could have directed the district court to
abstain until the tribal court determined jurisdiction. Applying the Tenth
Circuit's test for a dependent Indian community,5 the tribal court could have
made the initial determination regarding its jurisdiction. Had P&M challenged
the tribal court's decision, it would have had the benefit of the federal district
court's review,52 as National Farmers provides federal review of tribal court
41. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1541.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1543; see supra note 18.
44. See supra note 18.
45. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1542.
46. Id. at 1538.
47. Id. at 1542. The Tenth Circuit noted that if the mine were located entirely on Navajo
trust allotments, or if only the 47% of the mine within the allotments were in controversy, the
abstention doctrine would apply without question. Id. at 1542 n. 1.
48. Id. at 1542.
49. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985).
50. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1537.
51. See supra note 39.
52. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857 (concluding "that § 1331 encompasses the federal
question whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction, and that exhaus-
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jurisdiction after exhaustion in tribal court.53 The Tenth Circuit, however, did
not direct the district court to abstain. Instead, the Tenth Circuit directed the
district court to decide whether the mine lies in Indian Country. 4 The court
maintains that the remand to the district court is consistent with National
Farmers and its analysis of the tribal abstention doctrine.55 This is not the
case. The remand is inconsistent with National Farmers and contradicts the
Tenth Circuit's stance on initial questions of tribal court jurisdiction.
If the district court finds a dependent Indian community, the tribal court
may exercise jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit allows the federal court to review
tribal court jurisdiction before the tribal court has exercised jurisdiction.56 By
contrast, National Farmers provides for federal court review after the tribal
court has exercised jurisdiction. In this case, if the tribal court should acquire
jurisdiction, then P&M's right to subsequent federal court review of the tribal
court's exercise of jurisdiction57 should be precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata.s
When the Supreme Court set forth the tribal abstention doctrine in Nation-
al Farmers, the Court failed to direct the lower courts as to its proper scope.
Thus, federal courts apply the tribal abstention doctrine inconsistently.59 In
Pittsburg & Midway Coal, the court failed to explain why the tribal court
should not be allowed to determine the existence of Indian country for juris-
dictional purposes. Absent such an explanation, the Tenth Circuit's approach
either: (1) calls into question the ability of tribal courts to examine questions
of jurisdiction without bias or prejudice; or (2) suggests that tribal courts lack
the competence to follow directions. A more definitive line between federal
and tribal court jurisdiction would resolve the inconsistency in application of
National Farmers.'
tion is required before such a claim may be entertained by a federal court"). In National Farmers,
the Court implied that exhaustion of tribal remedies would "legitimize" the tribal courts. See id. at
856-57. This, in turn, would allow tribal courts to explain the reasoning behind their actions. Id.
Subsequently, on review, federal courts would have the benefit of the tribal court's expertise as
well as a comprehensive record. Id.; see also Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies:
Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1105
(1995) (analyzing the development of the tribal abstention doctrine).
53. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
54. Pittsburg & Midway Coal, 52 F.3d at 1541.
55. Id. at 1539 n.8. "We do not believe our final disposition of this appeal contradicts this
analysis. Our remand to the district court on the dependent Indian community issue is essentially
limited to the resolution of factual issues and their application to the legal framework outlined in
this opinion." Id.
56. It appears to follow that if the mine is located in Indian country, and the tribal court has
jurisdiction to hear the matter, then the tribe probably has authority to tax. If this is true, then the
federal district court has, in effect, resolved the controversy in its entirety. See id. at 1541 (holding
that § 1151 "represents an express Congressional delegation of civil authority over Indian country
to the tribes. As a result, the Navajo Nation has authority to tax any mining activities taking place
in Indian country without violating any express jurisdictional prohibitions").
57. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
58. "A matter decided or passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction is received as
evidence of the truth." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1310 (6th ed. 1990).
59. Reynolds, supra note 52, at 1114-19; see also Phillip W. Lear & Blake D. Miller, Ex-
haustion of Tribal Court Remedies: Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmative Action, 71 N.D.
L. REV. 277, 285-92 (1995) (pointing out the inconsistent application of the exhaustion rule by
federal circuit courts).
60. See Reynolds, supra note 52, at 1113-56 (discussing uncertainties related to the exhaus-
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B. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
1. Background
Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in an effort to
remedy past wrongs against the Indian community.62 Prior to ICWA's enact-
ment, presumably well-intentioned, but misguided, state agencies and courts
engaged in the systematic removal of reservation Indian children from their
parents.63 In passing ICWA, Congress recognized that as a sovereign entity,
an Indian tribe has a vital interest in its children. ICWA, therefore, gives ex-
clusive jurisdiction to tribal courts when a child resides on a reservation, and
concurrent jurisdiction with state courts when an Indian child is domiciled or
residing off a reservation.' Since state laws defining domicile vary among
the states, the Supreme Court in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield5 defined "domicile" for the purpose of jurisdiction under ICWA. 6
In Holyfield, the Court held that the domicile of a child is that of the child's
61parents.
tion doctrine and possible clarifications); see also Lynn H. Slade, Dispute Resolution in Indian
Country: Harmonizing National Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in the
Federal Courts, 71 N.D. L. REv. 519, 521-34 (1995) (comparing other federal abstention doctrines
to that set forth in National Farmers and suggesting that tribal abstention should be limited in
application as it is in the federal/state context).
61. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
62. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4), 1902.
63. Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to
Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 51, 57, 66-73 (1979); see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 32-37 (1989) (discussing the history and purpose of the Indian Child Welfare Act).
64. Section 1911 reads in relevant part:
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation
of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing
Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall
retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.
... In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination
of parental fights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of
the Indian child's tribe, the court, in absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer
such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon
the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided,
that such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(3).
65. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
66. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44-48. In Holyfield, the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of
the word "domicile" in its analysis of an adoption decree executed by the mother of twin babies.
Although the parents lived on the reservation, the babies were born off-site. The Holyfields, both
non-Indians, adopted the twins. The Choctaw Tribe moved to vacate the adoption decree based on
the ICWA. The lower court denied the motion, finding that the Tribe did not have exclusive juris-
diction because the children had never resided on the reservation and were not domiciled on the
reservation. Id. at 37-40. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 38-40. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the proceeding, reasoning that "domicile" is not synonymous with
residence. Because a child cannot form the intent to establish domicile, their domicile is deter-
mined by the domicile of its parents (i.e., the parents' physical presence in a place with the intent
to remain there). Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 48-49.
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2. Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis'
a. Facts
Rhonda Wahnee (Rhonda), a non-Indian, filed for divorce from Stuart
Wahnee (Stuart), a member of the Comanche Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
(Tribe). 69 Rhonda and Stuart signed a power of attorney giving custody of
their daughter to Stuart's sister, Blanche Wahnee, another member of the
Tribe.70 The state court granted a divorce decree but stayed determination of
custody and child support pending another proceeding on Rhonda's parental
rights.7" In accordance with ICWA, the tribal court informed the state court at
a hearing of its wish to assume jurisdiction over the termination of parental
rights proceeding.72 Rhonda objected to the transfer." Consequently, the
tribal court filed a formal motion with the state court for the transfer of juris-
diction over the termination of parental rights proceeding pursuant to ICWA.
The state court granted the motion.74
Rhonda then filed a motion in state court to vacate the order of transfer
on the grounds that her oral objection made the transfer to the tribal court
improper." The state court vacated its order, and the tribal court filed two
additional motions to transfer under ICWA.76 The first claimed that the tribal
court had exclusive jurisdiction to determine child custody proceedings pursu-
ant to ICWA. The second requested that the state court rescind its order vacat-
ing the transfer to the tribal court, or in the alternative, transfer the matter
back to tribal court.77 The tribal court claimed that the state court had lost ju-
risdiction to vacate its transfer order when jurisdiction was transferred to the
tribal court.78
The state court entered summary judgment in favor of Rhonda. 9 The
court found that at the time of the filing of the juvenile proceeding, Rhonda
and Stuart were not residing on tribal land."0 Therefore, ICWA did not apply.
Rather than appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Tribe filed an action
in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment as to which court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction to adjudicate the parental termination proceedings."' The
68. 53 F.3d 298 (10th Cir. 1995).
69. Comanche Indian Tribe, 53 F.3d at 299.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 300.
73. Id.
74. ld. The ICWA directs state courts to transfer proceedings to tribal court absent objection
by either parent. See supra note 64.
75. Comanche Indian Tribe, 53 F.3d at 300. The motion to vacate was made almost four
years after the state court ordered the transfer of the termination proceedings to the tribal court.





80. Id. at 301 n.5; see Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48
(1989) (indicating that "[slince most minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to
establish a domicile, their domicile is determined by that of their parents").
81. Comanche Indian Tribe, 53 F.3d at 300-01.
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federal district court ruled that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction be-
cause Kristy was a domiciled resident of the reservation, and a ward of the
tribal court. In addition, the federal district court ruled that the state court had
no jurisdiction to vacate its transfer order. 2
b. Decision
Without addressing the Tribe's substantive arguments, the Tenth Circuit
found that the ICWA did not provide independent grounds to litigate state
court decisions in federal court and reversed the lower court decision. As a
result, the tribe could not appeal the state court's judgment in federal court. s3
By statute, federal courts must give a state court judgment the same preclusive
effect that the courts of that state would give to such judgments.84 As such,
the Tenth Circuit reviewed Oklahoma's rules of issue and claim preclusion. 5
Finding that Oklahoma's "estoppel by judgment" doctrine precluded the Tribe
from re-litigating the matter in federal court under the guise of a motion for
declaratory judgment, 6 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.87 Because the matter was litigated in
state court, appellate review of that decision was limited to the state court
system."8
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Comanche Indian Tribe follows its earlier
decision in Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis. 9 When a tribe disagrees with a state
court's application of ICWA, the only available judicial review lies with the
state appellate court and the United States Supreme Court."
Comanche Indian Tribe and Pittsburg & Midway Coal demonstrate what
some perceive as a general bias against tribal courts.9 For example, when a
tribal court assumes jurisdiction in a matter involving a non-Indian, the en-
suing decision is subject to review by a federal district court.92 In contrast,
82. Id. at 301.
83. Id. at 304-05. Rhonda appealed to the Tenth Circuit asserting that the Tribe was collater-
ally estopped from raising this issue in federal court. The Tribe argued that § 1914 of ICWA gave
the Tribe the right to challenge in federal court the state court's ruling regarding the applicability
of § 1911 (a). The pertinent language in § 1914 authorizes certain individuals to "petition any
court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated
any provision of" § 1911. Id. at 300-04 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1994)).
84. Id. at 302.
85. Id. at 302-03.
86. Id. at 303.
87. See id. at 302-04.
88. Id.
89. 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986) (ruling on a tribe's at-
tempt to secure federal review of a Kansas Supreme Court decision denying the tribe's motion to
intervene under the ICWA). In Kiowa Tribe, the Tenth Circuit found that § 1914 was not an in-
dependent ground to relitigate the applicability of ICWA. Id. at 592.
90. Comanche Indian Tribe, 53 F.3d at 304-05.
91. See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 4, at 522-23 (discussing barriers to the im-
provement of and bias against tribal courts).
92. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-57 (1985).
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when a state court assumes jurisdiction over a matter involving an Indian tribe,
there is no similar option. The state court decision to exercise jurisdiction
stands unless the United States Supreme Court determines otherwise.
In Comanche Indian Tribe, the question of jurisdiction arose under the IC-
WA, a statute purporting to favor tribal court jurisdiction. In application, how-
ever, the ICWA places a tribal court on unequal footing with state courts. For
example, the ICWA gives state courts superior authority over tribal courts in
deciding child custody proceedings. For example, a state court decides whether
or not to grant a tribe's motion for transfer of jurisdiction,93 despite congres-
sional recognition that state courts in the past have often ordered unwarranted
separation of Indian children from their parents.9" Considering past and pres-
ent conflicts existing between state and Indian governments,95 the wisdom of
giving states the authority to decide matters that are so vital to the survival of
tribal government is questionable," and at odds with the federal policy of
self-determination.97 Without federal review, a tribe remains at the mercy of
state courts.
C. Other Circuits
During the Survey period, federal courts examined questions of tribal
jurisdiction in a variety of contexts. In United States ex rel. Morongo Band of
Mission Indians v. Rose,9" the Morongo Band of Indians brought an action
against a non-Indian and an Indian involving a contract and enforcement of a
tribal ordinance regulating bingo on reservation land." The Ninth Circuit
ruled that the contract did not preclude enforcement of the tribal ordinance
93. See supra note 55.
94. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994).
95. The battle between the states and the tribes to determine who prevails has continued
since, if not before, the Supreme Court's holding in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). In Worcester, the Court held that Georgia could not extend its laws within the boundaries
of the Cherokee reservation. Id. at 557-61. Since this decision, the rule has eroded largely due to
the enactment of the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, §§ 1-11, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1995)). The General Allotment Act opened up reservation land to white
settlement. As a result, some land within a reservation is owned in fee by non-Indians. States have
authority to regulate these non-Indians, but state regulation often interferes with tribal regulation.
These conflicts are readily apparent in more recent cases regarding hunting and fishing rights and
regulations and zoning. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (noting that tribes cannot zone areas within reservations owned predom-
inately by non-Indians); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (stating
that tribes have the power to regulate land and resources including the taking of wildlife); Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (noting that tribes have authority to regulate hunting
and fishing by non-members); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977)
(stating that tribes have power to regulate hunting and fishing by members). Most recently, the is-
sue of regulating gaming on all reservation land has been the focus of legal battles between states
and tribes. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996) (involving an Eleventh Amendment challenge to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); Cali-
fornia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that a state which mere-
ly regulates, but does not prohibit, gambling may not regulate tribal gaming operations). For a
further discussion of the regulation of gaming activities, see supra note 7.
96. Guerrero, supra note 63, at 51-54.
97. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
98. 34 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. Morongo Band, 34 F.3d at 903-04.
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because the Secretary of Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had
not approved the contract."° The Ninth Circuit concluded that the non-Indian
party had subjected himself to the authority of the Morongo tribe by entering
into a consensual commercial relationship with a tribal member.'0 ' The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court judgment against the non-Indian." 2
In another Ninth Circuit case, Hinshaw v. Mahler,0 3 the court addressed
subject matter and personal jurisdiction in a wrongful death and survivorship
action. '4 The court found that pursuant to Montana v. United States' and
National Farmers, the tribal court retained subject matter jurisdiction over
both claims."° The Ninth Circuit conceded that the tribal court did not have
concurrent probate jurisdiction over the survivorship claim, but held that this
tort action did not relate to the administration of an estate.0 7 The state
court's probate action, therefore, did not initiate the plaintiff's tort action in
state court.1'5
Addressing the defendant's claim that the tribal court lacked personal
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant's contacts with the
100. Id. at 904-05. The United States Code governs contracts made with Indians and tribes. It
provides in relevant part:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indi-
ans not citizens of the United States, for the payment or delivery of any money or other
thing of value, in present or in prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privi-
lege to him, or any other person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to
their lands ... unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:
Second. It shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.
All contracts or agreement made in violation of this section shall be null and
void ....
25 U.S.C. § 81 (1994).
101. Morongo Band, 34 F.3d at 906; see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565
(1981) (explaining that "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements").
102. Morongo Band, 34 F.3d at 906. The court noted that Montana is relevant where a court
determines that "there has been a general divestiture of tribal authority over non-Indians by alien-
ation of the land." Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, "whether or not the Band generally has the
authority to impose regulations such as its ordinance against non-Indians on Indians' trust allot-
ments" remains an unanswered question. Id. Rose, a non-Indian, argued that the allotment of land
to Miller, an Indian, should divest the tribe of authority over the activities carried on therein. Id.
This argument appears to ignore precedent. First, tribes presumably retain civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians in Indian country unless Congress expressly states otherwise. United States v. Wheel-
er, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). Second, in DeCoteau, the Supreme Court recognized that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 defines "Indian country" for the purpose of civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. DeCoteau
v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). Third, § 1151(c) includes "all Indian
allotments" in its definition of "Indian country." 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1994).
103. 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 485 (1994).
104. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1179.
105. 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see supra note 18.
106. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1180-81. Tribal Ordinance 40-A provides for concurrent tribal and
state jurisdiction over civil matters related to the operation of motor vehicles on public roads.
Tribal Ordinance 36-B defines the circumstances under which such actions could be filed. Id.
107. Id. In Montana, a wrongful death claim and a survivorship claim must be brought in a
separate nonprobate action. Id.
108. Id. at 1181.
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forum met the personal jurisdiction requirements of both tribal law" and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington."' The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of summary judgment and affirmed the tribal court's juris-
diction over both the defendant and the subject matter."'
In South Dakota v. Bourland,"2 South Dakota filed an action to enjoin
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe from excluding non-Indians from hunting and
fishing on nontrust lands within the reservation."3 The Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the conduct of the non-Indians did not fall within the exceptions
set forth in Montana and affirmed the district court's decision to grant the
injunction."4 The dissenting opinion criticized the standard used by the dis-
trict court." 5 The dissent concluded that under Montana, the conduct of the
non-Indians was sufficient to constitute a direct effect on the tribe warranting
tribal jurisdiction."6
During the survey period, the Eighth Circuit mirrored the Tenth Circuit's
conservative approach to issues involving tribal jurisdiction and its preference
for vesting jurisdiction in federal and state courts."7 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, appears more comfortable with tribal authority and the exercise of such
power. Unlike other circuits, the Ninth Circuit does not hesitate to rely on the
general principles and precedents set forth by the Supreme Court that support
109. Id. Tribal case law provides for personal jurisdiction where some relationship exists
between the Tribes and the parties. By living on the reservation, Hinshaw "purposefully availed
herself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum." Her claim, therefore, arose out of
her forum related activities. The Tribes' special interest in exercising jurisdiction in this matter
makes such exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. Id.
110. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
111. Hinshaw, 42 F.3d at 1179.
112. 39 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994).
113. Bourland, 39 F.3d at 869.
114. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous
in that the hunting and fishing of non-Indians on the taken land neither threatened nor directly
affected the political integrity, economic security, or public health and welfare of the tribe. Id. at
870-71. The district court noted that harassment had occurred and that the deer population had
been reduced. This reduction did not decrease subsistence hunting, however, and the court refused
to find these actions sufficient to trigger the second exception in Montana. Id. Non-Indians "may
have harassed cattle grazing on the taken area or on tribal lands, failed to close pasture gates, or
let down wires on fences." Id. at 870 (citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit called such actions
merely "vexatious." Id. Apparently, the district court and Eighth Circuit did not find cattle or the
use and enjoyment of tribal property to be economic interests worth protecting. The court's un-
willingness to categorize livestock as an economic interest is puzzling, especially given the cattle
industry's reaction to the wolf reintroduction in some western states. See Federal Efforts to Intro-
duce Canadian Gray Wolves into Yellowstone National Park and the Central Idaho Wilderness,
1995: Oversight Hearing Before the House of Representatives, Committee on Resources, 104th
Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1995) (arguing against reintroduction of wolves based in part on the fears of
ranchers that wolves will kill cattle, and that states should have a say in whether or not to allow
wolves to exist within their borders).
115. Bourland, 39 F.3d at 871-73 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
116. Id. Senior Circuit Judge Heaney pointed out that the Supreme Court quoted the language
of Montana. Id. at 871-72. Judge Heaney concluded that the district court misapplied the Montana
test because it only considered whether there was any "threat" or "peril" rather than addressing the
"direct effect" to the Tribe's economic security, political integrity, health, or welfare. Id. at 873.
117. But see Lear & Miller, supra note 59, at 290-92 (noting that "[oif all of the circuits, the
Tenth Circuit most readily embraces a mandatory exhaustion requirement"); cf. Reynolds, supra
note 52, at 1114 (referring to a Tenth Circuit opinion in which the court "avoided application of
the exhaustion doctrine").
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vesting substantial jurisdiction in tribal courts. The circuits, however, seem to
share a common inconsistency in the application of Supreme Court precedent.
CONCLUSION
Jurisdiction questions cast a harsh light on the confusion and contradiction
in federal courts with respect to Indian affairs, throwing these inconsistencies
into sharp relief. For example, Congress removed criminal jurisdiction from
tribes in several acts".8 that must be viewed together in order to determine
(a) whether federal or state law has been violated, and (b) which court may
exercise jurisdiction."9 While the statutory structure is puzzling, some sem-
blance of consistency appears in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
No such consistency exists, however, with respect to civil jurisdiction. In
Montana2° and National Farmers,2' the Supreme Court sets forth tests
which leave the scope of tribal jurisdiction to the discretion of lower federal
courts. Since the Court gave no formal guidance, this precedent has proved of
limited value. Perhaps this inconsistency and confusion could have been avo-
ided by adhering to earlier precedent and leaving tribes with exclusive auth-
ority over their territory.' 2
Lisa Vanderhoof
118. GETcHES ET" AL., supra note 4, at 551-73 (detailing the Indian Country Crimes (General
Crimes) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994); the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994); the As-
similative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994); as well as other federal laws which vest "the Unit-
ed States with jurisdiction over crimes by and against Indians, in and out of Indian country");
PEVAR, supra note 4, at 130-33 (explaining that the General Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act,
and the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1162 (1994)), "are the three most important statutes regarding criminal jurisdiction in Indian coun-
try").
119. See PEVAR, supra note 4, at 116, 132 (providing tables showing the confusion surroun-
ding criminal jurisdiction).
120. See supra note 19.
121. See supra text accompanying note 9-10.
122. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832). Worcester stated that:
[C]ongress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat
them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protec-
tion which treaties stipulate. All these acts ... manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which




The Tenth Circuit issued two published intellectual property opinions
during the September 1994 to September 1995 survey period. These cases
warrant discussion for their advancement of new law and adoption of legal
principles common in other circuits. In Vornado Air Circulation Systems v.
Duracraft Corp.,' the Tenth Circuit demonstrated the dormant power of feder-
al patent law.2 In Vornado, the court permitted patent law "principles" to
trump the clear statutory language of the Lanham Act.' According to the
court, the Lanham Act may not protect a nonfunctional product configuration
constituting part of a utility patent claim, even if the configuration falls within
the Act's explicit protections.' The Tenth Circuit also decided Stanfield v.
Osborne Industries.' In a holding consistent with other circuits, the Stanfield
court held that granting a license to use a trademark without maintaining ade-
quate quality control measures results in the licensor's abandonment of rights
to the trademark.6
This Survey analyzes both Vornado and Stanfield. Part I discusses the
history and relationship between the federal patent system and the Lanham
Act's protection for trademarks and trade dress. After presenting the facts and
decision in Vornado, Part I compares the Tenth Circuit's decision to those of
other circuits and then analyzes the court's reasoning. In addressing the
Stanfield decision, Part II first discusses the history of trademark licensing and
the requirements of quality control. Part II then presents the facts and decision
in Stanfield, analyzes the court's position, and briefly addresses the positions
of other circuits on similar issues.
I. PATENT LAW'S CORE PURPOSE PREEMPTS THE LANHAM ACT
A. Statutory Background
Three basic principles support the federal patent system: (1) "to foster and
reward inventionf" by permitting an inventor to enforce contracts licensing
inventions in exchange for royalties;' (2) to "promote[] disclosure of
1. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
2. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1508-10 (discussing the relevance of federal patent law principles
and policy).
3. Id.; see Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
4. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510.
5. 52 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 1995).
6. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 871 (adopting the views of the Second and Ninth circuits).
7. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). To qualify for a patent,
an invention must satisfy the three elements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§
101-103 (1994). The inventor must first show that the invention is "useful." Id. § 101. "Useful"
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inventions ... once the patent expires" and thus allow public use of the pat-
ented invention;8 and (3) "to assure that ideas in the public domain remain
there for the free use of the public."
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides protection for trademarks.'0
Courts have interpreted section 43(a) to protect "trade dress," the features
comprising a product's look or image." When litigating trade dress infringe-
ment issues, plaintiffs must establish that the trade dress is either (1) inherent-
ly distinctive, or (2) has acquired secondary meaning and that confusion in the
marketplace would result from copying. 2 If determined primarily function-
al,' 3 however, competitors may copy the trade dress. 4 Both courts and com-
mentators acknowledge that the functionality defense prevents the Lanham Act
from conflicting with federal patent law. 5
generally means that the item serves some identifiable benefit to people. See, e.g., Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519-30 (1966) (explaining the requirement and definition of utility). An inven-
tion is "novel" if another person has not already produced the exact same invention. 35 U.S.C. §
102. Finally, the inventor must establish that the invention is "'non-obvious' to a person having
ordinary skill in the art which the subject matter pertains." Id. § 103.
8. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
9. Id.
10. Section 43(a) provides in part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof, or any false designation of origin ... which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affili-
ation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the ori-
gin ... of his or her goods ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who be-
lieves that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
11. The Tenth Circuit explains trade dress as follows:
Trade dress is a complex composite of features. One may be size, another may be color
or color combinations, another may be texture, another may be the graphics and arrange-
ment and so on. Trade dress is a term reflecting the overall general impact, usually
visual, but sometimes also tactile, of all these features taken together.
Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.) (citing SK & F Co.
v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979), aff d, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d
Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 708 (1988).
12. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1502-03.
13. In W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed extensively the concept of functionality. The court provided an example: "A firm that
makes footballs could not use as its trademark the characteristic oval shape of the football, thereby
forcing its rivals to find another shape for their footballs." Id. at 339. Because a football must be
oval to function correctly, the shape is functional. Id. No alternative shapes exist that would suf-
fice for a football. Id.
One test used to determine functionality is to ask "whether the protection of the feature
would hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale
of goods." Hallmark Cards, 846 F.2d at 1272. If competitors could use alternative designs, the
challenged feature would likely be found nonfunctional. Id. at 1273.
As one commentator explained, "[A] nonfunctional feature ... is one with perfect (or
nearly perfect) substitutes." Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of
the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shake-
speare v. Silstar Co., 18 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 259, 265 (1995).
14. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1503.
15. See infra note 32.
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B. Case Law Background
1. The Sears-Compco Decisions
The idea that the federal patent system prevents other laws from protect-
ing an invention originates from Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' 6 and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.7 Because these decisions were
consistent and announced on the same day, they have become known as the
Sears-Compco decisions. The Sears-Compco decisions prohibit states from
enacting laws protecting objects if such protection is inconsistent with the
objectives of federal patent laws. 8
The dispute in Sears began when Sears copied a pole lamp design for
which Stiffel had obtained both design and utility patents." Stiffel sued Sears
for patent infringement and unfair competition, claiming that Sears had caused
confusion in the market about the source of Sears's lamps.2" The Supreme
Court found the lamp unpatentable and held that federal patent law preempted
Illinois unfair competition laws.2' The Court explained that "[a]n unpatentable
article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."22 This reasoning
led to a similar result in Compco.23
2. Cases Following the Sears-Compco Decisions
Over two decades later, the Supreme Court returned to this issue in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.24 Bonito sued Thunder Craft under a
Florida statute prohibiting "direct molding," a simple and inexpensive way of
duplicating boat hulls. 25 The Supreme Court held that the Florida law "sub-
stantially impede[d] the public use of the otherwise unprotected design and
16. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
17. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
18. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231. The Supreme Court subsequently explained the Sears-Compco
decisions as follows:
[Ildeas once placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject
to appropriation without significant restraint.
At the heart of Sears and Compco [sic] is the conclusion that the efficient opera-
tion of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly
known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) (citations omitted).
19. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26.
20. Id. at 226.
21. Id. at 231-33. The Court stated, "When [a] patent expires, the monopoly created by it
expires, too, and the right to make the article-including the right to make it in precisely the
shape it carried when patented-passes to the public." Id. at 230.
22. Id. at 231.
23. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. Compco also involved a lamp design protected by a state
unfair competition law that conflicted with federal patent laws. Id. at 234. Day-Brite sued Compco
for unfair competition for copying the design of its lighting fixtures. Id. at 235. The district court
held the design of the lighting fixtures manufactured by Day-Brite unpatentable. Id. As in Sears,
the Supreme Court held that federal patent law preempted state unfair competition laws protecting
the lighting fixture. Id. at 238.
24. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
25. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144-45. Bonito Boats did not have a patent for the boat hull
design in question. id. at 144.
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utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls," and therefore federal pat-
ent law preempted the Florida statute.26
The Third Circuit, however, in Sylvania Electric Products v. Dura Elec-
tric Lamp Co., recognized a situation where trademark protections survive
against federal patent law.27 Sylvania sued Dura for copying Sylvania's regis-
tered "blue dot" flash bulb system." Applying the general rule that trademark
protection does not extend to functional articles,29 the Sylvania court held that
it may extend to a feature of a patentable article as long as the portion protect-
ed by the trademark adds no functional use or value.3" Sylvania's claim ulti-
mately failed because the blue dot flash bulb system itself was functional."
Other courts and commentators have recognized the necessity of this
functionality exception to trademark protection.32 As the next section dis-
cusses, however, the Tenth Circuit departed from this trend and distanced
itself from the functionality requirement.
C. Vornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corp.:33
The Tenth Circuit's Rejection of the Functionality Defense
In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit confronted competing policies. Vornado
alleged a classic claim of trade dress infringement, but the claim also involved
an object in the public domain.3" On February 22, 1994, the Patent Office
issued a utility patent to Vornado's founders for a ducted fan manufactured
26. Id. at 157, 168. The Court also referred to the "balance struck by Congress in our patent
laws" between protection and public domain, and noted that "state regulation of intellectual prop-
erty must yield" to that balance. Id. at 152. As a matter of law, once a patent has expired, the
public is free to use the subject matter of the expired patent. Id.
In dicta, the Court recognized that "the common-law tort of unfair competition has been
limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have
acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a designation of source." Id. at 158. It is
this nonfunctional requirement that supposedly prevents friction between the Lanham Act and
federal patent law. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1985) (recog-
nizing a nonfunctionality defense).
27. 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957).
28. Sylvania, 247 F.2d at 731. The blue dot indicated when the bulb was spent. Id.
29. Id. at 732; see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 (1938) (stating that "[a] trade-mark is any
mark, word, letter, number, design, picture, or combination thereof in any form or arrangement,
which . . . (c) is not ... a designation descriptive of goods or of their quality, ingredients, proper-
ties or functions").
30. Sylvania, 247 F.2d at 734 n.I.
31. Id. at 734. The court stated that "[t]he purpose of this rule is obviously to prevent the
grant of perpetual monopoly by the issuance of a trade-mark in the situation where a patent has
either expired, or for one reason or another, cannot be granted." Id. at 732.
32. For example, in W.T. Rogers Co., the Seventh Circuit stated that when dealing with a
claim for trademark/trade dress infringement, "provided that a defense of functionality is recog-
nized, there is no conflict with federal patent law." W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 337. The court
recognized that the functionality defense only exists to "head off a collision between section 43(a)
and patent law." Id. at 338. Commentators have embraced the idea that the functionality defense
keeps the Lanham Act and patent laws in separate comers. One commentator stated that the pur-
pose behind the doctrine of functionality is "to exclude from trademark protection subject matter
properly covered by utility patents." Jay Dratler Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs,
1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 928.
33. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
34. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
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with a spiral grill. 5 Although patent protection did not extend to the grill it-
self because it was already in the public domain,36 Vornado was able to pat-
ent the entire configuration because of the fan,37 and in the original patent
request asserted that the spiral grill increased air flow and enhanced the fan's
safety.3" Vornado's own tests, however, had revealed that fans adorned with
commonly shaped grills worked as well as Vornado fans.39 Thus, according
to Vornado, the spiral design served no useful function other than pure aes-
thetic enhancement.'" From November 1988 until August 1990, Vornado was
the only company selling fans with a spiral grill.4' Thus, according to the dis-
trict court, consumers associated the grill design solely with Vornado fans.42
In August 1990, Duracraft began selling the DT-7 "Turbo Fan."43 The
DT-7 "Turbo Fan" was an inexpensive house fan with a spiral grill designed
specifically to avoid infringing upon Vornado's patent while replicating the
appearance of Vornado's spiral grill." Vornado sued Duracraft, alleging that
Duracraft infringed upon Vornado's trade dress.45 The district court found
that the spiral grill design was nonfunctional and inherently distinctive and that
"consumers were likely to be confused by Duracraft's use of a similar
grill.
46
35. Id. Vomado's founders acquired their first patent on May 22, 1990, and subsequently
applied for a reissue patent which was granted on February 20, 1994. Id.
36. Id. The spiral grill was in the public domain because it was part of earlier expired patent.
Id. The grill was known as the AirTensity Grill. James W. Dabney, Trademarks, Unfair Competi-
tion, and Copyrights: Recent Developments and Other Selected Issues, C962 ALI-ABA 179, 201
(1994).
37. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
38. Dabney, supra note 36, at 200, 202. Specifically, the 1990 patent claimed that the grill
design was superior to a conventional grill in that it absorbed impact shock better, provided higher
air flow at a normal power usage, and focused output where the vents were spaced at their maxi-
mum. Id. Vornado also advertised that the AirTensity Grill served a functional purpose. Examples
of advertisements included claims that the AirTensity grill: "actually amplifies the vortex for bet-
ter, more efficient operation," id.; "is specifically designed to amplify and enhance the naturally
occurring vortex created by the propeller"; and "fit] accomplishes a high degree of safety and
functionality." Id. at 202-04.
39. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. In fact, according to Vornado's expert, alternative grill de-
signs produced better results. Dabney, supra note 36, at 259. An in-court comparison of Vornado
fans with different grills illustrated little or no difference in the velocity or effect of the air flow
when using a spiral grill rather than a straight radial grill. Id. at 261. The district court found that
any difference in performance between fans using spiral grills and fans using normal radial grills
was minimal at best and that there was no "practical difference in the performance between such
grills." Id. at 264.
40. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501. Vornado argued that the spiral shape was chosen mainly to
associate the fan with the name "Vornado," a combination of "vortex" and "tornado." Dabney,
supra note 36, at 248.
41. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. Vornado began selling its fans in November 1988. Id. Ap-
parently, no other competitors offered fans with spiral grills. Id.
42. See id. at 1502 n.7 (noting that the district court found "an association between the grill
design and [the] Vornado [namel").
43. Id. at 1500.
44. Id. at 1500-01. The President/CEO of Duracraft had decided "'to borrow some ideas
from' the Vornado," and the result was the DT-7 "Turbo Fan." Dabney, supra note 36, at 254.
45. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501.
46. Id. at 1501-02. Vornado introduced evidence of a consumer who had bought both a
Vornado fan and a Duracraft DT-7 "Turbo Fan" and believed that the same company manufac-
tured both fans due to similarities in fan design. Dabney, supra note 36, at 264-65. Other witness-
es associated with retailers who sell Vornado fans testified that they had confused DT-7 "Turbo
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The Tenth Circuit admitted that it was reasonable "to assume that a
nonfunctionality requirement would eliminate any possible conflicts between
the Lanham Act and the Patent Act."'47 Relying on Bonito Boats, however,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, stating that the Supreme Court
had previously determined that once a product feature enters the public do-
main, competitors may copy and use the product feature." Therefore, the
Supreme Court's precedent mandated that when unfair competition laws pro-
tecting a product shape from copying clashes with the right to copy under
federal patent law, "the right to copy must prevail."'49
Because of the conflict between the Lanham's Act trade dress protection
and the right to copy under federal patent law, both statutes cannot simulta-
neously apply. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit looked to the "fundamental pur-
poses" of each statute to determine which statute prevailed." The court stated
that federal patent law's objective was to pass on technological progress to the
public." The Tenth Circuit also concluded that protecting against consumer
confusion associated with copying a product configuration is not a primary
emphasis of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.52 Therefore, in resolving the
conflict between federal patent laws and federal trademark protections, the
Tenth Circuit favored "core patent principles."53 The court held that
where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility
patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive
aspect of the invention... so that without it the invention could not
fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its protec-
tion as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional. 4
D. Other Circuits
The Court of Patent Appeals faced a factually similar situation in In re
Shakespeare Co.," also finding in favor of the federal right to copy expired
patents. 6 The appellant in Shakespeare manufactured fishing rods using a
patented process.57 A natural result of the unique manufacturing process was
a spiral design embedded in the rod.5" After the public began associating the
spiral mark with Shakespeare's rods, the company attempted to register the
Fans" with Vornado fans. Id. at 265. Also, a store employee who sells Vomado fans testified that
upon seeing the DT-7 "Turbo Fan," he knew that the fan was "a 'copycat' or [a] 'knockoff' of a
Vornado [fan]." Id.
47. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1506.
48. Id. at 1503.
49. Id. at 1504.
50. Id. at 1507.
51. Id. at 1508.
52. Id. at 1509.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1510.
55. 289 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
56. Shakespeare, 289 F.2d at 508.




spiral mark.59 The court denied Shakespeare's request because the patented
process would eventually pass into the public domain.' The court believed
that the spiral design was nonfunctional.' Despite this belief, the court de-
nied Shakespeare trade dress protection because such protection violated the
right to copy under federal patent law.62
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied the Third Circuit's functionality
distinction when addressing a similar situation in Clamp Manufacturing v.
Enco Manufacturing.63 Clamp Manufacturing (Clamp) manufactured and dis-
tributed the Kant-twist c-clamp under an expired patent.64 When Enco began
selling an identical c-clamp, litigation ensued and the district court held that
Enco infringed upon Clamp's configuration.6' After examining the meaning
of functionality in detail,' the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling.
The Ninth Circuit held that although the Kant-twist clamp was the subject
matter of an expired utility patent, the Kant-twist clamp's configuration was
nonfunctional.67
E. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Vornado ignored the fact that the spiral design failed
to improve the performance of Vomado's fans. Vomado argued, and the dis-
trict court found, that the spiral design is neither functional nor necessary for
competition since the Vomado fan worked equally well with other grill de-
signs." The only reason to copy the spiral grill design, therefore, was aesthet-
ic enhancement. Despite Vornado's argument, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
preventing others from copying features of a product with an expired patent
59. Id.
60. Id. at 508. If competitors could not make rods with the unique spiral markings, com-
petitors would be unable to practice the patented process upon the patent's expiration. Thus, al-
lowing trademark protection would grant the appellants a perpetual monopoly on the process or
require competitors to incur the expense of grinding off the spiral mark from their rods. Either
way, allowing protection hinders competition. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 901 (1989).
64. Clamp, 870 F.2d at 513 & n.1.
65. Id. at 514. The district court found "that the Kant-twist clamps were distinctive, primari-
ly nonfunctional, arbitrary, and that commercially feasible alternative configurations existed." Id.
at 516.
66. See id. at 515-17. The Clamp court quoted from an earlier Ninth Circuit decision:
"Functional features of a product are features 'which constitute the actual benefit that the consum-
er wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored,
or endorsed a product."' Id. at 516 (quoting Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d
769, 772 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court looked at several factors in analyzing functionality, including:
[T]he existence of an expired utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantage of the
design sought to be protected as a trademark; the extent of advertising touting the utili-
tarian advantages of the design; the availability of alternative designs; and whether a
particular design results from a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacture.
Id.
67. Id. at 516-17. Necessary to the court's decision was the fact that the "C" design of the
clamp added nothing to the utility of the clamp and that other designs were available. Id. at 516.
68. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501.
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seriously conflicts with the patent system's core objectives, "even when those
features are not necessary to [sic] competition."'
Both Vornado and Shakespeare enable competitors to legally produce
similar, but inferior, products. Under these decisions, competitors can legally
manufacture an inferior fishing rod affixed with a spiral design or produce a
poor-quality fan adorned with a spiral grill.7" In Shakespeare, however, prac-
ticing the patent necessarily resulted in the appearance of a spiral marking on
the rod.7' Competitors practicing the Vornado patent, on the other hand,
could easily achieve the Vornado's functionality without including the spiral
grill because the grill failed to enhance the fan's functionality. A competitor's
ability to practice the useful aspects of an expired patent is certainly important.
If, however, the overall appearance of a patented invention has become associ-
ated with a particular company, and practicing the patent does not dictate a
particular appearance for the resulting product, the invention's appearance
should be entitled to trade dress protection.
The Tenth Circuit considered important the fact that the spiral grill consti-
tuted part of an expired patent.72 The court, however, should not have ignored
Vomado's tests demonstrating that the spiral design failed to improve the fan's
performance. If accurate, the tests show that the spiral design is not necessary
to foster competition. Competitors simply employ the spiral design to enhance
sales by confusing potential Vornado fan consumers. Benefits certainly result
from allowing subsequent inventors to build upon the genius and practical
experience of expired patent holders. These benefits, however, should not pre-
empt Lanham Act protection for the general appearance of a patented inven-
tion if the appearance is not a necessary aspect of the patent's utility.73
69. Id. at 1508.
70. Vornado fans actually function differently from ordinary house fans. Vornado fans shoot
a beam of air into a wall at such a high speed that streams of air begin circulating around the
room. Susan Caba, From Futuristic to Vintage, Fans Today are so Cool, They're Hot, ARiZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Aug. 6, 1994, at AH6. By putting a spiral grill on their fans similar to Vornado's,
Duracraft can mislead the public into believing that their fan operates the same as a Vornado fan.
On the other hand, Duracraft attorneys have called the decision "a great victory for con-
sumers" since Vornado will not be able to hold a perpetual monopoly on patented subject matter.
Roz Hutchinson, Vornado Loses Appeals Ruling on Trademark, WICHITA Bus. J., July 21, 1995, §
1, at 1.
71. Shakespeare, 289 F.2d at 507.
72. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
73. Although the Tenth Circuit's decision seems contrary to what the functionality doctrine
directs, some support exists for the Vornado decision in past Supreme Court cases. In Bonito
Boats, the Supreme Court conceded that "all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpat-
ented subject matter is not ipso facto preempted by the federal patent laws." Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). By analogy, the same would be true for Lanham
Act protection since the Lanham Act is simply the federal government's version of an unfair com-
petition law. Id.
However, the Supreme Court also stated that "the heart of Sears and Compco [sic] is the
conclusion that the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free
trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions." Id. at 156. Further, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use [of once-pat-
ented inventions] is the centerpiece of federal patent policy." Id. at 157.
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II. LICENSING RIGHTS TO A TRADE NAME
A. Background
Trademark law permits trademark owners to issue licenses for the use of
registered trademarks.74 The trademark owner, however, must ensure that the
licensee maintains the quality of goods bearing the trademark." Failure to
ensure quality control results in a "naked" license.76 A naked license may
justify a court's finding that the trademark owner has abandoned the trade-
mark." Once abandonment occurs, the trademark owner may not assert rights
to the trademark."8
The belief that naked licensing is "inherently deceptive" underlies the
quality control requirement.79 The quality control requirement protects the
public from being misled."0 The Second Circuit decided one of the principal
naked licensing cases in 1959."
In Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,"7 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the defendant, Hart's Food, from using the name "Dawn" in
connection with its donut sales. 3 As part of its defense, Hart's Foods claimed
Dawn had failed to exercise adequate control over the quality of donuts sold
by Dawn's licensees and thus had abandoned the mark.84 The Second Circuit
noted that failing to include quality control requirements in licensing agree-
ments results in the production and sale of goods with varying qualities
74. Moore Business Forms v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. The Lanham Act allows companies related to the owner of a trademark to use the
owner's mark so long as the use of the mark does not deceive the public. 15 U.S.C. § 1055
(1994). The Lanham Act defines "related company" as "any person whose use of a mark is con-
trolled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on
or in connection with which the mark is used." Id. § 1127. To ensure that the use does not de-
ceive the public, the owner of the trademark must control the nature and quality of goods bearing
the mark. Id. § 1055.
76. Moore, 960 F.2d at 489.
77. Id.
78. Id. Abandonment precludes the licensor from bringing any complaints concerning in-
fringement of the mark. AmCan Enters. v. Renzi, 32 F.3d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1994).
79. First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Quali-
ty control ensures that the "trademark is not used to deceive the public as to the quality of the
goods or services bearing the name." Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.
1979).
80. Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Commentator
Frank I. Schechter remarked that "the trade-mark is not merely the symbol of good-will but often
the most effective agent for the creation of good-will, imprinting upon the public mind an anony-
mous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions." Kevin
Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the "Quality Control Require-
ment" in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 532 (1992). Furthermore, the trademark
has become an assurance of quality. Id. Failing to maintain the quality of products bearing a li-
censed trademark defrauds the public since the public is relying on the trademark name as guaran-
tee of quality. Id. at 533.
81. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (discussing
whether the Lanham Act protects the "Dawn" trademark).
82. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
83. Dawn, 267 F.2d at 360. Hart's Food Stores sold baked goods in their grocery stores with
the word "Dawn" imprinted on the packages. Id. at 361. Dawn sold doughnut mix to bakeries and
allowed those bakers to sell the doughnuts under its name. Id.
84. Id. at 366.
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bearing the same trademark. 5 The Second Circuit determined that the correct
inquiry asks "whether the [licensor] sufficiently policed and inspected its
licensees' operations to guarantee the quality of the products they sold under
its trademarks to the public."86 Although no one disputes the necessity of
quality control, no bright-line rule exists explaining what constitutes an "ade-
quate" level of quality control.87
Courts determine the adequacy of control on a case-by-case basis.8 One
commentator divided the types of quality control into six categories: (1) actual
control by the licensor;89 (2) a mere contractual right to control; (3) control
by an agent of the licensor; (4) control by a third party;' (5) reasonable reli-
ance on the licensee to control itself; and (6) control by stock ownership.9
B. Stanfield v. Osborne Industries:9
The Tenth Circuit's Adoption of the "Naked" License Rule
Stanfield, a developer of agricultural products, agreed to allow Osborne
Industries, Inc. (OII) to manufacture certain agricultural products for royal-
ties.93 Additionally, Stanfield began working for Oll.94 Pursuant to a subse-
quent agreement, Stanfield allowed OlI to use "Stanfield" as a trademark for
fifteen years in exchange for $75.00.95 Eventually the relationship between
Stanfield and OII soured.96 Stanfield quit his job at OII, and the contract
85. Id. at 367. The court reasoned that because the primary goal of the Lanham Act is to
protect against confusion, and the public cannot adequately protect itself against deceptive use of a
trademark, a licensor must take steps to ensure that others do not misuse the trademark. Id.
86. Id. The Second Circuit found no error in the district court's finding that Dawn had exer-
cised adequate control and supervision. Id. at 367-68.
87. The licensor does not need to be involved in the day-to-day operations of the licensee to
ensure quality control. Oberlin, 596 F.2d at 1327.
88. Parks, supra note 80, at 540.
89. William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Con-
trol, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 100-04 (1980).
90. Id. at 105. Granting a license to use the trademark on pharmaceutical products falls
within this category. Id. Since the FDA regulates the quality of pharmaceuticals, the licensor may
rely on the FDA's regulation of quality control. Id.
91. Id. at 106-07.
92. 52 F.3d 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 314 (1995). It is not surprising that the
Tenth Circuit recognized the requirement of quality control. Presumably everyone accepts the
quality control requirement without controversy. Parks, supra note 80, at 534-35.
93. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 869.
94. Id.
95. Id. The pertinent language of the license follows:
WHEREAS, Second Party [011] desires to use the name "Stanfield" on all or part of the
products manufactured by Second Party whether or not the same be invented by First
Party, as a distinctive mark on said products in conjunction with the name of said prod-
ucts, and
WHEREAS, Second Party [OII] desires to use the name "Stanfield" as a distinctive
mark on all or part of its products manufactured, at its discretion for a period of Fifteen
(15) years from the date of this agreement and that said design of the distinctive mark
bearing the name "Stanfield" shall be at the sole discretion of said party of the Second
Part [011] as to the design of the same ....
96. Id. at 870.
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between OII and Stanfield expired. 97 011 registered "Stanfield" as its trade-
mark.9 In September 1991 Stanfield requested that 011 discontinue using
"Stanfield" as a trademark. 99 OI continued using the "Stanfield" name and
Stanfield initiated suit against OII. Stanfield alleged that OII's use of the
"Stanfield" name violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which prohibits false representa-
tions about the quality of goods and false designation of product origin.
Stanfield also alleged that 011 fraudulently procured the mark, and that 011
was liable under various state laws.'' The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of 0II.02
The Tenth Circuit held that the July 1975 agreement granted 011 a naked
license. 3 Pursuant to the agreement, Stanfield had allowed OII "to use the
mark on any quality or type of good [011] chooses."'" The court concluded
that under the agreement, Stanfield failed to exercise control over the quality
of goods produced by 011 bearing the "Stanfield" name. Hence, Stanfield
abandoned any rights to the trademark by granting 011 a naked license to the
trademark. 05
The Tenth Circuit also addressed Stanfield's claim that even if he had not
expressly controlled quality through the agreement, he had reasonably relied
on 011 to maintain quality."° The court rejected this argument, stating that
Stanfield and 011 did not have the "special relationship" required for reliance
to substitute for quality control. 7 The continued litigation between Stanfield
and 011 and the acrimonious nature of the parties' relationship persuaded the
court that such a relationship did not exist."
C. Other Circuits
Every circuit addressing this issue has recognized the naked license theo-
ry, under which the holder of a trademark can lose trademark rights through
non-use or abandonment." 9 However, some cases indicate that a licensor
does not automatically abandon a trademark by failing to personally maintain
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 869-70.
100. Id. at 870.
101. Id. Because the district court did not exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, the
Tenth Circuit did not address them. Id.
102. ld. at 868.
103. Id. at 871.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 871-72. It is irrelevant that the license was for a fixed term of years, since the right
that Stanfield must retain is the right to control the quality of the products that bear the name
"Stanfield." Id.
106. Id. at 872.
107. Id. The court cited, as examples of cases in which a "special relationship" existed, Taco
Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1991) and Land O'Lakes Cream-
eries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). Id.
108. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 873.
109. E.g., Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121; Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist.,
889 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1989); Kulack v. The Pearl Jack, 178 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir.
1949).
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quality control. These cases involve a licensor who reasonably relies on the
licensee's control of quality.
In Taco Cabana International, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc.," the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a lack of certified quality'control did not result in abandon-
ment. "' Two brothers operated several Taco Cabana Mexican restau-
rants." '2 The brothers later split the business, one retaining the Taco Cabana
name and the other using the name "TaCasita.""' 3 Despite the split, the
brothers agreed to share the Taco Cabana trade dress."4 The Fifth Circuit
held that the brothers did not abandon the Taco Cabana trade dress because
the brothers had engaged in a close working relationship and could rely on
each other's working relationship to maintain quality control." 5
Similarly, in Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Oconomowoc Canning,"6 the
Seventh Circuit recognized a set of circumstances in which a licensee could
rely on the licensor to exercise quality control. In Land O'Lakes, the defendant
agreed to allow a licensee to use the trade name "Land O'Lakes" on canned
goods." ' The licensee used the name for forty years.' The court held that
the agreement was "more than a naked license" and did not constitute an
abandonment of the mark because there had been no complaints about the
quality of goods over this forty year time period."' The court affirmed the
lower court's decision that the "defendant's reliance on the Licensee's control
over the quality of products constituted sufficient supervision to protect the
quality of the goods bearing the trade-mark.'
20
D. Analysis
In Stanfield, the Tenth Circuit adopted the majority rule that granting a
license to use a trade name without maintaining quality control results in a
trademark's abandonment. Stanfield clearly granted a license without maintain-
ing quality control, as the license agreement did not provide for quality control
and Stanfield did not exercise actual quality control.
The Tenth Circuit gave little credit to the fact that Stanfield had once
worked for OII and was reasonably aware of the quality of Oil's goods. Like-
wise, the fact that no litigation ensued over the quality of goods bearing the
"Stanfield" trademark did not persuade the court. The Tenth Circuit empha-
sized that the parties must have a "special relationship" before a licensor may
110. 932 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1991), affd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
111. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121-22.
112. Id. at 1117.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1121-22.
116. 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).
117. Land O'Lakes, 330 F.2d at 669.
118. Id. at 670.
119. Id. The district court also based its decision on the following factors: (1) that the licensee
exercised adequate quality control; (2) that the licensor was familiar with the quality of products
produced by the licensee; and (3) that the licensee's distributor received all quality related com-
plaints. Borchard & Osman, supra note 89, at 106.
120. Land O'Lakes, 330 F.2d at 670.
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rely on the licensee to maintain quality control. But the court failed to describe
the circumstances under which such a relationship might exist. Thus, the cir-
cumstances in which reliance on a licensee can substitute for a licensor's
obligation to maintain quality control remains an open question.
CONCLUSION
The importance of Vornado and Stanfield goes beyond the fact that both
are cases of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. Attorneys practicing in the
intellectual property area should be aware that the Lanham Act may not pro-
tect an invention with a completely nonfunctional and unique appearance, even
if the invention is "a described, significant inventive aspect of [an] inven-
tion."'21 Stanfield gave the Tenth Circuit the opportunity to address the im-
portance of maintaining quality control when licensing a trade name, and
providing an example of when a licensor cannot rely on a licensee to maintain
quality control. Perhaps the best lesson to be learned from Stanfield is that
prospective licensors should seek representation prior to entering into an
agreement.
Timothy W. Gordon





The juvenile system, only recently established in the United States, has a
dark history in its treatment of delinquent youths.' Until the mid-1960s, juve-
niles had no constitutional rights or protections from the system's abuse.
2
Several major revisions to juvenile law culminated to form a juvenile justice
system nearly rivaling in size and complexity that of the adult criminal sys-
tem.3 In spite of the transformation, the judicial shift from pursuing the "best
interests of the child"4 to proof of criminal guilt continues to stimulate con-
troversy while steering juvenile law in the direction of greater
criminalization.5
In light of the debate surrounding adult sentence enhancement and certifi-
cation issues, this Survey examines two cases that came before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1995. Part I examines the use
of juvenile convictions to enhance adult criminal sentences. In United States v.
1. JUDGE JERRY L. MERSHON, JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ADJUDICATORY AND DIsPosrnONAL
PROCESS 11 (1991). Other than the New York House of Refuge, established in 1824, there were
very few early juvenile institutions in the United States. Id. While some discussion of the
government's parens patriae existed as early as 1839, the theory that children under a certain age
should be treated differently from adult criminals did not gain acceptance until the first juvenile
code in 1989. Id.
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. Past juvenile law procedures, which did not guarantee the right to remain silent, the
right to counsel, and other basic rights, were constitutionally suspect. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has corrected most of these deficiencies without destroying the underlying basis of the juve-
nile justice system. Id. As attitudes shift toward making juvenile offenders more accountable for
their actions, the adult and juvenile systems will become even less distinguishable.
4. Entrenched in family law, the "best interests" philosophy remains the predominant custo-
dy standard in most jurisdictions. Best interests philosophy developed by way of parens patriae,
on the theory that when a child's natural parents die, a special court would manage the family es-
tate until the child reached age 21. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 69
(1992). A fundamental difference, however, exists between the state's role as a parent and the
state's interest in the control and discipline of disruptive youths. Id. A parent may discipline
his/her child by placing limits on the child's behavior. Id. The state, on the other hand, punishes
the child by imposing sanctions such as arrest, detention, prosecution, stigmatization, probation,
and institutionalization. Id.
5. The juvenile justice system first evolved as an attempt to deal with the problems of
dependent, neglected, and delinquent juveniles. Originally, the court's role did not include culpa-
bility determinations or assignments of punishment, but served to protect and help youths in trou-
ble with the law. Id.
Through its evolutionary process, the philosophy has split into several directions in an
attempt to draw the most serious offenders further into the juvenile system and divert the least
serious offenders away from it. The juvenile justice system subscribes to several basic models
when dealing with juvenile offenders. DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 179
(1992). These models guide the different types of decision making made on behalf of or against
specific juvenile offenders. Id. Discussed in context throughout this Survey, these models include:
(1) the rehabilitation model, (2) the treatment or medical model, and (3) the "just desserts" or
justice model. Id. at 179-80. Other models include the noninterventionist, the due process, and the
crime control models. id.
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Alberty,6 the court affirmed the federal district court's legal conclusions re-
garding the application and interpretation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. 7 Part II discusses the Tenth Circuit's treatment of certifying juve-
niles for adult criminal prosecution. In Green v. Reynolds,' the court departed
from its traditional interpretation of Rule 9(b),9 which requires the dismissal
of successive habeas corpus petitions, and concluded that denying counsel at a
retroactive adult certification hearing constitutes a deprivation of due pro-
cess. ° After these two decisions, the Tenth Circuit's position on juvenile
rights is now less clear; it is evident, however, that the court has taken a step
backward in awarding the protections of procedural due process to minors."
I. THE USE OF JUVENILE CONVICTIONS TO ENHANCE ADULT CRIMINAL
SENTENCES2
A. Background
The juvenile justice system establishes the means by which state courts
adjudicate youths charged with violations of state laws or ordinances. 3 The
adult criminal system, however, may only sustain sanctions or penalties
against those offenders whom the court officially designates as "adults."' 4 In
that respect, the state must prove cases against adult defendants, who assume
full responsibility for their actions, beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 For non-
6. 40 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1416 (1995).
7. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1135.
8. 57 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1995).
9. Rule 9(b) applies to section 2254, or federal habeas corpus petitions. The rule states:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege
new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if
new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petition to
assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (1994).
10. Green, 57 F.3d at 958.
11. While the Tenth Circuit's present stance on juvenile rights is evident given the increased
punishment for serious or violent juvenile offenders, its opinion as to the future of the juvenile
justice system remains unclear. In any event, the current system must respond to complaints that
minors, left to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, receive neither the constitutional protections ac-
corded adults nor the rehabilitative treatment postulated for children.
12. 40 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1416 (1995).
13. CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 1-2. State juvenile laws include, within their definitions of
delinquent behavior, all criminal acts, whether violative of local ordinance, state law, or federal
law. Robert E. Shepherd Jr., Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JUST. 45, 45 (1994).
Although most juvenile delinquency proceedings fall within state court jurisdiction, several provi-
sions of the 1994 federal crime bill encourage or even require the federal handling of juveniles
charged with gun or gang related crimes. Id. As a result, state juvenile courts will likely see a
greater number of juvenile cases adjudicated in the federal system. Id. Unless otherwise stated,
this Survey will focus on state court procedures.
14. CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 1-2. Generally, an individual reaches adulthood at age 21.
Yet, the upper limit for many state juvenile courts is 18. The juvenile system resolves this prob-
lem by certifying certain juvenile cases to adult court for criminal prosecution.
15. Whenever a person's freedom becomes jeopardized, "beyond a reasonable doubt" serves
as the appropriate standard of proof in both criminal and juvenile courts. CHAMPION, supra note 5,
at 28. However, in many instances, juvenile courts continue to use the civil "preponderance of the
evidence" standard despite the Supreme Court's ruling in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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adults, a separate adjudication process exists for the purpose of deciding culpa-
bility and appropriate treatments. 6 As a result, two separate systems of jus-
tice coexist: adult and juvenile. 7
1. Defining Delinquency
Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over three major categories of
juvenile behavior. 8 First, the court may intervene in "delinquent offenses"
where the minor allegedly committed an act that the state defines as criminal
for an adult.' 9 Second, the juvenile court reviews "status offenses"2 involv-
ing juvenile behavior that would not be considered criminal if committed by
an adult.2' Finally, the court has exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile cases in-
volving dependency and neglect.22 In these situations, parent-child conflicts
and/or removal decisions merit court intervention simply for the child's protec-
tion.23
Much of the controversy surrounding the juvenile justice system lies in
the status offender classification. 4 This category's very existence illustrates
society's insatiable desire to punish juveniles whenever possible.25  In
CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 28. The Court ruled in that case that the U.S. Constitution entitled
juveniles to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Court, however, used a due
process rationale rather than the equal protection analysis which would have destroyed all distinc-
tions between juvenile and criminal proceedings. MERSHON, supra note 1, at 27.
16. BARRY KRSBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 64 (1993).
Since juveniles are not considered fully responsible for their actions, the antiquated view is that
juveniles do not deserve the same harsh treatment as their adult counterparts. Id. at 65. The logic
of this argument served as the basis for many notions adopted by the early juvenile courts. Id.
Contemporary jurisprudence, however, stresses individual accountability for one's action which
departs from the traditional view of the term "treatment." Consistent with the adult criminal sys-
tem, the juvenile justice system has also responded to the growing trend of "just desserts." CHAM-
PION, supra note 5, at 19.
17. This idea, reflected in court nomenclature, illustrates several outdated principles that
merely add to the complexity and confusion surrounding the juvenile system. For example, an
officer may not arrest a child, but may place him/her in "Protective Custody." MERSHON, supra
note 1, at 12. Similarly, the system does not jail children, but "Detains" them upon the adjudica-
tion of an "offense" rather than imprisonment following the conviction of a crime. Id. The juve-
nile court procedures refer to a "Hearing," not a trial, where a "Disposition" takes place instead of
sentencing. Id.
18. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 64.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 65. This group of juveniles is also referred to as "Persons (or Children, or Juve-
niles, or Minors) in Need of Supervision." MARTIN L. FORST, THE NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE 80
(1995).
21. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 65. This category includes truancy, curfew vio-
lations, and running away. Id.
22. Id. The only behavioral categories that involve the commission of an offense include
delinquency and status offenses. The children in the last category, whose contact with the law in-
volves issues of dependency and neglect, fall within the juvenile court's jurisdiction through un-
controllable circumstances. Their only problem is one of "status," in that these children are either
dependent (without family or support) or neglected (where the family situation is harmful for the
child). CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 30-31 (3d ed. 1991).
23. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 65.
24. Generally, status offending children have the same legal and constitutional rights as the
juvenile delinquent. Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile
Court Judge, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 11 (1992). Under state and federal law, the juvenile court
does not have the same power to detain or incarcerate status offenders. Id. at 12. In practice, how-
ever, most states still permit the detention of status offenders. Id.
25. A considerable part of the status offender debate surrounds the issue regarding the han-
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response to society's concern for violence by and against youth, the juvenile
system tends to "redefine" status offenders as delinquent offenders-directly
subjecting the child to juvenile court processing.26 For example, the more a
court official believes that a particular youth's "best interests" require institu-
tional placement, the more severe the particular status offense becomes.27
Furthermore, federal policy categorizes probation violations as criminal offens-
es, providing juvenile judges the authority to institutionalize status offenders
directly, even where the original violation constitutes only a mere status of-
fense.2"
In addition to the various behavioral categories, juvenile delinquency
definitions "differ from time to time and place to place" according to several
criteria.29 The term "juvenile offender" may differ depending on the particular
jurisdiction, the scope of the offensive behavior, and the ambiguities sur-
rounding age requirements. ° To add to the complexity, the juvenile system
breaks down the definition of offender status into categories of serious, vio-
lent, and chronic.3 The Federal Bureau of Investigation32 defines a "serious
juvenile offender" as a youth convicted of a Part I offense33 who is at least
age fourteen at the time of the offense.34 Similarly, a "violent offender" is a
dling of children who commit noncriminal acts. While a law enforcement agency would not arrest
an adult for running away from home, receiving an unexcused absence from school, or walking
the streets after dark, these behaviors call for juvenile sanctioning. Considered part of the juvenile
justice system, status offenders undergo a delinquent labeling process similar to society's more
serious juvenile offenders. Without judicial review, juvenile courts may legally institutionalize
youths who have not committed any criminal acts until they reach their twenty-first birthday.
KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 58. In that respect, society fails to distinguish between
juvenile delinquencies such as running away from severe offenses: armed robbery, forcible rape,
aggravated assault, or murder.
26. BERNARD, supra note 4, at 27.
27. Id. Not only does the juvenile receive institutional placement, he now becomes labeled a
"criminal," rather than a status offender. Id.
28. Id. at 28. Under federal policy, a youth charged with a status offense may appear in
court and receive court-ordered probation. Id. As a condition of this probation, the juvenile court
may order the youth not to commit another status offense. Id. Repeat offenders who violate the
conditions of their probation by committing a status offense may then receive criminal institution-
alization. Id.
29. STEVEN M. COX & JOHN J. CONRAD, JUVENILE JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO PRACTICE AND
THEORY 12 (3d ed. 1991).
30. Id. at 12-15. For example, an act might be delinquent in State X, but not State Y or the
law may change in State X, such that an act considered delinquent this year is not delinquent the
following year. Id. at 12. The scope of behaviors is subject to a wide variety of interpretations at
all levels of the juvenile justice system. For example, the terms "incorrigible" or "indecent" con-
duct may appear in delinquency definitions without a standard to guide judges and practitioners.
Id. at 13. Finally, states differ as to the minimum age below which the juvenile court will not hold
a child accountable for illegal acts, or an upper limit where the juvenile court loses jurisdiction.
Id. at 14.
31. NATIONAL COALITION OF STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUPS, MYTHS AND
REALITIES: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (1993) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. Note, however, that these
definitions do not fall along rigid lines as some youths may share the characteristics of more than
one category.
32. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports borrows the juvenile of-
fender definitions from the United States Department of Justice. Id.
33. Included among Part I offenses are murder and non-negligent homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id.
34. Id. at 8.
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youth convicted of a violent Part I offense who has a prior adjudication of
such an offense.35 The violent offender category also includes youths con-
victed of murder alone.36 The third classification, "chronic juvenile offender,"
applies to youths whose records reflect five or more separate charges of delin-
quency, regardless of the gravity of each offense.37
2. Procedural Rights
Juvenile justice philosophy developed from two distinct legal theories: the
doctrine of parens patriae and the rationale of due process.38 The most com-
prehensive landmark juvenile Supreme Court decision to date is In re Gault,39
in which the Court held that juvenile proceedings must measure up to the
standards of due process and fair treatment.4°
The revolutionary Gault decision at last addressed the constitutionality of
the parens patriae doctrine. The Court, however, not only failed to overthrow
the juvenile court system, but also disregarded many other aspects of the pa-
rens patriae doctrine. In an attempt to provide only basic procedural rights for
juveniles,"' the Court formally established the process of "selective incorpora-
tion" of constitutional guarantees on a case-by-case basis.42 Subsequent deci-
sions have broadened the juvenile's due process rights, but the Supreme Court
has failed to grant juveniles constitutional protection equivalent to those grant-
ed to adults.43
35. Id.
36. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention considers a youth a violent
offender if "found guilty of murder alone or of attempted murder, rape or attempted rape, aggra-
vated assault, armed robbery, arson of an occupied dwelling, voluntary manslaughter, or kidnap-
ping, combined with a prior adjudication." Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 8.
38. For a discussion of the parens patriae philosophy, see supra notes 1, 4 and accompa-
nying text.
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The treatment of Gerry Gault, arrested at the age of 15 for making
obscene phone calls to a neighbor, illustrates the disparity in treatment between youths and adults.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. Gault was taken into custody and detained overnight without notification of
his parents and appeared at a hearing the following day without counsel. Id. at 5-6. At the hearing,
the complaining witness did not appear, the judge did not take any sworn testimony, and the court
made no transcript or formal memorandum of the proceedings. Id. at 5. The trial court convicted
Gault of the charge and sentenced him to a penal institution for six years. Id. at 29. In the same
state and year, an adult would receive a prison sentence of 60 days or less with a maximum fine
of 50 dollars. Id.
40. Id. at 30-31.
41. Instead of demanding exact conformity with adult criminal procedural safeguards, the
Court required only a standard of "fundamental fairness" combined with four specific procedural
protections. These protections include: the right to adequate and timely notice; confrontation of
adverse witnesses; counsel; and the recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
31-57. Indicating that certain protections become applicable only in confinement cases, the Court
did not address the rights of a juvenile in the pre- or post-adjudicatory stages of the proceeding.
BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 19
(1993). Instead, the Court chose to narrowly confine the holding to the actual adjudication of guilt
or innocence. Id. Other matters not decided under Gault include: arrest rights, public or jury trials,
jeopardy, capacity under the insanity defense, grand jury indictment, and appellate review.
MERSHON, supra note 1, at 25.
42. MERSHON, supra note 1, at 24. In reviewing juvenile cases, the Court "selects" which
constitutional rights extend to juveniles and which do not, based upon a seemingly arbitrary deci-
sion-making process.
43. Listed in chronological order showing the evolution of the Court's incorporation doctrine
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3. Sentence Determinations
Another difference between the adult and juvenile justice system concerns
individualized dispositions." The philosophy underlying juvenile justice in-
cludes rehabilitation and individualized justice, thus the juvenile sentence
structure grants judges wide latitude in disposing of juvenile cases.45 Al-
though juvenile delinquency adjudications carry far less serious consequences
today, few sanctions actually reflect the seriousness of the crimes commit-
ted.' Tied to sentence determinations are confidentiality concerns.47 Gener-
ally, states hold juvenile records confidential, forbidding their use in subse-
quent civil or criminal proceedings.' Note, however, that a judge in a subse-
quent criminal case may properly have access to juvenile records paraphrased
in the presentence report.49 In addition, the presentence report itself may be a
key component in guiding the sentencing judge's decision.5" In that respect,
the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance the sentences of adult offenders
has a long lineage." Since juveniles do not have the full array of procedural
rights afforded to adults, critics argue that the use of juvenile adjudications for
regarding juvenile rights, the major cases include the following: Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948) (protecting juveniles against coerced confessions); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966) (establishing procedural requirements for certification hearings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (providing juveniles with rights of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross examination, and
protection against self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (establishing the child's
right, in a delinquency adjudication, to have charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (refusing to extend the right to a jury trial to
juveniles); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (establishing the child's right against double jeop-
ardy); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (rejecting the claim that pre-trial detention of juve-
niles offended the Due Process Clause); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 460 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that
a diminished Fourth Amendment standard applies to school searches).
44. FORST, supra note 20, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Considered a necessity to the treatment model, the indeterminate sentence has become
the hallmark of the juvenile justice system. Id. When disposing of offenders, one cannot determine
in advance how long it will take for the treatment to become effective. Leslie T. Wilkins, Fore-
word to GERALD R. WHEELER, COUNTER-DETERRENCE: A REPORT ON JUVENILE SENTENCING AND
EFFECTS OF PRISONIZATION xii (1978).
47. In achieving the purpose of rehabilitating troubled juveniles, the juvenile system promis-
es confidentiality to avoid the stigma of an arrest, criminal conviction, or delinquency finding.
DONALD B. KING, 100 INJUSTICES TO THE CHILD 14-15 (1971). The juvenile justice system often
undermines this promise, however, by the sheer number of people who have access to police re-
cords. Id. at 15.
48. MERSHON, supra note 1, at 13. Most state statutes incorporate this principle, and case
law clearly supports this proposition. Id. Exploring the traditional idea of juvenile confidentiality,
Judge Mershon refers to Eugene H. Czajkoski, author of Why Confidentiality in Juvenile Justice?,
which called for the abolishment of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings due to its lack of effect
on the juvenile offender and the disastrous effect on the court's control over serious crimes. Id. at
14.
49. Id. at 14-15.
50. Id.
51. See United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896, 898 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reid,
911 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1097 (1991); United States v.
Brown, 903 F.2d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 989 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858 (1990); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 1252, 1254 (8th Cir. 1989).
Other circuits have held that incarceration in a juvenile facility is "imprisonment" for sen-
tencing purposes, and that the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences do not
violate due process. See United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1991). For a review of the
context of other circuit court decisions, see also infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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sentencing purposes amounts to a denial of due process. 2 Like several other
circuits, the Tenth Circuit has accepted the constitutionality of the sentence
enhancement provisions without question. 3
Another procedural issue in juvenile case law addresses whether the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides juveniles a right to a jury in
delinquency proceedings. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,4 the Supreme Court
held that the right to a jury does not extend to juveniles.5 Emphasizing
treatment rather than punishment,56 the Court reasoned that the "juvenile pro-
ceeding has not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution' within the mean-
ing and reach of the Sixth Amendment."57 Again, the Court invoked its "se-
lective incorporation" of constitutional principles in reaching this conclusion.
Arguably, the use of less stringent procedures to generate an adjudication in
juvenile court followed by use of that same conviction to enhance a subse-
quent criminal sentences defies logic.5
Overall, the Supreme Court has sent a mixed message concerning the con-
stitutionality of the use of prior convictions.59 If ruled constitutionally invalid,
52. See generally David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the
Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1769 (1991).
53. Few federal courts have addressed the precise question of whether sentence enhancement
provisions violate the Due Process Clause. For example, the Ninth Circuit passed upon this issue
in United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1037 (1990).
The court reasoned that since McKeiver allowed juvenile courts to deprive liberty without benefit
of a jury trial, courts may use the juvenile sentence to later enhance an adult's deprivation of
liberty. Id. at 215.
54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Two juveniles, aged 15 and 16 (one charged with a felony and the
other charged with a misdemeanor), did not have the benefit of a jury during a delinquency pro-
ceeding. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534. The state accused the first child, Joseph McKeiver, of rob-
bery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. Id. Three of the felony charges arose from an incident
in which McKeiver, along with several other youths, chased three younger children and took 25
cents from them. Id. at 536.
In a separate case, the second child, Edward Terry, allegedly hit a police officer with his
fists and a stick, after the officer attempted to break up a fight not involving Terry. Id. After the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied each the right to a jury trial, in the consolidated case the
question eventually appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court, where it joined two North Carolina
cases. Id. at 536-38. The North Carolina cases involved two separate incidents where children
allegedly obstructed traffic and created a disturbance in a principal's office as a result of a march
protesting racial discrimination. Id. at 537.
55. Id. at 545.
56. Id. at 544 n.5. Emphasizing the potential adverse impact that jury trials may have on the
informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings, the Court decided not to
alter juvenile court practices. FELD, supra note 41, at 23.
57. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541. The Court remained unwilling to "remake the juvenile pro-
ceeding into a fully adversary process" and put "an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." Id. at 545.
58. If a juvenile court adjudicates a juvenile offender, the adult criminal court may use that
"conviction" in future prosecutions, even if the individual's rights were compromised (denial of
mandatory advice of counsel and/or the option of a jury trial) as a juvenile.
59. Enhancement provisions call into question two basic premises underlying Supreme Court
decisions. First, if a court uses a juvenile adjudication to enhance an adult sentence, the adjudica-
tion itself becomes "criminalized." Dormont, supra note 52, at 1797. Thus, the rehabilitative goal
of the juvenile justice system is abandoned and the fundamental differences between the adult and
juvenile procedural rights no longer hold true. Id. Second, the length of the juvenile confinement
directly affects the period of adult incarceration. If a minor receives a sentence of confinement for
treatment or warning purposes, the system later penalizes that person as an adult.
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courts may not use convictions against defendants in subsequent proceed-
ings.' The Court refined this principle in Burgett v. Texas,6' holding that
the use of such convictions would essentially deprive a defendant of a consti-
tutional right twice. 62 Nevertheless, the Court continues to permit the use of
prior juvenile adjudications to enhance later sentences.
Despite case law prohibiting the use of prior uncounseled convictions,
federal courts must include prior juvenile adjudications in adult sentence cal-
culations. 63 Federal courts generate their sentencing determinations with
guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission.6' The
heart of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) 65 is a sen-
tencing table, consisting of forty-three base offense levels and six criminal
history categories, identifying the applicable sentencing range for offenders.'
According to the Guidelines, assignments to the highest criminal history cate-
gory, level VI, include those persons classified as career offenders.67 Juvenile
defendants, aged eighteen years at the time of the offense, who commit crimes
of violence or controlled substance offenses, and have at least two similar
prior felony convictions, are classified as career offenders." Furthermore, the
various offense levels may also increase depending on the statutory penalty for
a particular crime.'
60. The Court has held that the denial of constitutional protections will invalidate a convic-
tion in several instances. Id. at 1805 n.32. For example, the denial of a speedy trial invalidated the
defendant's conviction in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970). In Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), the denial of a jury trial invalidated the conviction. Id. at 162. Similarly, the
Court held that the denial of the right both to confront and cross-examine accusers, and the right
against self-incrimination invalidated convictions in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Finally, the Court invalidated a defendant's conviction where
he had been denied of the right to counsel in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 517 (1962).
61. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
62. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115. The Court concluded that the admissions of constitutionally
infirm convictions result in inherently prejudicial decisions. Id.
63. Shepherd, supra note 13, at 47. "Despite their 'civil' tag, prior juvenile adjudications are
included as part of the 'criminal history' category under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines." Id.
64. Paul M. Winters et al., Project: Twenty-fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994 Sentencing Guidelines, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1229, 1229 (1995).
65. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4A1.3 (November 1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. The Guidelines are applicable to all offenses
committed on or after November 1, 1987. U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A(l). When a federal court convicts a
defendant, the sentencing judge must impose a sentence based on the Guidelines in effect at
defendant's sentencing date. Id. § lB 1.11, comment.
66. The base offense level constitutes the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. Id. at Ch.5,
Pt.A. This level focuses on the defendant's conduct during the commission of the convicted of-
fense(s). Darren M. Gelber, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is Discretion Still the Better
Part of Valor?, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 355, 357 (1992). The criminal history category con-
stitutes the horizontal axis of the table. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A. The judge determines the appropriate
category by totaling the number of criminal history points calculated in the pre-sentence report. Id.
§ 4AI.I. The points start at zero and have no upper limit. Id. All defendants with 13 or more
points have a criminal history category of VI, regardless of whether their point total adds up to 14
or 43. Id. at Ch.3, Pt.A.
67. U.S.S.G. § 4131.1.
68. Winters et al., supra note 64, at 1244.
69. Id. at 1230. Adjustment factors include the harm to the victim, the defendant's role in
the offense, the presence of any obstruction of justice, defendant's conviction of multiple offenses,
and whether the defendant accepted personal responsibility for the offense. Id. at 1230-36.
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The Guidelines treat prior sentences, imposed in "related" cases, as one
sentence for purposes of calculating the criminal history category. 0 Prior sen-
tences relate if the sentence results from one of three criteria. The commission
of the crimes must occur either: (1) on the same occasion, (2) as part of a
single common scheme or plan, or (3) or as a result of consolidation for trial
or sentencing.7' Prior sentences do not "relate" if an intervening arrest oc-
curs.72
B. United States v. Alberty
73
1. Facts
Defendant-appellant Anthony Alberty received indictments for unlawful
possession of a firearm as a convicted felon and unlawful possession of am-
munition as a convicted felon.7" Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alberty plead-
ed guilty to the firearm charge in exchange for the government's agreement to
dismiss the ammunition possession.75 Subsequently, the probation officer
classified Alberty as a level VI offender based on thirteen criminal history
points. 6 Alberty maintained that his two prior juvenile offenses were "relat-
ed," and therefore, made him only a level V offender with eleven criminal
70. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. The applicable provisions of the Guidelines read:
(a) Prior Sentences Defined. (1) The term "prior sentences" means any sentence previ-
ously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of no/o
contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. (2) Prior sentences imposed in
unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences imposed in related cases are
to be treated as one sentence for purposes of the criminal history. Use the longest sen-
tence of imprisonment if concurrent sentences were imposed and the aggregate sentence
of imprisonment in the case of consecutive sentences.
(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen. (1) If the defendant was convicted as an
adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3
points under § 4A1 .l(a) for each such sentence. (2) In any other case, (A) add 2 points
under § 4Al.1(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty
days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his com-
mencement of the instant offense; (B) add 1 point under § 4A.1.1(c) for each adult or
juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's commencement of the
instant offense not covered in (A).
Id.
71. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.3).
72. Id.
73. 40 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1416 (1995).
74. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1132. The felonies were in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2) respectively.
75. Id. at 1132-33.
76. Id. at 1133. The pre-sentence report assigned Alberty an unadjusted base level of 24. Id.
After receiving a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and an additional one-level
reduction for entering a timely guilty plea, the base dropped to 21. The issue presented on appeal
concerned Alberty's criminal history score of 13. Id. Assessed two criminal points for each prior
juvenile adjudication, Alberty received a total of 13 criminal history points. Id.
The first prior juvenile conviction stemmed from a failure to appear for a hearing relating
to a second-degree burglary charge. Id. Even though the court eventually dismissed the burglary
charge, Alberty received a delinquent adjudication for jumping bail on June 9, 1989. Id. at 1134.
Adjudicated on the same day, the second offense, robbery by force, occurred on a separate occa-
sion. Id. Placed in custody from June 23, 1989 to June 13, 1990, the court ordered the sentences
for bail jumping and robbery to run concurrently. Id.
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history points." In ruling against Alberty's argument, the district court
concluded that the two offenses were separate and unrelated." The court sen-
tenced Alberty to a ninety month term of imprisonment.79
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that
Alberty's two prior juvenile offenses were not "consolidated for sentencing"
under the Guidelines. ° The sole issue before the court concerned the "relat-
edness" of Alberty's two prior juvenile convictions. Relying on the prior sen-
tence criteria in the Guidelines' comment section, the court required Alberty to
prove the existence of some formal order of transfer or consolidation in sup-
port of his claim. However, the Tenth Circuit chose to rely on circuit prece-
dent and ruled that Alberty failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the
existence of a judicial order.8
The absence of a "factual nexus" between the prior offenses further per-
suaded the court's ruling.82 In the Tenth Circuit precedents requiring no for-
mal order, 3 the court required each of the prior cases to tie together factual-
ly.84 Since the prior cases at issue lacked any factual connection, other than
the fact that the juvenile judge adjudicated both cases on the same day, 5 the
court upheld the district court's assessment of two criminal history points for
each prior juvenile offense. 6
C. Analysis
In Alberty, the Tenth Circuit relied on its precedent in United States v.
Chavez-Palacios,87 which adopted as authority the commentary in the Guide-
77. Id. The greater the defendant's criminal history score, the more severe his sentence. For
example, the sentencing table for a level six offense and a level I criminal history category has a
range of imprisonment of zero to six months. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1772 n.20. If another
defendant commits the same offense, with a criminal history score of VI, he will receive 12 to 18
months imprisonment. Id.
78. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1133-34.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1135.
81. Id. Specifically, the court relied on: United States v. Gary, 999 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 259 (1993) and United States v. Villarreal, 960 F.2d 117 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 856 (1992). These cases, however, "impliedly suggest" the inclusion of a formal
judicial order (but do not necessarily require one) to permit a finding of consolidation. Gary, 999
F.2d at 479-80; Villarreal, 960 F.2d at 119-21.
82. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1135.
83. See supra note 81 (discussing the Gary and Villarreal decisions).
84. Gary, 999 F.2d at 479-80.
85. Alberty, 40 F.3d at 1134.
86. Id. at 1135. In finding the district court's judgment not clearly erroneous, the Tenth
Circuit cited other circuits where a formal judicial order serves as a prerequisite to a consolidation
finding. Id. at 1135 n.4. In United States v. Russell, 2 F.3d 200 (7th Cir. 1993), the court required
a judicial determination from the sentencing judge to consolidate into a single sentence. Id. at 204.
"Without something in the record.., the district court did not err in finding the offenses unrelat-
ed." Id. The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. McComber, 996 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1993), held
that the section 4AI.2(a)(2) consolidation requirement does not apply where the cases proceeded
to sentencing under separate docket numbers and no formal order exists. Id. at 947.
87. 30 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 1994).
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lines, unless it conflicts with federal law."8 Regardless of whether the prior
sentence counts as one related sentence or two separate sentences, sentence
enhancements undermine the important distinction between adult and juvenile
defendants. Sentence enhancement provisions directly conflict with the infor-
mal, nonadversarial setting of the juvenile courts. 9 As part of child
development,"' society expects young people to make mistakes and learn
from their indiscretions without exacting the full extent of adult criminal pen-
alties on juveniles.9' In practice, sentence enhancements illustrate the extreme
difficulties faced by the appellate courts in upholding the developmental ele-
ment of juvenile law.92 In Alberty, the Tenth Circuit misinterpreted the
McKeiver Court's treatment of youths who fall between the two worlds-the
adult and juvenile courts. 93
Unbeknownst to the McKeiver Court, section 4A1.2 of the Guidelines
opened the floodgates for the enhancement of individual sentences based upon
prior juvenile adjudications. 94 As juveniles, these defendants did not receive
the benefit of Sixth Amendment protections;95 yet as adults, they may endure
88. Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913
(1993)). Note, however, that the legislative history of the Guidelines fails to mention Gault,
McKeiver, or provide any logical basis for including juvenile adjudications in the criminal history
scoring. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1785 n.89.
89. SIMONSEN, supra note 22, at ix; see also CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 21 ("Juvenile
courts are civil proceedings designed exclusively for juveniles, whereas criminal courts are pro-
ceedings designed for alleged violators of criminal laws."). This civil-criminal distinction becomes
apparent in several areas: the absence of a criminal record, limited punishments, and extensive
leniency. Formal criminal procedures, relating to the admissibility of evidence or testimony, do
not enjoy the same heightened scrutiny in juvenile proceedings. Id. In addition, hearsay receives
the same consideration as hard information and evidence. Id. at 27.
Another remaining legacy of parens patriae lies in the right to a jury. In recent years, the
Court has consistently rejected attempts to extend the full range of procedural due process guaran-
tees to juveniles. Id. at 173.
90. Research on delinquency suggests that most youths mature out of illegal behaviors or
misdeeds. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 4. Generally considered less mature and respon-
sible than adults, minors often lack experience, perspective and judgment. Shelia L. Sanders, Com-
ment, The Imposition of Capital Punishment on Juvenile Offenders: Drawing the Line, 19 S.U. L.
REV. 141, 153 n.87 (1992).
91. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 16, at 5.
92. Id.
93. Similar to other federal courts, the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of § 4AI.2 produces a
result inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1788-89. The
interpretation problem arises when the underlying premises of the juvenile justice system do not
manifest themselves in adult sentencing requirements. Id. at 1790. In McKeiver, the Court made
two key assumptions in justifying a lower standard of due process for juveniles. Id. The first view
relies on the difference between juvenile punishment and treatment. Id. at 1790 n.103. The second
view reflects the belief that juvenile proceedings will not detrimentally affect individuals once
they reach adulthood. Id. at 1790. For a related discussion of the McKeiver decision, see infra
notes 54-62. For a review of the context of other circuit court decisions, see also infra notes 100-
08 and accompanying text.
94. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1805.
95. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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additional adult punishment.96 The collateral use of juvenile adjudications
demonstrates the failure of the "fundamental fairness" standard to protect the
very persons the Court meant to protect.9 7 By refusing to address the consti-
tutionality of sentence enhancements," the Tenth Circuit merely postponed
another challenge to juvenile rights.'
D. Other Circuits
Certain types of prior sentences are generally not included in the
defendant's criminal history calculations."'0 Note, however, that the circuit
courts do not always agree as to what constitutes an includable prior sentence.
The First Circuit ruled, in United States v. Unger,"°' that uncounseled juve-
nile proceedings count toward the criminal history scoring.'0 2 In United
States v. Ashburn, °3 the Fifth Circuit held that a juvenile conviction, auto-
matically set aside under a state statute, properly received the prior sentence
designation." In comparison, the Seventh Circuit held, in United States v.
Kozinski,'°5 that a sentence of supervision not based on a finding of guilt re-
ceived improper consideration as a prior sentence.'" However, in Nichols v.
United States, 0 7 the Supreme Court permitted use of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction
that did not, by itself, justify imprisonment. '°0
96. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1805.
97. Id.
98. The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to address the constitutionality of U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(d). In United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1037 (1990), the trial court committed the defendant to the California Youth Authority following
his second juvenile bank robbery. Id. at 213. His commitment, however, consisted of an indeter-
minate sentence according to a treatment mandate. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1803. Had the
sentencing judge not included Williams's juvenile sentences in his criminal history scoring, his
sentence would have ranged from 30 to 37 months, not 46 to 57 months. Williams, 891 F.2d at
214. Williams's first bank robbery would have added two points to his criminal history score re-
gardless of whether he had received incarceration in an adult prison, with full constitutional pro-
tection, or in juvenile hall with limited protections. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1804.
99. Dormont, supra note 52, at 1805.
100. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). According to the Guidelines, sentences for offenses such as hitch-
hiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy, loitering, minor traffic infractions, public intoxication,
and vagrancy do not count towards the criminal history scoring. Id. To work around these con-
straints, "the Guidelines place no cap on the number of points an adult may acquire from his
juvenile record." Dormont, supra note 52, at 1774.
101. 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991).
102. Unger, 915 F.2d at 761-62. Unger allegedly engaged in a variety of criminal conduct as
a juvenile, including breaking and entering, receiving stolen goods, and assault and battery. Id. at
763. In failing to prove this conduct, the state could not convict Unger of these offenses, but
instead found him "guilty" of being "wayward." Two years later, an adult court judge used this
wayward finding to increase his criminal history score, imposing the maximum sentence. Id. at
760.
103. 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.), opinion reinstated in part on reh'g en banc, 38 F.3d 804
(1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 1969 (1995).
104. Ashburn, 20 F.3d at 1343.
105. 16 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 812.
107. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
108. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
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II. CERTIFYING JUVENILES FOR ADULT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS"0
A. Background
Another issue in juvenile justice concerns the adequacy of "transfer"
proceedings. Transfers, also known as waivers or certifications, refer to the
transfer or jurisdictional shift of certain cases from juvenile courts to adult
criminal courts" ° for purposes of adult prosecution and punishment."' Few
jurisdictions provide an intermediate juvenile-adult category for sentencing
serious young offenders. As a result, juveniles indicted for certain serious
crimes may either be tried in juvenile court with inadequate procedures, or in
adult court, with standard adult sentences."2 Juveniles tried in juvenile courts
do not have a right to a jury trial and may receive longer sentences than
young adult offenders convicted for the same offense in criminal court."' On
the other hand, juveniles transferred out of the juvenile justice system are
subject to the full range of adult punishments, including life imprisonment and
the death penalty." 4
The landmark case concerning waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is Kent
v. United States."5 Regarded as the first major juvenile rights case, Kent ad-
dressed the issue of whether a juvenile should receive less protection than that
awarded to adults suspected of criminal offenses." 6 Kent established that: (1)
109. 57 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1995).
110. Hon. Vida J. Taliaferro, Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 REs GEsTAE 38
(1995).
111. CHAMPION, supra note 5, at 212. Intake officers generally refer the more serious cases to
juvenile prosecutors with a recommendation that the children receive a jurisdictional transfer, for
their safety, as well as the safety of others. Id. at 178. Once granted, the jurisdictional waiver
redefines and classifies the defendants as adults for prosecution in criminal courts. Id. at 212.
112. Juvenile judges have limited options when dealing with those offenders who commit
particularly serious violent or capital offenses. Id. at 228. Generally, prolonged incarceration in a
juvenile facility serves as the most powerful sanction available to these judges. Id. As a result,
officials consider waiver or certification actions the desired method of obtaining more severe pun-
ishments for juvenile offenders. Id.
113. Due to their wide discretion in handling juveniles, juvenile courts have the power to
administer lengthy sentences of detention. Id. Unfortunately, this discretion applies to status of-
fenders as well as to serious or dangerous juvenile offenders. Id. Despite the few unfavorable
implications of juvenile court adjudications, however, many juveniles prefer not to contest or fight
their transfers to criminal courts.
114. Generally, life imprisonment and the death penalty lie beyond the powers of the juvenile
court judge. Id. Age, however, no longer remains a mitigating factor as the U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld death sentences for two offenders who committed criminal offenses at age 16 and 17
in the consolidated cases of Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri. Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989). See generally Sanders, supra note 90, at 141 (discussing the death penalty
and juvenile defendants).
115. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The state arrested Morris Kent, then age 16, on charges of house-
breaking, robbery, and rape, as he was serving probation for housebreaking and attempted purse
snatching. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. After repeated interrogations, the juvenile court detained Kent
for one week at the receiving home for children, without the benefit of an arraignment or probable
cause hearing. Id. at 544-45. During the detention, the police interrogated Kent without the benefit
of his counsel or parents. Id. at 551. Kent's attorney filed a motion for a hearing on whether to
waive jurisdiction. Id. at 545. The judge waived jurisdiction without ruling on the motion and
without a waiver hearing. Id. at 546.
116. Id. at 551.
19961
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juvenile courts must conduct waiver hearings before transferring juveniles to
the jurisdiction of adult criminal court; 7 and (2) juveniles have the right to
counsel before and during such hearings." ' After summarizing the differenc-
es between adult courts and juvenile delinquency proceedings,' the Court
laid out several determinative factors to guide waiver judicial decision-mak-
ing.'
2 0
B. Green v. Reynolds'
2'
1. Facts
The Oklahoma district court convicted and sentenced Rickke Green when
he was sixteen years old.22 After filing the first of three federal habeas peti-
tions, Green pursued a state post-conviction claim asserting that his adult
prosecution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'2 3 At the time of the convictions, the applicable Oklahoma statute al-
lowed the adjudication of females, eighteen years old and younger, in juvenile
court'24 while subjecting juvenile males, sixteen to eighteen years old, to
adult prosecution without providing a transfer hearing.
Pursuant to the remedy announced by the Tenth Circuit in Bromley v.
Crisp,'25 the state granted Green a retroactive adult certification hearing
117. Id. at 561.
118. Id.
119. These differences include:
[The juvenile] may be confined, but with rare exceptions he may not be jailed along
with adults. He may be detained, but only until he is 21 years of age. The court is ad-
monished by the [D.C. juvenile] statute to give preference to retaining the child in the
custody of his parents "unless his welfare and the safety and protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded .. " The child is protected against consequences of
adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of adjudication against him in
subsequent proceedings, and disqualification for public employment.
Id. at 556-57 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-907, -915, -927, -929 (1961)).
120. The Kent factors address issues such as the seriousness of the alleged offense, the so-
phistication and maturity of the juvenile, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. For a complete list-
ing of the Kent factors, see id. at 566-67.
121. 57 F.3d 956 (1995).
122. Green, 57 F.3d at 957. Green faced over 55 years of incarceration for grand larceny,
possession of and robbery with a firearm after former conviction of a felony (AFCF), and con-
cealment of stolen property AFCF. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 958.
125. 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). This case established
the proper procedures for determining whether a defendant's conviction survived a challenge un-
der Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972). Under Oklahoma juvenile code provisions, the
state could prosecute males under age 16 as adults, while females of the same age remained sub-
ject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction, unless certified to stand trial as adults. OKLA. STAT. tit. X,
§ 1101(a) (Supp. 1969). The Lamb court held that the sex-based statute violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Lamb, 456 F.2d at 20. The court later held that the Lamb decision applied retroactive-
ly. Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975).
Citing Kent, the Bromley court held that it need not set aside convictions if the juvenile
court can establish that the adult certification would have taken place had it conducted an ade-
quate hearing. Bromley, 561 F.2d at 1356-57 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 564-65). To make such
determinations, the court requires that a state or federal court conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
at 1357 n.6. The burden of proof, however, rests with the state to take into account all doubts and
any weakness of proof due to the passage of time. Id.
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(RAC hearing) to determine whether a transfer would have even taken place
had the court followed the proper procedures in 1971.126 After denying
Green's request for assistance of appointed counsel, Green refused to partici-
pate in the hearing claiming insufficient time to prepare. 2 7 Upon hearing the
state's evidence at the RAC hearing, the court concluded that Green's transfer
would have occurred had the district court conducted a proper hearing in
1971.28 The district court concluded that each of the seven grounds for re-
lief 9 referred to in the habeas petition related to the 1971 convictions. "'
The district court ruled that defendant's grounds "could have been, or were,




The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision as to six of the
seven grounds-finding relief unavailable due to their omission from the first
habeas petition in 1977.113 The last ground for relief survived dismissal as
the Tenth Circuit further ruled that the state's denial of Green's request for
counsel at the RAC hearing deprived him of due process.'34 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reasoned that the claim contained neither successive nor abusive elements,
and, therefore, required a constitutional review on the merits due to the inap-
plicability of Rule 9(b). 3 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit remanded in part,
reversed in part,'36 and instructed the lower court to issue a conditional writ
vacating the pertinent convictions unless the state conducted an RAC hearing,
complete with representation."'
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Green v. Reynolds follows a long line of
cases protecting the rights of juveniles. 3 To comply with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Kent, a transfer hearing "must measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment." '39 Generally, a habeas petition requires
126. Green, 57 F.3d at 957.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 957-58.
129. Defendant's grounds included: (1) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (2) that
the Court of Criminal Appeals acted to deprive him of effective assistance of appellate counsel. Id.
Other grounds included one claim that the court subjected him to an unconstitutional appellate
delay and one claim that the convictions were unconstitutional under Lamb. Id.
130. Id. at 957.
131. Id. at 958.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 957.
134. Id. at 961.
135. Id. at 958.
136. Id. at 961.
137. Id.
138. For a brief description of the major juvenile rights cases, see supra note 43.
139. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562. Relevant provisions include representation by counsel; the
juvenile's meaningful access to pertinent information considered by the juvenile court; and an
adequate statement of reasons for the juvenile court's decision. Id. at 561-63.
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Rule 9(b) dismissal if the petition "successfully" repeats a claim previously
determined on the merits, or the petition "abusively" asserts new grounds
unjustifiably omitted from a prior petition.'" The "unique" factual twist pre-
sented in Green, however, required a somewhat different analysis of Rule
9(b). 4" As the only logical alternative, the Tenth Circuit regarded the Lamb
violation (gender-discrimination) and the denial of counsel as substantively
separate claims. Had the Tenth Circuit deemed the RAC hearing a post-con-
viction proceeding, the district court could deny counsel, thus repeating the
same due process violation. 42
The principal purpose of a jurisdictional waiver is to decide whether the
juvenile should receive criminal prosecution in adult court or be subject to the
rehabilitation of the juvenile courts.'43 Transfer procedures represent a type
of community vengeance toward juveniles.' Too frequently, however, the
use of transfers serves merely as a convenient tool for shifting jurisdiction
over certain juveniles to adult courts.'45 The system arbitrarily renders some
juveniles "death eligible" simply because a particular judge subjectively deems
the juvenile "mature."'" If the separation of juveniles from hardened adult
criminals serves as a crucial component of juvenile rehabilitation, then trans-
fers to adult facilities deprive youths of an opportunity for rehabilitation."
This loss also subjects juveniles to cruelty and abuse by other inmates."
The current standard of appellate review of waiver decisions 49 and the
consequences of reversal should remain separate and independent issues.
Every decision to transfer a child to criminal court should automatically create
140. Green, 57 F.3d at 958 n.3 (citing Watkins v. Champion, 39 F.3d 273, 275 (10th Cir.
1994)).
141. Id. at 958.
142. Id. at 961. As a post-conviction hearing, the only available remedy would be to institute
another uncounseled hearing on adult certification. Id. For an explanation of the Lamb decision
and Lamb violations, see supra note 125.
143. KING, supra note 47, at 70. According to the founders of the juvenile justice system, all
children capable of rehabilitation should receive a trial through the juvenile court procedures rath-
er than the criminal law system. Id.
144. Id. at 68.
145. Twenty years ago, most certification cases occurred as a result of a some type of sensa-
tional delinquency or criminal act that attracted public attention. Id. As a result, the child was
unjustly "thrown to the lions" to satisfy the community's sense of vengeance. Today, many chil-
dren receive the same fate simply due to society's abhorrence for youth violence. Id.
146. Glenn M. Bieler, Note, Death Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital Punishment, 7
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 179, 201 (1990).
147. KING, supra note 47, at 85-86.
148. Id. It is not uncommon for younger boys to be exposed to various sexual assaults by
other inmates. Id. Adult facilities may also become an undesirable school yard where juveniles
leam even more sophisticated methods of criminal activity from adults. Id. One study observed
that juveniles held in adult jails have a suicide rate nearly five times that of juveniles housed in
juvenile facilities. Sarah Freitas, Extending the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Juvenile
Waiver Hearing, 62 U. CHIi. L. REV. 301, 309 (1995). In addition, it is likely that a juvenile de-
tainee, without a prior record may share a cell with a hardened and dangerous adult offender. Id.
149. Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in American Juvenile Justice: In
Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 267, 278 (1991).
Generally, a defendant must demonstrate that the trial court abused its "sound discretion." Id. In
Green, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. Green, 57 F.3d at 957.
150. Zimring, supra note 149, at 278.
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a right of appeal. 5 ' As demonstrated by Green, a number of difficult issues
surround the standard of review and the appropriate remedy, especially if the
alleged behavior does not warrant the transfer.'52 If the Tenth Circuit had
held the district court's waiver decision inappropriate, Green's age, at the time
of the appeal, would have pushed him far beyond the reach and setting of the
juvenile court.' The consequences of reversal directly influenced the Tenth
Circuit's unwillingness to intervene and correct an abusive result. The court
did nothing but "pass the buck" back to the lower court, without addressing
the prejudicial effects of the entire waiver process. If the court truly recog-
nized the philosophy of "best interests," it would have to remand with instruc-
tions to impose juvenile sanctions.'54
D. Other Circuits
Transfer issues represent a complex area of juvenile law with many statu-
tory schemes. As it stands today, appellate courts reviewing the constitutional-
ity of state laws have found variance in their due process provisions. For ex-
ample, in Russell v. Parratt, the Eight Circuit found no denial of due process
in proceeding against a juvenile as an adult without an evidentiary hearing."'
In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in Guam v. Kinsbury,'56 held that due process
does not require a social investigation as a condition precedent to certification.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile courts in this country have an important mission regarding
their place within the criminal justice system. Since juveniles do not have the
full range of procedural protection under the law, the systematic violation of
juvenile rights becomes inevitable. At one extreme, a great tragedy would
result if the judicial system abolished all rehabilitative goals envisioned for
151. Id. at 277. Zimring proposes a system that provides "waived" defendants the option to
appeal the waiver determination before trial or after the conviction in criminal court. Id.
152. Id.
153. Prosecuted at the age of 16 as an adult, Green received a sentence of incarceration for
over 55 years. Green, 57 F.3d at 957. Having served some 24 years in an adult penitentiary, the
only available recourse is to reduce Green's sentence. Zimring, supra note 149, at 278. Had defen-
dant received a juvenile delinquency proceeding in 1971, state law would have mandated Green's
release from detention by his nineteenth birthday. Green, 57 F.3d at 961 n.8. Although a reduction
in sentence does not restore the defendant to juvenile status, it does prevent the state court from
conducting a retroactive adult certification (RAC) hearing in its favor.
154. Contrary to precedent established by Kelley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1993),
the Green court remanded the case to state court to conduct a constitutionally adequate RAC
hearing. Green, 57 F.3d at 960. Similar to Green, Kelley had also suffered a Lamb injustice. How-
ever, the Kelley court ruled that the state already had the opportunity to address the certification
issue and had resolved the question without providing the defendant with a full and fair hearing.
Kelley, 992 F.2d at 1516. The court then held that proper procedures required the district court to
address the issue. Id. While no proof exists as to which court, state or federal, provides the better
forum, the Green decision provides the trial judge an opportunity to search for new reasons to
certify the juvenile. If a trial judge denied jurisdiction over the juvenile once, it is highly unlikely
that judge would fairly reconsider the issue on remand.
155. 543 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976).
156. 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
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youthful offenders and treated all juveniles as adults. At the other extreme, the
system will continue to hold delinquents criminally responsible for their mis-
behavior without the added benefit of certain privileges and immunities intend-
ed for juveniles. In sum, the juvenile justice system lacks a coherent and con-
sistent policy on how to deal with juveniles. American society must decide
whether it wants to punish, protect, or treat its wayward youth. Only then may
the judicial system clear the muddle surrounding juvenile justice. Until that




During the last year, the Tenth Circuit interpreted several federal labor
statutes. It addressed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(WARN)' and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).2 The court also
considered preemption of various state and common law remedies under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).3
This Survey begins with a detailed examination of Frymire v. Ampex
Corp.4 Frymire presented the Tenth Circuit with its first opportunity to ad-
dress provisions of WARN.' Among the numerous issues involved, the court
set forth its interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations and the calcu-
lation of back pay, issues which other circuits have not treated consistently.
Part II of this Survey discusses three cases in which the Tenth Circuit exam-
ined issues affecting compensation calculation under the FLSA. In Henderson
v. Inter-Chem Coal Co.,6 the court reviewed the analysis used to determine
whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor for FLSA
purposes.' In Reich v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.,8 the Tenth Circuit clarified
the analysis used to determine the types of activities that constitute compensa-
ble work time within the meaning of the FLSA.9 Finally, in Aaron v. City of
Wichita," the court addressed the method of calculating the "regular rate of
pay"" used to compute overtime and the exemption of certain employees
from FLSA overtime requirements.'2 Part III examines the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of ERISA preemption of various statutory and common law reme-
dies. The court in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund'3
held that ERISA did not preempt statutory provisions exempting disposable
earnings from garnishment when state law does not sufficiently relate to the
benefit plan.'4 Additionally, in Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage,"
the Tenth Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt a medical malpractice
claim targeted at a health maintenance organization. 6
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
4. 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
5. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 761.
6. 41 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1994).
7. Henderson, 41 F.3d at 567-71.
8. 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
9. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125-26.
10. 54 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1995).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1994).
12. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655-59.
13. 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).
14. Guidry, 39 F.2d at 1083-86.
15. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
16. Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 153, 155.
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I. THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT 7
A. Background
In response to what Congress perceived as unhealthy and demoralizing
work force reductions by employers," it enacted the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN). Congress designed WARN to give state
and local governments, unions, and workers the time necessary to react and
adjust to reductions in the work force. 9 WARN prohibits employers with one
hundred or more employees2" from "closing" a plant2' or instituting a "mass
layoff' 22 without giving written notice to each affected employee or the
employee's representative at least sixty days prior to the action.23 Violations
of WARN subject employers to civil liability24 and fines.25
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
18. Jeffrey Turner, Comment, Damages Under the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Act
(WARN): Why Damages Cannot Be Based on Calendar Days, 12 COOLEY L. REV. 197, 201
(1995).
19. Id.; see Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the Worker Adjust-
ment and Retraining and Notification (WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT &
LAB. L. 1, 3 (1993).
20. The statute defines the affected employer as "any business enterprise that employs-(A)
100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees; or (B) 100 or more employees who in the
aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week (exclusive of hours of overtime)." 29 U.S.C. §
2101(a)(1).
21. The statute defines a "plant closing" as
the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more
facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in
an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for 50 or
more employees excluding any part-time employees.
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2).
22. The statute defines a "mass layoff" as
a reduction in force which--(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and (B) results in an
employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for-(i)(I) at
least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees) and (II) at least
50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or (ii) at least 500 employees (ex-
cluding any part-time employees).
29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3).
23. The provision states:
An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass layoff until the end of a 60-day
period after the employer serves written notice of such an order-(l) to each representa-
tive of the affected employees as of the time of the notice or, if there is no such repre-
sentative at that time, to each affected employee; and (2) to the State dislocated worker
unit (designated or created under title III of the Job Training Partnership Act [29 U.S.C.
§ 1651 et seq.]) and the chief elected official of the unit of local government within
which such closing or layoff is to occur.
29 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
24. WARN provides:
Any employer who orders a plant closing or mass layoff in violation of section 2102 of
this title shall be liable to each aggrieved employee who suffers an employment loss as
a result of such closing or layoff for--(A) back pay for each day of violation at a rate of
compensation not less than the higher of--(i) the average regular rate received by such
employee during the last three years of the employee's employment; or (ii) the final
regular rate received by such employee ... [sluch liability shall be calculated for the
period of the violation, up to a maximum of 60 days, but in no event for more than one-
half the number of days the employee was employed by the employer.
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The language of WARN leaves ample room for conflicting interpretations.
The circuit courts have inconsistently treated the issues of the appropriate
statute of limitations and the calculation of back pay. In passing WARN, the
legislature did not incorporate an express statute of limitations.26 The 1990
Implementation Act created a four-year federal statute of limitations applicable
to federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.27 Having no retroactive
effect, the Implementation Act does not apply to WARN actions.28 WARN
limitation periods vary among the circuits from six months to six years, de-
pending on whether that circuit chose to use an analogous federal or state
statute.29
The Supreme Court, in North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,30 attempted to
address the dispute between the circuits regarding the applicable WARN limi-
tations period." In North Star, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit's holding
that the period of limitations for WARN actions should be borrowed from
state law.32 Because the federal statute failed to specify a limitations period
for the cause of action, the Court, consistent with its settled practice,33 bor-
rowed from the state law.34 An exception is made to this practice only when
the state limitations period would interfere with or frustrate the underlying
policies and implementation of the federal statute.35 The Court, however, de-
clined to provide guidelines for determining the most applicable type of state
limitations periods.36 Subsequent to the North Star decision, several circuit
courts which had previously mandated a federal limitations period (specifically
the NLRA statute of limitations) vacated and remanded pending cases for
further consideration. 3
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
25. WARN provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 2101 of this title with respect to a
unit of local government shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $500 for
each day of such violation, except that such penalty shall not apply if the employer pays
to each aggrieved employee the amount for which the employer is liable within three
weeks from the date the employer orders the shutdown or layoff.
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(3).
26. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 115 S. Ct. 1927, 1929 (1995).
27. The Implementation Act states, "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not
be commenced later than four years after the cause of action accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1988).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1658; see also Kimberly J. Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation Pe-
riod with Real Limitations, 69 IND. L.J. 477, 503 (1994) (discussing the Implementation Act's
failure to specify a federal limitations period for civil rights actions under pre-existing statutes).
29. Norwood, supra note 28, at 501-02.
30. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
31. North Star, 115 S. Ct. at 1930.
32. Id.
33. See Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319 (1989) (holding that state personal
injury statutes govern limitations period for Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (stating that the state personal injury limitations period
governs civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
34. North Star, 115 S. Ct. at 1931.
35. Id. at 1930-31.
36. The Supreme Court recognized the appellate court's identification of four state limita-
tions periods: a two-year period for general civil penalties, a three-year period under a state wage
payment and collection law, a four-year period for contract breaches, and a six-year residual stat-
ute of limitations. Id at 1931.
37. United Mine Workers v. Peabody Coal Co., 38 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. granted
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Carpenters District Council v.
Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,38 addressed the other unsettled issue of cal-
culating back pay damages. 39 The Fifth Circuit, after examining the statutory
language and legislative intent, determined that back pay damages should be
based upon work days instead of calendar days.' The court noted that the
traditional notion of back pay connotes a sum of money which would put the
employee in as good a position as he would have been had the employer not
violated WARN." The Fifth Circuit determined that this calculation of back
pay aligned with Congress's intent to award damages under WARN equal to
the wages an employee would have received had he not been laid off.42
B. Frymire v. Ampex Corp. 3
1. Facts
Ampex Corporation (Ampex) designs, manufactures, and markets elec-
tronic audio and visual recording products." Although headquartered in Cali-
fornia, it maintained facilities in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where the plain-
tiffs were employed.45 Two wholly owned subsidiaries, Ampex Recording
Systems Corporation (RSC) and Ampex Video Systems Corporation (VSC),
shared the Colorado Springs facility.' Ampex separated RSC and VSC,
which were previously housed in the same building, into two separate adjacent
buildings.47
In September 1990, approximately six months after Ampex separated the
subsidiaries, the company informed its employees that it would be conducting
a work force reduction in the coming months.' In a November 1990 update,
Ampex notified its employees that approximately 350 employees would be laid
off.4 In January 1991, Ampex issued immediate termination notices to the
plaintiffs.5" Carolyn Frymire and eighty-four other employees brought a
and vacated, 115 S. Ct. 2272 (1995); Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224 (5th Cir.
1994), vacated per curiam, 56 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995).
38. 15 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
39. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1282-86.
40. Id. at 1285-86.
41. Id. at 1283 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
42. Id. at 1284-85 (citing S. REP. No. 62, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1987)). The court
adeptly hypothesized possible unfair results where
[e]mployee "A" is a full-time employee who works a regular eight-hour shift each week-
day. However, employee "B" is a part-time employee who works just one ten-hour shift
each Saturday. Under the Third Circuit's calendar-day approach, employee "A" would
receive 480 hours pay in lieu of notice (eight hours per day times sixty days), while the
part-time employee "B" would receive 600 hours pay (ten hours per day times sixty
days).
Id. at 1285.
43. 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
44. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 761.
45. Id. at 761-62.







WARN action against Ampex Corporation for failing to provide the requisite
notice."
The trial court granted Ampex's motion for summary judgment with re-
spect to the RSC employees.52 The court held that the two facilities were sep-
arate sites of employment; therefore, the number of RSC employees fell below
the WARN threshold requirement. 3 With respect to the group employed by
VSC, the court denied Ampex's motion for summary judgment, finding that
group's number met the WARN threshold.54 Subsequently, the court denied
Ampex's motion for reconsideration and granted class certification to the
plaintiffs."
At trial, the court found that Ampex had violated WARN's notice require-
ment and assessed damages, postjudgment interest, and attorneys fees.56 On
appeal, Ampex raised six issues: (1) whether the action exceeded the NLRA
six-month statute of limitations and was thus time-barred;57 (2) whether the
VSC and RSC facilities constituted separate sites or a single site of employ-
ment;5" (3) whether Ampex should have its damages reduced via "good faith"
mitigation;59 (4) whether Ampex should have its damages set off by the
51. Id. at 761.




56. Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1081, 1083-87 (D. Colo. 1994).
57. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 763.
58. Id. at 764-65. The Tenth Circuit relied on rules promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
Id. at 765-66. The pertinent rule states:
(i) Single site of employment. (1) A single site of employment can refer to either a
single location or a group of contiguous locations. Groups of structures which form a
campus or industrial park, or separate facilities across the street from one another, may
be considered a single site of employment .... (3) Separate buildings or areas which
are not directly connected or in immediate proximity may be considered a single site of
employment if they are in reasonable geographic proximity, used for the same purpose,
and share the same staff and equipment .... (4) Non-contiguous sites in the same geo-
graphic area which do not share the same staff or operational purpose should not be
considered a single site .... (5) Contiguous buildings owned by the same employer
which have separate management, produce different products, and have separate
workforces are considered separate single sites of employment.
20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i) (1995).
The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that VSC and RSC could be considered
two separate employment sites for WARN purposes. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 766-67. The court con-
sidered the criteria of proximity, contiguity, and, to a lesser extent, the dissimilarity of products.
Id.
59. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 767. WARN provides:
If an employer which has violated this chapter proves to the satisfaction of the court that
the act or omission that violated this chapter was in good faith and that the employer
had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of this
chapter the court may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of the liability or penalty
provided in this section.
29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(4).
The Tenth Circuit found that Ampex had a good faith belief that its conduct did not violate
the WARN notice requirement. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 768. The court concluded that liability there-
fore should have been reduced pursuant to § 2104(a)(4) by the lower court. Id. at 768-69. At a
minimum, the "good faith" defense requires proof of the employer's subjective intent to comply
with WARN and proof of the employer's objective reasonable belief that its conduct also com-
plied. Id. at 767-68.
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amount of voluntary severance benefits provided to the discharged employ-
ees;' (5) whether the district court erroneously used calendar days instead of
work days for calculating back pay damages;6' and (6) whether the plaintiff's
award of prejudgment interest was barred by WARN's "exclusive remedies"
61provision.
2. Decision
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in North Star Steel v.
Thomas,63 the Tenth Circuit held that the lower court correctly applied
Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for contract claims.' The court
noted the split in the circuits regarding WARN causes of action65 and the
North Star Court's refusal to decide which state limitations period applied.'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding on the limitations
period on three grounds. First, the goal of uniformity would be furthered if a
"universally recognized cause of action, such as a contract action" were bor-
rowed for WARN purposes. 67 Second, the employer-employee relationship
and the WARN remedy of back pay most closely resembled an implied con-
tract and the remedy for a breach thereof.' Third, the court noted that other
circuits have supported the use of state contractual limitation periods.'
The court also acknowledged a circuit split on the issue of whether work
or calendar days should be used in calculating back pay damages.7" The court
60. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 769. The Tenth Circuit held that Ampex could not set off payments
made under its "pay in lieu of notice" policy. Id. at 770. The court upheld the lower court's find-
ing that such payments represented a binding contractual obligation to pay benefits having no set-
off effect on WARN. Id. However, the court found that the lower court should have considered
monies paid under the policy in calculating good faith reductions of Ampex's liability. Id. at 770-
71.
61. Id. at 771.
62. Id. at 773. WARN states that "the remedies provided for in this section shall be the
exclusive remedies for any violation of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2104(b). The circuit court found
that while WARN contains an exclusive remedies provision, it also contains a nonexclusive reme-
dies provision. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 773. WARN states in relevant part:
The rights and remedies provided to employees by this chapter are in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any other contractual or statutory rights and remedies of the employees,
and are not intended to alter or affect such rights and remedies, except that the period of
notification required by this chapter shall run concurrently with any period of notifica-
tion required by contract or by any other statute.
29 U.S.C. § 2105.
Given the apparent ambiguity in the statute, the court looked to the congressional purpose.
Frymire, 61 F.3d at 773. The Tenth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which provides for
allowance of interest on civil case money judgments awarded, in conjunction with WARN's non-
exclusive remedies provision, evinced Congress's intent not to preclude prejudgment interest. Id.
63. 115 S. Ct. 1927 (1995).
64. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 763.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 764.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 246 (5th Cir. 1994) (Wisdom,
J., dissenting); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 57 (2d
Cir. 1993) (stating that state statutes of limitations should be applied).
70. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 772. The Fifth Circuit applied work days in Carpenters Dist. Council
v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1282-86 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933
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examined the language of the text,7 as well as the legislative history of
WARN, but found little clarification.72 Because the Tenth Circuit had never
addressed the method for calculating back pay damages, it looked to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Dillard for guidance. The court agreed with the Fifth
Circuit and concluded that using work days rather than calendar days to calcu-
late back pay damages more appropriately reflected the purpose of WARN. 4
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of WARN in Frymire reflected sound
policy and demonstrated consistent reasoning. The court correctly applied
contract theory to the statute of limitations, mitigation, and back pay calcula-
tion issues, but some flaws exist. By preventing Ampex from setting off
payments under its "pay in lieu of notice" policy,75 the court diminished the
employers' incentive to comply with the purpose and intent of WARN notice
requirements. On the other hand, by holding that work days should be used in
calculating back pay damages,76 the Tenth Circuit eliminated some potential
for unjust enrichment.7
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in North Star, a concern with
any federal court's decision with respect to the statute of limitations in a
WARN action is the lack of consistency and predictability nationally. A fed-
eral statute of limitations would alleviate this problem. Under the current
scheme, with circuit courts selecting appropriate state statutes of limitations,
multi-state employers must be wary of potential plaintiffs who may avail
themselves to venues that possess longer state limitations periods.
D. Other Circuits
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit court to discuss
which limitations period to apply in WARN actions.78 The Second Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's analytical framework set forth in Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson9 to identify the proper limitations
(1995). In contrast, the Third Circuit applied calendar days in United Steelworkers of America v.
North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 41-43 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
72. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 771-72.
73. Id. at 772 (citing Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1275).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 770.
76. Id. at 772.
77. But see Turner, supra note 18, at 222 (noting an inconsistency in basing the state's civil
fine upon calendar days, while basing workers' damages on work days).
78. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1993). The defendant, Specialty Paperboard, terminated all 232 employees of its mill and sold the
mill the same day to the co-defendant, Rock-Tenn Company. Id. at 52. On the same day, Rock-
Tenn rehired 141 of the employees. Id. The employees' union filed a class action suit under
WARN on behalf of the laid-off employees against both the selling and purchasing companies. Id.
The union claimed that the companies' actions violated notice requirements. Id.
79. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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period when the statute is silent."0 In such a situation, the court should bor-
row the local statute of limitations most analogous to the instant situation, so
long as it does not undermine federal goals."'
The circuits reflect a more dramatic split on the calculation of damages
when an employer fails to give sufficient notice in contravention of WARN. 2
The dispute centers on the interpretation of § 2104 of WARN, which states
that the employer is liable to the employee for "back pay for each day of
violation ... up to a maximum of [sixty] days." Only two circuits ad-
dressed this issue prior to Frymire, both reaching different conclusions. The
Third Circuit in United Steel Workers v. North Star Steel Co."4 found that
damages should be based upon calendar days. 5 In Carpenters District Coun-
cil v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. ,86 the Fifth Circuit declared that damag-
es should be calculated on the basis of work days. 7 The Supreme Court de-
clined to settle this dispute between the circuits by denying certiorari in
Dillard.8' As the issue percolates within the circuits, the potential exists for
varying interpretations of the WARN damages calculation provision.
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938:89 OVERTIME COMPENSATION
CALCULATION
A. Background
Relevant sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) set compensa-
tion requirements for overtime hours worked by employees. 9' The FLSA did
this in an attempt to remedy low wages and long hours that endangered
workers' health. 9' In 1985, a sharply divided Supreme Court in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority expanded the statute's reach, stating
that state and local governments would now be held accountable to FLSA re-
quirements. 93
FLSA overtime requirements apply only to employees, and not to inde-
pendent contractors.94 In Dole v. Snell,95 however, the Tenth Circuit stated
80. United Paperworkers, 999 F.2d at 53.
81. Id. (citing Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355).
82. See Turner, supra note 18, at 199-201.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
84. 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1060 (1994).
85. North Star, 5 F.3d at 42.
86. 15 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
87. Dillard, 15 F.3d at 1286.
88. 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
90. The statute provides that an employee who works longer than 40 hours shall be paid at
least one and a half times her regular pay rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
91. Kimberly A. Pace, What Does It Mean to Be a Salaried Employee? The Future of Pay-
Docking, 21 J. LEGIs. 49, 52 (1995).
92. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
93. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
94. The FLSA defines an employee as "any individual employed by an employer." 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The FLSA further defines an employer as
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that the degree and nature of the employer's control determines the status of
the worker, not solely the employer's classification.96 The Dole court stated
that the economic realities of the relationship governed whether an individual
is an "employee. '97 Under the FLSA, an employer must pay one and one-half
times the employee's "regular rate of pay for each hour worked over forty
hours per week." ' However, the FLSA exempts managerial and professional
employees from the overtime requirements."
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co."°
a. Facts
The defendant companies, Inter-Chem Coal Company, Nationwide Min-
ing, Inc., and Brent Nations, employed Henderson to repair and maintain
equipment.' ' Henderson filed suit against the companies seeking unpaid
overtime compensation pursuant to the FLSA 3 2 The evidence indicated that
although the defendant companies exerted little control over him, Henderson
was economically more dependent on the companies than not. 3 The district
court granted summary judgment for the companies after holding that
Henderson was an independent contractor." Henderson appealed the deci-
sion."'
any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization
(other than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or
agent of such labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
95. 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989).
96. Dole, 875 F.2d at 805.
97. Six factors comprise the economic reality test:
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the
worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in the business; (4)
the permanence of the working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform
the work; and (6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged
employer's business.
Id.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(l). The exemption may have been partly prompted by the notion
that managers and professionals possessed sufficient bargaining power as to make such govern-
mental protection unnecessary. Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the Managerial-Professional Ex.
emption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 139, 141 (1993).
100. 41 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1994).
101. Henderson, 41 F.3d at 570.
102. Id. at 569.
103. Id. at 570. Defendants provided affidavits showing that while they informed Henderson
about what equipment needed to be fixed, Henderson chose the manner of repair. Id. He did no
other type of mechanical work for the companies and possessed his own specialized tools and
truck. Id. However, Henderson worked almost exclusively for the defendant companies, which
paid him by the hour. Id. The working relationship between Henderson and the companies
spanned approximately three years and four months. Id. Lastly, the companies called on
Henderson for equipment repair work as needed, not solely on specific projects. Id.
104. Id. at 569.
105. Id.
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether Henderson was an independent contractor, thus precluding summary
judgment."° The court recognized that the FLSA definitions of "employer"
and "employee" expanded the boundaries of traditional agency law princi-
ples." The court, therefore, did not limit its inquiry into the employment
context by relying on contractual terminology or common law concepts of
"employee" or "independent contractor."' 0' The court instead applied the
economic reality test, which classifies employment based on economic depen-
dence upon the principal entity."° The totality of the circumstances deter-
mines the characterization."' The Tenth Circuit noted that because material
issues of fact remained, the defendants were not entitled to summary judg-
ment."' The court outlined three findings a lower court must make as the
trier of fact. First, the district court must determine the historical facts sur-
rounding Henderson's work." 2 The next step is to analyze the six factors of
the economic realities test.' Third, the district court must determine wheth-
er or not the individual is an "employee" under the FLSA."'
2. Reich v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc."1
5
a. Facts
Iowa Beef Packers (IBP) slaughters, processes, and packs meat
throughout the Midwest." 6 In accordance both with its own internal policies
and with OSHA and USDA regulations, IBP required its employees to wear
certain garments and safety equipment on the job."7 The trial court found
that there were two types of hourly production workers, those who used cut-
ting utensils in their jobs and those who did not."8 Both categories of work-
ers wore special white outergarments." 9
106. Id. at 570-71.
107. Id. at 570 (relying upon Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992)).
108. Id. (citing Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1989)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 571.
112. Id.
113. Id. For a list of the six factors, see supra note 97.
114. Id.
115. 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
116. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1124.
117. The knife-wielding/meat-cutting workers wore garments and special safety equipment
which included "a mesh apron, a plastic belly guard, mesh sleeves or plastic arm guard, wrist
wraps, mesh gloves, rubber gloves, polar sleeves, rubber boots, a chain belt, a weight belt, scab-
bard and shin guards." Id. The second category of workers wore gear such as hard hats, earplugs,
safety footwear, and safety eyewear. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1125.
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Under § 17 of the FLSA 20 the Secretary of Labor brought an action
against IBP seeking to enforce the overtime and recordkeeping provisions.'2 '
The Secretary argued that the time employees spent putting on, taking off, and
storing the safety equipment between shifts constituted compensable work time
under the FLSA.'22 IBP countered that the tasks were preliminary and post-
liminary activities that were noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947.123
The trial court agreed in part with both parties. It initially granted a
restitutionary injunction, having determined that part of the contested work
time for the knife-wielding workers was "hours worked" under the FLSA.
24
The trial court, however, later vacated the injunction and certified for appeal
the question of whether the FLSA required retroactive application of the in-
junction."' The parties appealed the issues of determining compensable
hours and issuance of the restitutionary injunction.
26
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court's determination of com-
pensable work time,127 but provided a different justification. 2  The court
reasoned that time spent by the second category of workers did not constitute
FLSA compensable time because that activity failed to reach the level of men-
tal or physical exertion that defines "work.' 29 The court defined work as a
physical or mental exertion, whether burdensome or not, which the employer
controls or requires of the employee, and which is pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer.3
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
121. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1124.
122. Id. at 1125.
123. Id. The Portal-to-Portal Act provides that
no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 ... on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee
minimum wages, or to pay an employee overtime compensation, for or on account of
any of the following activities of such employee .... (1) walking, riding, or traveling to
and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which
such employee is employed to perform, and (2) activities which are preliminary to or
postliminary to said principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to the time
on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the
time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.
29 U.S.C. § 254 (1994).
124. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The lower court found that the time consumed in donning, doffing, and storing the
protective gear by the knife-wielding workers was compensable because of the "integral and indis-
pensable" part it played in the performance of the principal activity, meat cutting. Reich v. Iowa
Beef Packers, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1315, 1326 (D. Kan. 1993).
128. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125.
129. Id. at 1125-26.
130. Id. at 1125 (relying on Tennessee Coal Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 598 (1944)). The circuit court also noted that such work could also be qualified as de mi-
nimis as a matter of law. Id. at 1126 n.l.
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The court also agreed with the lower court's initial grant of a
restitutionary injunction. 3' IBP's "good faith reliance defense"'' necessari-
ly failed because IBP did not rely upon either a written opinion issued by the
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor or
upon any other valid basis.'33 The Tenth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's
standard for judging the district court's discretion to implement a restitutionary
injunction. 34 The court examined the purpose of the FLSA and determined
that it seeks to secure full compensation due hourly workers for their
labor. 33 The court also affirmed the lower court's initial holding that knife-
wielding workers should be paid on the basis of a reasonable time to put on
and remove gear, rather than the actual time taken, in order to account for the
documented "wait-and-walk time" which is not compensable.'36
3. Aaron v. City of Wichita.37
a. Facts
Wichita firefighters sued the City of Wichita (City) for wages due under
the FLSA. 38 The firefighters claimed that the City improperly calculated the
"regular rate" of pay used to compute overtime and impermissibly exempted
certain employees from FLSA overtime requirements.'39
The firefighters alleged that the City had violated FLSA provisions by
failing to pay for sleep and mealtime hours, improperly exempting Division
Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, and Captains from overtime requirements, and using
an overstated number of hours to create an artificial hourly rate of pay. " In
131. Id. at 1125.
132. The defense is found in the Portal-to-Portal Act, which states:
[N]o employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account of the
failure of the employer to pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ... if he pleads and proves that the act or omission com-
plained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written adminis-
trative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation, of the agency of the United
States specified in subsection (b) of this section, or any administrative practice or en-
forcement policy of such agency with respect to the class of employers to which he
belonged.
29 U.S.C. § 259 (1994).
133. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1126.
134. "'While a restitutionary injunction need not issue as a matter of course upon a finding of
past wages due, the district court's discretion to deny the injunction where it makes such a finding
is severely limited and must be exercised with an eye to the purposes of the act."' Id. (quoting
Donovan v. Grantham, 690 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1982)).
135. Id. at 1127.
136. Id.
137. 54 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1995).
138. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 653.
139. Id. at 654.
140. Id. With respect to the rank and file firefighters, the International Association of Fire
Fighters and the City had bargained for a written Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which
contained pay schedules indicating fortnight salaries and hourly rates. Id. The salaries and hourly
pay were based upon a 56-hour work week. Id. The City arrived at the "regular rate of pay" by
dividing the salary by the 112 bi-weekly hours (which included some overtime hours). Id. The
firefighters argued that the "regular rate of pay" should have been calculated by dividing the sala-




its summary judgment order, the district court denied the unpaid hours claim,
but found for the firefighters on the other claims.'4'
b. Decision
In regard to the issue of the regular rate of pay, the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that the dispute hinged on the number of hours the union-bargained
salaries were intended to cover.'42 The court stated that the lower court's
holding clearly conflicted with FLSA regulations which allow the use of base
salaries in calculating a regular rate to cover more than forty hours in one
week.'43 The Tenth Circuit further stated that the lower court misinterpreted
149 Madison Avenue Corp. v. Asselta'" in holding that the City's method of
calculation was improper.'45 The court explicitly held that the base salary
should be divided by the total number of hours worked if the designated base
salary intentionally covers overtime hours, in order to avoid calculating a rate
that would not fairly represent the "normal, non-overtime workweek."'"
The Tenth Circuit noted that the FLSA exempts any employee in an exec-
utive, administrative, or professional capacity from its overtime require-
ments. 47  Using the two-pronged short test found in the federal
141. Id. The district court held that the City incorrectly calculated the regular wage as a
matter of law because overtime hours could not be used in finding the regular rate of pay. Id.
142. Id. at 655. The firefighters argued that the MOA salaries were intended to cover non-
overtime hours only, while the City contended that the salaries were intended to cover some over-
time hours. Id.
143. Id. The court set forth an example from the regulations:
If an employee whose maximum hours standard is 40 hours was hired at a fixed salary
of $275 for 55 hours of work, he was entitled to a statutory overtime premium for the
15 hours in excess of 40 at the rate of $2.50 per hour (half-time) in addition to his sala-
ry, and the statutory overtime pay of $7.50 per hour (time and one-half) for any hours
worked in excess of 55.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 778.325 (1993)).
144. 331 U.S. 199, modified, 331 U.S. 795 (1947) (holding that regular rate of pay equaled a
non-overtime work week).
145. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655-56. The Supreme Court has held that the regular rate of pay repre-
sented the rate actually paid for the "normal, non-overtime workweek." 149 Madison Avenue, 331
U.S. at 204. However, the implication of the Court's statement was not to forbid the use of over-
time hours in calculating the regular rate, but rather to state that "the object of that computation is
to determine what rate was being paid for the non-overtime workweek unaffected by any inflated
rate paid for overtime work hours." Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655-56.
146. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 656. The Tenth Circuit then turned to new issues raised by the
firefighters concerning the incorporation of "Kelly days" in the rate calculation and whether the
rate accurately represented the parties' intent. The court found that "Kelly days" were another
form of paid vacation, and were thus properly included in the regular rate of pay calculation. Id.
The court found the contractual intent issue without merit. Id.
147. The relevant section provides, "The provisions of section[] 206 .. .and section 207 of
this title shall not apply to-(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative
or professional capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 213(1) (1994).
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regulations," the court held that the City had satisfied the initial salary
prong of the test.49
Federal regulations consider an employee "salaried" if his paycheck con-
sists of a predetermined amount which is not subject to reduction due to fluc-
tuations in quality or quantity of the work performed. 5 ° The Tenth Circuit
noted the varying treatment between other circuits of the salary prong. 5' The
court adopted neither analysis of the salary prong because the City's policy
allowed for deductions in accrued leave for absences of less than one day"2
and it did not dock pay for days missed.'53 The court found no additional
support for the firefighters' contention that the captains' and chiefs' additional
compensation for overtime hours,'54 together with paystubs showing the
number of hours covered in the pay period,' undermined the determination
that the City paid the captains and chiefs on a salary basis. 56
The Tenth Circuit found that a genuine issue of material fact did exist
concerning the duties prong of the short test.'57 Because the lower court erro-
neously concluded that the captains and chiefs were not salaried, it never
reached findings of fact concerning the duties prong.5 In order to satisfy the
duties prong of the short test, an employee's primary duties must consist of
148. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (1994). The regulation states that "executive-exempt" status is given
to an employee who
is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate of not less than ... $250 per
week ... and whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which
the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision
thereof, and includes the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more
other employees therein ....
Id.
149. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 659.
150. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
151. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 658. A number of circuits have held that where the employer penalizes
an employee with lost pay for absences of less than one day, the employees are not salaried, and
therefore not covered by the executive exemption. See Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6,
11 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Martin v. Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., 949 F.2d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 506 U.S. 905 (1992); Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1990). Other
circuits have held that unless the employer actually docks the pay, the employee is salaried and
therefore still under the aegis of the executive exemption. See McDonnell v. City of Omaha, 999
F.2d 293, 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1993); York v. City of Wichita Falls, 944 F.2d 236, 242 (5th Cir.
1991); Atlanta Professional Firefighters Union v. City of Atlanta, 920 F.2d 800, 805 (11th Cir.
1991).
152. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 657.
153. Id. at 658.
154. Id. The court relied upon federal regulations stating that compensation in addition to
salary is not inconsistent with the employee's salary status. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(b)
(1994)).
155. Id. The court found that tallying hours was a simple accounting function. Id.
156. Id. at 659.
157. Id.
158. Id. The firefighters had argued, regarding the captains and chiefs, that they exercised
little independent judgment or discretion; they had no authority in personnel decisions; they had
no authority to transfer, or raise or reduce pay; and they had no authority to make policy judg-
ments, spending decisions, or equipment modifications. Id. The firefighters also argued that the
battalion and division chiefs' work consisted of mostly clerical duties and that they were expected
to perform with the rank and file in responding to emergencies. Id. The City argued that the cap-
tains and chiefs spent more than 80% of their time managing subdivisions of the fire department
and that they possessed supervisory power commensurate to the position. Id.
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managing the enterprise, department, or subdivision, and include the "custom-
ary and regular direction of the work of two or more employees."' 59 The
Tenth Circuit directed the lower court to determine whether the employee
spent more than fifty percent of his time performing management functions in
order to be characterized as executive."6
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit succinctly and accurately dealt with the definition of
"employee," the definition of "work," and the principles behind calculating the
FLSA regular rate of pay. The court's failure, however, to choose between the
competing analyses that control the salary prong of the executive exemption
may lead to future difficulties.
The court's failure to dictate a controlling analysis does not advance the
goals of predictability and fairness. Employers in the Tenth Circuit will contin-
ue to operate without a definitive rule upon which they may base their busi-
ness decisions. Furthermore, the court's omission raises another issue. The
court based its decision not to choose an analysis on the fact that the City of
Wichita's policy dealt with deductions in accrued leave. 6' The Tenth Circuit
did not address whether FLSA compensation encompasses accrued leave.
Federal regulations state that an executive's compensation cannot be subject to
reduction.'62 If the employee's predetermined compensation includes accrued
leave, it follows that deductions would undermine the salary prong of the
executive exemption.'63
D. Other Circuits
In Carrel v. Sunland Construction, Inc., 64 the Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs were not employees in an examination of the employee/independent
contractor distinction.165 The court relied on a five-factor economic realities
test very similar to the Henderson test."6 The court determined that the
159. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (1994)).
160. Id. (citing Department of Labor v. City of Sapulpa, 30 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1994)). The
Tenth Circuit noted that in the event the captains and chiefs were found to spend less than 50% of
their time on managerial tasks, the trial court must still apply a four-factor analysis to determine
whether they may be considered executive. Id. The four factors a trial court must examine are:
"(1) the relative importance of management as opposed to other duties; (2) the frequency with
which the employee exercises discretionary powers; (3) the employee's relative freedom from
supervision; and (4) the relationship between the alleged exempt employee's salary and the wages
paid to other employees for similar nonexempt work." Id.
161. Id. at 658.
162. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
163. Pace, supra note 91, at 58-59; see also Robert D. Lipman et al., A Call for Bright-Lines
to Fix the Fair Labor Standards Act, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 357, 358 (1994) (noting that the
salary prong of the executive exemption test is too rigid to accurately account for paid leave poli-
cies).
164. 998 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1993).
165. Carrel, 998 F.2d at 334. Sunland Construction employed welders for pipeline construc-
tion projects and considered them to be independent contractors. Id. The welders generally worked
60 hours per week. Id. at 332.
166. Id. The court said the five factors were
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economic realities supported Sunland's classification of the workers as inde-
pendent contractors.'67
With regard to executive exemptions under the FLSA, the District of
Columbia Circuit held in Kinney v. District of Columbia'" that D.C.
firefighters failed the salary prong of the short test and therefore were protect-
ed by FLSA overtime requirements. 69 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court that the critical issue was whether the employees are "subject to"
docking of their pay for partial absences. 7 ° By contrast, the Eighth Circuit,
in McDonnell v. City of Omaha,7' held that employees retain their executive
status unless the employer actually docks the employees' pay.'





Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in response to the rapid growth in size and scope of employee bene-
fit plans. 7 4 The legislature designed ERISA to provide consistent federal
regulation and minimum benefits vesting and funding requirements. 75 To en-
sure uniformity, Congress inserted a preemption clause mandating that the
statute "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan.' ' 6 The Supreme Court expansively
interpreted the phrase "relate to," stating that any connection or reference to an
employee benefit plan sufficiently draws ERISA concerns.'77 In District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade,'78 however, the Court tem-
pered the broad scope of the provision by holding that the preemption will not
apply to state laws of general applicability.
79
the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer, the extent of the relative invest-
ments of the worker and alleged employer, the degree to which the worker's opportunity
for profit and loss is determined by the alleged employer, the skill and initiative required
to perform the job, and the permanency of the relationship.
Id.
167. Id. at 334. The court found in part that the welders worked on a "project by project,
company to company" basis, that they were highly skilled, that Sunland controlled none of the
methods or details of the welding work, and that the welders provided their own equipment. Id.
168. 994 F.2d 6 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
169. Kinney, 994 F.2d at 11.
170. Id.
171. 999 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994).
172. McDonnell, 999 F.2d at 296.
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
174. 29 U.S.C § 1001(a).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
177. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). For a discussion of the "relates
to" standard, see Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick Seiter, Health Plan Liability in the Age of Man-
aged Care, 62 DEF. CotNs. J. 191, 197 (1995) (concluding that despite the wealth of ERISA
preemption cases, there is no definitive test for determining whether a state law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan).
178. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
179. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130 n.1.
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund8 '
a. Facts
Guidry, a judgment debtor of the Sheet Metal Workers' International
Association (Union), sought to recover ERISA retirement benefits from the
Union.'' After failing to impose a constructive trust on Guidry's pension
benefits, s2 the Union tried statutory garnishment to collect its judgment."3
The district court held that ERISA's anti-alienation provisions protected
Guidry's pension fund benefits from garnishment,8 4 just as the provisions
had protected against a constructive trust in Guidry 15
On remand, the Tenth Circuit panel reversed the district court, stating that
Guidry I did not control because that case did not present the issue of post-
payment garnishment. 6 In the remanded case,8 7 Guidry additionally ar-
gued that Colorado law restricting garnishment applied to his pension bene-
fits. 8 Although it held that ERISA did not bar post-payment garnishment,
the Guidry H court also held that ERISA preempted Colorado law restricting
garnishment to twenty-five percent of disposable earnings.8 9 Guidry ap-
pealed for rehearing en banc.
180. 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).
181. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1081. From 1964 to 1981, Sheet Metal Workers' International Asso-
ciation, Local No. 9, employed Guidry as its chief executive officer. Guidry v. National Sheet
Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Colo. 1986). In 1982, Guidry
pleaded guilty to embezzling $377,301.53 from the Union and served prison time. Id. The Union
never recovered the embezzled money. Id. The Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund and
the Local Unions and Councils Pension Plan denied Guidry's subsequent request for early retire-
ment benefits. Id.
182. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1081. On prior review, the Supreme Court held that ERISA prohibit-
ed assignment or alienation of pension benefits. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension
Fund, 493 U.S 365, 371-72 (1990) [hereinafter Guidry 1].
183. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1081. The parties agreed to channel all disputed pension payments
into a single bank account in Denver, Colorado. Id. The funds thereby became subject to a single
writ of garnishment for the purposes of this suit. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Guidry 1, 493 U.S. at 375-76 (1990)).
186. Id. (citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 10 F.3d 700, 717 (10th Cir.
1993)).
187. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Guidry 11].
188. Id. at 713. Guidry argued that two Colorado statutes exempted garnishment of pension
benefits in whole or in part. One statute provides 75% exemption: "Except as provided ... the
maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is
subjected to garnishment or levy under execution or attachment may not exceed ... twenty-five
percent of the individual's disposable earnings .... " COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-54-104(2)(a) (Supp.
1995). Another statute provides complete exemption:
Property, including funds, held in or payable from any pension or retirement plan or
deferred compensation plan, including those in which the debtor has received benefits or
payments, has the present right to receive benefits or payments, or has the right to re-
ceive benefits or payments in the future and including pensions or plans which qualify
under the federal "Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" as an employee
pension benefit plan ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102(1)(s) (Supp. 1995).
189. Guidry I1, 10 F.3d at 713.
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b. Decision
On rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Guidry 11's primary
holding, reasoning that the anti-alienation provision of ERISA does not bar
garnishment of private pension benefits once they are received by the benefi-
ciary."9 The Tenth Circuit, however, also concluded that ERISA does not
preempt Colorado law, which exempts seventy-five percent of disposable
earnings from garnishment. 9' The court held that total exemption under sec-
tion 13-54-102(l)(s) of the Colorado statute was not available because the
underlying writs were filed before the effective date of the statute.
92
The court noted that ERISA preemption occurs when the state law "re-
late[s] to any employee benefit plan."' 93 The Tenth Circuit explained that the
parameters within which a state law relates to an employment benefit plan
should be construed expansively' 94 insofar as there exists a connection or
reference to a benefit plan,'" and regardless of whether the law indirectly af-
fects the plan.' 96 The court conceded, however, that ERISA does not preempt
state law if only a tenuous connection exists.97 The Tenth Circuit held that
where the Colorado statute did not relate to ERISA pension plans, 98 no pre-
emption occurred. 99
2. Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage2"
a. Facts
Originally filed in state court, Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage2"
involved a medical malpractice claim." 2 Pacificare, the defendant health
maintenance organization, argued that ERISA preempted Burrage's state law
claims and successfully removed the action to federal court.20 3 The district
court found that ERISA preempted only one of the state law claims, dismissed
it, and remanded the remaining two claims to state court.2
190. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1083.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1084.
193. Id. at 1083 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)).
194. Id. at 1083-84 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)).
195. Id. at 1083 (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
196. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130
(1992)).
197. Id. at 1084 (quoting Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 125, 130 n.1).
198. Id. at 1084-85. The Tenth Circuit found it significant that the statute, while including
pension or retirement benefits, does not specifically refer to ERISA pension plans or benefits. Id.
at 1085.
199. But see Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988)
(holding that ERISA preempted where a state statute identified ERISA welfare plan benefits for
protection under state garnishment law).
200. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
201. Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 151.





The remaining claims charged that Pacificare was liable for the malprac-
tice of one of its physicians and that Pacificare should be held vicariously and
directly liable for loss of consortium.2 '5 Pacificare petitioned for a writ of
mandamus to the district court to rescind its order remanding the two claims
to state court and to decide that ERISA preempted those claims."° The dis-
pute hinged upon whether the state law medical malpractice claim related to
the Pacificare plan, an employee benefit plan. 7
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit denied Pacificare's petition for writ of mandamus,
holding that the state claims did not relate to employee benefit plans and,
therefore, were not preempted by ERISA.08 The court acknowledged that no
circuit had yet addressed ERISA preemption of HMO malpractice actions and
that there existed a division in the district courts.2"
As noted previously, a law relates to an employee benefit plan if it refers
to such a plan.20 The Tenth Circuit identified four categories of law which
"relate to" employee benefit plans: (1) laws regulating the type of benefits or
terms of ERISA plans; (2) laws creating reporting, disclosure, funding, or
vesting requirements for ERISA plans; (3) laws providing rules governing the
calculation of benefit amounts under ERISA plans; and (4) laws and common-
law rules providing remedies for misconduct arising from the administration of
ERISA plans."' The Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court's deter-
mination that the malpractice claim did not involve the HMO plan's adminis-
tration of benefits or the level or quality of benefits promised.22 The Tenth
Circuit disposed of the loss of consortium claim: because the claim hinged





The Tenth Circuit's decision in Guidry walks a precarious line. Although
the reasoning seems sound and persuasive, and protects the legal rights of
judgment debtors, the decision may provide perverse incentives for law-break-
ers.214 The court's ruling provides lawbreakers with largely ungarnishable
pension benefits, even in the event of a successful criminal prosecution.
The medical malpractice claim against Pacificare of Oklahoma is repre-
sentative of the nationwide tide of lawsuits filed against health maintenance
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 154.
208. Id. at 153.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 154 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)).
211. Id. (quoting National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992)).
212. Id. at 155.
213. Id.
214. See Guidry, 39 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1995) (Brorby, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority's holding mandates a bizarre result).
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organizations nationwide."' With such lawsuits comes the issue of ERISA
preemption. The Pacificare analysis indicated that factual posturing is critical
in determining whether ERISA preemption follows.2 6 As some commenta-
tors have observed, if the claim against the health benefit plan subject to




The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Corcoran v. United Healthcare,
Inc.," 8 addressed a medical malpractice claim brought against a health plan
administrator, United Healthcare." 9 The court noted the congressional intent
to broadly extend ERISA's reach.220 Based upon its findings that United
Healthcare dispensed medical advice in the context of making determinations
regarding the availability of benefits under the health insurance plan, the Fifth
Circuit held that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim.22 '
In Spain v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,"' a case similar to Corcoran, the
Ninth Circuit also found that ERISA preempted the plaintiffs' wrongful death
claim against an employee benefit plan administrator.223 The plaintiffs argued
that Aetna's delay in authorizing a bone marrow transplant negligently caused
the death of Steven Spain, the plaintiffs' husband and father.224 Citing the
established premise that ERISA should be applied expansively,225 the Ninth
Circuit stated that ERISA preempted common law claims based upon improper
administration of health benefits.226 The court stated that the plaintiffs' state
law action directly related to the administration of ERISA plan benefits.227
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided many significant labor law
and employment cases during the last year. In Frymire v. Ampex Corp.,228
the court found that the three-year contract actions period represented the
appropriate statute of limitations period for WARN actions.2 9 It also held
215. See Conrad & Seiter, supra note 177, at 197.
216. Pacificare, 59 F.3d at 154-55.
217. See Conrad & Seiter, supra note 177, at 197; see also Diana J. Bearden & Bryan J.
Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L.
REV. 285, 339 (1995) (concluding that ERISA will likely not preempt common law medical mal-
practice claims).
218. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
219. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321, 1323.
220. Id. at 1328-29 n.ll.
221. Id. at 1331.
222. 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1612 (1994).
223. Spain, 11 F.3d at 132.




228. 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
229. Frymire, 61 F.3d at 763.
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that actual work days rather than calendar days should provide the basis for
WARN back pay awards.23°
In Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co.,"' the Tenth Circuit reiterated the
analysis for determining the employee/independent contractor distinction for
FLSA purposes.232 The court in Reich v. IBP, Inc.,233 held that "physical or
mental exertion" best defines compensable work under the FLSA.234 In
Aaron v. City of Wichita,235 the Tenth Circuit determined that base salaries
which covered more than forty hours in a week could be used for calculating
the regular rate of pay for FLSA overtime purposes. 236 The court also clari-
fied the analysis used to determine when the FLSA executive exemption ap-
plied.237
In the area of ERISA preemption, the Tenth Circuit decided two signifi-
cant cases. In Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,238 the
court held that ERISA did not preempt statutory garnishment protections.239
In Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage,24 the court further found that ERISA
did not preempt a medical malpractice claim against a health maintenance
organization.'
Young Nam
230. Id. at 774.
231. 41 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1994).
232. Henderson, 41 F.3d at 570.
233. 38 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1994).
234. Reich, 38 F.3d at 1125.
235. 54 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1995).
236. Aaron, 54 F.3d at 655.
237. Id. at 658.
238. 39 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).
239. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1083.
240. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).




During the 1994-1995 survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided several
cases involving prisoners' substantive rights. This Survey features the seven
most significant cases, dividing them into four topical categories. The first
group of cases addresses the controversial freedom of religious exercise under
the First Amendment. This group includes Werner v. McCotter,' the most
influential case of the survey period. Werner offers the Tenth Circuit's first
interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)2 and
its effects on prisoners' rights.' This case may have additional far-reaching
implications because most other circuits have not yet had an opportunity to
interpret RFRA.' The second category of cases involves prisoners' Fourth
Amendment claims of unreasonable searches and seizures. The third group of
cases features the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Lastly, the fourth category addresses a prisoner's Fourteenth
Amendment right of access to the courts.
I. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT5
A. Background
When the United States Supreme Court examines an issue that involves
the constitutional rights of prisoners, the Court relies on a qualified premise:
prisoners retain constitutional protections even while incarcerated. The nature
1. 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Werner, see infra notes 29-35 and
accompanying text.
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 852 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993)).
3. Congress enacted RFRA to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a case having nothing to do with
prisoners' rights. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Now Law of Land, Vol. V., No.
5, CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 65, 67 (1994) [hereinafter RFRA Now Law of Land]. Several senators
and representatives attempted to carve out an exception to RFRA by proposing the Reid Amend-
ment, which would have prohibited RFRA's application to prisoners' free exercise claims. See S.
REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ V(d) and XI (1993); H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). The Senate defeated the Reid Amendment despite warnings from prison administra-
tors and state Attorneys General that RFRA would open the floodgate for inmate litigation should
the act take effect unamended. See RFRA Now Law of Land, supra, at 67. Congress, therefore,
clearly intended to apply RFRA to prisoners' free exercise claims. For a complete legislative his-
tory of RFRA, see H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-17 (1993); S. REP. No. 111, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-38 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892-1912; 139 CONG. REC.
H2,356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993).
4. See Abbott Cooper, Comment, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act's Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV. 325, 338 & n.81
(1995).
5. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of incarceration, however, justifiably limits those protections.6 The Court pre-
sumes that prison officials can best balance the constitutional rights of prison-
ers against penological interests. Consequently, the Court designed a formula,
known as the Turner test,' which heavily favors the interests of penological
institutions when those interests are in conflict with prisoners' constitutional
protections.9
According to this test, a prison administrator's policy decision that en-
croaches upon a prisoner's constitutional rights is valid as long as it is "rea-
sonably related to [a] legitimate penological interest[]."'" Thus, courts follow-
ing Turner must give considerable deference to the prison administrator's
judgment." Before RFRA's enactment, the Turner test represented the stan-
dard test used for evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims. 2 In effect,
RFRA legislatively overturned the Turner test with regard to religious exercise
cases. 3 In passing RFRA, Congress set forth new criteria for judging govern-
ment encroachments on prisoners' rights to practice their religion. 4
Only those restrictions which place a substantial burden on the practice of
religion trigger evaluation under RFRA. 5 This prerequisite places courts in
6. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
7. Id. at 349.
8. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). After setting forth the doctrine in Turner, the
Court applied it in O'Lone. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
9. See RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 69.
10. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Turner court set out the following factors as relevant in
determining the reasonableness of the regulation: (1) whether or not there is a rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate state interest; (2) whether or not there are alter-
nate means available for the prisoners to exercise their rights; (3) the impact on others of accom-
modating the prisoner's exercise of these rights; and (4) the existence of alternate means of
achieving the regulatory purpose. Id. at 89-90.
11. Id. at 89; see also RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 66. The "legitimate inter-
est," or "mere rationality" standard provides the lowest level of scrutiny employed by the Court in
constitutional cases. See Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1979) (describing the rationality
standard as the "most minimal of constitutional standards"). The other standards of review which
reappear consistently throughout constitutional law are "intermediate scrutiny" and "strict scruti-
ny." For more commentary on the three standards of review, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTrIONAL LAW § 18.3 (2d ed. 1992).
12. See RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 69.
13. Id. at 65-66. Although RFRA changed the government's burden with respect to viola-
tions of religious exercise rights, the Turner test remains the standard for all other constitutional
questions. Id. at 69.
14. Id. at 68. For more information on the effects of RFRA, see The James R. Browning
Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995). Spe-
cific articles of interest include the following: Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its
Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, supra, at 5; Daniel 0. Conkle, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Stat-
ute, supra, at 39; Frederick M. Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice, supra, at 95; David
L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's Proposed Guide-
lines, supra, at 119; Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, supra, at 145; Ira C.
Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, su-
pra, at 171; William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal
Protection and Free Speech Concerns, supra, at 227; Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through
It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, supra, at 249.
15. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995).
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the position of assessing the religious value of the practice in question. 6 The
Tenth Circuit has held that in order to create a "substantial burden":
A government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain con-
duct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a prisoner's
religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a prisoner's ability to
express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner reason-
able opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to
a prisoner's religion. 7
Once a prisoner establishes that a correctional regulation substantially
burdens his religious exercise rights, the court will find that regulation invalid
under RFRA, unless the prison administration shows that the regulation both
furthers a compelling state interest, and that the regulation represents the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.' The Supreme Court describes a
compelling state interest as an interest "of the highest order," one that is "not
otherwise served."' 9 Historically, courts have recognized health, safety, and
security interests as compelling interests in the prison context.2" In compari-
son, legitimate penological interests include interests of a lower order, such as
avoiding inconvenience to administrative personnel, or balancing the allocation
of prison resources.2' If a regulation survives the compelling state interest
analysis, then the government must show there is no less restrictive means of
furthering the interest.22 Because RFRA imposes such a heightened standard
of review, nearly every religious exercise restriction existing today is subject
to legal challenge.23
16. RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 66.
17. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted).
18. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 3(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b)
(Supp. V 1993). The effects of RFRA are so significant because government encroachments on
free exercise rights must now meet the compelling state interest standard, otherwise known as
strict scrutiny, in order to survive judgment. See id. Compare this to the former rationality stan-
dard under the Turner test which required the lowest level of scrutiny in cases involving
prisoners' constitutional rights. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); see also Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d
1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 1976) (noting that where restrictions are placed on the exercise of a reli-
gious belief, "the court should further determine whether any incidental burden on fundamental
First Amendment rights is justified by a compelling state interest").
20. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1479-80.
21. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352-53. The Supreme Court would probably reject administra-
tive inconvenience and cost as compelling state interests in prison cases, since the Court rejected
them as compelling interests years ago in other types of cases. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 263-69 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972); see also
RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 72 (commenting on administrative costs and inconve-
nience as a basis for denying a prisoner's religious dietary requests).
22. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 3(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b)
(Supp. V 1993). One example of a regulation failing the least restrictive means test comes from a
federal district court which held that a prison could not prohibit the wearing of religious beads
under clothing. The court found that there was a less restrictive means available for furthering the
government security interest of avoiding gang symbols. Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194,
209 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
23. RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 65.
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B. Werner v. McCotter24
1. Facts
A Cherokee Native American, Robert Werner, alleged that the Utah De-
partment of Corrections (UDOC) violated his right to freely exercise Native
American Shamanism.25 Werner claimed that administrators denied him ac-
cess to a sweat lodge, prohibited him from receiving or possessing a medicine
bag and other religious symbols, and failed to provide him with access to a
Cherokee Spiritual Advisor and Cherokee religious literature.26 In defense,
the Utah prison administration argued that the restrictions survived analysis
under the Turner test and moved for summary judgment. 2' The district court
granted summary judgment for the prison administration, and Werner ap-
pealed.28
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that the prison administration's reliance on the
Turner test was erroneous.29 The court invoked RFRA, stating that a prison
system may only substantially burden a prisoner's right to free exercise if the
prison has a compelling state interest, and employs the least restrictive means
necessary to further that interest."° The court held that only those restrictions
placing a "substantial burden" on the practice of religion fall within the ambit
of RFRA." Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions often fail to im-
pose a substantial burden, while the complete prohibition of an important
religious practice would impose a substantial burden.32
In reference to the plaintiff's specific complaints, the Tenth Circuit re-
manded the first claim, noting that Werner had presented credible evidence
indicating that the sweat lodge played a highly significant role in his sincerely
held religious beliefs, therefore presenting a prima facie claim under RFRA.33
The court also remanded Werner's claim concerning the medicine bag, stating
that religious symbols often play a valuable role in the expression of religious
beliefs. The denial of such symbols, the court explained, could create a sub-
stantial burden on religious exercise.3" Regarding Werner's claims concerning
denial of access to a spiritual advisor and religious literature, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment, finding the claims devoid of factual support.35
24. 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
25. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1478-79.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1479.
28. Id. at 1478.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1480.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1481.
35. Id. The Tenth Circuit found that prison administrators had employed several part-time
chaplains who offered nondenominational religious support to the entire prison population. Id. In
addition, two Native American spiritual advisors were available on a volunteer basis. Id. Werner




Prior to the passage of RFRA, the Supreme Court tended to narrow lower
courts' constructions of inmates' religious rights.36 By following RFRA, the
Tenth Circuit reversed this trend.37 Werner demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's
willingness to accept the new standard of review which RFRA imposes. This
decision also provides lower courts with a clear path to follow in future free
exercise cases.
Although Congress clearly intended RFRA to impose a heightened stan-
dard of review, Congress left the major terms of the statute undefined.38 The
Tenth Circuit relied on pre-RFRA case law to define those terms.39 This reli-
ance demonstrates the court's refusal to abandon pre-RFRA precedent, where
such precedent helps to fill in the gaps that Congress left in the wake of statu-
tory construction.
D. Other Circuits
When the Tenth Circuit decided Werner, few other courts had interpreted
RFRA.' For example, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have recognized
that prisoners' claims fall within RFRA's language, yet both Circuits have
failed to apply the statute. In Brown-El v. Harris," the Eighth Circuit noted
that prisoners' free exercise claims fell within the ambit of RFRA, yet the
court declined to apply the act. 2 In Bryant v. Gomez,43 the Ninth Circuit
generally acknowledged that prisoners' claims fall within RFRA's broad lan-
guage." The court, however, did not apply the statute, finding that the regu-
lation at issue did not impose a "substantial burden" on the prisoner's exercise
of his religion.43
In Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Department of Corrections,' the Sixth
Circuit held that the prison's refusal to allow the plaintiff time off from work
in order to attend religious services did not infringe on the prisoner's free
exercise rights.47 The court cited Werner and applied the substantial burden
also refused to accept a donated hawk feather and literature on Native American beliefs. Id. The
court found that Werner himself thwarted all of the correctional department's efforts to accommo-
date his desire to pursue a Native American faith. Id.
36. RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 65.
37. Id.
38. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(Supp. V 1993).
39. See Werner v. McCotter, 48 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (defining "substantial
burden" by relying on language in a pre-RFRA Supreme Court decision).
40. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 338 n.81.
41. 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1994).
42. Brown-El, 26 F.3d at 69. The court noted that although RFRA applied retroactively, the
act was inapplicable as the plaintiff failed to raise the issue. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that
either way, the regulation did not infringe on Brown-El's religious freedom. Id.
43. 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995).
44. Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949.
45. Id.
46. 65 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of injunctive and monetary relief for the
prison's refusal to allow time off to attend religious services).
47. Abdul-Rahman, 65 F.3d at 491.
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test.' Werner may have been the first case to invalidate a penal regulation
under RFRA's standards.
II. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 49
A. Background
Courts generally recognize that a prisoner's constitutional right to privacy
is diminished during his incarceration." In Hudson v. Palmer,5 the Supreme
Court held that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with re-
spect to his room or cell.5 2 In the same vein, strip searches and visual body
cavity searches do not create per se violations of prisoners' Fourth
Amendment rights, despite a lack of probable cause on the part of the perfor-
ming official.5 3 The Court has rejected a precise definition of "reasonable-
ness" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and has instead opted for a case by
case balancing test approach. 4 According to the test set forth in Bell v. Wolf-
ish,5 5 a court must strike a balance between the "need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."5 6 In
striking this balance, a court must also consider the facts and circumstances of
each case.57
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit held that a prison system has a legitimate
penological interest in extracting a prisoner's blood for AIDS testing, while a
prisoner has only a slight expectation of privacy regarding his blood.5" In a
1994 case, Lucero v. Gunter (Lucero I), the Tenth Circuit held that correction-
al facilities could require inmates to provide urine samples for drug analysis,
48. Id. at 492.
49. The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
50. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Ross A. Epstein, Note, Urinalysis Test-
ing in Correctional Facilities, 67 B.U. L. REv. 475, 480 (1987).
51. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
52. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530. The Court, however, noted that a prisoner may have an Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim when officials perform particularly egregious cell
searches. Id. Prisoners may also have a common law tort claim if officials destroy property during
a search. Id.
53. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). The Court implied, however, that the
Fourth Amendment may proscribe such a search if conducted in an abusive fashion. Id. at 560.
For further discussion of body cavity searches, see Tracy McMath, Comment, Do Prison Inmates
Retain Any Fourth Amendment Protection from Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 739
(1987).
54. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
55. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
56. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
57. Id. (stating that "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner
in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place where it is conducted").
58. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194-96 (10th Cir. 1989). In Dunn, the Tenth Circuit
used the Turner test to balance the intrusiveness of a blood test against the prison's justifications
for administering the test. Id. at 1194. Applying the test, the court found that the prison's regula-
tions rationally related to its justifications and passed constitutional scrutiny. Id. In the course of
its opinion, the court noted that a prisoner had a diminished expectation of privacy and that prison
regulations were entitled to greater deference than those in the outside world. Id.
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so long as the selection process was random. 9 An "insufficiently developed"
record, however, could not prove that the selection process was random, so the
court remanded the case.' In 1995, Lucero once again came before the Tenth
Circuit for a clarification of what constitutes a "random" selection process.
B. Lucero v. Gunter (Lucero 1)62
1. Facts
Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) officials requested that in-
mate Anthony Lucero submit to a urinalysis for drug testing purposes.63
When Lucero refused, the facility forced him to serve ten days in punitive
segregation, and subtracted eighteen days of his good time credit for "disobey-
ing a lawful order." While Lucero conceded that random urine testing was
not violative of the Fourth Amendment, he alleged that officials did not select
him randomly since they had requested his sample during the evening.65
According to prison policy, officials were to randomly select a list of
prisoners for urine testing during the day shift.' The CDOC acknowledged
this policy and admitted that officials requested Lucero's sample during the
evening. The CDOC argued, however, that officials randomly selected Lucero
for testing during the day shift, but were unable to collect the urine during the
day due to the shift manager's work load.67
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reiterated its holding in Lucero I, and further stated that
procedures for selecting inmates for urine testing must be truly random.' The
court defined "random" by explaining that selection procedures must not leave
any discretion in the hands of the selecting official, and that the procedures
must also provide "limiting guidelines."' The Tenth Circuit determined that
the Department's computer-guided selection process was random, especially
since no evidence existed suggesting the selecting official's awareness of the
selected inmate's identity.70
59. Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1994) (Lucero I).
60. Id. at 1350.
61. Lucero v. Gunter, 52 F.3d 874, 875-76 (10th Cir. 1995) (Lucero 11).
62. 52 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1995) (Lucero II).
63. Lucero H, 52 F.3d at 875.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 876.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 877.
69. "Limiting guidelines" are any guidelines preventing the prison's ability to circumvent the
randomness requirement. See id.
70. Id.
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C. Analysis
Lucero II establishes that random urine collection for drug testing does
not violate the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes a reasonable means
of combatting illegal drug use within prisons.7' Thus, correctional facilities
may sample and test inmates' body fluids when such sampling and testing is
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 72 The Tenth Circuit's
holding conforms to the Supreme Court's general willingness to defer to pris-
on administrators' judgment when reviewing prison policies designed to pro-
tect internal order and discipline. 73 According to the Tenth Circuit, however,
administrators must make concerted efforts to ensure that officials perform
such testing in a reasonable manner.74
D. Other Circuits
As early as 1984, the Eighth Circuit determined that a urinalysis consti-
tutes a search or seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 7" Two years
later, however, that same court held that prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by random urinalysis testing for drugs.76 The Tenth Circuit
appears to have followed the Eighth Circuit concerning this issue.
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit held that urine tests constitute searches for
Fourth Amendment purposes because such testing is analogous to body cavity
searches and blood testing.77 That Circuit also held, however, that random
selection was unnecessary when prison officials test the entire prison popula-
tion in one testing session on a periodic basis.78 This situation eliminates
some of the problems raised by a system that allows administrators to choose
individual inmates for testing.79 Random selection, therefore, was not an issue
squarely addressed by the Seventh Circuit. No other circuits have had the
opportunity to decide this issue.
71. See id. As in Dunn, the Tenth Circuit used a balancing test to weigh the "significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the prisoner." Lucero
1, 17 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979)). In the spirit of the Turner
test, the court also recognized the need to give prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in
their judgment to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id.
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547); see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.9 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
72. In other words, the body fluid testing must pass the Turner test; see supra notes 8-14
and accompanying text.
73. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; Epstein, supra note 50, at 480; see also Fred Cohen & Kate
King, Note, Drug Testing and Corrections, 23 CRiM. L. BULL. 151, 172 (1987) (concluding that
truly random urinalysis that is not conducted in an abusive fashion will withstand constitutional
challenge).
74. See Lucero 1, 17 F.3d at 1349-50.
75. See McDonell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the Iowa Department of Corrections from conducting strip searches, car
searches, blood tests, and urinalyses of employees unless the searching officials reasonably suspect
that an employee is smuggling contraband or under the influence of alcohol or a controlled sub-
stance).
76. Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986).
77. Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1992).




III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT °
A. Background
The Supreme Court has not yet created a specific test by which lower
courts may determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusu-
al." l The Court maintains, however, that in order to survive Eighth Amend-
ment scrutiny, such "[c]onditions must not involve the wanton and unneces-
sary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime warranting imprisonment."82 Conditions of confinement must not
offend "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"83 nor may they result in a serious deprivation of basic human
needs. 4
Since inmates must rely on prison authorities to provide their basic human
needs, a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to any of those needs rises
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 5 The Court maintains that
such basic needs include medical care, 6 food, warmth, and exercise.8 7 The
Tenth Circuit's list of basic needs includes additional necessities such as shel-
ter (including adequate space), sanitation, safety, and clothing. Conditions of
confinement that do not by themselves establish constitutional violations may
constitute Eighth Amendment violations if, when considered in combination
with other deprivations, the confinement conditions result in the deprivation of
a basic need.89 The Tenth Circuit explained that "a low cell temperature at
night combined with a failure to issue blankets" may deprive an inmate of the
basic need of warmth.'
A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference to a basic need "if he
knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."'" This is a subjective
test requiring actual knowledge of the substantial risk.92 In the following cas-
es the Tenth Circuit refined its definition of what does, and does not, consti-
tute a basic human need.
80. The Eight Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
81. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
82. Id. at 347.
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id. at 346-47.
85. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
302 (1991).
86. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
87. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
88. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
90. Id.
91. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
92. See Leading Cases, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARv. L. REV. 231 (1994).
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Housley v. Dodson1
3
a. Facts
Jim Housley, a prisoner at the Custer County Jail in Oklahoma, brought
an action against Department of Health officials for allowing him only thirty
minutes of out-of-cell exercise during a three-month period.94 The district
court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted and Housley appealed."
b. Decision
Although the Tenth Circuit never expressly held that prisoners have a
constitutional fight to exercise, the court stated that a "total denial of exercise
for an extended period of time would constitute cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." What constitutes adequate exercise
depends upon the circumstances of each case.97 Relevant factors include the
physical characteristics of the inmate's cell, the jail, the average inmate length
of stay, and the security risk associated with the particular complainant.98 An
inmate's complaint alleging a deprivation of adequate exercise for an extended
period of time is sufficient to state a claim under the Eight Amendment."
The court remanded for further proceedings in accordance with its holding."
2. Adkins v. Rodriguez'0'
a. Facts
Shelly Adkins, a prisoner at the Huerfano County Jail in Colorado, alleged
that a prison deputy sexually harassed her and violated her privacy.'" Ad-
kins claimed that while she was incarcerated, Deputy Rodriguez, a trainee,
made comments to her about her body and about his sexual prowess and con-
quests." 3 Adkins also asserted that Deputy Rodriguez entered her cell one
night while she was sleeping, and upon discovering she had awakened, told
Adkins she had "nice breasts."'' "° Deputy Rodriguez resigned soon after the
incident. 5 Finding no clearly established right to be free from verbal sexual
harassment, the district court dismissed Adkins's claim."° Without violation
93. 41 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1994).
94. Housley, 41 F.3d at 598.
95. Id.




100. Id. at 600.
101. 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
102. Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1035.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1036.
105. Id.
106. Id. Although Adkins advocated an analysis of her claim under the First, Third, Fourth,
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of a clearly established right, government employees retain qualified
immunity.7
b. Decision
Initially, the Tenth Circuit determined that Adkins's claim should remain
limited to the confines of the Eighth Amendment, which is the "explicit textu-
al source of constitutional protection in the prison context."'" Since the
court limited the claim to Eighth Amendment parameters, the test for deter-
mining whether Deputy Rodriguez violated Adkins's rights involved two con-
siderations. The court never determined whether the right to be free from
sexual harassment in prison exists at all."°9 Instead, the court examined
whether the alleged deprivation was "objectively, sufficiently serious," and
whether the prison official acted with "deliberate indifference to inmate health
or safety."''o
The court admitted that the deputy's conduct was "unacceptable and
outrageous." ' The court refused, however, to acknowledge the harassment
as the "sort of violence or threat[] of violence" that violates the Eighth Amen-
dment." '2 Adkins's allegations did not establish that the single invasion of
her cell constituted conduct rising to the level of deliberate indifference."3
Moreover, Adkins did not prove that Deputy Rodriguez knew that she "face[d]
a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take




3. Brown v. Zavaras"5
a. Facts
Josephine (formerly Joseph) Brown, an inmate at the Limon Correctional
Facility in Colorado, filed a complaint against two correctional officials alleg-
ing cruel and unusual punishment for withholding medical care in deliberate
indifference to her basic medical needs."6 Brown, a transsexual, claimed that
transsexuality is a medical condition termed "gender dysphoria.""'7 She fur-
ther alleged that gender dysphoria is a medically recognized psychological
disorder resulting from the "disjunction between sexual identity and sexual
organs.""'  Brown claimed that prison officials failed to provide her with
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court confined her claim to analysis
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
107. Id. For a discussion of qualified immunity in the prison setting, see Matthew P. Previn,
Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 83 GEO. L.J. 1498 (1995).
108. Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
109. Id. at 1036-37.
110. Id. at 1037 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1038.
114. Id. at 1037 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct 1970, 1984 (1991)).
115. 63 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 1995).
116. Brown, 63 F.3d at 969.
117. Id. at 968-69.
118. Id. at 969 (citations omitted). For more information on transsexualism and penological
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estrogen hormones and other medical care available to treat gender dyspho-
ria."9 The district court dismissed the claim and Brown appealed.'
b. Decision
Referring to an earlier decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that when the
provision of estrogen is medically controversial, prison administrators are not
legally required to administer estrogen, nor provide any other particular treat-
ment. '2 Nonetheless, the court maintained that prison officials must provide
treatment to address the "medical needs" of transsexual prisoners.'22 The
court concluded that Brown claimed a medical condition, and, therefore, also
claimed a general right to medical treatment for that condition in her com-
plaint.'23 Although prison officials have no duty to administer estrogen as a
particular treatment, the court remanded the case to determine whether the
Limon facility was providing Brown with the appropriate medical care neces-
sary for her condition.'24
C. Analysis
In Housley, the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's lead, ac-
knowledging exercise as one of the basic human rights officials may not deny
inmates."2  The court, however, did not hold that any deprivation of exercise
would automatically rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. In-
stead, the court required a totality of circumstances analysis and a determina-
tion of what constituted adequate exercise on a case by case basis.
In Adkins, the court firmly stated that allegations of verbal sexual harass-
ment of inmates by prison officials are limited to an Eighth Amendment anal-
ysis. The court relied on the Supreme Court's holding that both the treatment
which a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions of his confinement are
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. The court failed to explain,
however, how this language confined the plaintiff's claim exclusively to the
Eighth Amendment.'26 The Tenth Circuit also declined to explain why
concerns, see Ruth Colker, BI: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1 (1995); Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law Establishing Constitutional Minima for the Provi-
sion of Mental Health Services to Psychiatrically Involved Inmates, 15 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Civ. CONFINEMENT 243 (1990); Edward S. David, Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A
Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288 (1975).
119. Brown, 63 F.3d at 969.
120. Id. at 968.
121. Id. at 970 (citing Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Although the Tenth Circuit consistently referred to the necessity for treatment of
"medical needs," it declined to address what separated a medical need from a nonmedical one. Id.
125. Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597, 599 (10th Cir. 1994).
126. The Tenth Circuit relied on language from Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, to justify limiting Adkins's claim to the Eighth
Amendment. See Adkins v. Rodriquez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1995). Nowhere in Graham,
however, does the Supreme Court state that the Eighth Amendment is the sole source of constitu-
tional protection in the prison context, or that courts may scrutinize government action using only
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prisoners appear to have privacy rights in some contexts, such as the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches, and not in the Adkins
context. 1 27
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit never explained how a policy of allowing
prison guards to verbally sexually harass prisoners with no threat of legal
liability comports with "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."'28 Nor did the court explore the possibility that need-
lessly confining an inmate to a psychologically destructive environment may
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprison-
ment.12 1 Since the Tenth Circuit found no clearly established right in the Ad-
kins claim, it evidently did not recognize verbal sexual harassment as violating
a basic human need.
The Tenth Circuit appears to have set the trend on the estrogen issue.
After the Tenth Circuit held that transsexuals do not necessarily have a right
to receive estrogen, several other circuits held likewise. 3 ° Brown comports
with the decisions of Housley and Adkins; the Tenth Circuit defers to prison
administrations concerning policy decisions, and only interferes with those
decisions in the event of a clear constitutional violation. The court also seems
devoted to a narrow definition of "basic human needs" for purposes of Eighth
Amendment analyses.
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have also adopted a narrow definition of "basic needs." The
Eleventh Circuit has held that if an inmate receives adequate food, clothing,
and sanitation, then the conditions of confinement do not, on their face, violate
the Eighth Amendment. 3' The Seventh Circuit states that inmates cannot ex-
pect the "amenities, conveniences, and services of a good hotel."'' It also
held that an inmate was not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment during
his twenty-eight days in a segregation unit when prison officials offered to
one provision of the Constitution. In fact, the Court identifies the Eighth Amendment as one of
the "primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental
conduct." Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. In Adkins, however, there was no claim of physically abusive
conduct. Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1034.
127. The Tenth Circuit noted that Adkins did not allege that the "violation of her right of
privacy arose out of an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment," or that she
was "denied substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when she was sexually ha-
rassed." Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1037 n.4. The Supreme Court, however, has used substantive due pro-
cess to identify a right of privacy in some cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55
(1973). What the Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge was that the Supreme Court has also recog-
nized that the right of privacy exists in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Curiously,
these are the very amendments Adkins invoked in her claim. See Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1037. The
Tenth Circuit, however, never mentioned that Adkins probably attempted to invoke a substantive
due process claim under the penumbra analysis.
128. See discussion supra text accompanying note 83.
129. See discussion supra text accompanying note 82.
130. See discussion supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
131. See Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1429 (11 th Cir. 1987).
132. Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988).
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transfer him into the general prison population where he could exercise.1
3
Exercise deprivation may rise, however, to an Eighth Amendment violation
where "movement is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy, and the
health of the individual is threatened.'
34
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit's "totality of circumstanc-
es" approach to examining deprivation of exercise actions. However, the Sixth
Circuit refused to specify any minimum amount of exercise as a constitutional
requirement.'35 The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits generally concur with
the Tenth Circuit's views on right to exercise.'36 The Ninth Circuit, however,
has gone so far as to hold that the deprivation of outdoor exercise could con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment.'37
Regarding the Adkins issue, the Sixth Circuit generally agrees with the
Tenth Circuit, concluding that an alleged verbal abuse or harassment by prison
officials toward an inmate does not necessarily qualify as punishment within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.'38 The Ninth Circuit, however, did
not limit the harassment inquiry to an Eighth Amendment analysis. Instead,
the court recognized that "incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodi-
ly privacy,""' and subjected a policy that impinged on inmates' right to pri-
vacy to the Turner test."4' The Ninth Circuit has also held that inappropriate
body searches may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 4'
Turning to Brown, other circuits have also refused to find a transsexual's
inherent medical right to receive estrogen. The Seventh Circuit mandated that
federal courts should defer to the informed judgment of prison officials to de-
termine the appropriate form of medical treatment for gender dysphoria.42
133. Id. at 1236. The plaintiff in this case was in temporary segregation for his own protec-
tion. Officials offered him the option of either foregoing his exercise rights or accepting a transfer
to the general population where he could exercise. The court noted that, even in his segregation
unit, the plaintiff could have "improvised temporarily" with jogging in place, aerobics, or pushups.
Id.
134. Id.
135. See Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1087 (6th Cir. 1995).
136. See, e.g., Leonard v. Norris, 797 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a punitive
measure depriving an inmate of out-of-cell exercise for fifteen days is not violative of the Eighth
Amendment); Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that one hour of
outdoor exercise per 24-hour period for prisoners in "special housing units" did not violate the
Eighth Amendment); Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding no
Eighth Amendment violation where prison officials allowed an inmate one hour of daily indoor
exercise, although the officials did not allow the inmate to exercise outdoors for a period of five
years).
137. Allen v. Sakai, 40 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1695 (1995).
138. See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955-56 (6th Cir. 1987).
139. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988).
140. Id. In this case, inmates alleged that prison officials were violating their privacy rights by
performing routine strip searches where female correctional officers and visitors could view them.
The court acknowledged that "[allthough the inmates' right to privacy must yield to the penal
institution's need to maintain security, it does not vanish altogether." Id. at 334 (quoting Cumbrey
v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982)). Nonetheless, the court found that the position-
ing of female guards, that resulted in only infrequent observation, was reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests and was not so degrading as to warrant court interference. Id.
141. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prison policy
requiring male guards to conduct suspicionless clothed body searches on female prisoners inflicted
"pain" for Eighth Amendment purposes, where many female inmates were victims of prior sexual
abuse).
142. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 414 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987);
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The Eighth Circuit conceded that transsexualism is a very complex medical
and psychological problem, and that experts disagree on the proper treatment
for the problem.'43
IV. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'"
A. Background
The Fourteenth Amendment entitles inmates to "adequate, effective, and
meaningful" access to the courts. 45 In other words, states must provide in-
mates with a reasonable opportunity to present constitutional claims.'" The
right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in
preparing and filing legal papers, either by providing inmates with adequate
law libraries or with assistance from persons trained in the law.'47 The Sup-
reme Court has also recognized that communications between an inmate and
his legal counsel can constitute a valuable element of the right of access to the
courts.'"
While acknowledging the Supreme Court's determination that inmates
have a right to court access, the Tenth Circuit has noted that the Court did not
hold that inmates have "an absolute right to any particular type of legal assis-
tance."' 49 In addition, the Tenth Circuit does not require states to provide
unlimited access to assistance.' In evaluating restrictions on legal access,
courts "must consider the regulations, facilities, and available resources togeth-
er as a whole, remembering that 'meaningful access' is the touchstone of this
constitutional guarantee."'' In the following two cases, the Tenth Circuit
discusses what types of limitations on legal access remain constitutional.
see Mayer, supra note 118, at 248.
143. White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988).
144. The Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly create the right of access to the courts.
The Supreme Court has found the right implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977).
146. Id. at 825.
147. Id. at 828. Bounds does not require prison administrators to provide both as long as
access is "meaningful." See id. at 832. Note that the right of access to the courts is distinct from
the right to assistance of counsel, which is protected under the Sixth Amendment.
148. Id. at 823.
149. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 583 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981).
150. See Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978).
151. Ramos, 639 F.2d at 583.
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Mann v. Reynolds'
a. Facts
Anthony Mann filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself, inmates
confined to death row, and inmates confined in high to maximum security who
were incarcerated in the H-Unit of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.'53 The
inmates claimed that a prison policy prohibiting barrier-free or contact visits
between inmates and legal counsel violated the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel'54 and the Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts.'55
The policy also prohibited contact visits between inmates and health profes-
sionals.'56
During pre-trial proceedings, the prison altered its policy and allowed
medical experts and psychologists to interact with inmates while performing
clinical and psychological testing.'57 The prison did not, however, allow the
inmates' attorneys this type of interaction. Attorneys were separated from
their clients by a wire and plexiglas partition, and restricted to communicating
by telephone and passing documents through a two-inch hole.' In addition,
the prison failed to accommodate requests from double-celled inmates for con-
fidential telephone calls to their attorneys."'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that access to counsel may be essential to the
guarantee of meaningful access to the courts." The court held that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not always require full and unfettered contact
between an inmate and his counsel. 6' Refusing to acknowledge full contact
as a constitutional right, the court was unwilling to recognize, as a matter of
law, that the effectiveness of an attorney depends upon the strength of her
emotional bond with the client.'62
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit applied the Turner test to the prison policy
to determine whether the limit on legal access was reasonable.'63 The court
found that the policy prohibiting contact visits with attorneys was not reason-
ably related to any legitimate penological interest. Supporting this conclusion,
152. 46 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1995).
153. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1056.
154. The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
155. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1056.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1057.
158. Id.
159. The court found that approximately 89% of the inmates were double-celled. Id.
160. Id. at 1059.
161. Id. at 1060.
162. Id.
163. Id. For a discussion of the Turner test, see supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
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the Tenth Circuit noted that the prison offered no evidence that the restrictions
were related to any legitimate interest, such as security."6 The prison also
failed to offer any rational explanation showing why attorneys had been sin-
gled out for enforcement of the no-contact policy with inmates.'
65
2. Carper v. DeLand'6
a. Facts
Wayne Carper and other inmates at the Utah State Prison filed a class
action suit against the Director of the Utah Department of Corrections
(UDOC). 167 The inmates alleged that the legal services plan at the facility
unconstitutionally restricted their access to the courts by not providing attorney
assistance in general civil matters."6 At one time prior to the suit, the legal
services plan had provided legal assistance to inmates in general civil matters
(such as wills, divorces, workers' compensation, and creditor-debtor disputes),
as well as habeas corpus and civil rights actions."6 However, the Director of
UDOC revised the plan to curtail costs, and in the process retained attorney
assistance only in the filing of papers concerning habeas corpus and conditions
of confinement actions.7 The plan did not include the provision of a legal
library.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that a state's obligation to ensure prison inmates
access to the courts does not include providing legal services for civil matters
other than habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding conditions of current
confinement.'72 Although prison officials have no duty to provide legal ac-
cess in general civil matters, the officials may not "erect barriers" to impede
inmates from obtaining legal assistance regarding constitutional
protections."'
164. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1060-61 (noting that a legitimate security concern would rise to the
level of a compelling government interest); see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The
court, however, rejected prison officials' evidence of "isolated occasions when cigarettes, chewing
gum, pens, and paper clips have been unwittingly passed by uninitiated lawyers to inmates" as
proof of a security risk. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1060.
165. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1060. The court noted suspiciously that officials had allowed unfet-
tered contact with "virtually all those with whom [inmates] interact except their lawyers." Id.
166. 54 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1995).
167. Carper, 54 F.3d at 614-15.
168. Id. at 615.
169. Id. at 614.
170. Id. at 615.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 616-17.
173. Id. at 617. The court also stated that an inmate's right of access does not require the
state to supply legal assistance beyond the stage of initial pleadings in a condition of confinement
or habeas corpus action. Id.
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C. Analysis
In Mann, the Tenth Circuit did not expressly hold that a policy prohibiting
physical contact between attorneys and clients violated the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. An encroachment of rights must exist, however, to trig-
ger the Turner test. 74 Thus, the Mann court's use of the Turner test implies
that inmates have a constitutional right to contact visitation with their attor-
neys. It is reasonable to assume, however, that if a prison presented evidence
of a legitimate penological interest in prohibiting contact visits, the Tenth
Circuit would defer to that interest.'75
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Carper implies that a prison administra-
tor's refusal to provide legal assistance to inmates in general civil matters does
not erect a barrier impeding all rights of access. The court suggested that in-
mates have no right of access to state funded legal assistance in actions such
as divorce, wills and estates, and other general civil matters. Considering the
conservative nature of the current Supreme Court, the Court would likely
support the Tenth Circuit's holding in Carper.
76
D. Other Circuits
In 1973, the Seventh Circuit held that an inmate has the right of unfet-
tered access to the courts, and that all other rights become illusory without
such a right. 77 This Circuit also declared that "effective protection of access
to counsel requires that the traditional privacy of the lawyer-client relationship
be implemented in the prison context.' ' 78 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit re-
quired a prison administration to show evidence of reasonable suspicion of a
security risk in order to justify an impairment of communication between
attorneys and inmates. 7 9
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit held that the right of access to the courts in-
cludes attorney contact visitation.'s" A few years later, however, it found that
174. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
175. Id. The Tenth Circuit would likely defer to penological interests because the Turner test
is inherently highly deferential to administrative interests. One legitimate state interest is enough
to satisfy the test's requirements.
176. This hypothesis is especially convincing when one considers Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). In Bounds, Justice Rehnquist asserted that inmates have
no constitutional right to file habeas corpus and conditions of confinement actions in federal court.
Id. at 833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He stated, "There is nothing in the United States Constitu-
tion which requires that a convict serving a term of imprisonment... pursuant to a final judg-
ment ... have a 'right of access' to the federal courts in order to attack his sentence." Id. at 837.
The Court has grown more politically conservative since the 1970s. See DAVID G. SAVAGE,
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 3-25 (1992). Thus, it seems
unlikely that a modern majority would vote to broaden the rights acknowledged by the majority in
Bounds.
177. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973). The court found that unless in-
mates receive unhindered access to the courts, all constitutional rights would be "entirely depen-
dent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the prison warden." Id.
178. Id. at 631.
179. Id. at 631-32.
180. Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a policy denying a
prisoner contact visits with his attorney prohibited effective attorney-client communication and
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prohibiting certain inmates from contact visits with attorneys was rationally
related to legitimate penological interests in preventing escape, assault, hostage
taking, and the introduction of contraband, even where there was no history of
such incidents resulting from contact visitation.' This decision effectively
placed the burden on prison inmates to show that the non-contact visitation
policy fails under a Turner analysis.'82
Regarding the Carper issue of extent of access in civil matters, the Sixth
Circuit recently held that a state's obligation to provide inmates with access to
the courts does not extend to civil matters beyond collateral attacks on convic-
tions or challenges to the constitutionality of conditions of confinement.83
The Third Circuit recently held that the right of court access does not include
the right to counsel in civil actions (including habeas corpus proceedings)
because the language of the Sixth Amendment limits the right to counsel to
criminal proceedings.'84 In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's view, the Fifth
Circuit held that a prisoner's reasonable access to the courts "must include
access in general civil matters including, but not limited to, divorce and small
claims."'8 5
CONCLUSION
In general, the Tenth Circuit appears committed to giving deference to
prison administrations concerning correctional policy decisions. The court
seems unlikely to interfere with prison officials' policy making, absent a clear
constitutional violation. Avoiding any broad categorical expansion of inmate
rights, the court carefully follows precedent, and strictly applies legal tests and
definitions. The Tenth Circuit appears to construe inmate rights rather narrow-
ly; however, it also demonstrates a willingness to defer to legislation designed
to expand those rights.
Shann R. Jeffery
abridged the prisoner's right of meaningful access to the courts).
181. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1993).
182. See Song Hill, Casey v. Lewis: The Legal Burden Is Raised; The Physical Barrier Is
Spared, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1995) ("The Ninth Circuit requires prisoners to dem-
onstrate the unreasonableness of a prison regulation which infringes upon their constitutional
rights."). The Casey court held that thf encroaching prison policy was reasonable even in the
absence of any history of related security violations. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521. This seems to require
a prisoner who challenges the policy to show that, without the policy, the occurrence of a security
violation is unlikely or impossible.
183. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993).
184. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1453-54 (3d Cir. 1995).
185. Corpus v. Estelle, 551 F.2d 68, 70 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Texas Department of
Corrections could not prohibit prisoners from giving or receiving legal assistance with regard to
civil matters); see also Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the





At the end of this survey article, five Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
judges offer their thoughts and opinions on the subject of judicial recusal. In
general, the participants discuss the policy considerations underlying recusal
motions and the implications of denying or granting these motions.
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit cases regarding judicial ethics during the survey period
focused exclusively on recusal. The term "recusal" refers to the process by
which a judge is disqualified from a case because of self-interest, bias, or
prejudice. The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455 govern recusal of federal judg-
es.2 Section 455 provides two separate grounds for recusal. First, § 455(a) sets
out the general standard requiring a judge to disqualify himself when "his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."3 Second, § 455(b) lists specific
instances, in addition to situations in which a judge's "impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned," that necessitate recusal.4
Each of the recusal cases that the Tenth Circuit decided during the survey
period involved a motion to recuse based on § 455(a). The analysis of the
1. "[Riecusal ... refers to the process by which a judge is disqualified." BLACK'S LAW
DIcnONARY 1277 (6th ed. 1990); see also Adam J. Safer, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Extraju-
dicial Source Requirement for Judicial Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDO Zo
L. REV. 787, 787 n.3 (1993). Canon 3(C) of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Con-
duct governs recusal. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT Canon 3(C) (1972).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
3. "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
4. Section 445 (b) provides:
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed eviden-
tiary facts concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he served as a law-
yer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (3) Where he has served in govern-
mental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser, or material
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually, or as a fiduciary, or
his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a per-
son within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such per-
son: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is
acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge's
knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b); see also Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualifica-
tion in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049 (1993) (commenting that § 455(b) may be
seen as a list of per se circumstances requiring recusal in situations involving actual bias rather
than situations involving subsection (a)'s concern with the public's perception of bias).
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surveyed cases focuses primarily on the legislative policies behind the recusal
statute. With that in mind, Part I of this Survey traces the statute's legislative
history, which reflects the principles underlying 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Parts II
through V discuss the four recusal cases that the Tenth Circuit decided during
the survey period.
Part II explores the Tenth Circuit's treatment of judicial biases stemming
from extrajudicial5 sources. In Maez v. Mountain States Telephone & Tele-
graph, Inc.,6 the alleged bias arose from the judge's professional relationship
with the defendant.7 The Tenth Circuit focused on the temporal context of the
relationship and determined that the acquaintanceship did not mandate
recusal.' Part III examines the Tenth Circuit's approach to bias stemming
from intrajudicial9 sources. In United States v. Young,"° the court held that
recusal was unnecessary because the alleged bias stemmed from an
intrajudicial source and the judge did not display a "deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism."' Part IV discusses the implications of the Tenth Circuit's time-
liness requirement for § 455 motions. In United States v. Stenzel,"2 the court
determined that the recusal issue was not preserved for appeal because the
motion to recuse was not timely made. 3 Finally, Part V considers the proper
remedy for a violation of § 455. In King v. Champion,4 the court concluded
that the district judge should have recused himself. The court, however, did
not remand the case because the district judge was not required to make
credibility determinations or determine disputed facts.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF 28 U.S.C. § 455(A)
Prior to the 1975 amendment, § 455(a) contained a subjective test of the
judge's impartiality. 5 This subjective test, referred to as the "actual partiality
standard," required recusal if the judge himself believed that partiality exist-
ed.'6 Whether other reasonable persons thought the judge appeared biased
5. "Extrajudicial" refers to "[t]hat which is done, given, or effected outside the course of
regular judicial proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 586 (6th ed. 1990).
6. 54 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
7. Maez, 54 F.3d at 1508.
8. Id.
9. "Intrajudicial," conversely, is that which is done, given, or effected within the course of
judicial proceedings.
10. 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2633 (1995).
11. Young, 45 F.3d at 1415.
12. 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 123 (1995).
13. Stenzel, 49 F.3d at 661.
14. 55 F.3d 522, 524 (10th Cir. 1995).
15. Prior to 1975, § 455 provided that:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case
in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1968).
16. Kevin D. Swan, Comment, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the
Face of Law Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (1987) (discussing §
455 (a) and Congress's utilization of "a standard of actual impartiality based on the judge's per-
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was immaterial. 7 Commentators contended that the actual partiality standard
did little to encourage public confidence in the judicial system. 8 These critics
reasoned that public perception of impartiality determines the extent of public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and, further, the appearance of bias
was as harmful to this faith as actual bias.' 9
In response to this criticism, the American Bar Association (ABA) intro-
duced an objective standard, or the "appearance of partiality test."20 This test
inquires whether "a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances,
would be led to question the judge's impartiality."'" In 1975, Congress codi-
fied the ABA's objective standard at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).2 2 The codified stan-
dard requires a judge to disqualify himself if his "impartiality may reasonably
be questioned."23 If a reasonable basis exists for the motion, the judge should
recuse himself.24 Congress explained that it replaced the subjective standard
with the objective standard in order to clarify and broaden the grounds for
judicial disqualification and to foster public confidence in the judiciary. 5
ception").
17. Id. at 816. "Section 455 relied upon judges to recuse themselves when certain circum-
stances rendered it improper, in [their] opinion, for them to hear the case." Id.
18. Id.; see also Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the Challenge: Rethinking Judicial
Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1445, 1481-82 (1981); Note, Disqualification of Judges and
Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REv. 736, 764 (1973).
19. Swan, supra note 16, at 816 (stating that "it is the public's perception of neutrality, not
that of the judiciary, which governs the public's faith in the judicial system").
20. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (1972). Canon 3(C)(1) provides that
"[a] judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." Id.; see also Swan, supra note 16, at 816 (explaining that in response to criticism of
the actual impartiality standard the ABA introduced the appearance of impartiality standard in
1972).
21. A.B.A. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3(C) (1972); E. Thode, Reporter's notes to
the Code of Judicial Conduct 49 (1973); see also Swan, supra note 16, at 816 ("The test requires
an objective determination of only the appearance of impartiality, not actual impartiality. If a
reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would be led to question the judge's impar-
tiality the judge should recuse him or herself.").
22. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994). Section 455(a) provides that "[alny justice, judge, or magistrate
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned." Id; see also Swan, supra note 16, at 816-17 (explaining that once a
judge's impartiality is questioned, the judge decides only whether there is a reasonable basis for
the question).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Supreme Court interpreted the amended § 455(a) in Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). The Liljeberg court held that
[tihe goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would
appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him
an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no
actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge
actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorrupt-
ible.
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860.
24. Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th Cir.) (noting that
if there is a question about the judge's impartiality, and she finds that the basis for the doubt is
reasonable, she must recuse herself), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6351, 6354-
55 (describing Congress's intent that the amendment support the public's confidence in the impar-
tiality of the judiciary). The Supreme Court further interpreted Congress's intent, stating:
The statute was amended.., to clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualifi-
cation and to conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct ....
The general language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in
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II. BIASES STEMMING FROM ExTRAuDICIAL SOuRCES:
MAEZ V. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH, INC.
26
A. Background: The Objective Standard in the Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit applies § 455(a)'s objective test in judicial recusal
cases." In United States v. Cooley,8 the court held that when deciding
whether to affirm a judge's denial of a recusal motion, the proper analysis
asks "whether a reasonable person armed with the relevant facts would harbor
doubts about the judge's partiality. '29 The Cooley court explained that the
standard is purely objective and that the "inquiry is limited to outward mani-
festations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom."30 A "reasonable factu-
al basis" for questioning the judge's impartiality, however, must exist.
3'
B. Maez v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, Inc.32
1. Facts
The plaintiffs, former managers at defendant Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph, Inc. (Mountain Bell), appealed a district judge's denial of their
§ 445 motion to recuse.33 The plaintiffs contended that the judge should have
recused himself due to his association with Mountain Bell.3 4 Specifically, the
judge previously worked for Mountain Bell from 1955 through the early
1960s, had served for one year as Mountain Bell's in-house legal staff, had
special knowledge of the internal workings of Mountain Bell, and had a pro-
fessional acquaintance with Mountain Bell's general counsel.3" The judge
personally knew one of the defendants, and had business associations with
other defendants dating back twenty years.36 The district judge held that there
was an insufficient basis for a reasonable person to be concerned that the
the integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective "in his opinion" standard
with an objective test.
Liljeberg, 468 U.S. at 858 n.7 (citations omitted).
26. 54 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
27. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2250 (1995); United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 114 (1994); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
28. 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993). The Cooley judge's participation in a television interview
by Barbara Walters mandated recusal when, during the course of the interview, the judge dis-
cussed the abortion protest which was at issue in the case. Cooley, I F.3d at 995.
29. Id. at 993.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 54 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
33. Maez, 54 F.3d at 1495.





judge "might be biased or prejudiced with respect to [the] claims of any of the
parties or counsel."37
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, refusing to find an abuse of discretion in the
district judge's denial of the motion to recuse.3s After reiterating the objective
test set forth in Cooley, the court held that the requisite doubts were not raised
merely because the judge "worked for or even represented Mountain Bell
some thirty years ago and may have socialized with fellow Mountain Bell
employees."39 The court noted that this particular judge had heard three prior
cases involving claims and allegations against Mountain Bell where counsel
(in all three cases) had perceived no "appearance of impartiality."
4
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Maez reflects the practical realities in the
judicial process and the legal profession. One such reality is that a judge will
inevitably have numerous social and professional relationships.4 ' A judge fre-
quently exploits these professional relationships to obtain judicial office. In
practice, a judge will not terminate these relationships or social connections
once appointed. 42 A judge's responsibility to set aside personal biases and
rule impartially is an inherent requirement of the job; a different rule would
require recusal in a prohibitive number of cases. These practical limitations
must be weighed against the risk of harm to public confidence in the judicial
system created by the appearance of a partial judiciary.
The Maez court reasoned that "there is as much obligation for a judge not
to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do
so when there is." '43 Prior to the 1975 amendment of § 455(a), case law inter-
preting the statute implied a "duty to sit."" Thus, in the past judges chose to
err on the side of hearing the case when counsel questioned their impartiali-
ty.4 5 Congress's amendment of § 455 in 1975, however, included an explicit
repudiation of this duty to sit.' In proposing the amendment, the House
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1508.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. A New York court recently addressed this issue in a high-profile case involving Andy
Warhol's estate. Hayes v. The Andy Warhol Foundation, 637 N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996). The chief beneficiary of the estate claimed that the judge was a social acquaintance of the
lawyer of the estate. Id. The court, however, deemed the motion to recuse "belated," and denied it.
Id.
42. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1117 (4th Cir. 1988) (com-
menting that "litigants are entitled to a judge free of personal bias, but not to a judge without any
personal history before appointment to the bench"), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
43. Maez, 54 F.3d at 1508 (quoting Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987)).
44. Swan, supra note 16, at 816 (noting that cases interpreting § 455 inferred a "duty to sit,"
and judges presumed that they should hear a case unless it would be improper to do so).
45. Id. (stating that "in a situation where there were only doubts about their impartiality,
judges would err on the side of hearing the case"); see Harold S. Levy, Judicial Recusals, 2 PACE
L. REv. 35, 46 (1982).
46. H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. 6351, 6354-55.
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Judiciary Committee disclaimed the duty to sit by specifically requiring adju-
dication of close or questionable cases in favor of recusal.' Thus, the Tenth
Circuit's reference to such a duty may be inconsistent with congressional
intent.
D. Other Circuits
The Maez refusal to mandate recusal for the judge's mere familiarity with
the party is consistent with case law in other circuits. The First, Second,
Fourth, and Federal Circuits have upheld the denial of a recusal motion when
the relationship giving rise to the alleged bias terminated some time ago.'
III. BIASES STEMMING FROM INTRAJUDICIAL SOURCES:
UNITED STATES V. YOUNG
49
A. Background
Sections 14450 and 455(b)5 govern recusal of federal judges.52 Under
§§ 144 and 455(b)(1), the judge's personal bias or prejudice must stem from
outside the course of regular judicial proceedings. 3 The legal community
(1974). With the adoption of the new § 455, Congress removed the duty to sit. Id. Now a judge
should seek to "err on the side of caution and [recuse] himself in a questionable case."
Postashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
820 (1981); see also Swan, supra note 16, at 817 (explaining that the new § 455 repudiates the
duty to sit and requires that judges decide doubtful cases on the side of caution and recusal).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1453.
48. United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that because the
judge's relationship with the party ended seven or eight years prior to sentencing, the judge did
not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself); In re Allied Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 974, 976
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a business relationship between the judge and the lawyer that took
place eight years prior to the case, and before the judge's appointment, did not cast significant
doubt on the judge's impartiality); Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d at 1117 (noting that the judge's brief
association with the Sierra Club that terminated over a decade before adversary proceedings com-
menced did not form the basis for reasonably questioning a district judge's impartiality); Maier v.
Onf, 758 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that a trial judge's former association with
the Air Force did not reasonably raise appearance of partiality); Brody v. President & Fellow of
Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that a trial judge's graduation from the
defendant university did not in itself constitute a reasonable basis for recusal motion), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
49. 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2633 (1995).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). As with § 455, this statute applies if a judge has a personal
bias or prejudice towards a party. Id. Section 144 mandates that the party file a timely recusal
motion along with an affidavit stating the facts that suggest the judge's personal bias. Id. When
faced with a § 144 motion to recuse, the judge rules on the legal sufficiency of the motion but not
on the truth of the matters alleged. The affidavit is sufficient if the facts alleged, assuming that
they are true, would convince a reasonable person that bias exists. Id.; see Abramson, supra note
4, at 1050 n.l I (commenting on the procedure for filing a § 144 motion).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (1994).
52. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455.
53. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (explaining that in a mo-
tion for disqualification under § 144, "[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must
stem from an extrajudicial source"); United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that the extrajudicial source limitation applies to §§ 144 and 455(b)(1)), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 916 (1982); Lori M. McPherson, Liteky v. United States: The Supreme Court Restricts the
Disqualification of Biased Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1427, 1432-
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refers to this requirement as the extrajudicial source doctrine. 4 However, be-
cause § 455(a) does not contain the phrase "personal bias and prejudice," cir-
cuit courts are divided over whether the extrajudicial source requirement ex-
tends to § 455(a)." This confusion exists within the Tenth Circuit: the limita-
tion has been applied inconsistently to § 455(a) motions.5 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Liteky v. United States5 7 to re-
solve the inconsistent decisions among the circuit courts regarding whether §
455(a) was subject to the same extrajudicial source limitation as §
455(b)(1)." The Supreme Court held that the word "personal" in the phrase
"personal bias and prejudice" in § 455(b)(1) did not form the basis of the
extrajudicial source limitation. Rather, the limitation originated from the
33 (1994) ("The statutory 'home' of the extrajudicial source doctrine ... was the phrase 'personal
bias and prejudice' found in section 144. Because section 455(b)(1) also contains the personal bias
and prejudice language of section 144, the extrajudicial source requirement was universally ex-
tended to section 455(b)(1)."); Safer, supra note 1; Serena Viswanathan, Project: Twenty-Fourth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-
1994, 83 GEO. L.J. 1144, 1145-48 (1995) (explaining that §§ 144 and 455(b)(1) provide for
recusal when the judge has a bias stemming from an extrajudicial source).
54. One example of a motion to recuse originating from an intrajudicial source appears in a
high-profile New York state case involving the $1.2 billion estate of tobacco heiress Doris Duke.
The movants claimed the facts necessitated recusal because the judge created an appearance of
impropriety when he removed the movants as co-executors in a prior meeting. In re Will of Duke,
632 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
55. United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that "unlike
challenges under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144, the source of the asserted bias/prejudice in a Section 455(a)
claim can originate explicitly in judicial proceedings"); United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789,
791 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that recusal under § 455(a) must be predicated on extrajudicial con-
duct); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that bias must derive from extraju-
dicial source); Davis v. Board of Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that §
455(a) contained the extrajudicial source doctrine), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); see
McPherson, supra note 53, at 1428-33 (explaining the origin of the confusion in the circuit
courts).
56. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 994 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the inconsis-
tencies in the Tenth Circuit regarding application of the extrajudicial source doctrine); United
States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir.) (stating that the extrajudicial source rules apples
to § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230,
1234 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that the extrajudicial source rule applies to § 455(b)(1), but hold-
ing nothing specific as to § 455(a)); United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (10th Cir. 1982)
(stating that § 455 (b)(1) requires recusal for actual bias, but that subsection (a) requires it for the
mere appearance of impartiality).
57. 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994). In 1991, the government charged petitioners with willful de-
struction of federal property, for spilling human blood on various objects at the Fort Benning
Military reservation. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150. Before trial, the petitioners moved to disqualify
the district judge pursuant to § 455(a). Id. The motion was based on events that had occurred
during and after a trial in 1983 involving the same petitioner and the same judge. Id. at 1150-51.
In the earlier trial, the petitioner, a Catholic priest, was convicted of various misdemeanors com-
mitted during protest action. Id. at 1151. Petitioner claimed that recusal was necessary in the 1991
case because the judge had displayed impatience and animosity towards the petitioner and his
beliefs. Id. The judge denied the motion to recuse, reasoning that matters arising out of judicial
proceedings were not the proper basis for recusal. Id. The petitioners were convicted and appealed,
claiming the judge violated § 455(a) by refusing to recuse himself. Id. The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed, agreeing that matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings are not the proper
basis for recusal. Id.
58. Id. at 1150; see McPherson, supra note 53, at 1434 (noting that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the inconsistent circuit decisions).
59. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1154. The Court stated:
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connotations of the words "bias and prejudice."6 The Court then held that
although § 455 does not expressly include this statutory language, the word
"partiality" has the same negative connotation as the words "bias and preju-
dice."' The Court concluded that the basis for a § 455(a) motion to recuse
should stem from an extrajudicial source.62
The Court, however, did indicate a possible exception to the extrajudicial
source requirement. A bias stemming from an intrajudicial source may consti-
tute the basis for a § 455(a) motion to recuse if it displays "a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."63
Therefore, the Court concluded that generally neither a judge's critical, disap-
proving, or hostile remarks during judicial proceedings, nor her expressions of
impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, or anger, mandate recusal.
B. United States v. Young65
1. Facts
Laina Young appealed a conviction on two counts of money laundering,
contending that the district judge erred by denying her § 455(a) recusal mo-
tion.' The grounds for the motion included comments made by the judge
during the scheduling conference regarding Young's "obvious" fate in the tri-
al.67 Young claimed that the judge's remarks demonstrated an inappropriate
bias against her such that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned"
under § 455(a).'
In our view ... the basis of the modem "extrajudicial source" doctrine, is not the statu-
tory term "personal". Bias and prejudice seem to us not divided into the "personal"
kind, which is offensive, and the official kind, which is perfectly all right. As generally
used, these are pejorative terms, describing dispositions that are never appropriate ....
[li]nterpreting the term "personal" to create a complete dichotomy between court-ac-
quired and extrinsically acquired bias produces results so intolerable as to be absurd.
Imagine ... a lengthy trial in which the presiding judge for the first time learns of an
obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents. This would
be "official" rather than "personal" bias and would provide no basis for the judge's re-
cusing himself.
Id.
60. Id. at 1155.
61. Id. at 1155-56.
62. Id. at 1156.
63. Id. at 1157. The court provided an example of deep-seated antagonism by referring to a
World War II espionage case against German-American defendants where the court depicted their
hearts as "reeking with disloyalty." Id.
64. Id.
65. 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1995).
66. Young, 45 F.3d at 1414.
67. Id. at 1414-15. The judge's controversial remarks were:
And bear in mind this: that the obvious thing that's going to happen to Ms. Young is
that she's going to get convicted, and then they're going to sprinkle her and bless her
with immunity, and then she's going to get to testify. And then she's going to pull the
same act on me again, and then she's going to county jail for at least 30 if not 60 or 90
days for contempt.
Id. at 1414.




On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the judge's remarks in the schedul-
ing conference did not require recusal. 9 Relying on the Supreme Court's re-
cent interpretation of § 455(a) in Liteky,"° the court concluded that since the
judge did not express this opinion based upon knowledge gathered outside the
course of judicial proceedings, and since the comments, viewed in the context
of the case, did not display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgement impossible, recusal was unwarranted.7 The court rea-
soned that while the comments reflected the judge's belief that the jury would
likely convict Young, they did not indicate that the judge could not fulfill his
responsibilities impartially.72
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Young made a significant contribution to
the analysis of recusal cases by clarifying the grounds for a § 455(a) motion to
recuse. Specifically, Young marks the Tenth Circuit's extension of the extraju-
dicial source requirement to § 455(a) in accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in Liteky. This requirement invalidates § 455(a) motions based on
bias deriving from an intrajudicial source, unless it is so extreme that it re-
veals a "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism" that renders executing a fair
judgment impossible. Thus, Young demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's belief that
statements of opinion by the judge based on knowledge gathered in the course
of judicial proceedings should be analyzed differently than similar statements
originating from extrajudicial sources.
The court treats extrajudicial and intrajudicial biases differently because of
practical realities inherent in the judiciary. Specifically, the extrajudicial source
rule recognizes that judges naturally form opinions about the parties based
upon the information obtained in the course of judicial proceedings.73 Thus, it
would be unrealistic to expect the judge in Young not to have formed opinions
about what the jury would likely conclude.
Furthermore, applying the extrajudicial source limitation to § 455(a) de-
creases the risk that the parties might use the recusal process to disqualify one
69. Id. at 1416.
70. For a discussion of Liteky v. United States, see supra notes 57-64 and accompanying
text.
71. Young, 45 F.3d at 1416.
72. Id.
73. The Fifth Circuit expressed this idea in their explanation of the extrajudicial source rule:
[A] judge is not merely a passive observer. He must... shrewdly observe the strategies
of the opposing lawyers, perceive their efforts to sway him by appeals to his predilec-
tions. He must cannily penetrate through the surface of their remarks to their real pur-
poses and motives. He has an official obligation to become prejudiced in that sense.
Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If
the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court house dramas called trials,
he could never render decisions.
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 325 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting In re
I.B.M. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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judge in order to obtain a judge whose disposition is more favorable to their
position. In fact, Congress recognized this potential for "judge-shopping.""
The report advised courts to avoid interpreting the statute in such a way that a
party's fear of an adverse ruling would be treated as a reasonable questioning
of the judge's impartiality.75
The Young court did not address whether a reasonable person, armed with
the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's partiality. The Court
declined to apply this objective standard because the alleged bias did not stem
from an extrajudicial source. In effect, the extrajudicial source rule replaces
the statute's objective test with the "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism"
standard if the alleged predisposition originates from facts adduced at trial.76
Thus, the extension of the extrajudicial source requirement to § 455(a) nar-
rowed the grounds available for recusal. Such constriction, however, conflicts
with the policy underlying the recusal statute." By amending § 455(a) in
1975 to encompass an objective test, Congress intended to promote public
confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by broadening and clari-
fying the grounds for recusal.78 The Tenth Circuit's narrow interpretation of §
455(a), however, may weaken the public's faith in the judiciary by ruling
against recusal, despite the fact that the judge's "impartiality may reasonably
be questioned." This is particularly true where the alleged bias stems from an
intrajudicial source but does not reach the level of "deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism."79
D. Other Circuits
The full impact of Liteky's extension of the extrajudicial source rule to §
455(a) remains unclear. The Seventh Circuit recently denied a § 455(a) recusal
claim despite the judge's predisposition in the case because he did not display
the "deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment
74. H. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6351, 6355
(1974). "Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is a reasonable question of impar-
tiality, but they are not entitled to judges of their own choice." Id. Judges "must be alert to avoid
the possibility that those who would question [their] impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the
consequences of [the judges] expected adverse decision." Id.
75. Id.
76. See McPherson, supra note 53, at 1445-46 (commenting that the Court has substituted
the "impossibility of fair judgment" standard for the statute's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" standard).
77. Id. at 1446 (commenting that the interpretation defeats the purpose for which the statute
was enacted and sounds the "death-knell" on the broad protections that § 455 seeks to provide).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1453. The Supreme Court explained that
[tlhe statute was amended to clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualification
and to conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct .... The
general language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective "in his opinion" standard
with an objective test.
Liljeberg, 468 U.S. at 858.
79. Safer, supra note 1, at 812 (remarking that allowing an apparently biased judge to try the
case does not promote public confidence in the judiciary, and to suggest otherwise implies that the
public would be more confident if an apparently biased judge presided over the case, rather than if
the judge were disqualified).
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impossible.""s There is still some uncertainty as to how circuits will apply the
"deep-seated favoritism or antagonism" standard to recusal cases involving
biases stemming from intrajudicial sources.
IV. PRESERVING RECUSAL FOR APPELLATE REVIEW:
UNITED STATES V. STENZEL 8'
A. Background
A motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 may be filed at any time.82
Section 455 also provides a guideline for the judge to decide when self-recusal
is necessary. 3 Thus, either the judge or a litigant may assert a § 455 motion
to recuse. The Tenth Circuit requires that the party make a § 455 motion in a
timely manner in order to obtain review.84 Once it grants review, the court of
appeals determines whether the trial judge abused her discretion by denying
the recusal motion.85
B. United States v. Stenzel 6
1. Facts
Robert Stenzel was convicted under the Assimilative Crimes Act 7 for
"concealing his identity, disorderly conduct, failure to exhibit evidence of
financial responsibility, and failure to exhibit evidence of vehicle registra-
tion." 8 During the trial, the district court judge informed the parties that he
had been stationed at the military base where the criminal acts occurred, and
that he had recently been the Honorary Commander of the Air National
Guard.89 Mr. Stenzel's counsel asked the judge whether he felt that this
80. In re Huntington Commons Assoc., 21 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1994).
81. 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 1995).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
83. Id.
84. Wilner v. University of Kansas, 848 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
recusal motion was not timely when plaintiff moved for recusal four and one-half years into the
case), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989); Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984)
(noting that party seeking recusal failed to act in a timely fashion), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028
(1985).
85. United States v. Cooley, I F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Burger, 964
F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 114 (1994); Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l,
Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987).
86. 49 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 1995).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). The Assimilative Crimes Act provides federal jurisdiction for
state crimes committed on federal property. Id.
88. Stenzel, 49 F.3d at 659.
89. Id. at 661. The record states:
Q: And that's the Wyoming gate at Kirtland where this incident allegedly occurred, is
that correct?
A.: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: For the record, I'm well acquainted with the base. I was stationed there
years ago and I have also recently been the Honorary Commander of the Air Force
National Guard, so I know what it is.
MS. ROSENSTEIN [Stenzel's counsel]: I was unaware of that, Your Honor. Does the
Court feel that that would be an apparent conflict?
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"would be an apparent conflict."' The judge responded that it would not be a
conflict, and Mr. Stenzel's counsel replied, "Okay."' On appeal, Mr. Stenzel
contended that the district court judge erred in not recusing himself due to his
relationship with the military.92
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court held that the conversation between the district
court judge and Mr. Stenzel's counsel about a possible conflict of interest did
not constitute a request for recusal.93 Additionally, the court noted that Mr.
Stenzel's counsel did not develop, in the record, any basis for disqualification
of the district judge.94 Consequently, Mr. Stenzel did not make a timely ob-
jection, and the recusal issue was not preserved for appeal."
C. Analysis
Stenzel confirms the Tenth Circuit's timeliness requirement regarding §
455 motions to recuse. Timeliness preserves judicial resources by limiting the
issues reviewed on appeal. Furthermore, a contrary decision may encourage
litigants to manipulate the judicial process by delaying motions to recuse to
"wait and see" whether judgment will be in favor of the opposing party.
Congress's concern with "judge shopping" is equally relevant upon the trial's
completion.96 Although the equities do not favor the losing party requesting
recusal after an adverse judgment, the timeliness requirement creates an in-
herent risk that the litigant will be denied the fight to a neutral and impartial
judge. In Stenzel, the Court never analyzed whether a reasonable person would
harbor doubts about the district judge's partiality because the recusal issue was
not preserved for appellate review. A possibility therefore exists that recusal
was necessary and that the failure to recuse may have denied Mr. Stenzel his
fight to an impartial tribunal. The timeliness requirement seems particularly
unfair in Stenzel, where counsel had previously expressed concern that the
judge might have a conflict of interest.
D. Other Circuits
The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have also held that failure to file
a timely recusal motion bars the party from claiming on appeal that the judge
was biased.97 The Third and Ninth Circuits, however, have held that failure to





92. Id. at 660-61.
93. Id. at 661.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See discussion supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
97. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that defendant must
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file a timely recusal motion in the trial court does not constitute waiver of the
claim, but results in a higher burden of proof on appeal. 9 Additionally, some
circuits have distinguished between recusal motions based on the appearance
of impartiality and motions based on actual bias, imposing a timeliness re-
quirement only on the motions based on the appearance of impartiality.99
V. REMEDIES: KING V. CHAMPION'0
A. Background
Section 455 does not specify the proper remedy upon a finding that the
trial judge issued an erroneous recusal decision,' which leaves the task of
constructing a remedy for a violation of § 455(a) to the judiciary. The Su-
preme Court, in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., offers some
direction." 2 The Liljeberg Court advised that when determining whether to
vacate a judgment for a violation of § 455, a court should "consider the risk of
injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief
will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's
confidence in the judicial process."'0 3
B. King v. Champion"°
1. Facts
Oklahoman Doyle Kent King was convicted in state court of "assault and
battery with intent to commit a felony."'0 5 After appealing his conviction,
King filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that the delay in adjudi-
cating his appeal violated his constitutional right to due process."°6 The court
joined Mr. King's habeas case together with other similar habeas cases and
referred to the group as the "Harris cases."'0 7 A panel of three federal dis-
trict judges presided over the factually similar cases.'
object to bias in a pre-trial motion to recuse before trial or as soon as alleged bias is discovered),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995); United States v. Bauer, 19 F.3d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that § 455 claims "will not be considered unless timely made"); United States v. York,
888 F.2d 1050, 1053-56 (5th Cir. 1989) (construing § 455 to require timeliness); see supra note
41 (noting a denial of a motion to recuse due to "belatedness" in a high-profile case involving
Andy Warhol's estate).
98. United States v. Bosh, 951 F.2d 1546, 1548-49 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
989 (1992); United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 536 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979).
99. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1539-41 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1012 (1986); Unites States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1050 (1984).
100. 55 F.3d 522 (10th Cir. 1995).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
102. 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988).
103. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
104. 55 F.3d 522 (10th Cir. 1995).
105. King, 55 F.3d at 523.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
108. King, 55 F.3d at 523.
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One of the panel judges, Judge Brett, also presided over an evidentiary
hearing concerning King's case. °" Judge Brett determined that King's evi-
dence was insufficient, and denied King's petition for habeas relief."' King
appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief and also insisted that Judge
Brett erred by not recusing himself from the evidentiary hearing."' Because
Judge Brett's uncle was a member of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals during the period of excessive time delay alleged in many of the Harris
cases, King argued on appeal that Judge Brett was required to recuse himself
under § 455."2 Furthermore, the Harris civil rights claims named Judge
Brett's uncle as a party."3
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that Judge Brett should have recused himself from
the habeas action pursuant to § 455.' '4 The court also held, however, that the
judge's failure to recuse himself did not necessitate vacating the judge's opin-
ion."' The court reasoned that a vacation of the judgment and remand were
unnecessary since further delay would only add to the injuries that King alleg-
edly suffered due to the state court delays." 6 The court also justified its con-
clusion by explaining that Judge Brett based his decision on the delay claim
almost entirely on undisputed facts, and the resolution of the case at the evi-
dentiary hearing did not require him to make any credibility determina-
tions."7
C. Analysis
King represents the Tenth Circuit's position that absent credibility issues
or disputed facts, a new trial is not the proper remedy."' Arguably, in a case
where the judge is not compelled to determine which version of the facts is
true, or who has told the truth, impartiality is less crucial and a new trial
might waste judicial resources and entail unnecessary duplication.
The issue that the Tenth Circuit faced in King is directly attributable to
Congress's failure to specify appropriate remedial measures for violations of §
455. Despite the holding in King, the principles underlying § 455 suggest that
if recusal were necessary at the trial level, the appropriate remedial measure






114. Id. at 524. The court reached this conclusion by relying on Harris, which found that
Judge Brett should have recused himself but holding that his failure to do so did not require vaca-
tion of the panel's decision. Id. (citing Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1572 (10th Cir. 1994)).
Rather, the proper remedial action was for the judge to recuse himself from all further proceedings







Congress's recognition that the appearance of impartiality is as damaging to
the public confidence in the judicial process as actual bias. Thus, Congress
drafted the statute to inhibit both actual bias and the appearance of bias. If the
statute exists to avoid even the appearance of impartiality, it appears inconsis-
tent to limit the determination of an appropriate remedy to an examination of
what the district court judge was actually required to do at the trial.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of § 455 reveals that Congress intended to establish
an objective standard designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial process. The recusal statute attempts to preserve this confidence by
protecting one of the underlying principles of the American judicial system,
the right to an impartial tribunal.
The Tenth Circuit's case law regarding motions to recuse based on §
455(a) illustrates the court's reluctance to overturn the denial of a motion to
recuse at the district court level. In three of the four cases handed down on
this issue during the survey period, the court found recusal unnecessary. In the
remaining case, the court found recusal appropriate, but did not remand or
vacate the decision. The decisions as a whole reflect the Tenth Circuit's long-
standing belief that § 455(a) "must not be so broadly construed that it be-
comes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest
unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice."" 
9
Ultimately, the judge with the alleged prejudice knows whether or not the
bias exists. Regardless of the judge's perception, the litigant and the general
public believe that the litigant is being deprived of a fair trial. In this way, the
effect of the Tenth Circuit's tolerance for the appearance of partiality may
ultimately be to injure the public confidence in the essential fairness and integ-
rity of the judicial system.
Amy J. Shimek
119. United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 729 (10th Cir. 1982).
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: COMMENTS ON RECUSAL
A DISCUSSION WITH:
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL'
JUDGE PAUL J. KELLY, JR.2
JUDGE CARLOS F. LUCERO3
JUDGE JOHN J. PORFILIO
4
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
5
INTRODUCTION
The following edited and condensed version of a conversation between
members of the Denver University Law Review and five Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeal's judges is intended to supplement the preceding survey article on
judicial recusal. These members of the judiciary share their thoughts and opin-
ions on the topic of judicial recusal, focusing primarily on the purpose of
recusal, the objectives underlying recusal statutes, the potential abuse of the
recusal process, the Supreme Court's recent treatment of recusal in Liteky v.
United States,6 and circumstances requiring recusal.
In the subsequent discussion, members of the Denver University Law
Review posed questions to Tenth Circuit judges to better understand the
recusal process in this Circuit. The participants wish to emphasize that they
are responding to the questions in a general way and that they are in no way
intending to prejudge issues that may come before them. In future cases, the
judges will analyze these issues on a case by case basis.
THE DISCUSSION
Law Review: 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that "[a]ny ... judge . . . shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned." The Supreme Court recently interpreted § 455(a) in
Liteky v. United States and held that the alleged bias which forms the basis for
the motion to recuse should stem from an extrajudicial source.' If the alleged
1. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1962; J.D., University of Michigan, 1965.
2. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.B.A., University of Notre
Dame, 1963; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1967.
3. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Adams State College,
1961; J.D., George Washington University, 1964.
4. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., University of Denver,
1956; LL.B., University of Denver College of Law, 1959.
5. Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., University of Kansas,
1968; J.D., University of Michigan, 1971.
6. 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
7. Extrajudicial refers to "[t]hat which is done, given, or effected outside of the course of
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bias originates from an intrajudicial proceeding,8 the motion will be granted
only if the judge displays deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
make fair judgment impossible. When § 455(a) was amended in 1975 to in-
clude an objective standard, Congress intended to promote public confidence
in the integrity of the judicial process by broadening the grounds for disquali-
fication.9 Do you think the imposition of the extrajudicial source doctrine on §
455(a) is inconsistent with this goal because it limits the grounds available for
disqualification?
JUDGE LUCERO: Congress' intent to establish an objective standard is
clearly evidenced in the words "might reasonably be questioned." The Su-
preme Court's decision in Liteky appears to narrow the scope of these words. I
am not necessarily critical of that because the statute sweeps with a broad
brush.
The distinction between biases stemming from extrajudicial and
intrajudicial sources is not particularly significant to me because I am extreme-
ly sensitive to any bias whatsoever, and personally would recuse if there is
any reasonable possibility or suspicion of an appearance of impropriety.
JUDGE TACHA: What the statute requires is the lowest threshold and the
litigants' last ditch argument. Recusal is not about statutes, but about ethics
and avoiding the appearance of impropriety which is an individual determina-
tion of the judge. Most biases stem from extrajudicial sources, but I suppose it
could stem from an intrajudicial source in which case I would ask myself
whether it looks to others that there is an appearance of impropriety.
Law Review: The public's belief in the impartiality of the judicial system
is essential to their willingness to abide by judicial decisions and, thus, is
possibly the backbone of the American judicial system. Arguably, a narrow
interpretation of § 455(a) weakens the public's faith in the judiciary because
the appearance of unfairness is as damaging to this faith as an actual bias. Do
you agree?
regular judicial proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 586 (6th ed. 1990). If the motion to
recuse stems from "judicial rulings, routine trial administrative efforts, and ordinary admonish-
ments," then disqualification is not required. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1150.
8. Intrajudicial refers to that which is done, given, or effected within the course of judicial
proceedings. An example of a motion to recuse originating from a judicial source is found in
United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990). In Chantal, the criminal defendant's
motion to recuse stemmed from the presiding judge's statements at a prior sentencing hearing
indicating that the judge had doubts regarding the defendant's ability to rehabilitate himself. Id. at
1019-20.
9. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351,
6354-55 (describing the intention of the amendment to firther support the public's confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary). The Supreme Court explained:
The statute was amended ... to clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualifi-
cation and to conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. The
general language of subsection (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective "in his opinion" standard
with an objective test.
Liljeberg v. Health Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988).
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JUDGE LUCERO: When compared to other institutions, polls show that
the public has the highest level of confidence in the judicial system. It is of
the utmost importance that this trend continue. It is questionable whether the
public would view Liteky as a problematic narrowing of the grounds available
for motions to recuse.
JUDGE KELLY: I agree that the appearance of fairness is extremely im-
portant to maintain the public's faith in the judicial system. I am uncomfort-
able recusing, however, just because some guy points a finger if no factual
predicate for the bias exists.
Law Review: In close cases do you think doubts should be decided in
favor of the party or do you feel a duty to sit?
JUDGE EBEL: In a close case, I decide in favor of the party requesting
recusal. However, there is a duty to sit and unless the party presented a color-
able case for recusal, I would sit. This is not to undermine the importance of
the appearance of impartiality, but a reasonable basis for the challenge must
exist.
JUDGE PORFILIO: This is a tough question because certainly there is a
duty to sit. I am concerned with the party, however, because in the final analy-
sis it is the party's belief in the fairness of the tribunal that is of the utmost
importance.
JUDGE KELLY: There are no close cases. You either are or are not bi-
ased.
Law Review: Some states have dealt with the recusal issue by enacting
provisions that permit the litigant one preemptory disqualification." What do
you think of such provisions?
JUDGE EBEL: Such provisions are inherently not a good idea because
they encourage forum shopping. The litigant ought to have to prove that a bias
exists because it is a serious thing to get a judge removed from a case. Even
at the trial level the trend is to move away from preemptories.
JUDGE KELLY: Not only do preemptive recusal provisions allow for
judge-shopping, but they may actually get rid of the best judge for the case.
JUDGE PORFILIO: I am also opposed to preemptive disqualification pro-
visions because they allow for considerable manipulation.
Law Review: Section 455 requires recusal when there is a bias concerning
a party but not when the bias concerns an issue in the case. The drafters of the
American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct have suggested that it is
10. For example, in California if a party files an affidavit stating that she believes she cannot
have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the assigned judge, no further act or proof is re-
quired and a different judge is assigned. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West 1982 & Supp.
1996).
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unavoidable, and even desirable, that a judge have previously developed views
on constitutional and legal issues. Do you agree?
JUDGE LUCERO: I agree with the drafters that it is unlikely that a judge
will not have some view on many issues. However, someone must eventually
make the decision. Public policy considerations are less sensitive at the circuit
court and Supreme Court levels. A panel of judges can balance out one judge
who has, for example, a view on abortion or the death penalty. On the Su-
preme Court there are nine different views to act as a check and balance pro-
cedure. Furthermore, the very nature of the appointment process takes the
appointee's background and views into account.
JUDGE EBEL: It is unavoidable to develop positions on issues and it
would be impractical to expect otherwise, considering that it is the judges' job
to publish their views in decisions. If a judge expresses a view outside of an
official proceeding, however, and the opinion is direct enough that the party
reasonably does not think he or she will receive a fair trial, then recusal is
necessary.
JUDGE PoRFILIo: The issue is whether the belief is so strongly held that
the judge cannot view the case with an open mind. If he cannot, then his
opinion on the issue should be grounds for recusal.
Law Review: Do you think a judge ought to recuse himself or herself if
one of the parties is a personal acquaintance?
JUDGE LUCERO: It depends on how "personal acquaintance" is defined.
Knowing the party's name is not enough to mandate recusal. I am more in-
clined to recuse if I am acquainted with the party due to a social function
rather than a public function.
JUDGE EBEL: I agree that if a judge is socially interactive with the per-
son they should ordinarily disqualify themselves. Basically, my test is if there
is more than a professional relationship-a personal friendship---then I would
recuse.
JUDGE KELLY: I agree that it would be impractical to recuse every time
you are acquainted with a party. Especially considering that judges get ap-
pointed to the bench due to their familiarity with a lot of people and the orga-
nized bar.
JUDGE TACHA: The test is not whether you know the party as a personal
acquaintance, or know them personally-the test is whether you are biased.
Law Review: Do you think a judge should automatically recuse when a
former law clerk represents a party in the litigation?
JUDGE EBEL: If an attorney was formerly my law clerk, I would consid-
er recusal but would not automatically step down. I would analyze how close
a relationship we held and the number of years that have passed since the
clerkship.
JUDGE LUCERO: I also would require a substantial cooling off peri-
od-three to four years at a minimum. Not because I would fear favoring the
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clerk's position, but because I am afraid I would bend over backwards to
avoid the appearance of impropriety and hold the clerk to a higher standard.
This would disadvantage the clerk.
JUDGE TACHA: I personally do not sit on former law clerk's cases and
think it is presumptively not a good idea. I have a five-year time line. After
five years I would consider it. I do, however, sit in front of past students.
Law Review: Are you concerned that a per se rule against hearing cases
involving former law clerks would prevent highly qualified people from apply-
ing for clerkships?
JUDGE EBEL: A per se rule would be unrealistic, especially in smaller
towns where the wheels of justice may stop if certain lawyers are disqualified
from trying cases in front of what may be one of the only judges in town.
Law Review: When you are deciding whether or not to recuse, or to over-
turn a denial of a recusal motion at the district level, is society's frustration
with the massive flood of litigation or preserving resources a concern?
JUDGE TACHA: Most definitely! However, recusal motions are a rare oc-
currence in the Tenth Circuit because the judges usually recuse themselves
before the parties or lawyers are even aware of which judge was assigned to
the case. In ten years, I have never had a recusal motion.
JUDGE PORFILIO: I am more inclined to rule in favor of saving judicial
resources if it appears that the party may have filed the motion to recuse in
order to manipulate the court.
Law Review: When it is decided on appeal that a motion to recuse should
have been granted, do you think the case should always be remanded?
JUDGE EBEL: If I decide that the district court judge should have recused
himself, I usually remand for a new proceeding unless there was only harm-
less error.
JUDGE PORFILIO: If the recusal denial was erroneous, I agree that re-
mand should follow. But the error can be more technical than substantive, and,
therefore, harmless.
Law Review: Do you think the statute should specify what action should
be taken in the event of a violation?
JUDGE TACHA: I do not think that the statute should designate a remedy
because every case is different. It would be a waste of judicial resources to
mandate a remand when the failure to recuse was harmless.
JUDGE KELLY: A common sense approach is best. The judge is in the
best position to determine the appropriate remedy and, thus, the statute does
not need to stipulate a remedy.
JUDGE LUCERO: I agree that the remedy should be decided on a case by
case basis because the court has adequate internal mechanisms to deal with
this. It is important to keep the independence of the judiciary intact and there
1996]
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is the danger of a separation of powers problem when Congress begins to
legislate in the judicial arena.
CONCLUSION
The above discussion indicates that the judges we met with are extremely
sensitive to any appearance of bias. In fact, they are so concerned with the
appearance of impropriety that there are rarely recusal cases attempting to
disqualify a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals member. The judicial process
itself helps to reduce the number of recusal motions at the circuit level by
notifying the judges of the case assignments before the lawyers or parties are
informed of which Court of Appeals panel has been appointed to hear their
case. This mechanism gives the judges an opportunity to recuse themselves
from the case and for the case to be reassigned before the parties were ever
aware that the original judge was assigned to the case. Sorting out the recusal
concerns in advance cuts down on motions to recuse later in the judicial pro-
cess. Thus, the recusal issues that circuit court judges usually hear involve mo-
tions to recuse that were denied at the district court level.
It is our hope that this discussion, as well as the survey article on recusal,
will benefit the practitioner in their understanding of the recusal process and




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided three noteworthy cases in the
area of real property during the 1994-1995 survey period.' These cases ad-
dress issues of eminent domain, public lands, and water courses.
Part I of this Survey discusses third party authority to condemn property
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).2 In United States v. Hardage,3 the Tenth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court and at least two other federal circuits by using CERCLA to
interpret a federal statute's permanent taking authority. Part II considers the
valuation of undeveloped subsurface minerals for admittedly "taken" property.
United States v. Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc.' solidified current Tenth
Circuit law despite seemingly contrary Supreme Court and circuit authority.
Part III addresses an ambiguous land grant from the federal government. Cir-
cuit courts disagree as to whether state or federal law controls this issue. In
Koch v. United States Department of Interior,' a case of first impression, the
Tenth Circuit utilized state law to interpret an ambiguous federal land grant.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN AND THIRD PARTY AUTHORITY TO CONDEMN:
UNITED STATES V. HARDAGE6
A. Background
1. Congressional Grant of Condemnation Power
The United States Constitution reserves to the government the right to
take property for public use when it justly compensates the owner.' Congress
may confer this power of eminent domain upon whatever entity it selects.8
1. This Survey covers cases decided from September 1994 to September 1995.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
3. 58 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1995).
4. 60 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
5. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995).
6. 58 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1995).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a theoretical overview of eminent domain, see Maria
Mansfield, When "Private" Rights Meet "Public" Rights: The Problems of Labeling and Regula-
tory Takings, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (1994). See generally George W. Miller & Jonathan L.
Abram, A Survey of Recent Takings Cases in the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 863, 863 (1993) (surveying cases decided by
the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1991 through 1993); Sidney Z. Searles, The Law of Eminent Domain in the U.S.A.,
C975 ALI-ABA 333, 333-57 (1995) (providing an overview of the history of eminent domain and
offering recommendations to promote a more equitable balance between the interest of the public
at large and the individual property owner).
8. IA JuLius L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.03(3), at 3-58 to 3-76 (rev.
3d ed. 1995) (noting that the party must be bound to use the property taken for public use).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The grant of condemnation power, however, must exist in express statutory
terms.9 In addition, no one with a special grant of eminent domain power may
delegate that authority without a legislative designation.' ° Most importantly,
an exercise of condemnation power must derive its source from a statute."
2. The All Writs Act 2 Power of Condemnation
If the legislature makes no affirmative grant of authority, the judicial
branch may effect a condemnation through the federal "All Writs Act"
(AWA). 3 In order to broaden judicial condemnation power through the
AWA, an issuance: (1) must be appropriate to aid the court's existing jurisdic-
tion; and (2) comply with "the usages and principles of law." 4 The AWA
does not grant independent jurisdiction; it only strengthens condemnation
power that independently preexists. 5
The AWA authorizes a taking under certain highly specific circumstances.
The most expansive interpretation of the AWA is found in United States v.
New York Telephone Co. 6 In New York Telephone, the Supreme Court in-
voked AWA authority to allow a partial, temporary taking by physical occupa-
tion of a company's phones lines. 7
9. Id. The courts may also read a grant into a statute through "necessary implication" when
the grant would be without force in the absence of an implication. Pennsylvania R.R. Company's
Appeal, 93 Pa. 150 (1878) (finding that an act granting the railroad right-of-ways was impotent
without condemnation power); see IA SACKMAN, supra note 8, § 3.21.4, at 3-62 (noting that the
party must have no control over the situation creating the necessity).
10. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 594, 598, 603 (1904) (holding
that the lessee of a corporation with power of eminent domain cannot exercise that right).
11. IA SACKMAN, supra note 8, § 3.03(12), at 3-194 to 3-195 (noting that Congress may
grant the power of eminent domain to an individual, but the delegation must be explicitly granted
by statute).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994). "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
13. 28 U.S.C § 1651.
14. Id.; see also Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66, 69 (10th Cir. 1970) (granting an
injunction to solve segregation problems as pursuant to the AWA "necessary and appropriate"
standard), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
15. 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3932, at 185
(1977). There are two requirements under the AWA: (1) the case has some potential for an inde-
pendent source of jurisdiction, and (2) the writ will aid that jurisdiction. Id. at 188; see Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34-37 (1980) (reversing mandamus to restore a jury
verdict because parties may not immediately appeal an order granting a new trial). The Supreme
Court has said that the AWA is not a jurisdictional blank check, and thus, "it does not authorize
[courts] to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient
or less appropriate." Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S.
34, 43 (1985) (holding the district court's use of the AWA improper absent a showing of "excep-
tional circumstances").
16. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
17. New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 176-78. FBI officials had probable cause to believe that
illegal gambling was occurring by telephone. The telephone company refused, however, to comply
with a court order requiring it to lease the telephone lines to the FBI for surveillance purposes. Id.
at 161-62. The Supreme Court held that although "unreasonable burdens may not be imposed"
under the AWA, the AWA authorized commands to thwart frustration of a prior court order. Id. at
172. The Court found especially persuasive the circumstances where: (1) the company allowed the
illegal actions; (2) the company had a public duty; (3) the order was not burdensome; and (4) the
FBI had no alternative method to accomplish its goals. Id. at 174-75.
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The AWA may also force compliance with a previous court order frustrat-
ed by the acts of an individual. 8 Occasionally, this power can extend to indi-
viduals who "have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice."'9 Frus-
tration traditionally includes wrongful obstruction of an order or public duty
by one party.'
3. Congressional Grant of Condemnation Power: CERCLA
CERCLA2' provides for condemnation of Superfund cleanup sites and
adjacent land.22 Although commentators and courts interpret this provision
liberally in order to secure beneficial environmental goals, 3 the statutory lan-
guage does not grant condemnation powers to third parties.24 Trustees with
the power to bring a CERCLA damage claim include local governments,
states, and federal government departments.25 Consequently, the private party
charged with cleaning up a hazardous site has no power under CERCLA to
procure any necessary private property.
18. See id. at 172 (noting repeated Supreme Court recognition of the AWA grant of power
to prevent frustration of prior orders); Kemp v. Peterson, 940 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1991) (find-
ing no abuse of discretion in an order intending to facilitate monitoring of compliance with an
earlier order).
19. New York TeL, 434 U.S. at 174 (allowing a court to find frustration if people, "though
not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the im-
plementation of a court order"); see also United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir.)
(finding that third parties must answer questions and produce books despite self-incrimination
privilege), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 908 (1952); United States
v. McHie, 196 F. 586, 587-88 (N.D. I11. 1912) (finding power in the AWA to impound books
illegally seized by the government where they were necessary evidence).
20. Frustration is more readily found when one party has a public duty to protect the public
interest. See New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 174 (finding that the telephone company had taken on a
public duty); Federal Trade Comin'n v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 608 (1966) (preventing
the consummation of an illegal merger); Public Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F.2d
242, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (granting an injunction based on the Public Utilities Commission's ties
to Congress).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995). The original proceeding in Hardage came under 1980
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980), as opposed to the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986)
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j) (1988). See generally Bruce P. Howard & Kevin E. Solliday,
CERCLA and Similar State Laws: Overview and Current Developments, 797 Prac. L. Inst.Corp.
L. & Prac. 39 (1992) (describing the basic fundamentals of Superfund sites). A Superfund site
contains hazardous waste, is designated to receive federal funding for cleanup, and imposes liabili-
ty for most of the costs on private parties once owning the land. Id. at 39-40.
23. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst Cir. 1986)
(interpreting CERCLA to eliminate a "procedural obstacle that would otherwise hamper the efforts
of private parties"); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir.
1985) (refusing to interpret CERCLA to frustrate the environmental goals of the statute without
affinative congressional intent).
24. Although the original 1980 CERCLA made no provision for condemnation, the amend-
ments provide for presidential condemnation authority. 42 U.S.C. § 96070)(1) (providing that
"[tlhe President is authorized to acquire, by purchase, lease, condemnation, donation, or otherwise,
any real property or any interest in property that the President in his discretion determines is need-
ed to conduct a remedial action under this chapter"). See generally Carter H. Strickland, Jr., The
Scope of Authority of Natural Resource Trustees, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 303 (1995) (pro-
viding background on authority to condemn under CERCLA).
25. Strickland, supra note 24, at 303-04. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may
condemn a piece of property for public use as a CERCLA Superfund site, but third parties have
no statutory authority to do the same. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(j)(1).
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B. United States v. Hardage26
1. Facts
The United States filed suit under CERCLA to compel the Hardage Steer-
ing Committee (HSC) to implement remedial cleanup of a Superfund site.27
The cleanup order necessitated the acquisition of the neighboring property,
owned by Mr. Whitehead." HSC failed to negotiate a price for forty acres of
Mr. Whitehead's dairy farm, and instead initiated a third party complaint seek-
ing to take the land.29 HSC cited ancillary jurisdiction for condemnation au-
thority under the inherent powers of the court through CERCLA and the
AWA.3" The trial court compelled the condemnation through the AWA.3"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit refused to extend the AWA to provide authority for a
permanent taking because CERCLA does not grant such power.32 Determin-
ing that the broadest application of the AWA granted authority for only a
temporary physical occupation,33 the court found nothing in the language of
the AWA that would vest district courts with such extensive condemnation
jurisdiction.34 For such an extension, the AWA would require a finding that
Mr. Whitehead frustrated the previous order.3" The Tenth Circuit refused to
find frustration based only upon the failure of negotiations.36
The decision also reaffirmed the court's view that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 71A guarantees the right to a jury in a condemnation proceeding.37
26. 58 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1995).
27. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 571.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994). Alternatively, HSC asserted a private right to emi-
nent domain under an Oklahoma law providing condemnation power for a "sanitary purpose," but
the district court held that these grounds were not necessary because the AWA grounds deter-
mined the case. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 571-73; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 6 (West 1991). HSC
launched its claim that the Whiteheads do not have the right to a jury trial based upon this state
law claim. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 576.
31. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 573-74.
32. Id. at 573. HSC's counsel admitted that the EPA would have condemnation power in the
instant situation, but that HSC was not linked to the EPA. Id. at 572; see Commercial Sec. Bank
v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1972) (limiting the AWA to preserving
jurisdiction, not granting jurisdiction over people or property).
33. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 574-75 (citing New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 168-78).
34. Id. at 575.
35. Id. at 575-76.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 576. Rule 71A(h) states that if a tribunal is not specifically provided for by an act
of Congress, a party may have a jury trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h) (emphasis added). The Su-
preme Court, however, has declared that "there is no constitutional right to a jury in eminent
domain proceedings." United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18, 20 (1970) (providing that "[tihe
rule gives the trial court discretion to eliminate a jury entirely"); see also 12 WRIGHT Er AL.,
supra note 15, § 3051, at 123-25 & n.56 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (noting that the landowner may
demand a jury, but that the court may refuse); Searles, supra note 7, at 356-57 (stating that federal
claimants have a right to demand a jury trial unless the court appoints a commission).
The Tenth Circuit, in Hardage, recognized certain exceptions to the jury right, and stated
that the district court did not make appropriate findings for exceptions. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 576
n.5. The trial court did appoint a commission for the valuation. Id. at 573. The Tenth Circuit also
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Federal law governs a CERCLA action; therefore, the court determined that
Mr. Whitehead was due a "panoply of due process rights" under the Fifth
Amendment."
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision to limit the jurisdiction of the AWA was
reasonable. 9 First, the AWA itself does not explicitly mention power of con-
demnation.' The Tenth Circuit correctly relied upon New York Telephone,
which recognized that "unreasonable burdens may not be imposed," to deter-
mine the AWA's boundaries." New York Telephone relied on the AWA for a
partial, temporary taking, as opposed to the "full-blown eminent domain pro-
ceeding" in Hardage, which imposed severe burdens on the innocent neighbor
to the Superfund site.42 The Supreme Court has not extended the AWA to al-
low a permanent taking, primarily because CERCLA's congressional intent
was not to allow third party condemnation authority.43 Indeed, the Supreme
Court cautioned against the inherent dangers in expanding the AWA too far."
Second, the Tenth Circuit realistically considered that failed negotiations
may not necessarily be an attempt to thwart a judicial order.45 The new test
for finding frustration, as articulated in Hardage, requires proof of either: (1)
noted that both attorneys misled the trial court as to the jury trial right offered in its circuit. Id. at
576. In addition, the court noted that HSC's argument on appeal-that the Whiteheads simply
failed to demand a jury-was disingenuous because the trial court determined that the Whiteheads
could not have a jury prior to the point at which they could have demanded one. Id.
38. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 576.
39. The courts have traditionally used the AWA for the following procedural injunctive
actions and writs of mandamus: protecting the right to a jury trial; staying proceedings; denying a
stay of proceedings; reviewing orders compelling discovery; motions to dismiss; new trials; class
actions; reviewing requests for judge disqualification; transfers; and writs of habeas corpus. 16
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 3932, 3935.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
41. New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 172 ("We agree that the power of federal courts to impose
duties upon third parties is not without limits .... "); see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
42. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 575. Many other important distinctions exist between Hardage and
New York Tel.: (1) the phone company was not innocent like Whitehead; (2) unlike Whitehead,
the phone company had a public duty; (3) the phone company's burden was minor, whereas
Whitehead risked becoming landlocked; (4) the FBI had no other manner in which to accomplish
its investigation, whereas the government could use the EPA to obtain Whitehead's land; (5) un-
like HSC, the FBI needed assistance with law enforcement; and (6) the Supreme Court found
congressional intent to allow the FBI access to phone lines, whereas CERCLA does not grant third
party condemnation power. Id. at 569-74; New York Tel., 434 U.S. at 174-76.
43. The AWA does not allow "exercise of a specific nonexistent power." 16 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 3933, at 225.
44. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) ("While courts
have never confined themselves to an arbitrary and technical definition of 'jurisdiction,' it is clear
that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the
invocation of this extraordinary remedy."). See generally Paul Ganson, The SEC Speaks in 1995:
Recent Judicial Developments, 880 PRAC. L. INSTJCORP. L. & PRAc., 613 (1995) (noting that a
recent case denied use of the AWA to base a sua sponte exercise of jurisdiction over a person
who was not a party to the action).
45. Hardage, 58 F.3d at 575 (stating that "the 'frustration' of [the] prior order was simply
the product of the inability of either side to agree upon a fair price"). A court traditionally finds
frustration when a direct order is thwarted, even by a third party. Id. The Hardage order, however,
compelled HSC to acquire the land, not to condemn the land. Id. at 571.
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intentional refusal to bargain in good faith; or (2) intentional balking to ob-
struct a court order. '
D. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's refusal in Hardage to expand the substantive berth of
the AWA in a condemnation proceeding is consistent with case law in other
circuits.47 The narrow definition of "frustration" of a court order is also in
accord with other circuits, where courts traditionally limit frustration to situa-
tions in which the obstruction had a taint of wrongdoing or when law enforce-
ment required assistance.'
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND VALUATION OF SUBSURFACE MINERALS:
UNITED STATES V. CONSOLIDATED MAYFLOWER MINES, INC.49
A. Background
1. Valuation of Taken Property: The Highest and Best Use Test
Once a court determines that the government has taken property from an
individual with adequate authority, the government must give "just compensa-
tion."50 Determination of "just compensation" involves the land's market val-
ue as determined by the "highest and best use" test."' This test compensates
the landowner for only the most worthwhile use of the property. 2 Under
Olson v. United States,53 the government must consider all uses54 where
46. Id. at 575 (stating that "both parties must bear some responsibility for their negotiating
failure").
47. See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1979) (limiting
the AWA to provide jurisdiction for technical assistance to law enforcement, and not authorizing
the power "to order a party to bear risks not otherwise demanded by law"). At least one other cir-
cuit has used the AWA to enforce condemnation orders, but not to authorize a third party's power
to condemn without a statutory grant. Cole v. United States, 657 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.) (finding
injunction proper to prohibit condemnee interference with government possession), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
48. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit found frustration when
the EPA refused to comply with an order forcing promised funding of a municipal sewer project.
Michigan v. City of Allen Park, 954 F.2d 1201, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1992); see also National Org.
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an
appointment of a master to monitor compliance with an order was permissible under the AWA).
49. 60 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For recent in-depth discussions
of just compensation, see Michael Debow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Re-
form, 46 S.C. L. REv. 579 (1995); Clynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is
Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721 (1993).
51. Sidney Z. Searles, Highest and Best Use: The Keystone of Valuation in Eminent Domain,
C791 ALI-ABA 315, 315 (1993) (discussing the highest and best use doctrine: its meanings, ori-
gins, and effects on value).
52. Id. at 318 (quoting the earliest appearance of the test in In re Furman Street, 17 Wend.
669 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)). Current use of the land does not dictate the outcome of the doctrine.
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878) (providing that "property is not to be deemed
worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste"). Important factors to determine highest and
best use include land availability, land adaptability, need or demand for a use, and other possible
uses. Searles, supra note 51, at 321.
53. 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
54. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255. The Supreme Court has stated that compensation includes the
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there is a reasonable probability that the property will adapt to that use, and a
demand for that use in the "reasonably near" future.55 The government does
not consider any remote and speculative uses dependent upon extrinsic condi-
tions in the valuation.56
2. Valuation of Undeveloped Subsurface Minerals
Due to the inherently speculative nature of interests in undeveloped miner-
al deposits, complex valuation doctrines become even more difficult to apply
in mineral valuation disputes.57 For example, strict adherence to the Olson
test of "reasonable probability in the reasonably near future"58 would disallow
compensation for any speculative mineral deposit.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that speculative values for
undeveloped minerals are inevitable and yet may be compensable if (a) they
have an ascertainable market value and (b) extraction is the highest and best
use for the land. This realization in Montana Railway v. Warren' directly
conflicts with the Olson "reasonably probable" standard for compensation.
Under Montana Railway, a court may consider a speculative use in valuation
either before the vein has been fully exploited or the use is "reasonably prob-
able."'
The tension between Olson and Montana Railway causes complex valua-
tion disputes, exacerbated because the rule set forth in Olson did not involve a
subsurface mineral valuation.62 Montana Railway held that even though the
undeveloped mine in question was "only a prospect," mining prospects are
subjects of business transactions and, therefore, affect market value of com-
pensation."
land's "fair market value for all available uses and purposes." United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 80-81 (1913).
55. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255-57 (disallowing a valuation based upon use of shoreland as a
reservoir where the landowner has little possibility of acquiring all other lands necessary for that
use); see 4 SACKMAN, supra note 8, § 12B.12, at 12B-90 (discussing the prominence of the Olson
test); Searles, supra note 51, at 322 (discussing methods of proving highest and best use).
56. Olson, 292 U.S. at 256. Contra Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1890)
(allowing valuation for a speculative mining use). Possible uses that "have no perceptible effect
upon present market value" will not be compensated, but if extrinsic conditions are probable and
affect market value, they may be considered. 4 SACKMAN, supra note 8, §§ 12B.12, 12B-113.
57. See Joseph M. Montano, Valuation of Lands with Mineral Deposits, C791 ALI-ABA
269, 271-73 (1993) (discussing various solutions to the problem of speculative mineral values).
58. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255-57.
59. Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 352-54 (allowing compensation for in-place minerals);
Montano, supra note 57, at 272 (noting a number of different valuation doctrines used to compen-
sate for speculative mineral deposits).
60. 137 U.S. 348 (1890).
61. Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 352.
62. Olson, 292 U.S. at 248-55 (considering the possibility of using shoreland as a reservoir).
63. Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 352. This recognition of the "market value" concept in mineral
rights was reiterated as recently as 1989, after the Olson opinion, with regard to mineral lease
appraisals. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 628 n.3 (1989). The Tenth Circuit noted this
affirmation, despite that court's contrary outcome. United States v. Consolidated Mayflower
Mines, Inc., 60 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
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B. United States v. Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc.64
1. Facts
To relocate a highway, the government used eminent domain powers to
take 18.22 acres of land owned by Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc.
(CMMI).65 The government argued that it should base compensation on the
land's use for recreational home development.' CMMI argued for compensa-
tion based upon access to its Mayflower Mine.67 CMMI's mine leases were
subject to the consent of the current surface property owners, Stitching May-
flower Mountain/Recreational Fonds (Stitchings), who had refused to consent
to mining activities.' 8 CMMI and the government differed as to the profitabil-
ity of the mining venture.' The jury indicated that, based on the Olson test,
the highest and best use for the land was home development.7"
2. Decision
The Court of Appeals noted that the Olson requirement excludes unex-
ploited mineral deposits under the taken land.7' The court further stated that
Olson conflicts with Montana Railway, where speculative mining "prospects"
were determined to have market value.72 Despite this discord, the Tenth Cir-
cuit followed United States v. 494.10 Acres of Land,73 a decision where the
court adopted the Olson "reasonably near future" requirement for mineral
evaluation.74 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit currently requires a finding of
reasonably probable mineral values in order to qualify for compensation.75
64. 60 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1995).
65. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1471.
66. Id. at 1471-72.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1472. CMMI brought a second ground for appeal based upon Stitchings' "double-
teaming" with the government. Id. at 1477-78. Although Stitchings' standing was limited to pro-
tection of their royalty rights, its stance was adverse to CMMI. Id. at 1478. For example, Stichings
"often sounded as if [it] were seeking an injunction against a mining operation about to begin"
and testified that they would not have consented to the operations. Id. The court found no basis
for CMMI's claim because Stitchings' influence was minimal. Id. The court noted in dicta, how-
ever, that it thought the district court abused its discretion by allowing Stitchings to exceed their
standing limitations. Id.
69. Id. at 1472-74.
70. Id. at 1475. The instructions also provided that the "[miere possibility of a use is not
enough" and "[s]peculative schemes of the owner or witnesses are to be excluded from your con-
sideration." Id.
71. Id. at 1476.
72. Id. at 1476-77 (citing Montana Ry., 137 U.S. at 353).
73. 592 F.2d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusing to compensate for speculative underlying
sand and gravel value).
74. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1477. Thus, the jury instructions were not prejudicial according to
de novo review. Id. at 1475-77 (citing Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d
1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995)). The court also noted that a change in the instructions would not
have altered the jury verdict due to the tenuous nature of development. Id. at 1477.
75. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon several other opinions utilizing the
Olson standard. None of these, however, involved mineral valuations. See United States v.
77,819.10 Acres of Land, 647 F.2d 104, 110 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying the test in a farmland con-
demnation case contemplating a hunting use), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v.
46,672.96 Acres of Land, 521 F.2d 13, 15 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying the test in a condemnation
case contemplating use for a missile range); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901, 908 (10th Cir.
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C. Analysis
This case confirms the Tenth Circuit's willingness to apply the Olson test
to value unexploited minerals, despite the tension between the Olson test and
the holding in Montana Railway. This decision may give the government an
unfair advantage in condemnation proceedings because the value and nature of
most mineral deposits have an inherently speculative nature.76 The decision in
494.10 Acres initially adopted the Olson "reasonably likely to take place in the
near future" requirement,77 and Mayflower consummates the adoption by em-
bracing the "reasonably probable" standard for minerals.7" Mayflower,
therefore, reinforces the trend from Montana Railway to Olson,79 despite the
appearance that Montana Railway governs the issue.8"
D. Other Circuits
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have applied the Olson test to evaluate
unexploited subsurface minerals despite the conflict with Montana Railway."'
Other circuits follow Olson in condemnation proceedings, but have yet to
apply Olson to an unexploited mineral case.82
The Fifth, Ninth, and, to some extent, Eleventh Circuits have applied the
Montana Railway standard to compensate for unexploited minerals.83
1965) (applying the test in a ranchland condemnation case contemplating severance damages).
76. Montano, supra note 57, at 271-72.
77. 494.10 Acres, 592 F.2d at 1132 (holding that the near future "element of use" was sig-
nificant) (quoting Olson, 292 U.S. at 255) (emphasis added). This decision conflicted with a prior
holding allowing speculative valuations of minerals. United States v. Silver Queen Mining Co.,
285 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir. 1960) ("[Rlequired proof need rise no higher than the circumstances
permit. Some speculation is inherent in the ascertainment of value of all resource property .... ").
Indeed, even after 494.10 Acres, the Tenth Circuit recognized that awards may still be granted to
speculative mineral deposit holders. United States v. 179.26 Acres of Land, 644 F.2d 367, 372-74
(10th Cir. 1981) (holding no error in consideration of underlying limestone while relying on Silver
Queen Mining, 285 F.2d at 510).
78. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1476-77 (emphasis added).
79. Silver Queen Mining relied heavily upon the Montana Ry. allowance of speculative valu-
ations for subsurface mineral condemnation. Silver Queen Mining, 285 F.2d at 510.
80. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 628 n.3 (1989) (citing Montana Ry., 137
U.S. at 352-53) (noting that "whatever the difficulties may be in making [mineral] appraisals with
complete accuracy, it does not defeat the existence of a 'market value' in mineral rights").
81. See United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 290, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding
that the highest and best use of the condemned land was the potential use for sand mining based
on a commercially exploitable amount); United States v. 91.90 Acres of Land, 586 F.2d 79 (8th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). Although the Eighth Circuit did not cite Olson in
this opinion, it did require a market for the minerals, which is tied to the "reasonably probable in
the reasonably near future" test. Id. at 86; see supra text accompanying notes 57-63.
82. See United States v. 27.93 Acres of Land, 924 F.2d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 1991) (excluding
compensation based on prospect of rezoning as speculative); United States v. 47.3096 Acres of
Land, 583 F.2d 270, 272 (6th Cir. 1978) (excluding evidence based upon the Olson standard for
demand in the near future in a residential land takings case).
83. See St. Genevieve Gas Co. v. T.V.A., 747 F.2d 1411, 1413-14 (1 th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the district court did not err in finding that no potential for production existed); Cal-Bay Corp.
v. United States, 169 F.2d 15, 19 (9th Cir.) (taking judicial notice of the fact that land with even a
"prospect[] of possible successful development" has a market value), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859
(1948); Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 1944) (allow-
ing compensation for "reasonable possibilit[iesl of production in paying quantities"). CMMI re-
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Furthermore, in Phillips v. United States, 4 the Ninth Circuit noted that "[tihe
Supreme Court has answered [the unexploited mineral valuation] question" in
Montana Railway.5 The Eleventh Circuit applied the probable standard to a
taken mineral lease, but noted that the lease would not have survived scrutiny
even under the less arduous possibility standard. 6 Although a recent Supreme
Court case cited the Montana Railway approach, the circuits remain split as to
which Supreme Court authority to follow. s7
III. TITLE TO ISLANDS UNDER AMBIGUOUS FEDERAL GRANTS:
KOCH V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
8 8
A. Background
1. Origin of Title
Until all of the states became part of the Union, the federal government
held, in trust, those lands not possessed by the original thirteen states.8 9 The
"equal footing doctrine" allowed each new state to enter the Union with the
same rights as original states; as a result, the new state took the shores, beds,
and submerged lands of navigable waters upon entry into the Union.' ° The
United States, however, retained the islands in navigable rivers." Land in
non-navigable waters did not pass to the states under the equal footing doc-
trine.92 The federal government may pass title to these lands along with a
quested an instruction based upon Cal-Bay. Mayflower, 60 F.3d at 1475.
84. 243 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1957).
85. Phillips, 243 F.2d at 5. The court held that the trial court erred in relying solely on high-
est and best use because "where there is a reasonable POSSIBILITY of production in paying
quantities, [and] mineral rights are a common subject of barter and sale," a reasonable probability
of successful development exists. Id. at 6 (quoting Eagle Lake, 141 F.2d at 564) (emphasis in
original).
86. St. Genevieve Gas, 747 F.2d at 1413 n.4 (finding the substantial unprofitable develop-
ment conclusive that mining was not compensable). The court adopted the Fifth Circuit view, as
per the circuit split in 1981, but seemed uncertain as to what that view entails. Id.
87. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 628 n.3 (1989) (citing Montana Ry., 137
U.S. at 352-53) (noting that "whatever the difficulties may be in making [mineral] appraisals with
complete accuracy, it does not defeat the existence of a 'market value' in mineral rights").
88. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995).
89. See generally David W. Gross, Examining Aboriginal Rights in Submerged Lands:
Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 139 (1993) (discussing the equal footing doc-
trine).
90. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-71
(1977); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 425-26 (1867); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). The equal footing doctrine derives from the United States
Constitution. Denise Dosier, Note, The Clouds Are Lifting: The Problem of Title to Submerged
Lands in Alaska, 8 ALASKA L. REv. 271, 273 & n.10 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3). For a
discussion of the equal footing doctrine, and navigability theories of ownership, see Philip W.
Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of Riparian and Littoral Title Prob-
lems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 265, 270-73 (1991).
91. Kemp Wilson, Ownership of Mineral Interests Underlying Inland Bodies of Water and
the Effects of Accretion and Erosion, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14-1, 14-4 to 14-5, 14-22
(1984) (discussing exceptions to the equal footing doctrine).
92. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-57 (1926) (applying navigability
standards to determine that a lake was in fact navigable, and therefore, it belonged to the state);
Gross, supra note 89, at 145 n.48. For a discussion of tests determining navigability for purposes
of riverbed ownership, see Wilson, supra note 91, at 14-7 to 14-15.
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patent to surrounding riparian lands, or keep them as public land as expressed
in the surrounding land grant itself.93
The government passes title by surveying land, by including that survey in
an official plat, and then incorporating that plat into a grant by reference. 94
When a plot of land borders a stream or river, the surveyor "meanders" that
river by following the turnings of the river to set a record of its course.95 Un-
surveyed lands, those islands not meandered, remain the property of the Unit-
ed States and cannot pass from federal ownership. 96
2. Omission or Ambiguous Description of Islands
Occasionally, a survey will omit an island, or will contain ambiguous or
erroneous information about the island.97 Over time, the Supreme Court has
constructed a twisting course of authority to manage this problem, leading to
varying interpretations." First, courts generally use two interpretive doctrines:
(1) that no property right passes by implication;" and (2) that "nothing
passes but that which is conveyed in clear and explicit language.""
93. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922).
94. Snake River Ranch v. United States, 542 F.2d 555, 556 (10th Cir. 1976); see Jefferis v.
East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 194-95 (1890) (finding that an incorporated plat includes
accretion to the land up to the date of the plat); Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 123 (10th
Cir. 1969) (noting that because a plat omitted riparian fast land, land belonged to the United
States).
95. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891) (holding that meander lines merely
ascertain what lands are to be paid for, they do not limit the title to their lines); George J.
Morgenthaler, Surveys of Riparian Real Property: Omitted Lands Make Rights Precarious, 30
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 19-1, 19-10 & nn.19-21 (1984) (providing that "for various reasons,
meander lines are inherently inaccurate, meant only to approximate the course of a water body");
see also Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 512 (1905) (stating that the meander helps fix a
price). But cf. Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 U.S. 300, 306 (1899) (holding that a surveying error
"does not enlarge the title conveyed by the patents").
96. See United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 311 U.S. 317, 344 (1940) (finding that unsur-
veyed and ambiguous grants retain title in the United States); Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting
Club v. United States, 260 U.S. 561, 564 (1923) (holding that ordinary rules do not apply where
land was unsurveyed); Walton, 415 F.2d at 124 (noting that omitted and unsurveyed lands re-
mained in the possession of the United States). The Bureau of Land Management has consistently
applied this principle to riparian island disputes. See Loyla C. Waskul, 102 I.B.L.A. 241 (1988);
Emma S. Peterson, 39 PUB. LANDS DEC. 566 (1911).
97. Jeems Bayou, 260 U.S. at 563-64 (finding that 500 acres missing from initial survey was
an omission). Islands are considered omitted when they are permanent, dry, and "large enough that
a reasonable surveyor would consider it surveyor error if the island were omitted in a survey."
Lear, supra note 90, at 274-75.
98. Bourgeois v. United States, 545 F.2d 727, 730 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (noting that navigability
may play a key role in determining the ownership of the island). However, the factor tests dis-
cussed later seem to be more prevalent. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 101-08
and accompanying text.
99. See MacDonald v. United States, 119 F.2d 821, 825-26 (9th Cir.) (applying rule to a
statute to dismiss appeal), cert. granted sub nom. Great N. Ry. v. United States, 314 U.S. 596
(1941), modified, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942); Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1919)
(dismissing appeal based on rule). The interpretive doctrine against implication may originate in
the desire to retain sovereign power "to achieve important public purposes." Joseph L. Sax, Rights
That "Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 943, 948 (1993).
100. Caldwell, 250 U.S. at 20. Many, sometimes conflicting, interpretive doctrines for riparian
land disputes exist, including: reliability of patents; patents favor the United States; patents favor
the grantee; no implied government reservations; no implied government grants; and the govern-
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Second, several factors indicate the intention to either exclude or include
islands in the grant.'0 ' The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lane,
'02
found value, location, size, terrain, and presence or absence of fraud persua-
sive elements in assessing intent to dispose of the land." 3 Courts also inter-
pret grants as passing title when the surveyor excluded the land due to its
valuelessness at the time of the survey.' 4 Courts generally include unsur-
veyed lands in patents, °5 except for unusually large islands likely omitted by
error.'" The Surveyor General's instructions on meandering also relieve am-
biguity in a grant: instructions to find lands suitable for cultivation will pass
"inconsequential fragments,"'0 7 while instructions to note the existence of
any islands will retain federal possession.'
The third signpost on the Supreme Court's winding road consists of two
cases: Moss v. Ramey"9 and Scott v. Lattig."° These cases held that the ex-
istence of a mistake or error, rather than an ambiguity, demonstrates federal
intent to keep title."' Fourth, deliberate fraud perpetrated by the surveyor to
take land from the government demonstrates federal retention of
possession."' These four elements show the government's intent with respect
to possession of excluded islands.
Additionally, a choice of law problem arises with ambiguous or mistaken
title disputes.' In Moss and Scott, the Supreme Court applied federal law in
ment must produce clear and convincing evidence. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-44 to 19-
50.
101. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-50 (noting that courts often resort to factual tests for
riparian land disputes). Some important factual tests are: (1) whether occupation, improvement,
and use demonstrate intent; (2) survey accuracy; (3) value; (4) size; (5) government acceptance of
the survey; and (6) historical evidence. Id. at 19-50 to 19-55.
102. 260 U.S. 662 (1923).
103. Lane, 260 U.S. at 665; see Ainsa v. United States, 161 U.S. 208 (1896) (applying the
"substantial area test" to determine that the actual number of acres surveyed and included on the
plats limited that plat); Thomas B. Bishop Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 96 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.)
(including an adjacent sandpit overlooked in the meander, based on the Lane factors), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 623 (1938).
104. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 451 (1908) (not-
ing that "Ithe islands are little more than rocks, rising very slightly above the level of the water");
Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 511 (1905) (concerning small islands, "frequently covered
with water," that the Land Department refused to survey); Grand Rapids & I.R. Co. v. Butler, 159
U.S. 87, 89 (1895) (addressing a low sandbar usually covered with water).
105. Lane, 260 U.S. at 664-65 (citing Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406, 414 (1891)).
106. Id. (citing Jeems Bayou, 260 U.S. at 563). The prominence of the factual situations may
be the only way to reconcile the conflicting decisions because courts interpret the navigability
factor in conflicting ways as well. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28 (noting that a navigable
river case is routinely applied to non-navigable disputes).
107. Whitaker, 197 U.S. at 513.
108. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 241 (1913) (using surveying instructions and size of island
in question to show surveyor error).
109. 239 U.S. 538 (1916).
110. 227 U.S. 229 (1913).
111. Moss, 239 U.S. at 546 (distinguishing Whitaker based on that case's unstable land and
the Land Department's refusal to survey); see Scott, 227 U.S. at 241-43 (finding that an error in
the survey did not work to dispose of the large quantity of land while holding that "[tlitle to is-
lands remains in the United States, unless expressly granted"). But see Jordan, 140 U.S. at 400
(requiring extraordinary proof to show mistake and finding none in regard to large spit concerned).
112. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-31 to 19-41.
113. Federal law considers omitted islands government property, whereas state law grants the
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the wake of a mistaken survey," 4 whereas in Oklahoma v. Texas,"5 the Su-
preme Court applied state law to an overtly ambiguous grant." 6 These diver-
gent results demonstrate that considerable conflict exists regarding the applica-
tion of federal law to previously private or state owned lands." 7 The Su-
preme Court, in Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co.," held that state law governs riparian lands not passed under the equal
footing doctrine." 9 The Supreme Court, however, has also stated that the
United States retains title to islands not expressly granted, a result which may
conflict with state law.'20 Thus, tension remains as to whether state law will
always apply to riparian lands,'2' or whether federal law applies according to
the Lane factors for erroneous surveys.'22
B. Koch v. United States Department of Interior'23
1. Facts
An initial survey of the Colorado River described nine islands on a non-
navigable portion of the river. The survey, however, did not meander the
islands and, as a result, they remained officially unsurveyed.'24 The parties
riparian landowner title to the center of the water body. Lear, supra note 90, at 272-75. Basic
property rights are a traditional state area of law. Frank E. Maloney, The Ordinary High Water
Mark: Attempts at Settling an Unsettled Boundary Line, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 465, 476
(1978).
114. See Moss, 239 U.S. at 546; Scott, 227 U.S. at 241-42.
115. 258 U.S. 574 (1922).
116. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 594-95 (issuing an ultimatum that absent contrary intent, state
law applies to all conveyances); see also Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 377 (holding that state law applied
to navigable riverbed lands passed in an ambiguous grant); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519
(1903) (stating that state law applied to a non-navigable lakeside property dispute and requiring
extraordinary proof to apply federal law). The factors used to interpret an ambiguous grant may
also be used to determine if error exists. See supra text accompanying notes 101-12.
117. John A. Lovett, Comment, Batture, Ordinary High Water, and the Louisiana Levee
Servitude, 69 TL. L. REV. 561, 598-603 (1994).
118. 429 U.S. 363 (1977). Although courts may overlook these authorities in a non-navigable
water dispute because they concern navigable waters only, the court does not limit itself in this
way; nor do commentators suggest that the distinction would change the principles applied. See
Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378 (speaking expansively of all land not passed under the equal footing
doctrine); Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28 (noting that a navigable river case is routinely
applied to non-navigable disputes).
119. Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378. The Court first extended federal law application to any land
that passed under the equal footing doctrine. Lovett, supra note 117, at 599-600 (citing Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 319 (1973)). Later, the Court overruled Bonelli Cattle, stating
that state law applied after the state had entered the Union. Id. at 600 (citing Corvallis, 429 U.S.
at 370-71). It remains unresolved whether Corvallis overruled only the equal footing portion of
Bonelli Cattle or also implicitly overruled the entire doctrine that applies federal law to federal
grants. Maloney, supra note 113, at 485. The Eleventh Circuit recently held that "state law gov-
erns the disposition of property held by a state regardless of whether or not the state acquired the
property as sovereignty land under the equal footing doctrine." Lovett, supra note 117, at 603
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 425 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
120. Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973) (citing Scott, 227 U.S. at 242-43) (apply-
ing federal law to a navigable river dispute). One commentator notes that Scott is routinely applied
to non-navigable river disputes. Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28.
121. Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378.
122. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
123. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995).
124. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017-18. The survey was intended to locate saleable land in order to
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stipulated that the original survey did not meander the islands because they
lacked value at that time.' 25 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) assert-
ed that the United States owned the islands because they were not officially
surveyed, that they existed when the survey was conducted, 6 and that the
government is not bound by ambiguous grants. 7 Koch claimed ownership
of six of the islands based on patents incorporating the survey/plat by
reference.2 8 The district court, applying state law, determined that Koch held
title to the island. 29
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that because the islands exist in a non-navigable
part of the river, the islands did not belong to the State of Colorado under the
equal footing doctrine. 30 Additionally, the court refused to apply the general
rule of construction in favor of the government,' despite a finding that the
patent recorded did not demonstrate intent by the federal government to either
convey or keep the islands.'32 Recognizing that choice of law was an issue
of first impression in the Tenth Circuit,'33 the Court of Appeals relied on
Oklahoma and utilized state law to interpret the ambiguous federal grant.'34
Finally, Colorado state law vested title in the riparian land owner. 35
reduce the federal government's deficit, under the order of President Van Buren. PAUL W. GATES,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 178 (1968).
125. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017. The islands may now have value as critical habitats for endan-
gered species. Brief for Appellant at 2, Koch, 47 F.3d 1015 (No. 93-1298). The government also
noted that this decision will cast doubt about the ownership of thousands of islands with valuable
mineral resources. Id.
126. Some commentators agree that these facts vest title in the government. See Lear, supra
note 90, at 274-75 (discussing possession of omitted islands).
127. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1018. The last of these grounds is merely a general rule of con-
struction, not a rule of law. Id. at 1019-20.
128. Id. at 1017.
129. Id. at 1018.
130. Id. at 1019 (citing Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.l (9th Cir.
1986) (recognizing the stipulations of the parties that the river is non-navigable, and noting that "a
court is not bound by stipulations of the parties as to questions of law")). The court reviewed all
questions of law de novo. Id. at 1018.
131. Id. at 1019-20 (citing Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 595).
132. Id. at 1019 (basing the decision upon the islands' low value, lack of access to the is-
lands, and silence in the patents as to the islands).
133. The court conceded that "the law of this circuit was unclear before this case" and that
"other circuits had disagreed over whether state law applied under these circumstances." Id. at
1021. Two Tenth Circuit cases relied upon in the parties' briefs were not mentioned in the opinion
since they pertained to riverbeds or submerged lands; in addition, neither explicitly dealt with the
choice of law problem. See Bradford v. United States, 651 F.2d 700, 706-07 (10th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the government must expressly reserve land); Snake River Ranch v. United States,
542 F.2d 555, 557-58 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying meander doctrines to determine a boundary).
134. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 595.
135. More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437 (Colo. 1977) (accepting as settled the proposition that
Colorado state law vests title in the riparian land owner). The district court result was not disput-
ed. See also Jordan, 140 U.S. at 383-84 (stating the common law rule recognizing the riparian
landowner's possession of the non-navigable riverbed to the center); United States v. Goodrich
Farms Partnership, 947 F.2d 906, 908 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Colorado law conveying land to




The Tenth Circuit has interwoven several Supreme Court "interpretive
techniques" to advance the rights of private riparian land owners against the
government. First, Koch limited the general rule of construction in favor of the
government to grants not involving patents on islands in adjacent waters.
3 6
The Tenth Circuit then distinguished Moss: Moss applied federal law only to
mistaken surveys, rather than ambiguous surveys such as the survey in the
instant dispute'37 which concerned purposely overlooked islands. 3 The
Koch opinion is also significant because it determined that state law controls
riparian grants.'39 This result complies with the dictum in Corvallis that state
law controls all riparian disputes when the equal footing doctrine is inapplica-
ble."4 Moreover, the Koch opinion evaded the factors test,'4 ' indicating
that the Tenth Circuit may have simply adopted the maxim that state law
applies to all riparian land controversies."'
The facts of Koch, however, are consistent with the factual tests used to
apply state law, namely low value, small size, an absence of fraud, and sur-
veying instructions based on the need for saleable land.'43 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit has probably decided that state law applies to ambiguous grants and
federal law applies to erroneous surveys.
D. Other Circuits
Different circuits have reached seemingly disparate results for choice of
law problems involving riparian land disputes. These differences, however,
may be distinguished upon factual circumstances."
The Sixth Circuit and the Federal Court of Claims have both applied state
law to ambiguous grants with regard to islands adjacent to the granted
136. Koch v. United States Dep't of Interior, 47 F.3d 1015, 1020 (10th Cir.) (citing Oklaho-
ma, 258 U.S. at 595), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 303 (1995)).
137. Id. at 1020 n.5. The court noted the Sixth Circuit's rationale that Moss determines that
mistaken surveys do not affect the intent of the government to retain the lands. Id. (citing Wolff v.
United States, 967 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir.), affd, 974 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1992)). Although the
Tenth Circuit did not distinguish Scott, it also involved a mistaken survey. Scott v. Lattig, 227
U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913).
138. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017. The surveyors did describe the islands in their notes; they simply
did not meander them because of their low value. Id.
139. Id. at 1020.
140. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378
(1977); see also Lovett, supra note 117, at 600-01 (discussing the possible effects of Corvallis).
141. The Tenth Circuit relied upon these factors in a past case determining the ownership of
fast land on the Snake River, and applied federal law. Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 124
(10th Cir. 1969).
142. See Corvallis, 429 U.S. at 378. "This Court has consistently held that state law governs
issues relating to this [navigable river bed], like other real property, unless some other principle of
federal law requires a different result." Id.
143. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1017-18; see supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. Keep in mind
that the Tenth Circuit itself did not focus on these factors, but merely relied on persuasive authori-
ty that did consider the factors.
144. The Tenth Circuit did not note these factual differences, leaving open the questions of
whether federal law applies to all riparian land disputes and whether facts involving surveyor error
will be treated differently. Koch, 47 F.3d at 1021 (noting a disagreement in the circuits).
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shoreland' 45 The Sixth Circuit carefully distinguished Moss, Scott, and simi-
lar opinions as dealing with mistakes, omissions, unheeded survey instructions,
and large valuable islands."4 The Court of Claims applied state law by first
applying federal common law, 47 then by interpreting Scott as placing only
navigable river islands in governmental ownership,' " and finally by deciding
to apply state law to non-navigable islands. 49
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have interpreted Scott to mandate the
application of federal law to large or valuable mistakenly omitted islands.5
The Ninth Circuit also left the government intent issue open to a case-by-case
analysis, suggesting that intent to retain possession may be tied to surveyor
error and value of islands.''
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made significant changes in the law
of real property during this survey period. Based on the outcome in Hardage,
parties responsible for cleaning Superfund sites must enlist the EPA's help to
condemn land in conjunction with a cleanup plan. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
protected the individual's ownership of property and also allowed good faith
negotiation failures without entailing the concept of "frustration" of a court
order. Although Mayflower limited an individual's right to compensation for
nonspeculative mineral rights, one may question the stability of this decision
145. Wolff, 967 F.2d at 224; Bourgeois v. United States, 545 F.2d 727, 731 (Ct. CI. 1976).
146. Wolff, 967 F.2d at 225-26 & n.3 (applying state law to both navigable and non-navigable
rivers); see also Wolff, 974 F.2d 702, 704-05 (relitigating the navigability issue by determining
that state law applies to non-navigable rivers, and that land in navigable rivers passed to the state
under the equal footing doctrine); accord Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922) (ap-
plying state law absent intent in grant to keep land); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 452 (1908) (passing "unsurveyed islands and neglected fragments");
Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U.S. 510, 511-12 (1905) (passing unsurveyed island to private land-
owner under state law); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 384 (1891) (applying state law to grants
lacking government reservation).
147. Bourgeois, 545 F.2d at 729-30 (citing Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 320-
21 (1973) as authority that federal law governs federal grants).
148. Id. at 730. The Court of Claims is the only court to interpret Scott in this manner; the
Sixth Circuit expressly rejected this interpretation, holding that state law applies regardless of the
river's navigability. Wolff, 967 F.2d at 226 n.3. The Court of Claims also characterized Oklahoma,
Jordan, and Mitchell as mandating the application of state law only for the beds of non-navigable
streams. Bourgeois, 545 F.2d at 730. The Court of Claims stands alone in this contention as well.
See generally Morgenthaler, supra note 95, at 19-28 (noting "[t]he river [in Scott) is navigable at
the point in question, but the navigability does not affect the application of the principles an-
nounced in the case to non-navigable waters").
149. Bourgeois, 545 F.2d at 731 (citing no authority for its position).
150. Ritter v. Morton, 513 F.2d 942, 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975) (stating
that federal law applies to federal grants, and citing Borax); United States v. Severson, 447 F.2d
631, 634-35 & nn.3-5 (7th Cir. 1971) (citing Scott, 227 U.S. at 242-43) (distinguishing Grand
Rapids, Chandler-Dunbar, and Whitaker as applying state law to valueless islands), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1039 (1972). Both of these cases predate the overruling of Borax by Corvallis. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
151. Ritter v. Morton, 513 F.2d 942, 948 (9th Cir.) (holding that "[w]e emphasize again the
need to view the factual circumstances in their totality"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975). This
Survey intends to reconcile the holdings of the different circuits, but they may simply represent a
circuit split.
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based upon the circuit split and recent Supreme Court dicta affirming the
value of speculative mineral rights. Finally, the government attempted to re-
possess ambiguously granted islands, but Koch supported an individual's own-
ership by applying state law. This outcome may represent a maxim that ap-
plies state law to all disputes, or perhps an implicit reliance on the factor test
that reflects the government's intent to grant the omitted islands. Together,
these cases demonstrate the Tenth Circuit's willingness to protect individual





During the survey period the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided sev-
eral notable cases that indicate new trends in the law of federal taxation. Part I
examines O'Gilvie v. United States,' which discussed the inclusion of punitive
damage awards in gross income, a subject that baffles many courts. In
O'Gilvie, the Tenth Circuit was the first to interpret Commissioner v.
Schleier,2 a recent Supreme Court decision clarifying the issue of punitive
damages.
Several significant decisions in the survey period examined issues relating
to tax liens. Part II analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision in Burrus v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission,3 in which the court considered the relative priori-
ty of state and federal tax liens.' The court failed, however, to consider the
decisions of other federal courts and may have reached an incorrect outcome.
Part III reviews In re CF&I Fabricators, Inc.,' in which the Tenth Circuit
considered the proper characterization of a "tax" imposed on the accumulated
funding deficiency of a pension plan.6 The characterization of this federal lien
as a tax or penalty determined the priority afforded it in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Part IV discusses a third case focusing on federal tax liens. In re LMS
Holding Co.' considered whether the Internal Revenue Service must refile to
perfect a lien against corporate property purchased by another corporation as
part of a liquidation plan.' The case required an analysis of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
In the area of estate and gift tax, Part V examines DePaoli v. Commis-
sioner.9 The court analyzed the validity of a disclaimer and relevant state laws
of intestacy. The DePaoli analysis provides an informative survey of state
intestacy laws.
Finally, Part VI involves a gift revaluation by the IRS and the effect of
below-market interest rates on promissory notes given in exchange for the gift.
In Schusterman v. United States, ° the Tenth Circuit attempted to resolve this
issue, which previously had caused a split in the courts of appeals.
1. 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996)
(Nos. 95-966, 95-977).
2. 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (reiterating the analysis first articulated in United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
3. 59 F.3d 147 (10th Cir. 1995).
4. Burrus, 59 F.3d at 148.
5. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. CL 558 (1995).
6. In re CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d at 1157.
7. 50 F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995).
8. In re LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1527.
9. 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1995).
10. 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995).
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I. THE TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Background
The taxation of punitive damages has a long and troubled history in feder-
al courts." Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) excludes
from gross income amounts received "on account of personal injuries or sick-
ness.""2 Theoretically, punitive damages should be fully taxed as income to
the recipient since they serve no compensatory purpose: they fail to compen-
sate for losses and instead result in a windfall to the injured party. 3 Because
punitive damages are generally related to personal injury or sickness, however,
they often are exempt from taxation. Courts construe the exact language of §
104(a)(2) differently and reach divergent results. 4
Prior to O'Gilvie v. United States" the majority of circuit courts held
that punitive damage awards should be included in gross income and subject
to the federal income tax. 6 While the Supreme Court has ruled on related
issues involving § 104(a)(2), the proper application of these decisions to the
punitive damages dispute remains unclear.
In United States v. Burke, 7 the Supreme Court addressed whether the
settlement of a back pay claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was gross income under § 104(a)(2). 8 In order for § 104(a)(2) to apply, the
Court stated that the taxpayer must show that any award received served to re-
dress a "tort-like personal injury." 9 The Supreme Court held that back pay
11. For a detailed analysis on the taxation of punitive damages, see James Serven, The Taxa-
tion of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays An Egg?, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 215 (1995).
12. Section 104(a)(2) provides:
(a) In general.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) de-
ductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include-...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness ....
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994). Otherwise, subject to additional exceptions, gross income includes "all
income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994).
13. Compensatory damages serve only to make the injured party whole, and, therefore, result
in no income to the taxpayer, while punitive damages "are a windfall to the recipient and as such
should be taxed in full." Serven, supra note 11, at 228-29. Under this "return of capital theory,"
awards that do not result in additional income to the injured party or leave him in a better position
than before, should be exempt from tax. Id.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1992); Wesson v. United States,
48 F.3d 894, 898 (5th Cir. 1995); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696-97 (9th Cir.
1983).
15. 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996)
(Nos. 95-966, 95-977).
16. See, e.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 902; Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228, 235 (Fed.
Cit. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit, howev-
er, recently departed from its sister circuits when it ruled that § 104(a)(2) "does not permit a dis-
tinction between punitive and compensatory damages." Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631
(6th Cir. 1994).
17. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
18. Burke, 504 U.S. at 230.
19. Id. at 237. Unlike lower courts, the Supreme Court made no distinction between physical
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awards were not excludable from gross income because they did not compen-
sate for a "tort-like personal injury."2
Following Burke, a number of appellate courts applied its reasoning to the
issue of punitive damages taxation.2 Only one court, the Sixth Circuit in
Horton v. Commissioner," held that § 104(a)(2) excluded punitive damages
from gross income." Relying on Burke, the Sixth Circuit found that punitive
damages arising from gross negligence resulted from a personal injury and
were excludable from gross income. 4
The Supreme Court recently returned to the punitive damages issue in
Commissioner v. Schleier.2" In Schleier, the taxpayer excluded from gross
income the liquidated damages from a settlement under the Age Discrimina-
tion and Employment Act (ADEA). 6 The Court reiterated the Burke test: not
only must the claim be based on torts or tort-like rights, but it must also be
personal in nature."
B. O'Gilvie v. United States
8
1. Facts
Betty O'Gilvie died of toxic shock syndrome (TSS). 9 Her husband, ad-
ministrator of her estate, sued International Playtex, Inc., who manufactured
the tampons O'Gilvie used when she contracted TSS.3° The Court awarded
the estate actual damages of approximately $1.5 million and punitive damages
of $1.35 million.3' The estate distributed these amounts to the beneficiaries,
including the husband and children, who included the punitive damages in
their gross income and promptly sued for refunds of the taxes they paid.3'
The children received refunds.33 The district court held that in the husband's
and non-physical injuries. Id. at 238. The Court established a new "scope of the remedies" analy-
sis to determine whether "tort-like" rights are involved in the dispute. Id. at 234-37; see also
Serven, supra note 11, at 254-60 (discussing application of the Burke analysis).
20. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241-42.
21. See, e.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 902; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084; Reese, 24 F.3d at 235;
Miller, 914 F.2d at 590.
22. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
23. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
24. Id. at 631-32.
25. 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
26. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2162. The taxpayer, however, did include amounts received as
backpay in his gross income. Id. Clearly, the amounts received as back pay were not on account
of personal injury or sickness. Id. at 2164. Any amounts which might have been received as com-
pensation for some psychological harm, however, may have been entitled to exclusion under §
104(a)(2). Id.
27. Id. at 2167. The Court held that claims under ADEA are not tort-like and, therefore, any
recoveries thereunder are not to be excluded from gross income. Id.
28. 66 F.3d 1550 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996)
(Nos. 95-966, 95-977).




33. Id. Two years later the IRS sued to recover these amounts as erroneous refunds. Id. All
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case, the amounts received as punitive damages were excludable from gross
income.34 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. 5
2. Decision
The court addressed four factors in its analysis.36 First, the title of § 104,
"[c]ompensation for injuries or sickness," suggests that only compensatory
awards are excludable from income.37 Second, the predecessor statute to §
104 implied that unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are not a
return of capital and are income.38 Third, the Tenth Circuit considered the
Supreme Court cases of Burke and Schleier and distinguished them from the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Horton.39 Finally, the court focused on the policy
of narrowly construing any exclusions from income. '
With regard to the third factor, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Horton
court focused solely on the punitive damages claim.4' The Tenth Circuit
found this method erroneous, since Burke required a more thorough analysis
of the situation.42 Thus, the Horton court considered the first part of the
Burke test, but did not address whether the punitive damages were received
"on account of' personal injury. The Tenth Circuit, therefore, found Horton
unpersuasive and proceeded to define "on account of," which the Supreme
Court had failed to do in both Burke and Schleier.43
In interpreting this phrase, the Tenth Circuit followed four other circuits,
holding that punitive damage awards are taxable, and noted that the phrase "on
account of' is susceptible to two interpretations. First, the phrase may describe
a causal relationship in which punitive damages result from injury." Second,
the phrase may describe a causal relationship in which the injury itself deter-
mines the damages.4' The Tenth Circuit looked to the legislative history of §
parties agreed to be bound by the resolution of Kelly's suit. Id.
34. Id. at 1553.
35. Id. at 1560.
36. Other circuits have focused on numerous factors in making a determination as to the
applicability of § 104(a)(2). These factors include: (1) the statutory context and title; (2) the prin-
ciple that exclusions from income should be construed narrowly; (3) the policy and legislative
history of § 104; (4) a Treasury Revenue Ruling addressing this issue; (5) the 1989 amendment to
§ 104(a)(2); and (6) Supreme Court cases discussing § 104 in other contexts. Id. at 1556.
37. Id. at 1558.
38. Id. (agreeing with the Federal Circuit's analysis in Reese, 24 F.3d 228). Other courts
hold that the purpose of § 104 is limited to compensatory damages which make the taxpayer
whole again. Id. Because lost wages awarded due to some physical injury are compensatory and
excluded from income, the court noted that the taxpayer is made "more than whole": if she had
actually worked for those wages they would be taxable income and additional tax would be pay-
able. Id. at 1558-59.
39. Id. at 1556-57.
40. See, e.g., Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163.
41. Horton, 35 F.3d at 361 ("This is the beginning and end of the inquiry."). Id.
42. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1557; see also Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2159 (supporting the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of Burke). Schleier made it clear that Burke should be interpreted as requir-
ing a two-part test: first, whether the injury involved tort-type rights, and second, whether the
damages were received on account of personal injuries. Id. at 2167.
43. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1557.
44. Id. Therefore, punitive damages would be excluded from gross income because ultimate-
ly they are awarded on account of a personal injury. Id.
45. Id. In this case, punitive damages are not excluded because punitive damages are not
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104(a)(2) for the proper interpretation of this clause, particularly its 1989
amendment.' This examination, however, proved inconclusive." Thus, the
Tenth Circuit opted to follow "the default rule that exclusions from income are
narrowly construed," and found for the government. '
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision exemplifies the confusion over punitive dam-
ages taxation. Past congressional attempts to correct the problem have only
compounded the problem, as reflected by the O'Gilvie decision. The Tenth
Circuit's decision does not differ in substance from those of other circuit
courts that have held punitive damages taxable. The decision rejects the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Horton, thereby reaffirming the analyses and outcomes of
the other courts of appeals. O'Glivie is also significant for its application of
the Supreme Court's Schleier decision, as it clarified the applicable tests in
punitive damages analysis.
4. Other Circuits
Since the Tenth Circuit's decision in O'Gilvie, the circuits, with the ex-
ception of the Sixth Circuit, favor subjecting punitive damages awards to
federal taxation by five to one.4
II. STATE TAx LIEN PRIORITY
A. Background
Generally, a state tax lien merits priority in payment over a federal tax
lien if it is perfected, or "choate," before the federal lien comes into exis-
tence." The determination of tax lien priority represents another area of
received based on the injuries, but rather on the unreasonable and outrageous conduct of the de-
fendant. Id.
46. Id. at 1559. The 1989 amendment to § 104(a)(2) provides that the exclusion "shall not
apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical
sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a). Congress's use of the double negative has confused many courts. See
Serven, supra note 11, at 260. There are several interpretations of Congressional intent in enacting
this amendment and three possible results of the amendment. Id. at 262-66. First, punitive damag-
es awarded in connection with non-physical injuries are now taxable while those awarded in con-
nection with physical injuries are tax exempt. Id. at 262-63. Second, punitive damages are always
taxable. Id. at 263-64. Third, Congress only spoke as to the taxability of punitive damages in fully
taxable non-physical injuries and made no decision regarding the taxability of punitive damages
awarded in cases involving physical injuries. Id. at 264-66. The Tenth Circuit stated, "We believe
that using the amendment to interpret Congress' intent in 1954 (or 1918) is a questionable prac-
tice, particularly because of the long lapse of time and because the legislative history of both the
original statute and the amendment are not enlightening." O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1559.
47. O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d at 1560. The court noted that "good reasons tug each way" in refer-
ence to the possible interpretations of the clause based on an analysis of the legislative history. Id.
The Tenth Circuit, however, held that a determination of which interpretation was more correct
was not necessary to decide the outcome of this case. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see, e.g., Wesson, 48 F.3d at 902; Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084; Reese, 24 F.3d at 235;
Miller, 914 F.2d at 590.
50. Burrus v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 59 F.3d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
taxation troubling the Tenth Circuit, as demonstrated by its decision in
McDermott v. Zion First National Bank."
In United States v. City of New Britain,52 the Supreme Court stated that
when a solvent debtor exists, a federal lien is subordinate to any prior perfect-
ed liens." In that case, certain real property was foreclosed by judicial sale,
the proceeds of which were insufficient to satisfy both municipal and federal
liens. 4 The Supreme Court established a three-part "choateness" test to deter-
mine whether a state lien is entitled to priority over a subsequent federal
lien.55 The test states that "when the identity of the lienor, the property sub-
ject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established," the state lien is
choate.56
Subsequent to the New Britain decision, the Tenth Circuit, in T.H. Rogers
Lumber Co. v. Apel," addressed the issue of lien priority between a claim by
the federal government and two mechanics' and materialmen's liens.58 In
T.H. Rogers, a federal claim was perfected prior to the mechanic and
materialmen's liens; however, the mechanics and materialmen had commenced
work on the property to which all liens attached before the federal government
had perfected its lien. 9 The state lien holders argued that their liens related to
the commencement of work and were entitled to priority over the federal
government's claims.' The Tenth Circuit held that liens created under state
law must be "enforceable by summary proceedings [to be] ... specific and
perfected on the date the federal lien was recorded."6 Since the mechanics'
and materialmen's liens were still indefinite (as to amount) and, therefore
Court has often used the "choateness doctrine" to frustrate the priority of state tax liens. Michael
D. McCullogh, Note, When First in Time Is Not First in Right: The Supreme Court Frustrates
Judgment Creditors in United States v. McDermott, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 414 (1994).
51. 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S.
447 (1993); see also James Serven, Taxation, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 1063 (1994); James Serven,
Taxation, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 1037, 1076 (1992); (discussing the Supreme Court and Tenth
Circuit McDermott opinions). In McDermott, the Tenth Circuit held that a prior perfected federal
tax lien did not extend to after-acquired property. McDermott, 945 F.2d at 1481. Predictably, the
Supreme Court reversed. United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447 (1993).
52. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
53. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 87 ("[W]ith no question of insolvency involved ... 'the
first in time is the first in right."'). Id. There is no question that where the debtor or estate is
insolvent a claim of the federal government, whether for taxes or not, is always entitled to priori-
ty. 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (1995).
54. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 82-83. The state liens were for delinquent real estate
taxes and water rent, while the federal taxes secured unpaid federal withholding and unemploy-
ment taxes, as well as unpaid insurance contributions. Id.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id. If the state tax lien is choate when the federal lien is filed, then the state lien is enti-
tled to priority. Id. The Supreme Court further addressed the issues in New Britain and determined
that where a state-created lien is perfected before a federal lien, the federal lien is entitled to prior-
ity with respect to after-acquired property. McDermott, 507 U.S. at 455.
57. 468 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1972).
58. T.H. Rogers, 468 F.2d at 15-16.
59. Id. at 18-19.
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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unperfected at the time the federal lien was perfected, the latter took priori-
ty. .62
B. Burrus v. Oklahoma Tax Commission
63
1. Facts
On October 7, 1986, the Oklahoma Tax Commission filed a tax warrant
against Vernon V. Burrus and his wife for unpaid withholding taxes.' On
March 23, 1989, and November 16, 1989, the IRS assessed penalties against
the Burruses for unpaid taxes. 65 They subsequently sold their house, but the
proceeds were insufficient to satisfy both the state and federal tax claims.'
The IRS acknowledged that the state liens should receive priority for payment,
because the state liens pre-dated those of the federal government, provided the
state liens were choate when filed.67
The Oklahoma State Constitution provides a homestead exemption that
prohibits the attachment or forced sale of a principal residence for the satisfac-
tion of a debt.' Relying on T.H. Rogers, the federal district court added a
new "enforceability" element to the New Britain three part test to determine
the choateness of a nonfederal tax lien.69 The district court held that because
the Oklahoma homestead exemption prevented the state lien from attaching
and becoming enforceable, the state lien was not entitled to priority over the
federal government's claim.7"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that the New Britain test had been satisfied,7
and rejected the district court's imposition of an additional enforceability re-
quirement.72 The Tenth Circuit held that the only additional element that may
62. Id. at 18-19.
63. 59 F.3d 147 (10th Cir. 1995).
64. Burrus v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 850 F. Supp. 963, 964 (W.D. Okla. 1993), rev'd, 59
F.3d 147 (10th Cir. 1995). A similar warrant was recorded with respect to Mr. Burrus's wife on




68. OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, § I(A)(1) (1991). "[Tlhe following property shall be reserved to
every person residing in the state, exempt from the attachment or execution and every other spe-
cies of forced sale for the payment of debts .... The home of such person, provided that such
home is the principal residence of such person .... " Id.
69. Burrus, 850 F. Supp. at 964; see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
70. Burrus, 850 F. Supp. at 965.
71. Burrus, 59 F.3d at 149.
72. Id. In rejecting this approach the Tenth Circuit stated:
[W]e interpret T.H. Rogers to mean not that the lien must be immediately enforceable
by summary proceedings at the time of filing, but rather that at the time of enforcement,
whenever that should occur, a lienholder may satisfy its debt by resort to a summary
proceeding because the lien will be both choate and perfected.
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be necessary in proving choateness or perfection is that the lien must attach to
an "identifiable piece of property.
7 3
The Tenth Circuit then addressed the Oklahoma homestead exemption
which provides that no debt shall "attach" to the debtor's principal
residence.74 Because the Tax Commission's lien could not attach to any iden-
tifiable piece of property, it appeared incapable of becoming choate." The
Tenth Circuit interpreted the word "attachment" in the Oklahoma statute to
mean the physical seizure of a principal residence.76 Therefore, the state lien
could attach to the Burrus's principal residence but could not be executed."
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit decision failed to consider the body of law, rooted in
interpretations of Supreme Court opinions, recognizing the enforceability ele-
ment. Two courts of appeals' decisions have addressed the issue of enforce-
ability of a lien as a prerequisite to choateness." These cases analyzed simi-
lar issues, namely, whether a state tax lien is sufficiently choate and entitled to
priority over an IRS lien. The Third Circuit ruled that choateness requires
enforceability.79 That court refused to rule in favor of the IRS because the
state lien was enforceable."s The Third Circuit relied in part on the federal
district court decisions in T.H. Rogers and Burrus.' The Third Circuit also
relied on several additional federal court decisions, many of them Tenth Cir-
cuit district court opinions. 2 Furthermore, the court cited several United
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. In order for perfection to occur a lien must first attach to identifiable property. With
regard to attachment and perfection, see U.C.C. §§ 9-203 and 9-303 (1995).
76. Burrus, 59 F.3d at 150. The court noted that this is the exact harm the homestead ex-
emption was designed to prevent. Id. The Tenth Circuit found this interpretation consistent with an
earlier decision and a similar Kansas Supreme Court decision. See Tillery v. Parks, 630 F.2d 775
(10th Cir. 1980); Homestead Land Title Co. v. United States, 819 P.2d 660 (Kan. 1991). In Home-
stead, the federal district court transferred the case to the Kansas Supreme Court to determine
whether a lien for unpaid sales taxes could attach to real property despite state homestead exemp-
tion. Homestead Land Title Co. v. United States, No. 90-4116-SAC, 1993 WL 360389, at *3-*4
(D. Kan. Aug. 17, 1993). The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished between the attachment of a
tax lien to the homestead and the ability to force the sale of the homestead. Id. at *2.
77. "[A] properly filed state tax lien does 'attach' to homestead property for purposes of
determining priority ... even though it cannot be enforced at the time of filing." Burrus, 59 F.3d
at 150.
78. Monica Fuel, Inc. v. IRS, 56 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1995); see In re Terwilliger's Ca-
tering Plus, Inc., 911 F.2d 1168, 1176 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
79. Monica Fuel, Inc., 56 F.3d. at 513 ("Choateness only requires that the state have a right
to enforce its lien in a summary fashion.").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 512-13. T.H. Rogers, as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit, only stood for the propo-
sition that a lien must be enforceable at the time of enforcement, not at the time of filing, and of
course, Burrus was reversed by the Tenth Circuit.
82. See Homestead, 1993 WL 360389, at *3; United States v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 642
F. Supp. 8, 9-10 (D. Utah 1983). The former case sent a certified question to the Kansas Supreme
Court, on which the Tenth Circuit relied to reach its decision in Burrus. See supra note 76-77 and
accompanying text. While the federal district court in Homestead recognized that the state sales
taxes in that case could attach to the homestead, it also recognized an enforceability element to es-
tablishing that a state tax lien is choate. Homestead, 1993 WL 360389, at *3. In keeping with this
principle, the district court sent another certified question to the Kansas Supreme Court to deter-
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States Supreme Court decisions implying that the additional enforceability
requirement exists.83
The Sixth Circuit also found enforceability to be a prerequisite to
choateness s4 The Sixth Circuit's decision rested on a parallel Supreme Court
case,8 5 and the Supreme Court's statement that "the choateness rule should be
similar to the rule of priorities established for cases where an insolvent debtor
is subject to a tax lien. 86
The decisions of the Third and Sixth Circuits undermine the Tenth
Circuit's holding. 7 While the interpretation of enforceability remains unclear,
the Supreme Court's statements imply that enforceability should be a require-
ment in determining if the state lien is choate. The Tenth Circuit's abrupt
departure from this interpretation suggests that other courts of appeals are
unlikely to follow.
III. ACCUMULATED FUNDING DEFICIENCIES
A. Background
The Code requires that an employer who maintains a qualified employee
benefit plan must meet minimum funding standards.8 The employer can meet
these standards by ensuring that the qualified plan has accumulated no funding
deficiencies. 9 Failure to meet the minimum funding requirements results in
mine whether the homestead exemption prevented the creditor from foreclosing on its sales tax
lien. Id. at *4. In Jones v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 594 P.2d 162, 166-67 (Kan.
1979), the court found that taxes were excepted from the homestead exemption, and that a forced
sale could begin against a homestead to satisfy a tax lien. Id.; see In re Johnson, 872 P.2d 308,
310-11 (Kan. 1994). Therefore, in Homestead, the sales tax lien would have been entitled to prior-
ity because it was enforceable. With further analysis of the confusing events in Homestead and the
related Kansas Supreme Court cases, the Tenth Circuit may have become aware of the detailed
analysis those courts engaged in and, as a result, the Tenth Circuit may have been persuaded to
rule otherwise. Essentially, in ruling against the enforceability element, the Tenth Circuit relied in
part on a Kansas case which addressed an issue solely for the benefit of a federal district court
which found that the enforceability element existed.
83. Monica Fuel, Inc., 56 F.3d at 512 n.13 (citing McDermott, 507 U.S. at 452 n.5 (ac-
knowledging that the lien therein "was perfected ... in the sense that it was definite as to the
property in question, noncontingent, and summarily enforceable")); United States v. Vermont, 377
U.S. 351, 359 n.12 (1964) (acknowledging that the "municipal liens accorded priority in New Brit-
ain were also characterized as summarily enforceable").
84. "[T]he state lien holder must show that he had the right to enforce the lien at some time
prior to the attachment of the federal lien." Terwilliger's, 911 F.2d at 1176. Note that this decision
barely preceded that of the Tenth Circuit's; therefore, the court may not have had the benefit of
reviewing the Sixth Circuit's opinion.
85. Id. A state lien holder must be able to enforce the lien prior to attachment of the federal
lien. Id. Otherwise, "[n]umerous contingencies might arise that would prevent the attachment lien
from ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and recorded." Id. (quoting United States v.
Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950)).
86. Id.; see supra note 50.
87. Another federal court of appeals addressed this issue and it is reasonable to infer that it
recognizes an enforceability element. See In re Thriftway Auto Rental Corp. v. Herzog, 457 F.2d
409, 414 n.8 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. I.R.C. § 412(a) (1994).
89. Id. In general terms, the accumulated funding deficiency is the amount by which the
charges to the standard funding account exceed the credits to such an account. See id.
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the assessment of a tax equal to ten percent of the deficiency at the end of any
plan year.' Most employers who fail to maintain the minimum funding stan-
dards do so as a consequence of financial hardship.9' This was the case in In
re CF&I Fabricators,92 where the employer failed to meet the minimum
funding standards before petitioning for Chapter 11 reorganization.93
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, excise taxes accruing before bankruptcy
or penalties to compensate for pecuniary losses merit priority payment.94
While the provisions allowing the tax on accumulated funding deficiencies
come under the Internal Revenue Code section "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes,"
that label is not necessarily determinative of the tax's priority in bankrupt-
cy.95 The tax may, in fact, be more adequately described as a penalty. The
tax should be analyzed under a four-part test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
In re Lorber Industries' to determine if it is an excise tax or a penalty.97
The four factors include whether the "tax" is imposed: (1) as an involuntary
monetary burden; (2) pursuant to statutory law; (3) for public purposes; and
(4) under the police or taxing power.98
B. In re CF&I Fabricators99
1. Facts
The debtors filed petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 to reorganize
because of their inability to fund two pension plans."°° The IRS then filed
notice of claims for taxes imposed pursuant to § 4971 and alleged that the
taxes, almost $42 million, merited priority status under § 507 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.'' The debtors argued that these taxes were penalties and
90. I.R.C. § 4971(a) (1994). Additional taxes equal to the amount of the deficiency are im-
posed if the deficiency is not promptly corrected. I.R.C. § 4971(b).
91. In re CF&I Fabricators, 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 558 (1995).
92. CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1156.
93. Id. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to file for bankruptcy without
surrendering all non-exempt assets to creditors. 4 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 20.1, at 3 (6th ed. 1994). Under the automatic stay the debtor receives temporary
relief from creditors while the debtor develops a plan for reorganization and repayment of credi-
tors. Id.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E), (G) (1994). CF&I determined that the priority status afforded
these taxes was located at § 507(a)(7)(E), (G). CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1156. This Survey will refer to
the amended provisions as the texts are virtually identical.
95. "Congress' labeling of [an] exaction as a tax is not determinative of its status for priority
in bankruptcy." CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1157 (quoting In re Cassidy, 983 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir.
1992)).
96. 675 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066.
98. Id. Failing any part of this test leads to a conclusion that the assessment was a penalty
rather than a tax. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
99. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 558 (1995).
100. In re CF&I Fabricators, 148 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 558 (1995).
101. Id. at 335, 337.
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should have been disallowed. 2 The bankruptcy court agreed with the debt-
ors and refused to grant the liens priority status.13
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's findings and its analy-
sis of the § 4971 tax under the four-part Lorber test.0 4 The court reinforced
the doctrine that the label Congress places on an exaction is not determinative
of its status as a tax or penalty. 5 Neither the bankruptcy court nor the Tenth
Circuit presented a detailed analysis of the Lorber test. Therefore, the applica-
tion of the facts in this case to that test is provided below.
3. Analysis
The imposition of the tax in CF&I resulted from an obligation to which
the debtors did not consent; therefore, it meets the first part of the Lorber test
because it was an involuntary monetary burden."° The tax also fulfills the
second part of the Lorber test because it was imposed pursuant to the Internal
Revenue Code. With regard to the third part of the test, however, the tax
serves no benefit, such as defraying governmental expenses, to the public. 7
The tax merely serves to insure the adequacy of funding certain employee
benefit plans. The bankruptcy court noted that affording the § 4971 tax priori-
ty would result in additional harm to the individuals that the tax was designed
to protect." Finding that the § 4971 tax could not meet the requirements of
the Lorber test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax was neither a penalty
nor entitled to priority status."
102. Id. Additionally, the debtors came to an agreement with the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) to terminate one plan, after which the PBGC would act as successor trustee
of the plan and become liable for benefits to plan participants. Id. at 336. The debtors objected to
many of the taxes, claiming that the plan of reorganization or direction of the bankruptcy court
prevented the payment of funds to the plan. Id. Therefore, the debtors claimed that it was ineq-
uitable for the IRS to continue assessing taxes for the accumulated funding deficiency. Id. The
bankruptcy court, as well as the Tenth Circuit, addressed additional claims of equitable subordi-
nation in this case. Id.; CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1158. Although beyond the scope of this Survey, the
issue of equitable subordination is perhaps the most important issue in this case and was the rea-
son a petition for certiorari has been granted. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that a nonpecuniary loss
tax penalty claim could be equitably subordinated to the claims of general unsecured creditors. Id.
at 1159. The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in light of Congress's express intention to
provide priority to tax penalties. In re First Truck Lines, Inc., 48 F.3d 210, 212 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 558 (1995). Both circuits held that it was reasonable to allow the bankruptcy
court to exercise its discretion in order to ensure fair treatment and an equitable result. Id. at 218;
CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1159.
103. In re CF&I Fabricators, 148 B.R. at 343.
104. CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1158.
105. See supra note 95.
106. See In re Farmers Frozen Food Co., 221 F. Supp. 385, 387 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
107. Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066.
108. CF&I, 148 B.R. at 339. Affording the IRS's claims priority would be at the expense of
unsecured pre-petition creditors which include the members of the pension plans themselves. Id.
The IRS acknowledged that if the court accepted the Lorber analysis, this third prong of the test
could not be met. Id. at 338. With regard to the last part of the Lorber test, the § 4971 tax was
clearly imposed pursuant to the federal government's taxing or police powers.
109. CF&I, 53 F.3d at 1158. The legislative history of § 4971 further substantiates this hold-
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4. Other Circuits
The Sixth Circuit was the only other circuit court to treat the issue pre-
sented in CF&I."° The Sixth Circuit relied on Congress's label of § 4971 as
an excise tax as dispositive"' and refused to consider the Lorber test."2 It
rejected the holding that labels are not determinative as to whether a lien is a
tax or a penalty and concluded that federal courts do not have unlimited li-
cense to challenge Congress's designation of certain taxes."3
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits interpreted the priority status afforded §
4941 exactions, albeit in reference to a different code section." 4 They con-
sidered whether, for bankruptcy purposes, a court may look beyond Congress's
characterization of an exaction. Both circuits held that the characterization of §
4941 exactions as a tax would contradict the very notion of fairness and public
policy against punishing innocent creditors. "'
At least one commentator has stated that it was unfortunate that the Su-
preme Court did not resolve the circuit split."6 In light of recent Supreme
Court decisions favoring the plain meaning rule,"7 many courts confronting
this issue will likely side with the Sixth Circuit's decision. In light of Tenth
Circuit precedent, however, CF&I was correctly decided and should remain
the law until the Supreme Court confronts this issue.
IV. PERFECTION OF FEDERAL TAx LIENS
A. Background
When a taxpayer fails to pay assessed taxes, the tax due becomes a lien
"upon all property and rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer."' Gen-
erally, the lien is not perfected and enforceable against third parties until no-
tice has been properly filed pursuant to state law.' The Bankruptcy Code
ing: "The [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] provides new and more effective penalties
where employers fail to meet funding standards .... [T]he bill places the obligation for funding
and the penalty for underfunding on the person to whom it belongs-namely, the employer." H.R.
REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong, 2d Sess. 25 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4694 (em-
phasis added).
110. In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1092 (1992).
111. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1062.
112. Id. at 1057. The bankruptcy court in that case applied the four-part test and found that
the § 4971 exaction failed the third prong of the test. In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 80 B.R.
395, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
113. Mansfield Tire, 942 F.2d at 1059-60.
114. See In re Kline, 547 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1977) (adopting the reasoning of the district
court); In re Unified Control Sys., 586 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978). Section 4941 imposes a "tax"
for self-dealing between a taxpayer and an exempt foundation. See David L. Kwass, Note, Excise
Taxes in Bankruptcy: United States v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. Holds Congress to Its Word,
12 VA. TAx REv. 513, 522 (1993).
115. Kline, 586 F.2d at 1038; Unified Control Sys., 586 F.2d at 1037-38.
116. Kwass, supra note 114, at 523.
117. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
118. I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).
119. I.R.C. § 6323(a), (f) (1994). Subsection (f) provides that state law determines the proper
place for filing, although the subsection does provide some default rules. I.R.C. § 6323(f). Every
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provides that a trustee may avoid any unperfected statutory lien against a
"bona fide purchaser... whether or not such purchaser exists."2 Federal
law looks to the law of the applicable state to determine the rights of a bona
fide purchaser.'
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) grants priority to claims of lien
creditors over the claims of unperfected secured creditors.'22 The U.C.C. also
states that a filing of notice continues to be effective against the attached
collateral even upon transfer of the property.1
23
B. In re LMS Holding Co. 2
1. Facts
On January 25, 1988, the IRS perfected its lien against property held by
MAKO, Inc., a corporation which subsequently filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 1 .25 Retail Marketing Corp. (RMC) acquired the property, subject
to a tax lien, pursuant to the corporation's reorganization plan.'26 After the
transfer occurred, the IRS, with full knowledge of the transaction, chose not to
file notice of the tax lien against RMC.2 7 RMC then filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11."2 The bankruptcy court held that the IRS's failure to file
notice of the lien against RMC entitled the trustee to avoid the lien.'29 As a
state within the Tenth Circuit, with the exception of Utah, has enacted the Uniform Federal Lien
Registration Act, which provides that notices of liens on real property are filed in the office of the
county clerk where the property is located, while liens on personal property are generally to be
filed with the state's secretary of state (where the taxpayer is a corporation). See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-25-102(l)(b), (2)(a) (Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2614(b), (c)(1) (1989); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-1-1(A), (B) (Michie 1995) (liens on personal property are filed in the county
where the taxpayer resides); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 3403(B), (C)(1) (1992) (liens on personal
property are filed in Oklahoma County); WYO. STAT. § 29-6-204(b), (c)(i) (Supp. 1995). Utah
provides that all federal liens are to be filed in the county in which the property subject to the lien
is located. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-6-1 (1994).
Generally, such notice must at least provide the identity of the taxpayer, the tax liability
under which the lien arose, and the date of the assessment. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) (as
amended in 1994). Federal tax liens need not describe the property attached since the obligation
becomes a lien on all property of the taxpayer. In re LMS Holding Co., 50 F.3d 1526, 1530 (10th
Cir. 1995).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1994).
121. See e.g., In re McClaim, 447 F.2d 241, 243-44 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
918 (1972) (holding that the priority of the trustee is determined pursuant to the law of the state in
which the property is located).
122. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b), (3) (1995) (providing that generally "an unperfected security inter-
est is subordinate to the rights of... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected").
123. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1995). The official comments state that no new filing is necessary in
this case. Id. official cmt. 8. "[Any person searching the condition of ownership of a debtor must
make inquiry as to the debtor's source of title, and must search in the name of a former owner if
circumstances seem to require it." Id.
124. 50 F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995).
125. United States v. LMS Holding Co., 161 B.R. 1020, 1021 (N.D. Okla. 1993), rev'd, 50
F.3d 1526 (10th Cir. 1995).
126. Id. RMC also agreed to assume all liabilities of MAKO. LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1526.
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result, the IRS held an unsecured claim. 3 ° The district court affirmed, hold-
ing that the IRS had knowledge of the transfer of assets and was required to
file notice of the lien in the name of RMC.'
31
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that where the identity of a debtor has
truly changed, no new filing is necessary. 3 2 The transfer to RMC was not
merely a change in the debtor's identity, but rather a change to an unrelated
third party. 3 3 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit noted that RMC's assumption
of MAKO's tax liability did not justify characterizing RMC as the taxpayer in
this matter.'34 The Tenth Circuit's decision hinged on its interpretation of
U.C.C. § 9-402(7), which provides that the security interest in collateral con-
tinues to be effective even after the collateral is transferred to another par-
ty. 33 As a result, the IRS's lien continued to be effective against the proper-
ty purchased by RMC. The Tenth Circuit reversed the findings of the bank-
ruptcy and district courts.'36 The court also stated that the IRS was not enti-




The Tenth Circuit correctly decided that this was not a case of a debtor
name change but rather a complete transfer of assets to another entity. While
the U.C.C. states that a prior lien remains effective against the transferred
property, it makes no reference to extending that lien to additional property of
the acquiring party. It would not be surprising if this case came about as the
result of an IRS error in filing a financing statement and the agency's woeful
attempt to correct an inexcusable mistake.
V. FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAX DISCLAIMERS
A. Background
Taxes are based on the value of a decedent's estate.'38 In arriving at the
net taxable value of a decedent's estate, the value of all property transferred to
a surviving spouse is deducted from the gross estate.'39 Testamentary trans-
fers, such as a bequest pursuant to the decedent's will, may be disclaimed by
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1023.
132. LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1528. The IRS relied on two cases where federal courts held
that a new filing was not necessary in the case of a name change of the debtor. Id. (citing Davis
v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 446 (C.D. I11. 1989); United States v. Clark, 81-1 T.C.M. (CCH)
9406 (S.D. Fla. 1981)).
133. Id. at 1528-29.
134. Id. RMC simply remains the transferee in this situation, not the taxpayer. Id.
135. For a further discussion of § 9-402(7), see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. LMS Holding, 50 F.3d at 1530.
137. Id.
138. I.R.C. § 2001 (1994).
139. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1994).
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the recipient and such property will transfer pursuant to state law."4 If a re-
cipient of a testamentary transfer disclaims such interest and the property
transfers pursuant to state law to the surviving spouse, the estate is entitled to
deduct the transfer in arriving at the net taxable estate. 4'
A disclaimer is valid if it meets four requirements. The disclaimer must:
(1) be in writing; (2) be received by the transferor or his personal representa-
tive within certain time constraints; (3) be made by a person who receives no
interests or benefits of the property; and (4) pass such interest without direc-
tion on the part of the person making the disclaimer.'42
In the Tenth Circuit, a disclaimed interest passes as though the person
making the disclaimer predeceased the decedent. 43 The states generally man-
date that when the devisee or legatee is related to the testator and is treated as
if having predeceased the testator, all issue of the devisee or legatee take in
place of that individual.'"
B. DePaoli v. Commissioner
45
1. Facts
Quinto DePaoli, Sr. died, leaving his entire estate to his son Quinto
DePaoli, Jr."4 The son and Soila, Quinto Sr.'s wife, sought to have the pro-
bated will set aside so that the property would instead transfer to the moth-
er. 47 The son agreed to accept $600,000 from the estate in return for his de-
cision not to contest the will.' The federal tax return for the estate indicated
140. See Estate of Bennett v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 42, 67 (1993). For code provisions
discussing disclaimer, see I.R.C. §§ 2046, 2518 (1994).
141. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-l(b) (as amended in 1986) (qualifying the transfer for the sur-
viving spouse deduction).
142. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (emphasis added). If the formal requirements of § 2518 are met, the
transferred property is treated not as if the property passed from the transferor to the disclaimant
then to the ultimate taker, but instead as if the property passed directly from the transferor to the
ultimate taker. Grayson M.P. McCouch, Timely Disclaimers and Taxable Transfers, 47 U. MIAMi
L. REV. 1043, 1057 (1993). As a result, only one gift or estate tax is imposed rather than two
separate taxes on two transfers. Id. The resulting transfer closely resembles a power of appoint-
ment, the major difference being § 2518's formal requirements. Id. The two methods of transfer,
however, reach strikingly different results. While the use of a disclaimer results in no additional
tax, a power of appointment often results in additional taxes. Id. at 1057-58; see also I.R.C. §§
2038, 2041 (1994). Some commentators have suggested that disclaimers should be treated as
taxable transfers to achieve a more consistent outcome, simplify taxation, and end the problems
associated with determining if disclaimers meet the requirements of § 2518. Joan B. Ellsworth, On
Disclaimers: Let's Renounce I.R.C. Section 2518, 38 VILL. L. REV. 693, 775 (1993).
143. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-801(4)(a) (Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2293(a)
(1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-801(D) (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 26 (1990); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-801(3) (1993); WYO. STAT. § 2-1-404(a)(ii) (1980 & Supp. 1995). Wyoming
is the only state providing that the interest will pass as if the disclaimant predeceased the decedent
only if the disclaimant is a residuary beneficiary. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-404 (a)(ii).
144. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-603(2)(a) (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615(a) (1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-603 (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 142 (1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-605 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 2-6-106 (1980).
145. 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. Depaoli, 62 F.3d at 1260.
147. Id.
148. Id. The $600,000 represents the maximum amount Quinto Sr. could have transferred to
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that the entire estate, less the $600,000 transferred to the son, passed to Soila
and thus qualified for the surviving spouse deduction. 9 He alleged that he
made a qualified disclaimer in which he directed that the property disclaimed
be transferred to Soila.'5 The Commissioner denied the marital deduction
arguing: (1) that the probated will bequeathed everything to the son; (2) that
the disclaimer was invalid due to the son's direction of the property to his
mother; and (3) that as a result of the invalid disclaimer, he was liable for gift
tax on the property transferred to his mother. 5' Quinto Sr.'s personal repre-
sentative and the son alleged that the disclaimer was valid because the proper-
ty would have passed to Soila in accordance with state law even without the
son's direction. 5 2 The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held the disclaim-
er invalid.'53
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit focused on whether the son's interest would have
passed, under state law, to Soila or his issue. The son had two illegitimate
children.' 54 Under New Mexico law, an illegitimate child is considered the
issue of the father if the father has signed a writing that the child is the
father's heir. 5 The Tax Court concluded that since the son included his two
illegitimate children as dependents on his tax return, this writing was sufficient
to meet the statutory requirements.'56 Thus, his interest would have passed to
his sons, rather than Soila, without his direction.'57 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, concluded that the Code's definition of "son" is broader than that of the
New Mexico probate code.'58 The court held that the tax returns were not
signed with the intent of recognizing the illegitimate children as his issue. 9
Under this interpretation, the disclaimed interest would have passed to Soila
pursuant to New Mexico law even without the son's direction, since the ille-
gitimate sons did not qualify as his issue."' Thus, the disclaimer was valid
under § 2518(b) of the Code. 6'
his son without his estate incurring any tax liability. I.R.C. § 6018 (1994). As a result, the tax-
payer claimed the entire estate would not be subject to tax since all $600,000 qualified for the
marital deduction and the remaining $600,000 was exempt from tax.
149. DePaoli, 62 F.3d at 1260. The return failed to indicate that the property transferred to
Soila as a result of a qualified disclaimer. Id.
150. Id. at 1260, 1266.
151. Id. at 1260-61.
152. Id. at 1261.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1262.
155. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109(B)(2) (Michie 1995).
156. DePaoli, 62 F.3d at 1263.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1264.
160. Id. at 1265.
161. Id. at 1265. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the only issue involving I.R.C. §
2518(b) before them was whether the disclaimer was invalid due to the son's direction of the




The Tenth Circuit's decision reflects the importance of examining state
intestacy and property laws when considering the federal estate tax. Congress,
by enacting the marital deduction, evidenced its intent that transfers of prop-
erty as a result of death should not be subject to tax. While the disclaimer in
this case was invalid, the ultimate transfer of property in DePaoli was of the
nature of those specifically deemed exempt from tax by Congress.
VI. THE GiFr TAx: SAFE HARBOR RATES Do NOT APPLY TO BELOW-
MARKEr LOANS
A. Background
A federal gift tax is imposed on the transfer of any property by gift.'62
The gift tax affects more than purely gratuitous transfers. For example, it can
apply to a sale or exchange of property where the fair market value of the
property transferred exceeds the value of the consideration given in
exchange.'63 It follows that when a taxpayer gives property in exchange for a
promissory note, gift taxes may be imposed to the extent that the fair market
value of the property transferred exceeds the fair market value of the note
received in exchange. In assessing the fair market value of a promissory note,
the IRS considers the face value of the note, the stated interest rate, the ap-
propriate market rate of interest, and the term of the note. 64
Under I.R.C. § 483, the holder of an installment contract which contains
"total unstated interest" may be forced to recognize payments representing
principal under contract terms as interest for income tax purposes.63 Section
483 serves to prevent the avoidance of income taxes, whereby payments re-
ceived under an installment contract are payments of principal which may be
taxed as a capital gain rather than payments of interest taxed as ordinary in-
come."6 Under this provision, the interest rate applied by the government in
assessing fair market value of the installment contract is a published rate regu-
larly determined by the Secretary of the Treasury.'67 If the sum of the pay-
ments of principal received under the installment contract terms exceeds the
present value of such principal payments and interest discounted at the rate
determined by the Secretary, the contract contains unstated interest.'
6
8
162. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1994).
163. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1994); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); see also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992) (excluding transactions made in the ordinary course
of business from this provision).
164. Blackburn v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 204, 207 (1953).
165. I.R.C. § 483(a) (1994).
166. Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d 986, 990 (10th Cir. 1995). For a complete dis-
cussion of Schusterman, see infra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
167. I.R.C. § 483(b) (1994); I.R.C. § 1274(d) (1994). The version of § 483 in place at the
time the Schusterman trusts were created provided that the interest rates were determined by the
Secretary. See Schusterman, 63 F.3d at 989. The amended version simply refers one to § 1274 for
determination of the applicable rate rather than to the regulations. I.R.C. § 483(b).
168. I.R.C. § 483(b).
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Portions of payments received must be recharacterized: from payments of
principal to payments of interest."6 If the terms of the installment contract
provide for an interest rate equal to or greater than the rate determined by the
Secretary, no recharacterization would be necessary. 7 '
In Schusterman, the Tenth Circuit decided whether § 483 applied to the
gift tax provisions of the Code. The two circuits that had previously addressed
this issue had reached conflicting conclusions. In Ballard v. Commissioner,7'
the taxpayer argued that the provisions of § 483 applied to all provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code.'72 Thus, a taxpayer complying with the safe har-
bor rate provisions should not suffer a penalty by the imposition of gift taxes
where the safe harbor rate falls below the prevailing market rate of
interest.'73 The Seventh Circuit in Ballard ruled in favor of the taxpayer.'74
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals ruled otherwise when presented with a
similar argument.'75 Agreeing that § 483 applied to the entire Internal Reve-
nue Code, the Eight Circuit concurred with the tax court's determination that
"nothing in the language of § 483... indicates that this section has anything
to do with valuation."'
76
B. Schusterman v. United States 7'
1. Facts
The taxpayers, Charles and Lynn Schusterman, transferred stock to five
irrevocable trusts in exchange for promissory notes in the principal amount of
the fair market value of the stock, $7,954,046.178 The notes provided for in-
terest at a rate of six percent, which is the safe harbor rate as provided by §
483 and the appropriate treasury regulation.'79 The prevailing market interest
rate at that time was eleven and one-half percent. 80 Counsel advised the tax-
payers to set the interest rates of the promissory notes equal to the safe harbor
rate provided by § 483 to avoid the imposition of any gift taxes by the
IRS. '8 The IRS informed them that § 483 did not preclude the assessment
169. Id.
170. "In sum, I.R.C. § 483 prevents a seller of property under an installment contract for sale
or exchange of property from converting ordinary income (interest) into capital gains (principal)."
Schusterman, 63 F.3d at 990. The court continued: "The interest rate set by regulation is known as
the 'safe harbor' rate because a contract for the sale or exchange of property that employs the
interest rate will by definition never contain 'total unstated interest."' Id.
171. 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988).
172. Ballard, 854 F.2d at 187. Mrs. Ballard must have been relying on the prefatory language
of § 483 which states, "For purposes of this title ... [this provision applies to] the sale or ex-
change of any property." I.R.C. § 483(a)(1) (emphasis added). The word "title" refers to Title 26
of the United States Code, more commonly known as the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
173. Ballard, 854 F.2d at 187.
174. Id. at 189.
175. Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072
(1991).
176. Id. (quoting Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 887, 890 (1990)).
177. 63 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 1995).






of gift taxes in this situation and taxed the difference between the value of the
stock transferred and the present value of the notes, discounted at the prevail-
ing eleven and one-half percent market interest rate.' The taxpayers paid
the gift taxes and then sued for a refund."3 The district court agreed with the
findings of the Eight Circuit in Krabbenhoft and held in favor of the IRS." 4
2. Decision
Like the federal district court, the Tenth Circuit sided with the Eight
Circuit's holding in Krabbenhoft. While recognizing that § 483 applies to all
provisions of the Code, the Tenth Circuit agreed that it is irrelevant for pur-
poses of gift tax valuation.8 5 The court stated that while the safe harbor rate
protects taxpayers from recharacterization of income under § 483, there were
no indications that "the safe harbor rate insulates a taxpayer from the adverse
gift tax effects of § 2512. '86
3. Analysis
An examination of the purpose of § 483 leads to the conclusion that the
Tenth Circuit reached the correct decision. Section 483 serves only to insure
that payments received under an installment sale or promissory note are cor-
rectly characterized, and is solely concerned with the income tax consequences
of such a transaction. Had the promissory notes in Schusterman provided for
interest at five percent, § 483 would take effect, recharacterizing payments of
principal to payments of interest but would have no bearing on valuation.
Since the stated interest rate of the promissory notes met the safe harbor rate,
§ 483 would have no income tax consequences.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit continues to apply established tests in reaching well-
reasoned conclusions to issues involving federal taxation. Generally, the court
appears to favor erring on the side of the taxpayer unless the law conclusively
holds to the contrary. While this is an admirable approach to the tax laws, it
seems lead to muddy analysis, as applied in Burrus, where the area of federal
tax liens remains a thorn in the Tenth Circuit's side.
Steven M. Weiser
182. Id. This resulted in gift taxes owed of $1,157,127.72. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 988-89.




THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, September 1994 through September 1995, the Tenth
Circuit decided eleven noteworthy cases involving sentencing in federal courts.
In each of these decisions, the Tenth Circuit addressed issues of first impres-
sion involving the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).' This
Survey contains nine sections.
Part I provides a brief background and history of the Guidelines. Part II
discusses the Guidelines application. The remaining Parts (III through IV) sur-
vey Tenth Circuit decisions on the following sentencing guideline issues: (1)
what conduct a sentencing court may review in making sentencing determina-
tions; (2) how a sentencing court should apply sentencing enhancements for
crimes involving "special skill" or "sophisticated means"; 2 (3) when the
Guidelines limit a sentencing court's discretion to impose a concurrent sen-
tence prior to an undischarged prison term; 3 (4) whether a court must apply a
sentence consecutive to a state prison term when a defendant committed the
offense while on release or when a defendant used firearms, piercing ammuni-
tion, or explosives in committing the crime;4 (5) under what circumstances a
court should apply a sentence enhancement for an offender's misrepresentation
that she was acting on behalf of a charitable organization;5 (6) whether the
commencement of trial precludes sentence reductions for substantial assis-
tance;6 and (7) whether placing a juvenile under the custody of the state Sec-
retary of Social and Rehabilitation Services constitutes a "confinement" for
sentence reduction purposes.7
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Sentencing Commission (Commission)8 promulgated
the United States Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to the Sentence Reform Act
1. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
2. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.3, 2Tl.3(b)(2).
3. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.3(b)-(c).
4. See U.S.S.G. § 2.11.7 (Commission of an Offense While on Release); id. § 2K2.4 (Use of
Firearm, Armor-piercing Ammunition, or Explosive, During or in Relation to, Certain Crimes).
5. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A).
6. See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)(l)-(2).
7. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).
8. "The United States Sentencing Commission ('Commission') is an independent agency in
the judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members," three of
whom must be federal judges. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(l), intro, comment.; 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994).
The Commission is charged with "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the federal
criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed Guidelines
prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." U.S.S.G. Ch.1,
Pt.A(I), intro, comment.
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of 1984 (SRA). 9 The SRA charged the Commission to develop determinant
sentencing guidelines that further four "basic purposes of criminal punishment:
incapacitation, deterrence, just punishment, and rehabilitation."'"
The Guidelines represent the culmination of a reform movement aimed at
achieving honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing." Congress
sought honesty by curbing the broad sentencing discretion that accompanied
the previous indeterminate sentencing system. 2 That system resulted in the
imposition of indeterminate sentences, and allowed the parole commission to
determine the actual time served. 3 The Guidelines attain uniformity by em-
bracing a "real-offense model" that bases punishment decisions on a
defendant's actual conduct rather than on the conviction offense. 4 This mod-
el attempts to curb sentencing disparity for "similarly situated offenders."' 5
Finally, Congress realized proportionality by establishing different sentences
for differently situated offenders according to the relative seriousness of their
conduct. 6
The Guidelines apply to all federal offenses committed on or after the
effective date of November 1, 1987.7 They employ a sophisticated array of
empirical, quasi-mathematical formulas for calculating sentences."8 With the
passage of the Guidelines, Congress abolished parole, thereby requiring that
convicts actually serve the sentences imposed by the court, less a permissible
good behavior reduction of approximately fifteen percent."
9. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, was passed as Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976, 1987-2040 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
10. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(2), intro, comment. (The Statutory Mission).
11. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.) (The Basic Approach).
12. See id.; David A. Hoffman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation
Rights, 42 DUKE L.J. 382, 387-88 (1992); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 92-93 (1973) (criticizing the indeterminate sentencing system for its "reha-
bilitative" objective).
13. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.).
14. For a general discussion about the choice to embrace a real-offense-based model as
opposed to a conviction-based scheme, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988); Ilene H.
Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 883, 925-27 (1990). Through the real-offense mechanism, the Commission
sought to prevent prosecutors from "circumventing" the Guidelines by charge bargaining. See
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 278-79 (1989).
15. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro. comment. (p.s.).
16. Id.
17. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3372; U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(2), intro. comment. For an analysis of applying sentencing proce-
dures to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, see James L. Slear, Project, Twentieth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1989-
90, 79 GEO. L.J. 591, 1162-71 (1991).
18. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.); cf Note, An Argument for Confrontation
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992) (arguing that judges
retain discretion even under the Guidelines because Congress left intact informal procedures for
gathering "facts relevant to sentencing").
19. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(3), intro, comment. (p.s.).
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II. APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES2"
The Guidelines consist of a sentencing scheme centered around a 258-cell
grid, or "Sentencing Table."'2 Each box contains the presumptive sentencing
range, also known as a "heartland": a "set of typical cases embodying the
conduct that each guideline describes. '2  The sentencing matrix consists of
two axes. An offender's offense level forms the vertical axis and ranges from
a low of one to a high of forty-three. 23 An offender's criminal history forms
the horizontal axis and ranges in severity from category level I to VI.
24
Before calculating the applicable sentence under the Guidelines, a judge
must first determine the "sentencing range" using this sentencing matrix.25 To
determine the sentencing range, judges must: (1) establish the vertical axis;26
(2) establish the horizontal axis;27 and (3) plot the vertical and horizontal axis
lines on the sentencing matrix. 28 After determining the sentencing range,
judges have limited discretion to consider statutorily permissible departures
from the sentencing guideline matrix. 29 Federal law prohibits judges from
imposing prison terms that vary from the sentencing guideline matrix more
than twenty-five percent or six months, whichever is greater.3" Thus, offend-
ers with similar criminal histories, convicted of the same crime under similar
circumstances, will receive fairly uniform sentences.
A. Establishing the Vertical Guideline Axis
Section 1BI.1 of the Guidelines sets forth the steps used in establishing
the vertical axis value, or offense level.3' Establishing the offense level re-
quires consideration of not only conduct constituting an element of the offense
charged, but also the totality of the "relevant" criminal conduct.3 2 As defined
by section 1B1.3, "relevant conduct" includes all "acts and omissions commit-
ted, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the
20. See generally U.S.S.G. Ch.1 (providing a mission statement and philosophical, historical,
and other background information); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 388-90 (using a money laundering
hypothetical to illustrate the application of the Guidelines).
21. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A (Sentencing Table), reprinted infra app. 1.
22. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(4)(b), intro, comment. (p.s.). The Guidelines require the judge to
impose a sentence within this range unless the court finds an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind (or to a degree) not adequately considered by the Commission. Id.
23. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1); see supra note 21.
24. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1); see supra note 21.
25. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1); see supra note 21.
26. U.S.S.G. § IB1.1(a)-(e) (Application Guidelines); see infra notes 31-67 and accompany-
ing text.
27. U.S.S.G. § 11l.l(f); see infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
28. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.l(g); see infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
29. U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.l(i); see infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994); U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A(2), intro, comment.
31. U.S.S.G. § lBl.l(a)-(e).
32. U.S.S.G. § IB1.3 (Relevant Conduct) (listing "factors that determine the guideline
range"); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (backg'd.) (explaining the difference between the
breadth of information relevant in determining the guideline range and that relevant in determining
the ultimate sentence under § 1B1.4).
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offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of at-
tempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that-offense" and any harm
caused thereby.3 The scope of "relevant conduct" in a "jointly undertaken
criminal activity,"34 for example, is very broad and includes "all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertak-
en criminal activity.
35
To establish the vertical guideline axis within this broad definitional pa-
rameter, judges must first locate the base offense level from the appropriate
guideline in Chapter Two and apply any relevant offense-specific and
nonoffense-specific adjustments.36 A judge then gives these classifications
numerical weight and applies them to the vertical grid axis.33
1. The Base Offense Level
Each statutorily defined federal offense corresponds to one of forty-three
base offense levels.3 To find the corresponding level for a specific offense, a
judge must find the applicable "offense guideline section" from Chapter Two
of the Guidelines using the Statutory Index in Appendix A.39 The offense
guideline section gives the base offense level for the offense.' For example,
burglary, an offense covered by section 2B2.1, has a base offense level of
seventeen if the offender burglarizes a residence but only twelve if the bur-
glary involves a structure other than a residence.4
2. Offense-Specific Adjustments to the Base Offense Level
Each offense guideline section in Chapter Two may contain specific of-
fense characteristics that adjust the base offense level upward or downward.42
For example, the specific offense characteristics for burglary include: (1) an
offender used "more than minimal planning" (two-level increase); (2) the loss
exceeded $2,500 (one- to eight-level increase); (3) an offender stole a "fire-
arm, destructive device, or controlled substance" (one-level increase); and (4)
33. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(l)-(2).
34. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
35. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.3, comment. (n.2(c)) (providing examples of "jointly under-
taken" conduct for which an offender may be accountable).
36. See U.S.S.G. § IBI.1(a)-(e) (Application Instructions); U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.2(b) (Applicable
Guidelines) (directing sentencing judge to consult § I B 1.3 when determining the applicable guide-
line range); see also U.S.S.G. § IBl.1, comment. (n.1(l)) (including "relevant conduct," as defined
in § 1B1.3 in the definition of "offense," unless otherwise stated or apparent from the context).
37. See U.S.S.G. § lBl.1(g) (instructing sentencing judge on how to plot the vertical and
horizontal axes on the matrix); U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1).
38. See supra note 21.
39. U.S.S.G. § 1B.l(a); see U.S.S.G. App. A. Each guideline section may cover multiple
statutes, while a single statute may reference multiple guideline sections. U.S.S.G. App. A., intro.
comment. The introductory commentary to the Statutory Index explains how to determine the
correct guideline section when a statute corresponds to multiple guidelines. Id.
40. U.S.S.G. § lB.1(a).
41. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(a). Specific adjustments for nominal loss value over $2500 vary from
one to eight levels as the amount increases. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1(b)(2).
42. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(b); see also U.S.S.G. § IB1.2, comment. (nn.2-4) (directing a court to




an offender possessed a dangerous weapon during the offense (two-level in-
crease).43
3. Non-offense-Specific Adjustments to the Base Offense Level
Chapter Three describes non-offense-specific characteristics that may war-
rant upward or downward adjustments." Part A prescribes victim-related ad-
justments for cases where the victim was especially vulnerable,45 or had an
official status,' where an offender physically restrained a victim,47 or where
an offense could constitute a hate crimei5 Parts B and C contain adjustments
for an offender's role in the offense. 9 The Guidelines increase the sentence if
an offender had a significant role in an offense," or abused a position of
trust or used special skill." If the offender was an "insignificant participant"
in the offense, Part B directs the judge to reduce the offense level. 2 Part C
provides sentencing enhancements for offenders who: (1) "willfully obstruct-
ed... or attempted to obstruct... the administration of justice during the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the ... offense";53 or (2) "reck-
lessly create[d] a substantial [threat] of serious bodily injury to another person




For sentencing on multiple counts, the Commission created Chapter Three,
Part D, which provides incremental sentence enhancements for "significant
additional criminal conduct."55 Section 3D1.1 outlines the requisite procedure
for calculating a single combined offense level which encompasses multiple
offenses committed by one offender. 6 The most serious offense determines
43. U.S.S.G. § 2B2.1 Specific offense characteristics for nominal loss value include the
following adjustments: (A) $2,500 or less, no increase; (B) more than $2,500, add 1 point; (C)
more than $10,000, add 2 points; (D) more than $50,000, add 3 points; (E) more than $250,000,
add 4 points; (F) more than $800,000, add 5 points; (G) more than $1,500,000, add 6 points; (H)
more than $2,500,000, add 7 points; and (I) more than $5,000,000, add 8 points.
44. See U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.A, intro, comment. (providing that section 3A.1 adjustments are
nonoffense-specific and may apply to a wide variety of offenses); U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a) (declaring
Chapter Three adjustments relevant in determining the guideline range).
45. U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l(b) (establishing a two-level enhancement for offenders who "knew or
should have known that a victim ... was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental
condition, or... otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct").
46. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 (providing for three-level enhancement for offenses against govern-
ment officers or employees or their family members, and for offenses involving an assault on a
law enforcement officer).
47. U.S.S.G. § 3AI.3 (providing for a two-level enhancement).
48. See U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l(a) (establishing a three-level enhancement for crimes motivated by
the victim's actual or perceived class status).
49. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.B, intro. comment. (instructing a trial court to determine an offender's
role on the basis of all relevant conduct within the scope of § I B 1.3).
50. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (providing sentence enhancements for an offender's role as organizer
or leader in crimes committed by multiple offenders).
51. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (providing a two-level enhancement for offenders who abused a posi-
tion of trust or used a special skill "in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission ...
of the offense").
52. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (providing reductions for offenders who had a minimal or minor role
in the offense).
53. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.L (establishing a two-level enhancement).
54. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (establishing a two-level enhancement).
55. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.D, intro, comment.
56. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.! (instructing a sentencing judge to group closely related counts pursuant
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the basis for establishing the base offense level,57 and additional counts in-
crease the offense level."
Section 3D1.2 mandates "grouping" of offenses charged in multiple-count
indictments when the offenses "involve substantially the same harm." 9 Sec-
tion 3D1.3 treats "grouped" offenses as a single combined offense for deter-
mining the applicable sentencing range.' The range for each group will cor-
respond either to the offense level of the most serious offense or to the range
determined by the combined total of Chapter Two and Chapter Three adjust-
ments for the "aggregate" criminal conduct for all offenses.6' For example,
under section (a), counts are "grouped" if they "involve the same victim and
the same act or transaction." '62 Therefore, if a defendant kidnaps a victim and
assaults the victim during the kidnapping, the counts of kidnapping and assault
are grouped for sentencing purposes.63
A sentencing judge then makes a final adjustment to the offense level
depending on the offender's acceptance of responsibility for the offense.'
Section 3El.1(a) provides a two-level sentence reduction for offenders who
"clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility."6 Section 3E1.l(b) pro-
vides an additional one-level reduction for offenders who also assist the au-
thorities in the investigation or prosection. 6' Offenders qualify for these addi-
tional reductions either by providing timely notice of an intention to enter a
guilty plea or by timely disclosure of all relevant information pertaining to
their role in the offense.67
to § 3D1.2 and then determine the offense level applicable to each group under § 3D1.3-.4).
57. U.S.S.G. Ch.3, Pt.D, intro, comment.
58. Id.
59. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Counts involve substantially the same harm:
When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction.
(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connect-
ed by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.
When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense character-
istic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts.
When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or
loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate
harm ....
Id.
60. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3.
61. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a) (prescribing use of the count creating the highest offense level
as the offense level for counts grouped under § 3D1.2(a)-(c)); U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(b) (prescribing
use of the offense level determined by the offender's behavior as a whole as the offense level for
counts grouped under § 3D1.2(d)).
62. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a).
63. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, comment. (n.3(l)).
64. U.S.S.G. § 3El.I (Acceptance of Responsibility).
65. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). Examples of an offender demonstrating acceptance of responsibility
include: "truthfully admitting" the crime; "voluntary payment of restitution" before trial; prompt
and "voluntary surrender to authorities"; "voluntary assistance to authorities" in recovering contra-
band; "voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of the of-
fense"; and "post-offense rehabilitative efforts." U.S.S.G. § 3El.l, comment. (n.1).




B. Establishing the Horizontal Guideline Axis
Section 4Al.1 of Chapter Four ("Criminal History and Criminal Liveli-
hood") provides instructions on determining the offender's criminal history
category.' An offender receives points for each prior sentence.' The longer
the sentence, the more points a defendant receives."0 Generally, a defendant
receives three points for each prior sentence of more than thirteen months; two
points for each sentence between sixty days and thirteen months; and one
point for all other prior sentences." A judge calculates the criminal history
category by identifying an offender's prior sentences, assigning each a numeri-
cal value, and totalling the values. 2 Factors that affect the weight given to
each prior sentence in computing the total include: the defendant's age at
sentencing; 73 the type of crime;74 the similarity of the past crime to the cur-
rent crime; 5 whether the offender is a career offender; 6 whether the offend-
er is an armed career offender;77 and whether the offender "committed an of-
fense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood.'
'
7
After totalling the points to determine the proper criminal history category, 9
a judge may further enhance the sentence if the offender committed the instant
offense during the period of a prior sentence, during an escape, or within two
years of release from incarceration. 0
C. Plotting the Vertical and Horizontal Axis Lines on the Sentencing Matrix
A sentencing judge applies the sentencing matrix to calculate the appropri-
ate guideline range.8 ' The intersection of the offense level on the vertical axis
and the criminal history category on the horizontal axis identifies the applica-
ble sentencing range in "months of imprisonment."'" For certain categories of
offenses and offenders, Chapter Five of the Guidelines permits the court to
68. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.I.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. The Guidelines exclude or limit certain prior convictions from a trial court's
sentencing determination, for example: "sentence[s] imposed more than ten years prior to the
defendant's commencement of the instant offense" and "adult or juvenile sentence[sl imposed for
an offense committed prior to the defendant's eighteenth birthday" occurring five years prior to
the defendant's commencement of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4Ail, comment. (nn.1-3);
U.S.S.G. § 4AI.2(d)-(e). See generally U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 (instructing the trial judge on how to
compute criminal history).
72. U.S.S.G. § 4AI.1, comment; U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.3). Ranges for the six
criminal history categories are as follows: category i, 0-1 points; category II, 2-3 points; category
III, 4-6 points; category IV, 7-9 points; category V, 10-12 points; and category VI, 13 or more
points. See U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A (Sentencing Table), reprinted infra app. 1.
73. See U.S.S.G. § 4Ai.2(d).
74. See U.S.S.G. § 4Al.2(b).
75. U.S.S.G. § 4A.lI, comment. (backg'd) (n.6).
76. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1..
77. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.
78. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.3.
79. Id.
80. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.i(d)-(e).
81. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.l(f)-(g).
82. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, comment. (n.1).
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impose either imprisonment, probation, restitution, or some other sanction or
combination of sanctions. 3
D. Determining Applicable Departures from the Sentencing Guideline Matrix
Section 5K2.0 permits departures from the presumptive range in excep-
tional circumstances. 4 The Guidelines authorize departures only if a judge
finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Com-
mission in formulating the guidelines."85 To decide whether the Commission
adequately considered a circumstance, a judge must rely entirely on "the sen-
tencing Guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Com-
mission."" Chapter 5, Part K, identifies several factors the Commission ex-
pressly identified as grounds for departure from the Guidelines, including: a
defendant's "unusually heinous, cruel or brutal conduct" toward the victim;"
an offender's substantial assistance in the prosecution of others;88 an offender
who created or threatened the harm that the criminal statute sought to pre-
vent;89 and highly provocative behavior by a victim.'
Part H further delineates a list of "specific offender characteristics" which
may justify a departure from the Guidelines' prescribed sentencing range.9'
Specific offender characteristics include an offender's advanced age92 or "ex-
traordinary physical impairment." '9 The Commission warned, however, that
these characteristics are rarely relevant in establishing a sentence outside the
applicable guideline range.94 Moreover, the Guidelines expressly prevent a
sentencing judge from considering the offender's "race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, socioeconomic status," '95 or "disadvantaged upbringing."
83. U.S.S.G. § lB1.1(h) (instructing sentencing court to consider the sentencing options
delineated in Chapter Five, Parts B through G); see U.S.S.G. §§ 5Bi.1, 5Dl.i, 5Ei.i, 5FL.i (list-
ing, respectively, circumstances in which a court can impose probation, supervised release, resti-
tution, and other "sentencing options").
84. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (Grounds for Departure).
85. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
87. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8, p.s.
88. U.S.S.G. § 5KI.1, p.s.
89. U.S.S.G. § 5D2.11, p.s.
90. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. Other bases for a sentencing departure include: refusal to assist au-
thorities, § 5KI.2, p.s.; abduction or restraint of a victim, § 5K2.4, p.s.; use of weapons or danger-
ous instrumentalities, § 5K2.6, p.s.; disruption of a governmental function, § 5K2.7, p.s.; conceal-
ment of a prior offense by committing an additional offense, § 5K2.9, p.s.; commission of the
offense under coercion or duress, § 5K2.12, p.s.; diminished mental capacity, § 5K2.13, p.s.; com-
mission of the offense posed a "significant" risk to public health or welfare, § 5K2.14, p.s.; volun-
tary admission and disclosure of the offense to authorities, § 5K2.16, p.s.; or the offense resulted
in death, § 5K2.1, p.s., serious bodily injury, § 5K2.2, p.s., extreme psychological injury, § 5K2.3,
p.s., or extreme property loss, § 5K2.5, p.s.
91. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1-. 11, p.s. (providing policy statements outlining 11 "specific offend-
er characteristics" that may justify a departure from the prescribed guideline range).
92. U.S.S.G. § 5HI.1, p.s. (justifying a sentence departure when an offender is "elderly and
infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as
and less costly than incarceration").
93. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s.
94. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.H, intro, comment.
95. U.S.S.G. § 5HI.10, p.s.
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The Guidelines do not authorize any departure in the absence of suffi-
ciently "atypical circumstances or characteristics" that warrant divergence from
the required sentencing range.97 The Sentencing Commission, while not fore-
closing the possibility of an atypical circumstance, specifically stated that such
circumstances are "extremely rare." 9 A judge's dissatisfaction with the man-
datory sentencing range or preference for an unauthorized sentence are inap-
propriate bases for departing from the Guidelines.'
III. DECISIONS LIMITING THE SCOPE OF CONDUCT REVIEWABLE IN MAKING
SENTENCING DETERMINATIONS
A. United States v. Warner"°
1. Facts
Warner received a sentence for unlawful machine gun possession.'
During the initial sentencing, the trial court improperly allowed a downward
departure under the "sporting and collection" exception in section
2K2.1(b)(2).' ° The Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for de
novo resentencing."3 On resentencing, the trial court allowed a section
5K2.0 downward departure."° The trial court justified the downward depar-
ture, in part, because the defendant had already successfully completed a reha-
bilitation program and a six-month period of home confinement. 5
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's resentencing determination,
concluding that it was impermissible to consider evidence of conduct occur-
ring after initial sentencing."° Instead, in making de novo resentencing deter-
minations, the trial court may consider only those factors arising out of evi-
dence that the court could have heard at the original sentencing hearing. 7
In Warner, the government asked the court to extend the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits' rationales in United States v. Apple'" and United States v. Gomez-
Padilla,"° which held that trial courts cannot consider post-sentencing
96. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.12, p.s.
97. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 43 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 1994).
101. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1336; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994).
102. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1340; see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2).
103. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1336.
104. Id. Section 5K2.0 permits departures in exceptional circumstances. See supra text accom-
panying notes 84-96 (discussing § 5K2.0).
105. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1336-37. The court also believed that the "unshootable" collectable
nature of the gun qualified the defendant for the "lesser harms" departure in § 5K2. 11. Id.
106. Id. at 1336-37, 1340.
107. Id. at 1340.
108. 962 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992).
109. 972 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1992); see Warner, 43 F.3d at 1340 (distinguishing Apple and
Gomez-Padilla).
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conduct upon a limited remand for resentencing."' The Warner court distin-
guished Apple and Gomez-Padilla because those cases did not involve fully de
novo resentencing."'
B. United States v. Gacnik"2
1. Facts
Three defendants pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture explosive
materials without a license." '3 Defendants Gade and Sandoval manufactured
aluminum flash powder, and then sold the volatile explosive to juveniles."4
Gade was in custody for an unrelated charge when law enforcement offi-
cials received information that he was manufacturing explosives." 5 The offi-
cers obtained a search warrant and returned to Gade's residence to search for
the explosives." 6 Meanwhile, unaware of the impending search, defendants
Sandoval and Gacnik had concealed the explosive materials." 7 As a result,
the district court enhanced Gacnik's conspiracy offense level by two points for
obstructing the investigation, pursuant to section 3C1.1." 8
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit overturned the trial court's decision to apply section
3C1.1 by looking to the section's plain language. Section 3C1.1 articulates a
two-part "nexus requirement": the obstructive conduct must "relate to the
offense of conviction" and occur during the investigation.' The Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that "obstructive conduct undertaken prior to the investiga-
tion ... [or] prior to any indication of an impending investigation ... does
not fulfill this nexus requirement. ' '120
The court expressly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding in United
States v. Dortch,'2 ' which read section 3C1.1 more broadly.' 2  The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that the "offense of conviction may not be what initially
attracts police attention," and that an act intended to conceal the "instant of-
fense," even when the offender is aware only of an investigation into another
offense, meets section 3C1.1 requirements.'
23
110. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1339; Gomez-Padilla, 972 F.2d at 285-86; Apple, 962 F.2d at 336.
111. Warner, 43 F.3d at 1340.
112. 50 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1995).
113. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 850; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).




118. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (mandating that "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice during the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense," a judge must "increase the offense level by two
levels").
119. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852.
120. Id.
121. 923 F.2d 629 (Sth Cir. 1991).
122. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852; see Dortch, 923 F.2d at 632.
123. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852; see Dortch, 923 F.2d at 632.
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According to the Tenth Circuit, the Eight Circuit overlooked the plain
language of section 3C1,1 which provides a sentence enhancement for "will-
ful" obstructive conduct pertaining to "the investigation ... of the instant
offense."'24 Obstructing an investigation into an unrelated offense does not
sufficiently relate to the "instant offense" and therefore does not warrant a
section 3C1.1 sentencing enhancement. 5 The record must demonstrate that
the offender possessed actual knowledge of a possible investigation into the
instant offense to fulfill the section 3C1.1 nexus requirement.
2 6
C. Analysis
The requirement of proof of actual knowledge presents a difficult standard
for prosecutors, Moreover, facilitating investigations into criminal conduct and
the subsequent apprehension of the offender appear to be the underlying pur-
poses of section 3C 1.1. Obstructive conduct not motivated by knowledge of a
pending investigation will thwart investigative efforts just as obstructive con-
duct initiated by an offender's knowledge of the investigation.
27
Cumulatively, Warner and Gacnik clarify the parameters for the types of
conduct a sentencing court may examine in making sentencing determinations.
Post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct no longer justifies a reduced sentence.
This outcome removes an incentive for an offender subject to de novo
resentencing to engage in post-sentencing rehabilitative conduct. Despite this
probable outcome, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Warner is consistent with
decisions of the Fourth Circuit
2
2 and the Eighth Circuit. 29
IV. DECISIONS APPLYING SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS IN SECTIONS 3B1.3 3 °
AND 2T1.1(B)(2) T'
A. United States v. Gandy1
3 2
1. Facts
Gandy, a licensed podiatrist, pleaded guilty to falsifying health insurance
claims. 33 The trial court applied a two-level sentence enhancement under
section 3B1.3 because Gandy used his special skill as a podiatrist to falsify
124. Gacnik, 50 F.3d at 852 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.l).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. The author acknowledges, however, that some could argue that "willful" requires knowl-
edge that the conduct will thwart any potential effort to investigate the offender's crime, but not
that the offender actually knew that the investigation has been initiated.
128. United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir. 1993).
129. United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992).
130. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).
131. U.S.S.G. 2Tl.l(b)(2) (Tax Evasion; Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information,
or Pay Tax; Fraudulent or False Returns, Statements, or Other Documents) ("If sophisticated
means were used to impede discovery of the existence or extent of the offense, increase by 2
levels.").
132. 36 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 1994).
133. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 913; see 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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Medicare forms for various reimbursable procedures he did not perform. 34
Gandy appealed the enhancement.'35
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit applied a two-part test to determine the applicability of
the special skill enhancement under section 3B1.3. The offender must "possess
a special skill," and must actually employ the special skill to "significantly
facilitate the commission or concealment of his offense."'136 The court noted
that the commentary to section 3B1.3 defines "special skill" as "a skill not
possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial
education, training or licensing. ' 33 Additionally, the section lists physicians
among its examples of persons with special skill along with "pilots, law-
yers, . . accountants, chemists, and demolition experts.'f3 Gandy did not
dispute that his podiatry license qualified as a "special skill," so the first part
of the test was undisputed.'39 However, section 3B1.3 also requires that the
offender use that special skill to "significantly facilitate the commission or
concealment of the offense.""
Because the Guidelines fail to define "facilitate," the Tenth Circuit relied
upon the common definition of the word: to "make easier."'' The Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the trial court failed to adequately determine whether Gandy
actually employed his skill as a podiatrist to make the crime of Medicare fraud
easier.'42 The trial court therefore had an insufficient factual basis to justify
an enhancement under section 3B1.3.43
B. United States v. Rice'"
1. Facts
Rice, a certified public accountant, was convicted of making false claims
for income tax refunds and filing false income tax returns. 45 Rice used vari-
ous Subchapter S corporations in order to facilitate a "complicated scheme of
134. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 913. Section 3B1.3 provides in part:
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special
skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
offense, increase by 2 levels. This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust
or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
135. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 914.
136. Id. at 915.
137. Id. at 914 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.2)).
138. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.2)).
139. Id. at 915.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 914 (citing United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1510, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The
D.C. Circuit adopted its definition from WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 410 (5th ed.
1977). Young, 932 F.2d at 1513.
142. Gandy, 36 F.3d at 915.
143. Id.
144. 52 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 1995).
145. Rice, 52 F.3d at 844; see 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994); 26 U.S.C. § 7206(l) (1994).
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tax fraud."'" The trial court calculated Rice's sentence using both section
2T1.1 (Tax Evasion) and section 2F1.1 (Fraud or Deceit), and each calculation
resulted in the same total adjusted offense level. 47 The total adjusted offense
level included enhancements under three guideline provisions: section
3B1.3,' providing an enhancement for use of a "special skill"; section
2Tl.1(b)(2), 49 providing an enhancement for using "sophisticated means" in
tax evasion crimes; and section 2FI.I(b)(2)(A), 5 ° providing an enhancement




Relying on the two-part test established in Gandy,' the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's application of section 3B1.3 for the defendant's
use of a special skill.'53 Rice's status as an accountant satisfied step one of
the Gandy inquiry, since the Commission specifically listed accountants as
persons possessing a special skill.'54 As for the second step, the trial court
failed to make specific factual findings regarding how Rice used his certified
public accounting skills to facilitate tax evasion.' Nonetheless, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the record, taken as a whole, demonstrated that Rice's
actions satisfied the second step of the Gandy inquiry.'56
The Tenth Circuit then examined the applicability of the sophisticated
means enhancement. The commentary to section 2T1.l(b)(2) defines "sophis-
ticated means" as "conduct that is more complex or demonstrates greater intri-
cacy or planning than a routine tax evasion case."'57 Because the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that Rice's fraud was the "functional equivalent" of simply claiming
excessive itemized deductions, the court held that the tax evasion scheme did
not constitute "sophisticated means."'58 To categorize this conduct as sophis-
ticated, the court reasoned, would require sentencing courts to apply section
2Tl.l(b)(2) to virtually every fraudulent tax return scheme.'59 The Tenth Cir-
cuit determined that the Guidelines did not contemplate this result."6°
146. Rice, 52 F.3d at 844.
147. Id.
148. See U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3.
149. See U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.1(b)(2).
150. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.I(b)(2)(A).
151. Rice, 52 F.3d 848-50. For a general discussion on sentencing guidelines for multiple
counts, see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the two-prong test set forth in Gandy, see supra text accompanying
note 136.
153. Rice, 52 F.3d at 850.
154. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.2)).
1.55. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 849; see U.S.S.G. § 2TI.I, comment. (n.4).
158. Rice, 52 F.3d at 849. The court relied on examples in the commentary to § 2Tl.1 sug-
gesting that a proper "sophisticated means" enhancement requires a level of sophistication associ-
ated with the utilization of offshore bank accounts or transactions through corporate shells for tax-
evasion purposes. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.1, comment. (n.4).
159. Rice, 52 F.3d at 849.
160. Id.
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether the district court's application
of the special skill enhancement, along with either the "sophisticated means"
or "more than minimal planning" enhancements, constituted "impermissible
double counting."' 6 The court concluded that each provision served a dis-
tinct purpose.'62 Criminals who use their special talents to commit even the
simplest of crimes deserve an upward adjustment under the special skill en-
hancement.'63 In contrast, the "sophisticated means" and "more than minimal
planning" enhancements are intended to punish offenders who use complex
criminal schemes."6 Therefore, the simultaneous application of the special
skill enhancement along with one of the other two enhancements did not con-
stitute impermissible double counting.'65
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's determination that the sophisticated means enhance-
ment and the special skills enhancement did not constitute impermissible dou-
ble counting is somewhat problematic. An offender who engages in a sophisti-
cated criminal scheme most likely possesses a special skill acquired through
specialized education, experience, or self-teaching. An expansive interpretation
of "special skill" would encompass the common burglar who through experi-
ence and self-teaching acquired a particular skill for breaking and entering.
While the Tenth Circuit's adoption of such an expansive view is unlikely, the
Gandy decision supports this conclusion.
V. DECISIONS IMPOSING A CONCURRENT SENTENCE ON A DEFENDANT
SUBJECT TO GUIDELINE SECTIONS 5G1.3(B)'
66 AND 5G1.3(c) 167
A. United States v. Johnson"6
1. Facts
Oklahoma officials arrested Johnson for driving a stolen vehicle."6
While confined in county jail, Johnson and another prisoner escaped and were
recaptured.71 Johnson pleaded guilty to operating a stolen vehicle and eight
161. Id. at 850. The court had defined "impermissible double counting" as using the same
conduct to support separate sentencing enhancements having identical purposes. Id. at 850-51
(citing United States v. Flinn, 18 F.3d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1994)).
162. Id. at 851.
163. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, comment. (backg'd.).
164. Rice, 52 F.3d at 851; see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2T.l, comment. (n.4).
165. Rice, 52 F.3d at 851.
166. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).
167. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), p.s. (providing that in cases not covered by subsections (a) and (b),
"the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment
for the instant offense").
168. 40 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 1994).
169. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1080. The escapees fired a volley of gunshots and tossed numerous
incendiary devices at state officials during their escape. Id.
170. Id.
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escape-related state law violations. 7 ' He received various state sentences and
the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. 7 1 Johnson also
pleaded guilty to two federal law violations,'" and the trial court ordered the
federal sentence to begin upon completion of the state sentence.
74
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that section 5G1.3(b) limits the court's tradition-
ally broad discretion in sentencing defendants.'75 When the offense in ques-
tion is committed during a term of imprisonment, subsection (a) requires con-
secutive sentencing. Conversely, subsection (b) requires a concurrent sen-
tence when subsection (a) does not apply and the court fully considers the
conduct underlying the undischarged term of imprisonment.'77
Johnson argued that because the presentence report fully detailed the
conduct underlying the undischarged state-related escape sentence, section
5G1.3(b) required the district court to impose a concurrent sentence.' The
Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and concluded that section 5G1.3(b) ap-
plies when an offender is prosecuted in both state and federal court for the
same criminal conduct or for different criminal transactions that constitute part
of the same course of conduct.'79
The other issue examined by the Tenth Circuit in Johnson involved the
trial court's departure from the methodology for applying section
5G1.3(c).' The commentary to section 5G1.3(c) instructs the trial court to
establish the total punishment for all the prior and instant offenses as if section
5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) applied.'' Thus, the




174. Id. at 1082.
175. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). This subsection provides:
If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted
from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the of-
fense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed
to run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.
Id.
176. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a).
177. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).
178. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1082-83.
179. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.2).
180. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083-84. Subsection (c) permits the trial imposition of a concurrent,
partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence prior to the undischarged term of imprisonment "[t]o
the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the offense." U.S.S.G. §
5G1.3(c).
181. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083. Application note (3) states:
To the extent practicable, the court should consider a reasonable incremental
penalty to be a sentence for the instant offense that results in a combined sentence of
imprisonment that approximates the total punishment that would have been imposed
under § 5GI.2 ... had all the offenses been federal offenses for which sentences were
being imposed at the same time.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.3).
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offense." ' This should result in a combined sentence that approximates the
total punishment in accordance with section 5G1.2 had all offenses been feder-
al offenses.8 3 Following the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in United States v.
Haney,"4 the Tenth Circuit in Johnson relied upon the methodology in the
commentary to section 5G1.3(c) to interpret and explain how courts should
apply this provision. 5
The Tenth Circuit determined that although the trial court should consider
subsection (c) in imposing a sentence, a court may depart from the methodolo-
gy.8 6 The Commission itself recognized that sometimes the comprehensive
application of subsection (c) would be "impracticable."'8 7 Certain factors,
such as insufficient information about prior offenses, warrant a sentencing
court's discretion. 88 In such circumstances, a trial court may employ a sim-
pler sentencing determination method that constitutes the "functional equiva-
lent of more complex computations."'8 9 In other words, the court may make
rough estimates.
A trial court departing from the analysis required by section 5G1.3(c),
however, must state its reasons for doing so."'" In Johnson, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the trial court impermissibly departed from the methodology of
section 5G1.3(c) and failed to justify such a departure.' 9 '
B. United States v. Yates
92
1. Facts
Charles Yates pleaded guilty to abusive sexual contact with a minor on an
Indian Reservation. 93 The trial court sentenced Yates to seven years of con-
finement with an additional three-year period of supervised release.' 94 Yates
appealed the sentence, and the Tenth Circuit remanded for resentencing.
95
While the resentencing was pending, Yates received an eighteen-year state
court sentence for two counts of criminal sexual penetration and one count of
kidnapping."'
182. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083.
183. Id.
184. 23 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 253 (1994).
185. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1083. This determination is also consistent with the Sixth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Coleman, 15 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a trial court should
employ the methodology set forth in the commentary of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) to determine whether
a consecutive sentence results in a reasonable incremental punishment).
186. Johnson, 40 F.3d at 1084.
187. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3, comment. (n.3) (providing a list of factors for courts to con-
sider in order to "achieve a reasonable punishment").




192. 58 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1995).






On resentencing the trial court applied section 5G1.3(c) and ordered the
federal sentence to run consecutively with the state term of imprisonment,
amounting to a total of twenty-five years of imprisonment.'97 Yates appealed
on the grounds that the section 5G1.3 application methodology provides for a
seventeen to twenty-one year total combined sentence for the analogous feder-
al offense levels under section 2A1.3.19s
Yates asserted that since the eighteen-year state sentence fell within this
sentencing range, an additional seven years of consecutive imprisonment was
unnecessary for a reasonable incremental punishment under section
5G1.3(c).' 99 The trial court determined that Yates did not qualify for a con-
current sentence under section 5G1.3(c).2° Assuming good time credits, the
court reasoned, Yates would effectively serve a only nine to twelve years of
state imprisonment, rendering his total combined sentence to approximately
twenty-two years in length."'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that in applying section 5G1.3(c), courts may
consider the actual term of a state sentence rather than the nominal state sen-
tence.0 2 This is only permissible, however, if a trial court can reliably de-
termine the real or effective term of state imprisonment.2 3 A sentencing
judge must make a factual determination on the basis of the available evidence
and provide rational explanations for that determination.2 4 In Yates, the re-
cord did not support the trial court's assumption that the real or effective term
of the defendant's sentence would constitute only twelve years.25 The Tenth
Circuit noted that application note three in the Guidelines indicates that a lack
of information concerning an offender's prior state offense prevents an accu-
rate estimate of the total sentence required by the Guidelines.2" Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentencing decision and remanded the matter for
resentencing.2 °7
197. Id. Section 5G1.3(c) mandates that a trial court impose a consecutive sentence for the
instant offense prior to the undischarged term of imprisonment to the "extent necessary to achieve
a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3(c), p.s. If the trial
court can achieve a reasonable incremental punishment by imposing a concurrent sentence with
the remainder of an unexpired term of imprisonment, a consecutive sentence is not warranted. See
U.S.S.G. § 5GI.3(c), p.s. (permitting concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive sentences to
achieve "reasonable incremental punishment").
198. Yates, 58 F.3d at 544.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 546-47.
202. Id. at 548-49.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 549.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 544; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), comment. (n.3); see also United States v. Hunter, 993
F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 1993) (Ryan, J., concurring) (setting forth examples when application of
the methodology is impracticable and stating that a trial court should calculate an offender's sen-
tence under section 5G1.3(c) only to the "extent practicable" and in a manner that does not "undu-
ly complicate or prolong the sentencing process").
207. Yates, 58 F.3d at 550.
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C. Analysis
In establishing the section 5G1.3(c) methodology, the Sentencing Com-
mission anticipated the complexity of applying this provision. 8 This com-
plexity, however, does not justify a trial court's refusal to consider subsection
(c)'s methodological implications.2 °"
The Yates and Johnson decisions exemplify not only the complexity and
arbitrariness of applying section 5G1.3(a)-(c), but also the Tenth Circuit's
reliance on the commentary to the Guidelines and the underlying congressional
goals. The Tenth Circuit also relied heavily on other circuits to verify the
accuracy of their sentencing guideline interpretations.
In Yates, the Tenth Circuit required the trial court to determine reasonable
incremental punishment based on a preponderance of the evidence."' The
Tenth Circuit reiterated the holding of the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Brewer,2 ' that a trial court must make more than a mere educated guess in
determining the "likely" real or effective term of imprisonment."' The trial
court must determine the reasonableness of the incremental punishment pur-
suant to section 5G1.3(c) upon establishing the real or effective sentence.2 3
While no specific criteria exist for making this determination, the trial court
must state its findings and explain its rationale for determining the reasonable-
ness of the incremental punishment.2 4
VI. DECISIONS ADDRESSING WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF GUIDELINE
SECTIONS 2J1.725 AND 2K2.4216 REQUIRE THE SENTENCING COURT TO
IMPOSE ENHANCED SENTENCES CONSECUTIVELY TO A STATE IMPRISONMENT
TERM
A. United States v. McCary
2 17
1. Facts
An Oklahoma state court sentenced Tommy McCary to 211 months for
possession of and intent to distribute methamphetamine.2 8 McCary also re-
ceived a forty-six month federal sentence for possession of a firearm while a
208. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.5).
209. Id.
210. Yates, 58 F.3d at 549.
211. 23 F.3d 1317 (8th Cir. 1994).
212. Brewer, 23 F.3d at 1319.
213. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.
214. Id.
215. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 (Commission of Offense While on Release) ("If an enhancement under
18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, add three levels to the offense level for the offense committed while on
release as if this section were a specific offense characteristic contained in the offense guide-
line ...."). Id.
216. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 (Use of Firearm, Armor-Piercing Ammunition, or Explosive During or
in Relation to Certain Crimes) ("In each case, the statute requires a term of imprisonment imposed
under this section to run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment."). Id.
217. 58 F.3d 521 (10th Cir. 1995).
218. McCary, 58 F.3d at 522.
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fugitive of justice,2 9 and for knowing possession of a stolen vehicle that had
crossed state lines.220
On remand, the trial court imposed a seventeen-month enhancement pur-
suant to section 2J1.7, which applies 18 U.S.C. § 3147 (Penalty for an Offense
Committed While on Release).2 2' The trial court ordered the enhancement to
run consecutively with the federal charges and concurrently with the 211-
month state court sentence.222
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit vacated the trial court's sentencing decision and re-
manded the matter for resentencing.223 Section 3147 requires trial courts to
impose an additional sentence of not more than ten years upon a person con-
victed of an offense while released on another federal charge.24 The appli-
cation notes of section 2J1.7 clarify that § 3147 mandates imprisonment in
addition to the sentence for the underlying offense. 225 The notes also require
that the additional sentence "run consecutively to any other sentence of
imprisonment. '226
The Tenth Circuit held that the phrase "any other sentence of imprison-
ment" clearly encompasses the state court sentence. 227 The trial court there-
fore erred in failing to order the § 3147 enhancement to run consecutively to
the 21 1-month state court sentence.228
The Tenth Circuit's plain language interpretation is consistent with the
holdings of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Lincoln229 and the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Galliano.23° In United States v. Wilson,3 the
Seventh Circuit also held that a trial court must impose a § 3147 enhancement
consecutively to a state sentence.232
219. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2) (1994).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2313(a) (1994).
221. McCary, 58 F.3d at 522.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 525.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1) (1994).
225. U.S.S.G. § 2.11.7, comment. (n.2) ("Under 18 U.S.C. § 3147, a sentence of imprisonment
must be imposed in addition to the sentence for the underlying offense, and the sentence of im-
prisonment imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 must run consecutively to any other sentence of
imprisonment.").
226. Id.
227. McCary, 58 F.3d at 524.
228. Id.
229. 956 F.2d 1465, 1473-74 & n.8 (8th Cir.) (holding that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147
(1988), an offender may not serve a term of such an enhancement concurrently to any other term
of imprisonment), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 891 (1992).
230. 977 F.2d 1350, 1351 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 966 (1993).
231. 966 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1992).
232. Wilson, 966 F.2d at 248.
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B. United States v. Gonzales2 3
1. Facts
Defendants Gonzales, Perez, Hernandez-Diaz, and Leon all received sen-
tences ranging from 120 to 147 months for various drug charges, including the
"use of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)."' Each offender also received state sentences stemming from the
same incidents.235 For each offender, the trial court imposed a five-year sen-
tence enhancement under section 2K2.4, which in turn applies 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1). 36 The enhanced sentences were to run consecutively with both the
federal and state sentences.2" The defendants, except Leon, appealed, charg-
ing that the trial court erred in ordering the federal sentence under § 924(c) to
run consecutively with the state offenses.238
A provision in § 924(c) requires the imposition of an additional five-year
consecutive sentence for persons possessing a firearm "during a crime of
violence or a drug trafficking offense." '239 The application notes of section
2K2.4 provide that under § 924(c)(1), a trial court must impose the additional




The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court, although it noted that the trial
court's decision was consistent with every circuit that previously had consid-
ered the issue.2 41' The Tenth Circuit recognized two possible interpretations
for the phrase "any other term of imprisonment."242 The literal interpretation
of the phrase encompasses both federal and state sentences.243 Alternatively,
a court could read the phrase to apply only to federal sentences, excluding any
consideration of state imposed sentences in applying 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
21
Adopting the latter view, the Gonzales court relied upon the stated con-
gressional purpose of § 924(c). 45 The Gonzales court stated that an offender
initially sentenced in state court and serving the state court sentence cannot
possibly serve a subsequently imposed federal sentence under § 924(c) prior to
the preexisting state sentence."
233. 65 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1995).
234. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 817.
235. Id.
236. Id. For the text of § 2K2.4, comment. (n.1), see supra note 216.
237. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 817.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 820.
240. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, comment. (n.1).
241. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 819.
242. Id. at 820.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 313-14 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492 (including a Senate report that reads in part that a defendant must serve
the additional sentence prior to the beginning of the sentence for any other offense).
246. Gonzales, 65 F.3d at 820. It is implausible to suggest that an offender can serve a federal
sentence slated to begin prior to a previously existent state sentence.
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The Gonzales court also reasoned that a literal reading of the statutory
language in § 924(c) produced another absurd result not contemplated by
Congress.24 Upon calculating the defendant's total sentence under the
Guidelines, the Gonzales court determined that a combined reading of § 924(c)
resulted in more than twice the custodial price intended by Congress for the
totality of the defendants' criminal conduct in this case. 2' The Gonzales
court concluded that the prohibition against concurrent sentences under §
924(c) refers only to federal sentences.249 Under this reading, an offender
begins serving the mandatory five-year sentence pursuant to § 924(c) immedi-
ately upon the federal court's final sentencing decision." ° Under this inter-
pretation, the trial court erred in ordering the § 924(c) five-year sentence to
run consecutively to the defendants' state court sentences.2 5'
C. Analysis
After McCary and Gonzales, the Tenth Circuit's position as to whether
application of Title 18 sentencing enhancements requires consecutive state sen-
tencing is unclear. The absence of any clear factual distinctions or policy
differences precludes a simple explanation for the Tenth Circuit's inconsistent
holdings. The plain language of the Title 18 sentencing enhancements, coupled
with the plain language of the Guideline sections that effectuate these enhance-
ments, suggest the accuracy of the McCary decision. Further, as previously
noted, the vast majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue agree
with the McCary approach.252
VII. DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION
2F1.1 (B)(3)(A)
25
A. United States v. Frazier254
1. Facts
Gregory Frazier was the former president of the National Indian Business
Counsel, doing business as the United Tribe Service Center (UTSC), a non-
profit corporation assisting the education of American Indians." The UTSC
received funding from the United States Department of Labor (DOL) pursuant
to the Job Training Partnership Act.256 Frazier was convicted of "intentional-
ly misapplying property valued at $5,000 or more and owned by or under the
247. Id.
248. Id. at 821.
249. Id.
250. Id. All other federal sentences for any additional substantive offenses begin immediately
after the expiration of the mandatory 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) five-year sentence. Id.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
253. U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) (providing an enhancement for offenses involving a misrep-
resentation that a defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable organization).
254. 53 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1995).
255. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1108.
256. Id.
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care, custody or control of the UTSC," under 18 U.S.C. § 666." The trial
court imposed a section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) enhancement on the basis that Frazier
committed the offense while acting on behalf of an educational affiliated agen-
cy.258 Frazier appealed the enhancement.259
2. Decision
The plain language of section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) penalizes the offender who
"misrepresent[s]" that he "acted on behalf of a governmental agency or a
charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a government
agency.''2' The Tenth Circuit used the Random House Dictionary to define
"misrepresent" as making a false representation that generally involves a "de-
liberate intention to deceive for either profit or advantage."26' The phrase "on
behalf of' means, in this context, a "representative of, or in the interest or aid
of." '262 An offender therefore receives an enhanced punishment if she either
(a) falsely claims to represent the organization, or (b) falsely claims to act "in
the interest or aid of' the organization.263
The Frazier court, however, rejected this literal interpretation as overly
expansive.M Instead, the Tenth Circuit examined Application note four, the
Commentary adjoining section 2F.I(b)(3)(A), and the hypothetical examples
they contained, to establish the parameters of conduct intended to fall within
the purview of the guideline. 265 The conduct falling within the scope of sec-
tion 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) is "exploitative conduct which induces victims to act upon
their charitable or trusting impulses.""6 The Tenth Circuit determined that
section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) applies only to offenders who misrepresent their au-
thority to act on behalf of a governmental agency or a charitable organization,
if the offender's conduct "induces" the victim to contribute funds. 67
The hypothetical examples accompanying section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) suggest
that the offender must also utilize "exploitive" conduct in furthering the of-
fense of conviction.2" Section 2FI.I(b)(3)(A) applies, for example, to of-
fenders who seek donations under the guise of fundraising for a parochial
school, soliciting contributions for a nonexistent charitable organization, or
collecting delinquent student loan funds while posing as a federal collection
agent.2 9
257. id.; 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
258. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1109.
259. Id.
260. U.S.S.G. § 2FI.I(b)(3)(A). "If the offense involved (A) a misrepresentation that the
defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a
government agency, or (B) violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or
process not addressed elsewhere in the Guidelines, increase by two levels." Id.
261. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1112.
262. Id.
263. Id.




268. Id.; U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l, comment. (n.4).
269. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1112; U.S.S.G. § 2FI.1, comment. (n.4).
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The defendant, as the former president of an educational organization,
misappropriated the organization's DOL grant funds.27 The defendant did
not engage in "exploitive" conduct by affirmatively soliciting contributions
from the public.27" ' The trial court therefore erred in imposing a section
2F1I.(b)(3)(A) sentencing enhancement.272
The Tenth Circuit stated that paragraph four of section 2F1I.1(b)(3)(A)
applies to offenders who engage in "false pretenses" and "exploit" the gener-
osity of their victims. 273 In adopting this narrow interpretation, the Tenth Cir-
cuit specifically rejected the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Marcum 274
VIII. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY: DECISIONS ADDRESSING WHETHER
THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF SECTION
3.EI .1(B)(1)-(2)
25
A. United States v. Ortiz
27 6
1. Facts
Julio Ortiz, when found with the possession of a stolen handgun with a
filed-off serial number, pleaded to "unlawful possession of a firearm with an
obliterated manufacturer's serial number" under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).277 Ortiz
asserted that this "acceptance of responsibility" entitled him to a large down-
ward adjustment of his sentence, but the trial court refused to award a sen-
tencing reduction under section 3El.l(b).2" Despite the defendant's admitted
knowledge of the obliterated serial number, the trial court determined that the
commencement of trial before the admission precluded application of section
3E1.1(b)(2).279
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined that the trial court, while correct in its read-
ing of section 3El.1(b)(2), erred in failing to determine the applicability of a
section 3El.I(b)(1) sentencing reduction. The Tenth Circuit noted that section
3E1.l(b) of the Guidelines permits an additional one-level reduction for of-
fenders who assist authorities in the investigation or prosecution of the instant
270. Frazier, 53 F.3d at 1114.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1112.
274. Id. at 1114; see United States v. Marcum, 16 F.3d 599 (4th Cir.) (holding that U.S.S.G.
§ 2FI.I (b)(3)(A) applies where a defendant misrepresents to the public that he was conducting the
bingo games wholly on behalf of the charitable organization, when, in fact, he was acting in part
for himself and his fellow deputies in skimming the charitable proceeds), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
137 (1994).
275. U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b)(l)-(2) (providing a downward adjustment for an offender's accep-
tance of responsibility).
276. 63 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 1995).
277. Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 953.
278. Id. at 955.
279. Id.
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offense." ° Pursuant to that section, an offender assists authorities by: "(1)
timely providing complete information to the government concerning his own
involvement in the offense; or (2) timely notifying authorities of his intention
to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing
for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently." '8
Application note three provides that the commencement of trial precludes
the application of section 3E1.1(b)(2).282 The Tenth Circuit determined that
the commencement of trial, which renders a guilty plea "untimely" under
section 3El.1(b)(2), does not affect the "timeliness" of complete information
under section 3E1.l(b)(1). 3  Subsection (1) and subsection (2) are
disjunctive; 24 as a result, the Tenth Circuit stated that "language referencing
the commencement of trial applies only to section 3El.1(b)(2)."' t  Therefore,
the commencement of trial precludes application of a sentence reduction under




The Tenth Circuit's holding is consistent with the First, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits' holdings in United States v. Tallandino,287  United States v.
Tello,28 and United States v. Stoops, 289 respectively. Generally, conduct
qualifying for a sentencing reduction under subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) occurs
during the investigation into the instant offense.2 ° Section 3E1.3(b) recogniz-
es "society's legitimate social interest" in defendants who accept responsibility
280. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
281. Id.
282. U.S.S.G. § 3El, comment. (n.3). Application Note 3 provides:
Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthfully
admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and truthfully admitting or
not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable under
§lBI.3 (Relevant Conduct) (see Application Note l(a)), will constitute significant evi-
dence of acceptance of responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a). However, this
evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such
acceptance of responsibility. A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an
adjustment under this section as a matter of right.
Id.
283. Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 956.
284. Id.; U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(1), (2) (allowing a reduction for "(1) timely providing complete
information to the government concerning his own involvement in the offense; or (2) timely no-
tifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to
avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently").
285. Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 956.
286. Id.
287. 38 F.3d 1255 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that § 3El.l(b)(1) and § 3El.l(b)(2) are disjunc-
tive).
288. 9 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that the commencement of trial only precludes an
application of § 3El.1(b)(2)).
289. 25 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the language referencing the commencement of
trial applies only to § 3E1.l(b)(2)).
290. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (nn.1-6).
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for their actions, the government's need to avoid making trial preparations,
and the court's reduction of the number of cases on court dockets.2 9,
A sentencing court can apply section 3E1.3(b) in conjunction with section
3E1.3(a).292 Subsection (a) provides a two-level reduction for offenders who
"clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. 293 Application note 1(b)
to subsection (a) provides several examples of conduct which indicate a clear
acceptance of responsibility, including: "a voluntary payment of restitution
prior to the adjudication of guilt"; "a voluntary surrender to authorities prom-
ptly after the commission of the offense"; or "a voluntary termination or with-
drawal from criminal conduct." '294
IX. DECISIONS ADDRESSING WHETHER SECTION 4A1.2(D)(2)(A)295 APPLIES
TO A JUVENILE PLACED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE STATE SECRETARY OF
SOCIAL SERVICES




In Birch, the defendant received a sentence for committing a violent crime
while possessing a firearm. 297 The trial court assessed two criminal history
levels for each of the defendant's two prior juvenile convictions pursuant to
section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).298 The defendant served his juvenile convictions in
the custody of the State Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services.2
The defendant appealed on the grounds that the trial court improperly imposed
a two-level enhancement under section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) rather than a one-level
enhancement pursuant to section 4A1.2(d)(2)(B).3"
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit decided that section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) requires the impo-
sition of a two-level criminal history adjustment for each juvenile or adult
"sentence of 'confinement' of at least sixty days.""'' Section 4AI.2(d)(2)(B)
provides a one-point criminal history adjustment for a "juvenile sentence im-
posed within five years to the defendant's commencement of the instant of-
fense."3"2 Subsection (B) does not require the existence of a period of
291. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.6).
292. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.l(b).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History).
296. 39 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 1994).
297. Birch, 39 F.3d at 1090.
298. Id. at 1095. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(a) applies a two-level enhancement for each adult or
juvenile sentence resulting in a "confinement" that exceeds 60 days. Johnson contested the court's
determination that placement into the custody of the state secretary of Social and Rehabilitation
Services constitutes a "confinement" within the purview of the guideline section. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 4AI.2(d)(2)(A).
302. U.S.S.G. § 4A.2(d)(2)(b).
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"confinement."3 3 The propriety of the trial court's application of subsection
(A) depends on whether an offender's commitment to the custody of a state
juvenile authority constituted a "confinement."3 °4 The commentary to section
4A1.2(d)(2)(A), however, fails to define the term "confinement.""3 5 The
Tenth Circuit held that confinement includes a commitment to the custody of a
state juvenile authority within the scope of section 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), and af-
firmed the trial court's sentencing determination.3°
B. Analysis
Guideline sections 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) and (B) provide enhancements for both
an offender's adult and juvenile convictions.307 Section 4A1.2(d) limits the
use of juvenile convictions. 38 A sentencing court may only consider an
offense committed prior to age eighteen that resulted in the imposition of an
adult sentence of imprisonment exceeding thirteen months.3' Additionally, a
sentencing court may not count juvenile or adult offenses occurring more than
five years prior to the commencement of the instant offense.30 These limita-
tions were designed in part to "avoid large sentencing disparities resulting
from the differential availability" of juvenile records among jurisdictions.3'
C. Other Circuits
The Tenth Circuit's holding is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's holdings
in United States v. Hanley1 2 and United States v. Kirby,"3 and with the
Eleventh Circuit's holding in United States v. Fuentes."4 In each of these
decisions, the offender's criminal history also included a juvenile conviction
for which a state agency obtained custody of the offender.3 5
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the complexity of applying the
Guidelines' determinative sentencing scheme. Perhaps the complexity explains
the pervasive nature of Guidelines issues on the Tenth Circuit's docket sheets.









312. 906 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir.) (concluding that the term "confinement" in § 4A1.2(d)(2)(a)
included placement into custody of the state's juvenile authority), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 945
(1990).
313. 893 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that commitment to the custody of the state's
juvenile authority constitutes a "confinement" under U.S.S.G. §4Al.2(d)(2)(a).
314. 991 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir. 1993) (finding that the defendant's commitment to a state juve-
nile authority in excess of 60 days was a "confinement").




The Tenth Circuit continues to struggle with the Guidelines as the Sentencing
Commission continually adopts new amendments and as factual scenarios not
contemplated by the Guidelines arise.
In the face of this uncertainty, the Tenth Circuit has generally adopted an
extremely restrictive interpretation of Guideline principles. Perhaps, the only
exceptions to this conclusion are the Tenth Circuit's holdings in Frazier
1 6
and Gonzalez,"7 where the Tenth Circuit abandoned its strict reliance on the
plain language of the Guidelines and opted for a more liberal reading of the
guideline provisions.
David A. Forkner
316. United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Frazier, see
supra text accompanying notes 255-74.
317. United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1995). For a further discussion of
Gonzales, see supra text accompanying notes 234-52.
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SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category
Offense I II III IV V VI
Level
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3a 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8b 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
lOc 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
I 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
13 12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 92-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
43 life life life life life life
a. Probation available (see U.S.S.G. § 5Bl.1(aX).
b. Probation with conditions of confinement available (see U.S.S.G. § SB.l(a)(2)).
c. New "split sentence" available (see U.S.S.G. §§ 5C .(c)(3), (d)(2)).
